Desertions blow hits Afghan army
- Thread starter Pikache
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It's suppose to be a pun on staying in your "lane".
Got it from <a href=http://lightfighter.net/eve/ubb.x/a/tpc/f/9036044533/m/2971030441>Lightfighter.com</a>
Got it from <a href=http://lightfighter.net/eve/ubb.x/a/tpc/f/9036044533/m/2971030441>Lightfighter.com</a>
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Actually, Brit doesn't have too bad of an idea, IMHO.
I had an old prof ages ago who fought in Africa. He had some great rules for combatting an insurgency:
1. An attractive alternate political agenda effectively communicated to the population.
2. Effective and reliable rural policing (note: not army)
3. Secure lines of communications.
4. Actionable intelligence.
5. A swift and lethal killing force.
There are others, but you get the idea.
In Afghanistan, I'm not sure we have an effective political agenda that's being effectively communicated. This is, in part, due to the myriad of tribal loyalties, the corruption and (I have to say it) a singular lack of effectiveness on the part of the Afghan government to properly get its message out - if indeed it has a "message".
Where the "militia" idea could be effective is in the rural areas. As Brittany says, a significant Western presence - in leadership roles - would be mandatory and it could not be built on the AMF bag of hammers that we currently have. The Western presence would be there to ensure impartiality and to reduce the massive corruption level. The "militia" would not have to be heavily armed (light weapons, mortars, RPG-7, that sort of thing - perhaps wheeled APCs). Instead, their role would be to:
- ensure local policing (not military action)
- demonstrate authority of the national government
- gather actionable intelligence
- act as the "trigger" for killing force action
- assist with security of lines of communication
The "federal police" (as I'll call it) would be backed up by coalition/Afghani military units strategically located throughout the country. The military would concentrate on:
- providing QRF (likely largely heliborne) forces as the main "killing force"
- providing border security on the ground and operating in the zone along the Pakistani border
- assisting with security of lines of communication
- coordinating strategic assets (intelligence, etc.) and actioning strategic intelligence
For the short term, you're not going to prevent individual acts of terrorism in the centre of the country. Instead concentrate on establishing a valid presence throughout the countryside, displacing the warlords and sorting out the Pakistani border region. Above all, the political agenda has to be valid and communicated effectively in a way Afghans can understand and support.
If any of the above looks familiar, I did a major MA paper on the insurgency in Rhodesia...
The Rhodesians did all the above (with the exception of the intelligence) very effectively, but didn't get the political side sorted out until the very end - when it was too late.
Thinking out loud.
Cheers,
Teddy
I had an old prof ages ago who fought in Africa. He had some great rules for combatting an insurgency:
1. An attractive alternate political agenda effectively communicated to the population.
2. Effective and reliable rural policing (note: not army)
3. Secure lines of communications.
4. Actionable intelligence.
5. A swift and lethal killing force.
There are others, but you get the idea.
In Afghanistan, I'm not sure we have an effective political agenda that's being effectively communicated. This is, in part, due to the myriad of tribal loyalties, the corruption and (I have to say it) a singular lack of effectiveness on the part of the Afghan government to properly get its message out - if indeed it has a "message".
Where the "militia" idea could be effective is in the rural areas. As Brittany says, a significant Western presence - in leadership roles - would be mandatory and it could not be built on the AMF bag of hammers that we currently have. The Western presence would be there to ensure impartiality and to reduce the massive corruption level. The "militia" would not have to be heavily armed (light weapons, mortars, RPG-7, that sort of thing - perhaps wheeled APCs). Instead, their role would be to:
- ensure local policing (not military action)
- demonstrate authority of the national government
- gather actionable intelligence
- act as the "trigger" for killing force action
- assist with security of lines of communication
The "federal police" (as I'll call it) would be backed up by coalition/Afghani military units strategically located throughout the country. The military would concentrate on:
- providing QRF (likely largely heliborne) forces as the main "killing force"
- providing border security on the ground and operating in the zone along the Pakistani border
- assisting with security of lines of communication
- coordinating strategic assets (intelligence, etc.) and actioning strategic intelligence
For the short term, you're not going to prevent individual acts of terrorism in the centre of the country. Instead concentrate on establishing a valid presence throughout the countryside, displacing the warlords and sorting out the Pakistani border region. Above all, the political agenda has to be valid and communicated effectively in a way Afghans can understand and support.
