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Deep thoughts about "Transformation"

a_majoor

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http://www.buzzmachine.com/archives/2005_01_06.html#008818


Gememeshaft
: Susan Crawford is at some egghead event about complexity and she's blogging it. That's guts.

In today's report, there's a fascinating bit from Mary Ann Allison of the Allison group saying that societies were once described by gemeinschaft (think community) and the, after the industrial revolution, as gesellschaft (think society). We're at a next stage:

Allison doesn't see these as oppositional systems, but rather as stages in evolution -- and she thinks we're at a big punctuation point prompted by the information revolution. The new society is gecyberschaft.

So if your unit of community in gemeinschaft was the village, it became "friends and family" in gesellschaft, and it's now your "primary attention group." You pay attention to that group (or groups, I'd hope she'd say) and to "groups of purpose" -- groups neither bound to a place nor to a particular bureaucracy.

In gemeinschaft, your status was ascribed (based on birth); in gesellschaft, it was achieved; and now, in gecyberschaft, it's assessed.

Is this on the final?

But seriously... It is a compelling concept: Has society fundamentally changed again? Are the old strings that tied us together replaced with (and tangled in) new strings that not only cut across geography, boundaries, and societies but also are created and valued in entirely new means and measurements? We are assessed not by our bloodline and not by our location or income or education but instead by our connections. Hmmmm.

: LATER: Matt Bruce calls gecybershaft "extreme language torture." Yes, I thought gememeshaft was a bit more elegant.

Transformation will be very difficult so long as we are wedded to the current army "culture". Using new tools or discovering new uses for old tools requires a breaking of old patterns of thought, and creating new organizations to employ new tools and techniques. Early experiments of transformation like "Force XXI" superimposed high efficiency digital communications on existing command structures, and the command staffs ended up being drowned in torrents of data. The Technology Review article "How Technology Failed in Iraq" suggests the same thing; the organizational structure is not equipped to handle data collection, processing and transfer in a timely and efficient manner.

Information technology and social changes among the eligible recruit cohorts suggest a different Army and armed forces: Troops who have belonged to self selected "groups of purpose" bound by shared interests and beliefs and connected through the internet by Bulletin boards, "chat rooms and Instant Messaging, and sharing large information files through peer to peer networking programs like KAZZA, Bit torrent or  Morpheus. How will people acculturated to such an environment behave in a hierarchical organization? Will we be able to use their talents to the fullest extent?



 
". . . drowned in torrents of data."  Excellent image of the situation.

The problem may not be in the structural design of military formations as in the handling of the data itself.  In my careers (air traffic control, auto & truck mechanic, municipal technology & equipment buyer) I've been part of the so-called information revolution in several different ways.

Inevitably, programming wonks manage to capture and process vast amounts of data for transmission to workers or decision makers, but those writing the programs and developing the equipment have little or no experience in the practical applications using the data.

No matter what type of data is being captured and used, the systems have to be able to direct information streams to the correct users and data has to be given priorities depending on volume and current need.  The eventual ability of air traffic control systems, automated engine controls and corporate information systems to process and properly distribute data depends on feedback and development. 

We are in the first few generations of truly usable military information and action systems.  The onboard computers used for gun platforms like the M1 tank only reached practical usability just prior to the First Gulf War.  UAVs really able to generate large quantities of information have only been with us a few years.  It's too much to expect that any military organization has been able to consolidate and optimize the vast amounts of data now available.  Not even the US Army has that much money.

All technical progress is incremental, although the stress of current events will certainly hurry the effort to make efficient use of information.  Coupled with this is the need to re-emphasize traditional activities, such as the development of human intelligence networks at the mud hut level.

The US Army and other services are being asked, nay, told to succeed in Iraq while remodeling itself for a new type of conflict.  The up side is that money is available where it wouldn't be otherwise.  The down side is that soldiers and Marines will die because of current system failures.

But that's nothing new and it will be the situation when armored formations deploy on the plains of Tau Ceti Three.  Soldiers pay in blood where others are asked for no more than cash.

Jim
 
In a related vein, I noted some time ago, when their favourite game was the Legend of Zelda that in addition to being able to move their fingers faster than I, and also keep track of some pretty weird and complicated keystroke patterns that they also seemed to process data differently.  It was almost as if their mental imaging was different.

