- Reaction score
- 12,196
- Points
- 1,260
Interesting quote from Imperial Hubris, which I am going through right now in light of world events:
Now, people may be apt to blow the book off because of its title, but it is interesting to read that the author is in support of fighting, but on the right terms. He argues that we are losing the "War on Terror" because we are approaching it wrong.
Anyways, the link between al Qaeda is strongest with the Kurds - this does nothing to implicate Saddam's regime because it was after the first invasion that he started losing his grip on the Kurdistani regions of Iraq (IIRC). The other links also appear to be touchy; at best they represent the regime not really caring if the terrorists went through Iraq or not; what more would we expect from Saddam Hussein?
It seems that by invading, we've made it easier for these groups to work in lawless Northern Iraq. On the flip-side, the West has a definite capability to destroy terrorist infrastructure in Iraq. I'm sure that the subject is much more complicated then a few pundits shooting statements back and forth.
I wonder at times if it would have been best to pull out of Iraq once Saddam's regime had been shattered (or at least after they captured him). Since Al Qaeda levels the finger at the US and the West for supporting apostate regimes like Hussein's - it could have been a public-relations victory of sorts against Al Qaeda; "Here you are pious Muslims - the United States has destroyed the apostate regime of Hussein and returned Mesopotamia to the faithful...." ^-^
Anyways, I agree with Edward Campbell that this war isn't a "War on Terror" or against any specific group of people, rather it is an Islamic Insurgency that (IMHO) is one that is of Huntingtonian Clash of Civilization proportions. I think the two main questions worth debating are:
1) Was Iraq a larger player in the Islamic Insurgency under Saddam's regime or as it is now (essentially the Wild West). It appears that the answer is the latter, so....
2) Is it desirable to have Iraq become a larger player in the Islamic Insurgency and to have the United States strategically engaged there?
Big question, complex answer - oh well, that's what internet forums are for.
Infanteer
Al Qaeda's ties to and presence in northern Iraq existed before 11 September 2001 but took on greater momentum and importance there-after. While it was long known that Kurdistan was home to multiple, largely secular Sunni Kurdish groups opposed to Saddam Hussein's regime, the presence there of an assortment of militant Sunni Kurdish groups opposed to Daddam, secular Sunni Kurds, and the West was less clear. What Western observers for the most part missed, however, was not overlooked by al Qaeda and the Taleban. The New York Times has reported, for example, that documents from an al Qaeda computer captured by U.S. forces in Kabul show that bin Laden hosted the leaders of several Kurdish Islamist groups in Afghanistan in 2000 and 2001, meetings in which Taleban representatives were included. The message delivered to the Iraqis appears to have been threefold: unite the disparate Sunni Islamist factions in northern Iraq; propagate the teachings of the Salafi sect of Islam among the Sunni population there and try to create a Taleban-style regime in Iraq; and train and prepare fighters for war against U.S. forces if Washington again invades Iraq. In addition, the Iraqi Kurds received $350,000 in funding, weapons, Land Cruisers, and instruction in administration, logistics, and military training methods, as well as an offer - which was accepted - to provide al Qaeda cadre to assist in putting the administrative and military sides of their house in order. Finally, it appears that the Ansar al-Islam group asked for and received from al Qaeda training in the fabrication and use of toxic weapons; manuals for producing toxins found in 2002 in Ansar camps in Iraq are identical to those taken from al Qaeda in Afghanistan. By late summer 2002, Ansar al-Islam had built a toxin-producing facility near Khurma, Iraq, and was testing ricin and other poisons on farm animals - perhaps with the guidance of senior al Qaeda ally Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The British media have reported that the Khurma camp may have been involved in training and supplying the poison ricin to Islamists who were arrested in London in late 2002 and found to have traces of it in their possession....
The militant Sunni Kurds seem to have been eager learners and in summer 2001 the Ansar al-Islam organization - led then by Norway-based Mullah Krekar, and now by Abu Abdallah al-Shafi'i - undertook efforts to unite the large Jund al-Islam group and several other Sunni groups under Ansar's banner. The efforts succeeded and Ansar al-Islam's manpower rose from six hundred to more than two thousand by January 2003; these numbers do not include the "scores" of Arab Afghan insurgents who entered Iraq after the fall of the Taleban. Based in the mountains near Halabja, the newly united group began in the summer 2001 to stage guerrilla-style attacks on the U.S.-allied secular Kurdish groups - including assassination, car bombs, and ambushes. In doing so, Ansar al-Islam showed an unexpected military competence, an inventory of modern weaponry, and an ability to conduct suicide attacks. These operations again showed the qualitative edge given to a a Sunni militant group by a small number of al Qaeda trainers and combat veterans. In every country where an Islamic insurgency is under way, al Qaeda trainers have improved the military skills and enhanced the religious zeal of local fighters. Al Qaeda's trainers are proving the truth of bin Laden's late mentor Shaykh Abdullah Azzam's assertion that the Koran and the AK-47, together, yield the levels of lethality needed for Islam to triumph.
Anonymous, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, pp. 74-76
Now, people may be apt to blow the book off because of its title, but it is interesting to read that the author is in support of fighting, but on the right terms. He argues that we are losing the "War on Terror" because we are approaching it wrong.
Anyways, the link between al Qaeda is strongest with the Kurds - this does nothing to implicate Saddam's regime because it was after the first invasion that he started losing his grip on the Kurdistani regions of Iraq (IIRC). The other links also appear to be touchy; at best they represent the regime not really caring if the terrorists went through Iraq or not; what more would we expect from Saddam Hussein?
It seems that by invading, we've made it easier for these groups to work in lawless Northern Iraq. On the flip-side, the West has a definite capability to destroy terrorist infrastructure in Iraq. I'm sure that the subject is much more complicated then a few pundits shooting statements back and forth.
I wonder at times if it would have been best to pull out of Iraq once Saddam's regime had been shattered (or at least after they captured him). Since Al Qaeda levels the finger at the US and the West for supporting apostate regimes like Hussein's - it could have been a public-relations victory of sorts against Al Qaeda; "Here you are pious Muslims - the United States has destroyed the apostate regime of Hussein and returned Mesopotamia to the faithful...." ^-^
Anyways, I agree with Edward Campbell that this war isn't a "War on Terror" or against any specific group of people, rather it is an Islamic Insurgency that (IMHO) is one that is of Huntingtonian Clash of Civilization proportions. I think the two main questions worth debating are:
1) Was Iraq a larger player in the Islamic Insurgency under Saddam's regime or as it is now (essentially the Wild West). It appears that the answer is the latter, so....
2) Is it desirable to have Iraq become a larger player in the Islamic Insurgency and to have the United States strategically engaged there?
Big question, complex answer - oh well, that's what internet forums are for.
Infanteer