If any of the above looks familiar, I did a major MA paper on the insurgency in Rhodesia...
The Rhodesians did all the above (with the exception of the intelligence) very effectively, but didn't get the political side sorted out until the very end - when it was too late.Thinking out loud.
Cheers,
Teddy
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The seed from my idea was the use of the US Army Special Forces in Vietnam, where they organized village/tribe based civillian defence battalions, with Green Beret NCOs and Local officers. From all accounts they were quite effective at securing the remote border mountains against local insurgents, even with much less support from the air than what is available in Afghan today. Of course, the North Vietnamese Reg Force eventually showed up with tanks and then the game was up, but it still seems like a good idea.
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Exactly right - and the UK did much the same in Malaya (although the protected village idea may not work too well in an Afghan context).
Luckily, the Taliban/AQ don't have access to a regular army's equipment so there wouldn't be an equivalent to the NVA threat in Vietnam, making the concept that much more viable...
Luckily, the Taliban/AQ don't have access to a regular army's equipment so there wouldn't be an equivalent to the NVA threat in Vietnam, making the concept that much more viable...
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Britney Spears said:
Actually it isn't ludicrais, as it is one of the solutions they (the higher powers as OMC-A et all) are looking at as as way to combat the desertions. By developing a regional command (RC)organization (which thay have now) they hope in the future that recruits from a given area would be returned to the area of thier homes once they are trainied to serve in the corps which is responsible to protect that given area. This way it would reduce the time for travel when on leave and give more incentive for newer soldiers to learn and develop into possibly career soldiers who will serve for 5-10 yrs. That way a recruit from Herat would be returned to the RC where he would serve in one of the brigades in or very close to his home province. But this system is still in its building stages as the ANA grows so that it can have the 2-5 brigades per regional command corps.
Also a point o note, the ANA is growing at an impressive rate. They (I can say we, because my group is part of Training Assistance Group) are producing a new Kandak roughly every two weeks, five Kandaks every 12 weeks. Change is being worked into the sausage machine as lessons are learned, but as in any beauracracy, they are slow.
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More on thier conditions:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4080578.stm
Toughing it in the Afghan army
By Tom Coghlan
In Kandahar
Dwarfed by the air conditioned sprawl of the nearby US airbase, the barracks of the Afghan National Army's 205th "Atal" (Hero) corps outside Kandahar are, to put it politely, extremely basic.
There is none of the shopping mall consumption that characterises the neighbouring US base. No DVDs, "air con" or golf buggies to transport soldiers to the groaning trolleys of the mess hall.
The ANA soldiers take their water from the non-potable tap that feeds the toilet block; they have not received mineral water or canned drinks for months.
They wash their dishes in the showers, outside which a green pool of sewage festers. Their food comes topped with buzzing clouds of flies.
The Afghan National Army are very much the junior partner in the ugly, forgotten war being fought here in southern Afghanistan; their 3,000 man contribution set against the 18,000-man US force.
But it will not be so forever.
Low morale
By 2007 it is planned that the army will top 70,000 men, allowing the foreign forces to begin to leave.
But this assumes that all goes to plan.
And at present all is not well with the Afghan National Army's southern command, which was first deployed last September.
What is clear is that morale is low.
"Everyone wants to run away," said one sergeant. "We cannot tolerate this."
The soldiers' complaints focused largely on the perception that they had not been given a fair deal.
The ANA receive their wages from the US government, and at a starting salary of $75 a month they are comparable or slightly better to those of most civil servants.
But this is before taking into account the risks that the troops in the southern command face.