I have grown up with maps and books.  Two dimensional objects where data is presented consecutively.  One point after the other and the next building on the last.

My kids seem to have developed a different mental map, almost as if they can function in n-space.  Legend of Zelda is like playing 3-D chess on a blacked out board where you can only see the next space once you get there.  The space that you jump to isn't necessarily contiguous to space you occupied and following the same route doesn't guarantee ending up in the same space.  Amazingly confusing to me with my book-image brain and slow fingers but no problem at all to my (at that time) 7 and 10 year olds.

They process data differently, seem to be less dependent on progressive logic and more at ease with fuzzy logic - one might say they appear more intuitive than logical in their thought processes.  And they are not tied to physicality.  Playing internet games (SOF etc) means that they are learning to co-operate on pseudo battlefields with people they have never met and never will, and are quite comfortable with that.

That comes back to a_majoor's question about the impact of social changes on the recruits and what does that impose on the military organization.  How many of the traditional skills need to be retained, and many will,  and how many new skills can we take advantage of?  Will we need to spend more time selecting and training bodies from a diminishing pool of traditionally skilled warrior-capable types?  Can we replace them all with techno-geeks?

As I have stipulated elsewhere, I don't see a diminished need for infanteers with traditional skills.  I do think that support will improve using either diminishing number of bodies or else as Old Guy stated their work will expand to occupy the bodies available.  The good news is that the traditionally capable recruits, although diminishing in numbers available are more at ease in working in a techno-geek saturated environment.  The hard part will be finding the recruits capable of performing traditional tasks.
 
At some levels, the traditional tasks never change. The heroic warriors of Homer killed their enemies in the same way the "300" killed their Persian enemies some 800 years later. Like Kirkhill noted, it is the "mental space" which changed. A Mycenaean heroic warrior would not be able to understand how the Classical Phalanx was able to go into battle, given the vastly different cultural assumptions about how society was organized, why men should fight, how the fighters were to be armed organized and supported....

What I am trying to get at (an even grasp myself) is that since the new soldiers are seemingly from a different culture than the traditional Army, then they will have different ways of doing things. Current ideas like sequential Operational Planning Procedure (OPP), five paragraph orders format, radio "nets", segregated messes and hosts of other ideas and assumptions (some so deeply embedded we may never even notice them) might be unfathomable to them, given their ability to navigate in "fuzzy logic", non contiguous space and virtual reality.

Once that fact is fully grasped, and probably only when soldiers of that generation are firmly in leadership positions, will we see substantial changes in organizations. Will there still be riflemen? Yes. Will the riflemen be organized in sections, platoons, companies etc? Who knows?

Transformation is probably easiest to practice at the support level, requiring fewer stages or steps to do the various processes required to support soldiers in the field. Headquarters and support bases could (in theory) be stripped out, and the manpower and funds released to the field army. Service battalions would be next in line, although the limiting factor is the physical size and bulk of the supplies (you still need to move and process "stuff" rather than information. You would just have better information tools to move "stuff" more efficiently, like Wal Mart). The final stage of transformation would be to restructure command and control systems and military organizations to become much faster and more flexible. This does not mean getting rid of tanks, rather how tanks are used in battle becomes different.



 
So when these kids used to 'fuzzy logic' become soldiers will they and their machines be virtually unstoppable by armies dominated by less adaptable thinkers?

No puns or jokes intended.  I'm wondering about the widening disparity between the best armies and everyone else.

Jim
 
Conversely, can we make soldiers out of them at all?

Chris.
 
Old Guy said:
So when these kids used to 'fuzzy logic' become soldiers will they and their machines be virtually unstoppable by armies dominated by less adaptable thinkers?

No puns or jokes intended.  I'm wondering about the widening disparity between the best armies and everyone else.

Jim

    You're already seing that in places like Iraq.  Currently western soldiers are leaps and bounds ahead of the competition as far as flexibility, adaptability, and creative thinking are concerned.  The trend for the last hundred years at least has been forming smaller and smaller units, each able to act independantly while at the same time being aware of the locations and actions of other units, and able to coordinate and integrate their efforts as required.  At the start of WW1, carrying out any actions at a smaller than company-sized level was very unusual.  If the trend continues and the technology improves enough, in a few decades you'll be seing tactics relying on hundreds of 2-man teams all operating independantly but in concert with eachother.  A force with the ability to coordinate such an attack would be just as far ahead of today's military tacitcs and capabilities as the US military was compared to the Iraqis.
 
