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Death Traps; The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War Two

It was much more than material that defeated the Germans on the Eastern Front.  As demonstrated at Stalingrad (Op URANUS), Kursk and especially in 1944 (Op BAGRATION), the Soviets became masters at Operational Level of Warfare.  Although the upgunned T-34's with their 85 (?) mm cannons made the headlines, in the end, it was through focussed attacks with goals set at the HIGHEST of levels that won them the war.
As for the firefly, etc, let us not forget that the workhorse tank of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS was the Mark IV.  By the end of the war, it had graduated from an infantry support tank with a short barreled 75mm gun to a formidable foe!
 
Hauptmann Scharlachrot said:
It was much more than material that defeated the Germans on the Eastern Front.  As demonstrated at Stalingrad (Op URANUS), Kursk and especially in 1944 (Op BAGRATION), the Soviets became masters at Operational Level of Warfare.  Although the upgunned T-34's with their 85 (?) mm cannons made the headlines, in the end, it was through focused attacks with goals set at the HIGHEST of levels that won them the war.
As for the firefly, etc, let us not forget that the workhorse tank of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS was the Mark IV.  By the end of the war, it had graduated from an infantry support tank with a short barreled 75mm gun to a formidable foe!

Interesting points herr Haptmann but are we not digressing from original idea of "how,who and why" armoured regiments fought and died and who has written credible literary efforts in this area. I would be more than willing to discuss the eastern front overall or facets in another thread. It seems you have some good source information in that regard.
 
Ah, seen.  Just went up a few posts and replied to them.  Sorry for the mini-split.  :D
 
Centurian1985 said:
Whether its good or bad would depend on how long it took to accomplish that and the scale of losses... I guess over a couple of years of heavy fighting, 580% might not be bad for a small unit, but pretty costly for larger units.  How many tanks were in a US armored div at that time? 
-That depends on the division. Both 2nd Armored(Hell on Wheels) & 3rd Armored(Spearhead) stayed under a "Heavy" TO/E(1 March, 1942) of 2 Armored Rgts. of 3 Bn's each, totaling 232 Medium(M4, M4A1, M4A3), 158 Light tanks(M3, M5, M5A1), vs. the Light Div. strength of 186 Mediums/77 Lights.  in 1943 the remaining armored divisions reorganized under 1 Tank regiment each.
 
The annual paper presentation here at U of C is on March 2/3. One of the Presenters is going to cover:Too Few to Fight: The German Army
Force Maintenance 1943 -Gregory Liedtke. Will post  his thoughts if worthwhile.

Full listing of papers at: http://homepages.ucalgary.ca/~cmgainer/SMSS/Historic/Conference_Website_Schedule.pdf
 
Another little gem relevant to this topic has surffaced.

Hot off the printing press or as near as we can get it is T-34 in Action edited by Artem Drabkin and Oleg Sheremet, published in September 2006 by Pen and Sword Military, South Yorkshire, UK. It is the resulting interviews of a number of Soviet tank crewman, battle officers and enlisted. From their opinions stated it is interesting to note the the preferred lend lease tank was the Canadian built Valentine. The consensus seems to revolve around it's ability to survive due to "it being low to the ground, with a powerful gun and a quite engine."(pg.16). An example of this is provided later in in the book of two Valentines destroying three Tiger tanks. The Tigers had just finished a forward detachment of T-34s in the area of Skalat in March of 1944. The Valentines using the ground for cover took out the Tigers from the flank after moving across the ground the other Soviet tanks were destroyed attempting.(pg.159-160)

The crewman also bring to mention the actual armour compostion in the British/Canadian(Matilda/Valentine) was a "medium hardness" and had a high nickel content. This 'softness' they credit to having reduced the numbers of KIA/WIA due to the metal splinters flying around the inside of the tank after being hit. Quoting one interview, " If a shell had gone through the turret of a British tank the commander and gunner could have stayed alive, because there were virtually no splinters, Bryukhov observed, while in a T-34 the armour would spall a lot and the crew had fewer chances of survival"(pg.24)

As for the individual positions in the tank it was felt that the drivers position was far by safer than any other. Many credit their successful survival of the war to this. In the realm of learning something new, many Soviet tank commanders were in fact the drivers not as found in Anglo/Allied armies. The Soviet model both officially as in doctrinal training and then unofficially as part of a crew ensured a high standard of cross training. Thus devastated units were reequipped and dispatched back into battle faster than opposing German forces. Other interesting facets in the book include tank crews being sent back to factories to assist in the building of their own tanks beginning with an armoured box on the floor to rolling out 24 hrs later ready for a fifty km test and then on to the transporter train to the front.

Not all but a decent breakdown of survivability due to hits on the various portions of the T-34 is included. They indicate of total hits per area "81% of hits were on the hull and 19% on the turret, however more than half the hull hits were harmless. In breaking down the hull hits, 89% were on the upper front, 66% of the lower front and 40% on the side that failled to penetrate."(pg.27) Combing a single heavy turret hatch and weak cast armour caused high rates of the turret crew not surviving. Other faults in the T-34 attributed to the interviewed surviving crew were the "noise of the engines(early models did not come with mufflers), the noise of the steel road wheels, the uselessness of the radio operator and position, limited visibility when 'hatches closed', poor ventilation of the turret(loaders passing out due to fumes). In closing it seems that these veterans equate the Sherman with the SU-76 as "real cigarette lighters" and that the main advantage of the T-34 was it's diesel engine and the confidence it gave the crews in being able to survive. The primary fear was of being burnt alive.
 
I was recently looking at pictures of knocked out T-34, showing massive failures of the armour which had cracked and large chunks missing from the side of the turret after being hit from a round that had passed through the turret other side.
 
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