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Here is an amazing article I found recently dealing with the misconceptions people have about diplomacy. Although I've always understood that intenrational relations don't conform to the utopean ideals invisioned by advocates of the UN and the International Court, I've never really been able to logicaly explain why that is. Therefore I was extroaridnarily impressed when I came across this article. It's very long, so I've had to cut it down in size in order to post it on the forums. The original article can be found here.
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We've been running into a conceptual problem in the last few years, where a lot of people have been trying to extrapolate concepts and experiences from their normal peace-time lives into realms where they make no sense. There has been, for instance, the attempt to extrapolate the concept of national law into the larger realm of "international law". There has been the idea that international terrorists should be treated as if they were criminals, and pursued and ultimately tried as we would normal criminals without our own nations. (Among other interesting ramifications of that would be that we could only arrest terrorists for attacks they had already made, not for attacks they were planning, and that we could only imprison them if we could prove their complicity "beyond a reasonable doubt".)
In some cases these things are deliberate obfuscations by people with an agenda, but in other cases it's confusion, where they don't really understand how those things work in one context and thus why they would not work in another. For instance, the reason citizens of western nations (for instance, we Americans in the US) can make contracts with one another and willingly submit our differences to adjudication in civil court is because we rely on the US government to use force if necessary to enforce the decision of the court. We therefore do not ourselves have to use force to ensure the other guy fulfills his commitments under the contract. If we had no faith that the government would indeed use force for us if we prevailed in court, few would rely on the courts and more would use violence directly.
Drug traffickers and other members of organized crime enforce their own deals that way, since they can't use legal contracts or the courts. And in parts of the world where the legal system is corrupt or the government is toothless, agreements are largely enforced with direct violence.
That's why the utopian idea of an international version of civil court is unrealistic. If two nations take their disagreements to such a court, even assuming they believe that the court would be disinterested and competent, how could they be sure that the other side would yield if it lost? There's no enforcement mechanism.
The utopian belief behind this is to assume that everyone would act in good faith. No enforcement mechanism would be needed because the loser of the case would willingly comply with court orders. The best that can be said about that idea is that there's no historical justification for believing it would work out that way.
Another area where many have completely unrealistic expectations is the entire subject of international diplomacy. There will be disagreements between nations, about small things or big things, and many of those disagreements end up being settled without war through agreement or treaty. So doesn't it make sense that the agreement should be just? Shouldn't the party which is in the wrong give in to the other and make amends?
It's a nice idea, I guess. But it's another for which there's no historical justification. One problem with it is that it isn't necessarily obvious which side is in the wrong; too often both sides feel aggrieved. (Too often, both are right.)
But even if there were some sort of consensus on that, it wouldn't matter anyway. Negotiations have nothing to do with justice. They have nothing to do with fairness. They never have.
I wrote extensively about negotiations a year ago in two articles (first second). My conclusion is this: all negotiations are trials of strength, and all successful negotiations are backed up with threats.
In civil contracts, we need not threaten each other because the government threatens us both if we fail to live up to the terms of the contract. If you break a contract, I can threaten you with a lawsuit, which in turn means I can get the government to apply force to you in my favor. You can do the same to me. But each of us could only succeed in doing that if a disinterested party, a judge or jury, decides we're entitled to relief.
In international negotiations there is no such disinterested third party, and that means we have to have our own threats, and the willingness to carry them out.
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Mike asks if I consider the Europeans to hold sole responsibility for the state of affairs between the two groups. In this case he's talking about the abstract concept of justice: who was the transgressor? Who's misdeed disrupted the situation?
I do not for a moment grant that even evaluated on that basis that it's really primarily our fault, or that fault is equally held by both sides. But it doesn't really matter how one evaluates that, because "fault" has nothing to do with the process of attempting to heal the rift. It's about strength, and about need, and about urgency. Like all forms of competition, diplomacy is usually asymmetric and unbalanced, and that's the case here.
Do I think that's how it should be? I don't really know, in fact. What I do know is that's how it actually is. My engineering pragmatism forces me to deal with things as they are, not with how they should be if I lived in an ideal world. Even if negotiations should include justice and a feeling of responsibility to higher principles, that isn't how things actually are.
Suppose that the Europeans actually are right. Suppose that we Americans really are unsophisticated, hot-headed fools. Suppose that our chosen path actually would lead to catastrophe. I don't believe it, but suppose that it's true. And suppose that the Europeans really are more wise than us, and that they truly have identified a better way.
Even in this hypothetical case, for the Europeans to lecture us and insult us, to talk down to us, is extraordinarily inept diplomacy. Even if it might be somehow satisfying to verbally put us in our place, it has little chance of making us change our policy or coming to agree with them. And since we can implement our policy despite their objections, then the only way they have to prevent that (which is one of their goals) is to convince us to change our policy.
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That's why Sharon's radical disengagement plan, and the decision to build "the wall", is so important. (Previous articles here and here.) It changes the situation radically because of two characteristics. First, when it is completed, the practical ability of the Palestinians to take the war to Israel will be degraded seriously, enough so that it will no longer place enough pressure on Israel to make a deal.
Second and even more important, Israel can implement this plan without Palestinian cooperation, and in spite of Palestinian objections. That means that time is now on Israel's side, not on the side of the Palestinians.
The dreadful consequence of this plan for the Palestinians is that it is now they who need an agreement more than Israel does, and they who are facing a deadline.
Based on the way Palestinian foreign policy has been floundering, it seems they don't know what to do about that. Arafat's second prime minister is no more empowered than the first one was, and it's anybody's guess what Qureia himself believes. But he's been trying to make the best of a bad situation, and I have to say I admire him for the attempt, even though it's been inept and futile. It was inevitable that it be futile, because he is in an extraordinarily weak position.
On the propaganda front, there were actions in the UN and an appeal to the World Court. The UN general assembly was more than willing to condemn Israel, something it's routinely done for years, but the general assembly has no power. The US has continued to use its veto in the Security Council to protect Israel, so there was no help there. Meanwhile, Israel kissed off the World Court and refused to even show up for the trial. And even if the Palestinians win there, the World Court has no enforcement power save through the UN Security Council (where the US has a veto).
Diplomacy by the Palestinians has been increasingly chaotic and disjointed in the last few months. The largest Palestinian factions were never very united anyway, but now they're making their own public pronouncements, and even those have been confused: after Yassin was killed, Hamas at first blamed the US and threatened attacks against us, but then backtracked and said that the US would not be a target. Finally they split the difference and rather lamely said that the US would not be a target short term, but might become one later. The best guess is that the initial threat against the US was really public bluster by the new leadership trying to win points with the membership by talking big; the later backtrack came on the realization that right now it is not a good idea to walk into America's cross-hairs.
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I call it the distinction between fault and problem. The fact that something may be someone else's fault does not affect the question of whose problem it is. Your correspondent (and the Left, broadly) are arguing that the state of transatlantic relations are Americas fault. The fact is, however, that it is primarily Europe's problem.
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