Interesting thread, if a bit too much like my old school days!

I think that we will need a heirarchical system as long as war requires people having to risk their lives.  We tend to forget this in peacetime, but the purpose of tactical leadership is not simply to formulate plans but to get people to do extradorinary things (I'm thinking about all levels of tactical leadership).  A chat room society of young soldiers may be able to do quite well on a simulation, but when you can't just reboot after you've been hit it may turn out a bit different!

That being said I'm all for having small units that are tactically self-sufficient and imbibed with an independent spirit.  The German Army achieved something like this during their last offensive in WWI. These small groups of soldiers were not the product of the internet but rather of high quality soldiers lead by very high quality junior leaders who were operating under senior officers who trusted them.

The whole intent of our SAS and ATHENE seems to be the remove the requirement of trusting subordinates to do their jobs in conditions of uncertainty.  Perhaps instead of madly charging down the blind alley of information technology we should instead focus on creating these conditions of trust and initiative.  This will allow us to succeed in the fog of war, instead of seeking some philosopher's stone that will take away the fog (hmm, may have mixed some metaphors there). 

Our own army seems to be subscribing to a model that is based on perfect situational awareness and never "advancing to contact."  Our love of the deliberate battle and fixation on the reduction of risk and uncertainty is somewhat similar to the French Army's philosophy on the eve of WW II. 

Sorry for the rant..I'll get back in my hatch.  ;)

Iain

 
<Crunchie furiously beating on hatch with rifle butt because field telephone has been ripped from hands by accelerating black hat....again>

Stay out a minute.

I will try and stick to geometric metaphors:

If the ideal network is a 2 dimensional planar structure covering a large area but with no hierarchy and
if the ideal hierarchical pyramid is an obelisk with many levels each dependent on each other, a lot of depth, a lot of control but influencing a very tight area
(I suppose ultimately you are talking a linear structure with much duplication and only able to exert influenc on a point) and
if we assume these two configurations as the logical absurdities at the extreme ends of the organizational spectrum and
if we assume that neither logical absurdity is likely to happen

then the likely organization will be somewhere in between
It will be a pyramidical organization of some sort or other, a hierarchy will always exist, but the base may be more diffuse, non-contiguous and have fewer layers between shooters and decision-maker.

Thus instead of having a solid Egyptian style pyramid, a structure easy to identify and easy to destroy by either removing a key-stone or else by brute force, we have a more amorphous structure that exerts influence over a wider area and is harder to attack.

I once had a boss (actually his previous predicament was as a Hauptmann in the Erste Fallschirmjager - Crete, Cassino, Russia, Skorzeny and the Ardennes where captured).  He insisted that all his staff be cross-trained on everyone else's duties.  Wonder where he came up with that concept Infanteer?

I felt that while this was a great goal it wasn't practicable.  That the end result of all this flexibility would be the end of hierarchy and thus the end of control.  I argued that all good organizations needed a structure to progress, to limit, contain and discipline actions, to force direction.  That any organization needed a hierarchy in the same way that a body needs a skeleton.  Without a skeleton we were doomed to be amoeba, drifting aimlessly.

Now I am inclined to think differently.

Especially after watching my kids and their friends think fuzzily, after participating in this forum and watching the development of the internet and e-banking and e-education, after achieving success for my employer when he flattened his pyramid leaving us peons with more freedom of movement, after watching the long term survival of the IRA, after watching the success of Al Qaeda and the difficulty experienced in closing down a self-regenerating, survivable amorphous mass which knows only one thing - the definition of success.


Hierarchies will always exist.  The size and shape, and solidity, of the pyramid will vary.  What will also vary is the demand on leadership styles - coercive or collaborative.


 
a_majoor>
"Information technology and social changes among the eligible recruit cohorts suggest a different Army and armed forces: Troops who have belonged to self selected "groups of purpose" bound by shared interests and beliefs and connected through the internet by Bulletin boards, "chat rooms and Instant Messaging, and sharing large information files through peer to peer networking programs like KAZZA, Bit torrent or   Morpheus. How will people acculturated to such an environment behave in a hierarchical organization? Will we be able to use their talents to the fullest extent?"