Many men talked bitterly of a $2 a day bonus they say they were promised for "dangerous operations".
It has never been paid. The Defence Ministry say it will be.
The soldiers also said food and conditions were very poor and deteriorating.
The biggest problem though was how to get their cash wages home to their families when they have to serve up to half a year at a time without leave.
Afghanistan has no banking system.
The soldiers say that their loved ones face starvation.
It is a logistical nightmare with which the Afghan government says it is wrestling.
Casualty rate
Then there is the threat from the Taleban.
Since March, government forces have lost dozens of men to a reinvigorated Taleban insurgency.
The fighting has been hard and without body armour and heavy weaponry.
The ANA inevitably suffer much higher casualties than US troops.
And to this has been added horror.
An ANA patrol was almost wiped out last month and its wounded tortured and executed by the Taleban.
"The Taleban had used knives on them," said Mohammed, one of the patrol's survivors.
"They had no eyes, no noses. Their mouths were destroyed. These were our best friends."
A much repeated, though erroneous, rumour said the men were also castrated.
The incident has compounded already fragile morale, particularly after the discovery that the families of dead soldiers' only receive a single $400 payment for their loss.
"I am afraid of what the Taleban would do to me," said one soldier.
"A boy was crying and asking his commander to go home because he is the only son of his family."
One soldier wondered whether it was right for the ANA to be "helping foreigners to kill Muslims," though others said that achieving "national unity" necessitated the defeat of the Taleban.
Uniting force
And yet, there is much to be admired about the ANA.
It is respected by US officers as a generally disciplined and uncorrupted force, unlike the National Police.
Many of the ANA's officers are capable and boast vast combat experience.
"They are some of the bravest soldiers I've seen and I'm proud to be associated with them," said Colonel Tom Wilkinson, a liaison and training officer.
Above all the ANA appears to have succeeded in integrating Afghanistan's multitude of different ethnic groups, all of which were responsible for reciprocal human rights abuses during Afghanistan's long civil war.
"We are just like brothers of the same family," said Sergeant Mohammed Wali from the Tajik north of the country.
The recruitment of the ANA has meticulously followed a policy of maintaining an ethnic balance in units which broadly reflects that found country wide.
As such it remains a popular army with many Afghans, the green bereted soldiers affectionately nicknamed the "Chai Sap" (Green Tea); a gently teasing pun on Isaf, the name of the international stabilisation force.
**********************************
I would like to dispute what is reported in this article, but, unfortunately I can not. I have seen the insides of the barracks and DFACs in Pol E Charki.............
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4080578.stm
Toughing it in the Afghan army
By Tom Coghlan
In Kandahar
Dwarfed by the air conditioned sprawl of the nearby US airbase, the barracks of the Afghan National Army's 205th "Atal" (Hero) corps outside Kandahar are, to put it politely, extremely basic.
There is none of the shopping mall consumption that characterises the neighbouring US base. No DVDs, "air con" or golf buggies to transport soldiers to the groaning trolleys of the mess hall.
The ANA soldiers take their water from the non-potable tap that feeds the toilet block; they have not received mineral water or canned drinks for months.
They wash their dishes in the showers, outside which a green pool of sewage festers. Their food comes topped with buzzing clouds of flies.
The Afghan National Army are very much the junior partner in the ugly, forgotten war being fought here in southern Afghanistan; their 3,000 man contribution set against the 18,000-man US force.
But it will not be so forever.
Low morale
By 2007 it is planned that the army will top 70,000 men, allowing the foreign forces to begin to leave.
But this assumes that all goes to plan.
And at present all is not well with the Afghan National Army's southern command, which was first deployed last September.
What is clear is that morale is low.
"Everyone wants to run away," said one sergeant. "We cannot tolerate this."
The soldiers' complaints focused largely on the perception that they had not been given a fair deal.
The ANA receive their wages from the US government, and at a starting salary of $75 a month they are comparable or slightly better to those of most civil servants.