I've sat for the last 20 minutes thinking about this concept but I have to agree with Old Guy.   The word Transformation
suggests that something which has always been is changin into something else.   My perception is more the
evolution of technology but people remain the same.

As an example, the discovery of the wheel was to help solve an ancient problem of engineering.   Millenias later,
the invention of the car and the dang carburator.   How many times from 1910 to 1980 has one gone outside
and wondered what the chances are of starting a car in cold weather?   Flash forward today with computer
controlled cars with fuel injection, significantly fewer people wonder whether their car will start at -40 C.
If the car or transportation medium breaks down, no matter of what millenia people will do the same thing
in response.   Consider the military units of 6,000 years ago, the times of Greece and Rome, Chinese,
Eurpopean, Ottoman armies up until today and technology has evolved.   Yet, the basic make-up of the
individual and society in general is not significantly different.   We form communities, communicate, engineer,
procreate, and move on.

It appears less a transformation of society or the military, but a more simpler evolutionary adaption to the tool set.


 
Kirkhill,

But if I open the hatch the snow will get in.  Oh well, I do have hot coffee.  Or at least I did when I had a tank. :'(

Getting back on track I agree with you, but would suggest that the amount of latitude and independence given within a "structure" should be proportional to the level of training, experience and capability for initiative of the sub-units.  In addition, there still needs to be a coherent plan (or perhaps just a "vision" that comes from somebody that everybody understands and is working for.  I am somewhat hesitant to use business models for military purposes as "middle managment" has a slightly different purpose in the miltary (as I am sure that you know).  Each level of leadership is there not only to plan to but to lead.  Even highly motivated and trained troops need leadership and motivation to risk their lives (once casualties start).

Up until the last century there was actually quite little scope for tactical decision making by lower levels of command.  They were still needed, however, to keep discipline and lead the troops in battle.  Methods may have changes but I still believe in that requirement.  In addition, a somewhat redundant "pyramid" is quite hard to knock over by simply taking out one HQ. 

Does anybody think that we can run a Battlegroup with one HQ and nine Platoons or eighteen Sections?  It might work on Janus but I'd hate to try it in battle (I know that that is not what you are suggesting).

Getting back to Art's question of how we get the newer generation to come on board, I do realize that this crop has means of access to information that did not really exist ten years ago.  These boards, the DIN and other systems allow soldiers to go outside their chain of command for info.  This is not a bad thing, but it is something that leaders should be aware of. 

My own thought is to train them, give them the required tools, give them a mission and a task and then get out of the way.  Accept that not everything will be done the way that you would have done it.  Correct the aggregious errors if they come up but focus on giving "task and purpose" for activities and not "how."

As an aside, our newer soldier's "spatial relationship abilities" should be better due to their extensive videogaming experience.

p.s. My boys (ages five and six) are starting to play my old Nintendo.  They haven't beaten me yet but the day will come very soon!


Bert,

I was also wondering about the Revolution in Miltary Affairs aspect to this thread.  In my belief the last two majors ones were the introduction of the machinegun and aircraft.  The machinegun had the largest impact on land operations.  Alexander the Great's army would have probably done quite well at Waterloo but they would have lasted 2 minutes at the Somme.  I would argue that RMAs do have an impact on soldiers as they make qualities and techniques that used to successful either become irrelevant or even harmful.

Steadiness in ranks, deep columns, unflinching bravery and finishing the charge were recipes for success from Marathon to Waterloo and could get you through the American Civil War.  By 1914 they were recipes for a massacre.

I'm not sure that we are in an RMA in the order of magnitude of the machinegun.  Patton or Manstein would have done quite well in Iraq in 2003.

I believe you are correct in that man adapts to his new technologies.  I would say, however, that the level of adaption is evolutionary for most technology changes but is quite dramatic for revolutions.  The casualty figures for WW I indicate the price of not adapting to revolutionary change in revolutionary ways.

Being a bit of a skeptic, I would say that we are still waiting for the next real RMA (since the machinegun and aircraft).  I do not know what the next RMA will be, but it may have something to do with either personalized stealth technology or somekind of light bodyarmour that can withstand machineguns.  Until then I believe that we will just adapt with each new piece of kit (as you suggest) but retain the organizations and tactics that arose out of WW I and came to fruition during WW II.

Cheers,

Iain
 
Getting back on track I agree with you, but would suggest that the amount of latitude and independence given within a "structure" should be proportional to the level of training, experience and capability for initiative of the sub-units.  In addition, there still needs to be a coherent plan (or perhaps just a "vision" that comes from somebody that everybody understands and is working for.  I am somewhat hesitant to use business models for military purposes as "middle managment" has a slightly different purpose in the miltary (as I am sure that you know).  Each level of leadership is there not only to plan to but to lead.  Even highly motivated and trained troops need leadership and motivation to risk their lives (once casualties start).

I agree with you but think we can expand on this thought of yours.

that the amount of latitude and independence given within a "structure" should be proportional to the level of training, experience and capability for initiative of the sub-units.

A force of 19 year old conscripts with 6 months of training requires a different model of "leadership" than does a force of 30 year old volunteers with 10 years or training and experience.  Even a 19 year old volunteer needs different handling.

Because everybody has to start someplace, and because the military can't afford too many idle hands, then that keen young 19 year old needs to be gainfully employed as soon as possible. That means teaching him simple skills and keeping him under tight control with lots of support from more experienced bodies to set the example.  The 19 year old goes into a period of OJT where he is contributing while learning.  The model that served at Waterloo serves the 19 year old fairly well in some respects - if we can find the recruits willing to accept functioning in that environment.  Let's stipulate that we can.

As the 19 year old ages and matures and gains experience he changes.  The organization is constantly reappraising him and he is constantly reappraising the organization.

Traditionally the organization keeps its eyes open for leaders and extracts them from the ranks and promotes them.  But as everybody here knows that is a game where not everybody wins.  There aren't enough leadership slots to employ everybody and in any event not everybody is cut out for leadership or desires to lead. But many of those non-leaders are excellent soldiers, self-disciplined, motivated and highly skilled and capable of independent action.  More to the point, by the time any adult has reached the age of 30 they are starting to chafe at being subject to whims of youngsters with less time in than they have.

So that we can make best use of the dollars invested in these soldiers it makes sense to me that we should try to organize them in such a fashion that they can stay in the Army and contribute, using their skills and at the same time supplying different capabilities to HMG than the 19 year old operating under tight supervision.

That is why I am a fan of, for want of a better phrase, stepped elitism.  As an infantry example, rifle company, rifle to support, support to recce, recce to para, para to JTF2.  "Elites" give something for the youngsters to aspire to, serve as role models, supply homes for experienced soldiers that are happier or more capable as operators than leaders,  and also bring capabilities that the youngsters don't.  In particular they are capable of independent action.  They can also be a place where leaders can mature prior to returning to bolster the 19 year olds.

So an effective army, in my view, benefits from having different units, with different experience and capability levels and that require different leadership models.  More coercive with the 19 year old and collaborative with the 30 year old.

Now if we assume that there will continue to be occasions where we wish to mass forces against a well defined target then the 19 year old will serve well.  On the other hand if the enemy is diffuse and distributed in small pockets then the 30 year old will likely be a better choice.

My belief is that while the entry level 19 year old task is not likely to be much affected by the change in technology (we may value his speed on the joystick at some point) it is the 30 year old that will benefit most from the technology.  With his self-discipline and experience and capability and desire for independent action then he can and should be entrusted with greater opportunities to influence the battle.  Nowadays that capability is exemplified by two men with a LRF and radio calling down precision guided munitions from 50,000 feet.

In the type of volunteer army that the CF seems to have become (at least when seen from this seat outside the organization), where a small number of people, with wives, families and mortgages and a considerable number of medals for Rotos served, it seems to me that there is likely to be a considerable proportion of the force that is capable of independent action.

From this I think that any future army structure could take advantage of this by increasing the proportion of bodies capable of operating in small units independently and reducing the proportion of Waterloo era structured units.  Not eliminating, not even making them the minority, just reducing.

As stated elsewhere, in the Global War on Terror, I believe that a good portion of the fighting is going to be done against small pockets of enemy forces, widely distributed, loosely connected and often ignorant of their command structure.  They only way to tackle this type of structure is node by node and keep trying to take the nodes apart faster than the enemy can build new ones.  That means large numbers of units with small numbers of members but capable of visiting lethal force rapidly on the enemy.  That, in my book, argues for a larger force of 30 year olds.