But this is before taking into account the risks that the troops in the southern command face.
Many men talked bitterly of a $2 a day bonus they say they were promised for "dangerous operations".
It has never been paid. The Defence Ministry say it will be.
The soldiers also said food and conditions were very poor and deteriorating.
The biggest problem though was how to get their cash wages home to their families when they have to serve up to half a year at a time without leave.
Afghanistan has no banking system.
The soldiers say that their loved ones face starvation.
It is a logistical nightmare with which the Afghan government says it is wrestling.
Casualty rate
Then there is the threat from the Taleban.
Since March, government forces have lost dozens of men to a reinvigorated Taleban insurgency.
The fighting has been hard and without body armour and heavy weaponry.
The ANA inevitably suffer much higher casualties than US troops.
And to this has been added horror.
An ANA patrol was almost wiped out last month and its wounded tortured and executed by the Taleban.
"The Taleban had used knives on them," said Mohammed, one of the patrol's survivors.
"They had no eyes, no noses. Their mouths were destroyed. These were our best friends."
A much repeated, though erroneous, rumour said the men were also castrated.
The incident has compounded already fragile morale, particularly after the discovery that the families of dead soldiers' only receive a single $400 payment for their loss.
"I am afraid of what the Taleban would do to me," said one soldier.
"A boy was crying and asking his commander to go home because he is the only son of his family."
One soldier wondered whether it was right for the ANA to be "helping foreigners to kill Muslims," though others said that achieving "national unity" necessitated the defeat of the Taleban.
Uniting force
And yet, there is much to be admired about the ANA.
It is respected by US officers as a generally disciplined and uncorrupted force, unlike the National Police.
Many of the ANA's officers are capable and boast vast combat experience.
"They are some of the bravest soldiers I've seen and I'm proud to be associated with them," said Colonel Tom Wilkinson, a liaison and training officer.
Above all the ANA appears to have succeeded in integrating Afghanistan's multitude of different ethnic groups, all of which were responsible for reciprocal human rights abuses during Afghanistan's long civil war.
"We are just like brothers of the same family," said Sergeant Mohammed Wali from the Tajik north of the country.
The recruitment of the ANA has meticulously followed a policy of maintaining an ethnic balance in units which broadly reflects that found country wide.
As such it remains a popular army with many Afghans, the green bereted soldiers affectionately nicknamed the "Chai Sap" (Green Tea); a gently teasing pun on Isaf, the name of the international stabilisation force.
**********************************
I would like to dispute what is reported in this article, but, unfortunately I can not. I have seen the insides of the barracks and DFACs in Pol E Charki.............
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I can't resist putting my two cents in. Armymedic as the current poop in theatre as always. However I was an Embedded Trainer of the 1st Kandak of the 1st Brigade of the Central Corps in Kabul. The troops came from all over Afghanistan as they were the first and finest of the ANA. The ETT members had to on a daily basis ensure that the troops pay and welfare was taken care of. We were not alone in this. My company's officers from 2nd Coy were very checked out with loads of practical combat experience. They were organized along US doctrine with a Company CO(Capt), Executive Officer(LT) and Platoon Leaders(2LT). Our Coy XO and Coy 1st Sgt handled all the admin of the company. They kept merticulise records. Especially pay. That was our Admin officers worst nightmare. However once we got them organized and set paydays were a breeze as long as we were able to imput the proper paperwork. 9 out 10 times it worked out well. But only US officers were allowed to pay the ANA as they are the ones paying the MOD. all in all the do use computers and keep paperwork on everything and never throw anything out. I would put them on pare with our Coy 2 i/c's with that regards. About the desertion question. Just before I departed our Coy was at 68 personal all ranks. When I finally handled over my responsibilites the Coy was up to 98 all ranks. troops were coming back not going AWOL. With move of the Brigades out into the Provinces that will decrease the desertions in the ANA. However they need to rotate in and out Kandahar region or else lose the morale issue.
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