The 19 year olds will get their feet wet on operations in one of two ways, either in stability ops or else in high intensity ops.  While they need to be trained and equipped for the high intensity end the odds lie in favour of them first being employed on stability ops.  As stability ops require significant numbers of bodies on the ground just to supply a presence - "they also serve who only stand and wait" - this means that we are still going to have a need for  a large pool of Waterloo era structured forces.  That pool will serve HMG well as well as supplying a recruiting pool and training ground for independent minded 30 year olds with mortgages.

The 19 year olds still have to be led and directed.

As to my comments about my kids thinking fuzzily, maybe its not just my kids, I am still trying to determine in my own mind what the difference in mental acuity is between myself and my ancestors of the last 1.5 million years that have ridden out a number of Ice Ages with fire, sticks, stones and furs. I don't think the mental capacity has changed that much but the skill sets that that capacity has been focused on has definitely changed over the years.
 
Great thinking here. I'm biased, but most of it points to the overwhelming importance of Infantry and its derivatives such as "Rangers" or "SF" type units in the type of modern warfare that is actually being fought now and will probably constitute the most common type of warfare in the near future. The Infantry community is by far the most easily adaptable to such conditions. All of which leads me to believe that maybe we shouldn't worry so much that our heavier capabilities such as Arty and Armour may be degrading. I just finished reading an interesting critique of the US Army's current paradigm of structure and operations, which in the opinion of the authors is heavily focused on getting "decisive" results by "kinetic" means. They suggest that while devastating Fallujah block by block with M1s and other heavy weapons systems appears to be "decisive", in fact it may be the wrong way to attack this kind of enemy. They even suggest that this type of op, with its inevitable collateral damage and arbitrary impacts on the population, can weaken the US cause. They seem to be urging that the US focus much less on "heavy" ops (while retaining the capacity if it becomes necessary), and more on flexible, "thinking" small units. Interesting. Cheers.
 
A few random thoughts from reading through the thread....

2Bravo said:
I was also wondering about the Revolution in Military Affairs aspect to this thread.   In my belief the last two majors ones were the introduction of the machinegun and aircraft.   The machinegun had the largest impact on land operations.   Alexander the Great's army would have probably done quite well at Waterloo but they would have lasted 2 minutes at the Somme.   I would argue that RMAs do have an impact on soldiers as they make qualities and techniques that used to successful either become irrelevant or even harmful.

Steadiness in ranks, deep columns, unflinching bravery and finishing the charge were recipes for success from Marathon to Waterloo and could get you through the American Civil War.   By 1914 they were recipes for a massacre.

I'm not sure that we are in an RMA in the order of magnitude of the machinegun.   Patton or Manstein would have done quite well in Iraq in 2003.

Although I tend not to get excited and short of breath when "RMA" is mentioned, you've brought up some compelling points.   It seems to me that the RMA's that you brought up, along with other RMA's that come to mind, seem to be intimately linked to the principle of diffusion.   Now, I will contend that that their are two forms of diffusion that interact with the way people fight.

1. Spatial diffusion - This is quite literally the physical space that human beings fight in.   Since the way technology is wedged onto the battlefield has differing effects on the physical, mental, and moral levels of conflict, soldiers must adapt to the effects of these technologies in a manner which enables one to survive and win (essentially, Darwinism on the Battlefield).

2.   Directive Diffusion - This is the diffusion involved in Command and Control relationships.   Warfare is an inherently organized form of human (or primate!) activity - thus any act of warfare involves conditions that are intrinsic parts of human behaviour - hierarchy, competing and cooperative interests, leader/follower, etc, etc.

These two forms of diffusion are usually symbiotic and when you have dramatic alteration in one or the other, you usually have a rapid shift in the way we organize and fight.   For example, 2Bravo has pointed to the Machinegun and the Airplane as RMA's - essentially transformation in the way we fight.   How are these transformations?   They are both clear examples of an alteration to the spatial diffusion of the battlefield.  

The machinegun rendered close order tactics (which were essential for effective musketry) obsolete.   The introduction of the rifle to the common soldier put the writing on the wall during the American Civil War; when this was essentially mechanized (The Grip of Hiram Maxim), the paradigmatic shift was complete and Transformation in spatial diffusion took place in the trenches of WWI.

Same with the Aircraft - it initiated a paradigm shift by turning the battlefield from a two-dimensional area to a three-dimensional one.   The battlefield move over us as well as around us.

However, other RMA's may not affect transformation in the area of spatial diffusion, but rather in that of directive diffusion.   Take for example Napoleon and the leve en masse of the French Revolution - which many regard as one of the first "RMAs" (contendable, I guess).   Was the transformational effect spatial in nature?   Not really, when you consider the same tactical approaches were used.   Clearly, the leve en masse presented society with such a new way to approach fighting that transformation took place - the result, directive diffusion.   You simply had so many soldiers that you could diffuse their combat power over a large area and bring it back together in a manner which gave you an advantage.   The military genius of Napoleon was able to grasp and execute it through sheer personal willpower - the other genius, Scharnhorst, was able to observe it (as his Prussian Army was being severely whipped by it) and institutionalize it in the form of the General Staff system.   Is it no coincidence that Napoleon's two tactical defeats at Leipzig and Waterloo were at the hands of coalition Armies that were extensively served by members of Scharnhorst's gang of military reformers?

Ok, before I start babbling about dead Germans, this is going somewhere (hold you breath)....

I think that the transformation that we may be seeing today is one not so much influenced by spatial diffusion but rather by directive diffusion.   Like the leve en masse, you are seeing a shift in the way that society organizes itself to fight.   Gone are the days of the citizen soldier, the conscript, and draft.   The level of professionalization by Information Age military forces demands a smarter and more capable individual (Want proof, look at the USMC - they only accept high-school graduates now).   Your average recruit will be literate, will easily adapt to any information age technology, will be quite healthy and capable of quickly adapting and learning new things.   Look at the leaders that the new transformation will produce - look to soldiers in the Special Operations world or coming out of Staff Schools - they are fluent in more then one language, they are inculcated with iniative and a wide array of skill sets, they have access to a tremendous resource and knowledge base.

All these will act as "force multipliers" in a sense.   Technology that leads to spatial diffusion contributes to "force multipliers" by sheer destructive power (Mostly at the Physical and Mental levels of conflict).   Bigger, faster, and more boom means that the average unit is X times more destructive (again, physically and mentally) then its predecessor.   The effects of a directive diffusion are "force multipliers" in a different sense; they will act on the Mental level of war and move into the Moral level.   Quite simply, the abilities of a soldier affected by this transformation will be X times greater then G.I Joe sitting in a trench at Bastogne.   Look at a Special Forces team and what it is capable of accomplishing as compared to a similar group of soldiers 50 years ago; this is the individual or group of soldiers that may not see pounding Fallujah to dust with M-1's as the best way to approach the battle.   There is your directive diffusion - it is, I guess, the heart of the transformation that we're surfing through right now.   The shape of the pyramid discussed will begin to shift as we begin to realize the potential of soldier at the low-to-middle portion of the structure.

Anyways, enough on that for a while....

2Bravo said:
Being a bit of a skeptic, I would say that we are still waiting for the next real RMA (since the machinegun and aircraft). I do not know what the next RMA will be, but it may have something to do with either personalized stealth technology or somekind of light bodyarmour that can withstand machineguns. Until then I believe that we will just adapt with each new piece of kit (as you suggest) but retain the organizations and tactics that arose out of WW I and came to fruition during WW II.

Power armour of course.   I can only see an increasing confluence of protection, firepower, mobility, and information technology merging to the point where the individual soldier will wield the capabilities of a modern-day combat team.   We're seeing it right now - look at some of the FCS stuff; multi-capable vehicles with fewer operators.  

Perhaps Heinlein's ideas weren't that far-out after all.... :)

Kirkhill said:
That is why I am a fan of, for want of a better phrase, stepped elitism. As an infantry example, rifle company, rifle to support, support to recce, recce to para, para to JTF2. "Elites" give something for the youngsters to aspire to, serve as role models, supply homes for experienced soldiers that are happier or more capable as operators than leaders, and also bring capabilities that the youngsters don't. In particular they are capable of independent action. They can also be a place where leaders can mature prior to returning to bolster the 19 year olds.

LOL, you better grab that William Slim book off you shelf, Mr Kirkhill - he'd be rolling in his grave if he heard that.... ;)

(As an aside - stepped elitism makes me ponder on the enduring aspects of the way people fight.   For some reason I am thinking about the Warrior Societies of the Aztecs, with its Eagle and Jaguar clans, etc, etc, that are for those who have proven themselves as the most capable warriors in their society (in the Aztec case, prisoners for sacrifice).)
 
Part of this idea is driven by Victor Davis Hanson's thesis that there is a "Western way of war" that integrates the various aspects of our culture. Historical examples have to be carefully examined, since some factors can completely overwhelm the argument (Spanish soldiers so overmatched their Aztec opponents on a man for man basis that they could actually dispense with some of their steel armour).

Some of the factors like market capitalism are not "military" in the usual sense, but undirected free market capitalism provides the forum to test new products and ideas, and promotes the rapid evolution of better and better designs. The Ottoman Turks had more galleys and cannon at the battle of Lepanto than the combined Christian fleets, but ship for ship and gun for gun, the Christian fleet was much better. In fact, the Sultan did not even develop his own fleet, his ships and guns were inferior copies of the ships the Doge of Venice had in his arsenal. Other factors like initiative, citizen soldiers, civic audit and so on either do not exist or are severly constrained in other cultural settings.

We are at a cusp where we can see and manipulate the tools that will drive the next steps in military evolution, but are still constrained by the mindsets of the past. At Lepanto, the Christian commanders could see guns were the next "big thing" in Naval warfare, so sawed the rams off their galleys and developed even bigger "galleasses" to carry as many cannon as possible. Meanwhile, the future of sea warfare was really being developed in England and the Netherlands with sail powered "ships of the line".... Our own "new" systems like SAS and Athena are very heirarchical in nature, and support a philosophical model which most of us find somewhat improbable. Our next generation of soldiers might rework the system into a "tactical Napster" or something we can't even imagine yet.
 
LOL, you better grab that William Slim book off you shelf, Mr Kirkhill - he'd be rolling in his grave if he heard that....
y
Possibly Infanteer...

On the other hand Bill Slim had the opposite problem to our Army.  He had massive quantities of 19 year olds with 6-months training and various degrees of motivation under his command and precious few experienced soldiers.  He needed every leader and trainer he could get his hands on.  Also he had a significantly higher turn-over rate than we do.  Finally, as strapped as we are for funds and technology Bill had to make do with dodgy radios and burlap parachutes ( increasing the turn over rate).

I think that his prescription for the Wartime army is considerably different than his prescription for maintaining skills in a "Peacetime" army involved in constabulary duties on half-pay.  If I remember rightly he was a half-pay officer at one time himself.

Cheers
 
Looking at the "Western Way of War", I think that the West's greatest strength has been in not having a "Way."  Western armies have tended to be adaptive to both new technologies and approaches.  Western armies have also tended to me more individualistic and thus able to "muddle through" when things went bad.  This gap may be narrowing, however, as other cultures move towards to Western individualism.

I sometimes worry that I am like the old Cavalry establishment who looked at barbed wire and machineguns as not being of much military value.  Could a "swarm" of tiny units operating outside of a hierarchical structure defeat a conventional force (all else being equal)?  Possibly, although I think that the true test has to be done with real bullets (unfortunately).  I believe that the West's (well, the US and UK) victories in the desert were due more to the armour, sensors and GPS on the M1 combined with well trained and led soldiers than any high speed information technology.  I could, however, be very well out to lunch and only seeing what I want to see.  On the first day of my Surveillance Operator course I wondered if I was seeing the beginning of a new RMA.  I do not think that we are there, but are we at another Port Arthur where the lessons are there if only to be seen? ???

Cheers,

2B
 
2 interesting analogies 2Bravo, Port Arthur and the Desert.  Need to think of Port Arthur a bit more.

As to the Desert perhaps the answer to your question on small swarms vs large concentrations lies in the N. African desert in between 1940 and 1942.  O'Connor, Wavell, Auchinleck, Montgomery and Rommel.  Those were campaigns that saw everything from Montgomery's set piece WW1 type offensives at El Alamein, to O'Connor's thrusts across Cyrenaica by Light Cavalry (often wheeled) brigades to the use of the LRDG, the SAS and Popski's Private Army operating independently in small groups in coordinated support of the overall objective.  Sledge hammer, sabre and scalpel.  Which one chased Rommel out?

 
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