DND may be shopping for new subs, sources say

[Neill McKay]

Has anyone actually looked at a chart?

The approaches to the NW Passage are ~4500 nm from Halifax. That's a 9000 nm round trip. At 7.5 knots likely SOA, you're looking at 50 days to get there and back. As large as the Victorias are, they're limited to about 45 days endurance unless you want to get really uncomfortable. That means at best they'll just be able to get to the general area and then they'll have to leave.

Realistically you might be able to achieve a NW Passage sovereignty patrol on a Collins type displacement(~3000 tons), but it might need to be even larger. A smaller boat isn't going to even reach the patrol area, let alone actually perform once they get there.

Could you not just RAS at some point along way?

 

[aesop081]

Could you not just RAS at some point along way?

Your answer lies in a question......

"What is a submarine's best asset ?"

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

Could you not just RAS at some point along way?

Not really, no. It's unsafe to haul the fuel lines around on the casing while you're underway. For that matter, it's unsafe to be on the casing while you're underway.

Going into a port to refuel would work, but you'd still have a crew fatigue problem. Those boats are just too small to allow an endurance significantly longer than 45 days. Even with a 45 day patrol, you're normally looking at a port visit around the 21 day mark.

 

[T.S.Rea]

Definitely would not be easy to support a small submarine in the NW Passage, but the same would apply to any submarine apart from nuclear (although nuclear would require much greater support farther south, and I can't see it happening).  As far as I can recall, one of the Victoria's was present during last years Arctic exercise, and probably got refueled at least once from the auxilliary present, although the boat probably came along for the ride just as a dry run to see what problems could be present to do even that.

The emphasis on ice eroding/surfacing and boring methods, isotope energy (despite the weight/cost of it for very small amounts of energy), a drogue prop generator system, the bases to be developed at Resolute and Nanissivik, the submarine tender function that could be incorporated into the planned APV's, the lower stores support of a small crew, potential energy generation in the region for the aluminum or hydrogen/oxygen, a small refueling station at Iqaluit and possibly near Goose Bay as well, mutual submarine search and rescue and two boat patrols, and a number of other factors could provide enough critical mass of support to station the boats there (ie. four of the ten-twelve suggested).  I would even suggest that little effort should be expended initially on the question of arming the boats beyond leaving space for it, not because it would not be required at some point, but that it could slow the development of simply building a boat that can operate under all these demanding factors.  HMS Terror and Erebus were lost due to tragic underestimation of the difficulties of functioning in that environment, but their presence was a pivotal event in establishing our sovereignty over the region today, and we need to reassert that sovereignty as soon as possible or it will slowly erode away due to inaction.

I think it would be imperative to conduct realistic tests of any prospective propulsion system, since you would need some hard numbers to make any responsible decision about investing a substantial amount of money in them.  And as Neil pointed out, the amount of crew support needed to properly operate the vessel and man the communications and sensors, as well as the degree of automation that is safely feasible for things like the Mk48 torpedo and a lengthy list of other basic equipment, would have to be examined in depth and verified to any degree that that is possible.

It will not be easy, and probably the deciding factor will be as much the competence of the people doing the feasibility studies now as much as the technology required itself, and that is not in any way to even hint at critiquing the competence of the people selected to do this work.  A major challenge for the people involved, but their is a lot at stake.

 

[TCBF]

... and probably the deciding factor will be as much the competence of the people doing the feasibility studies now as much as the technology required itself, ...

- No.  The deciding factor will be that without conscription THERE WILL BE NO ONE TO MAN THE BOATS. 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

- No.  The deciding factor will be that without conscription THERE WILL BE NO ONE TO MAN THE BOATS. 

So can we impose conscription on anybody holding a Liberal party membership and send them to sea in some surplus Kilo class boats, with an instruction manual of course (in Russian)  ;D

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Maybe we should try and get the Vics up and running before we give them a new task in the high Arctic....

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

As far as I can recall, one of the Victoria's was present during last years Arctic exercise, and probably got refueled at least once from the auxilliary present, although the boat probably came along for the ride just as a dry run to see what problems could be present to do even that.

She was only up there for 10 days, and it was the Southern Arctic. The entrances to the NW Passage are considerably farther north.

The emphasis on ice eroding/surfacing and boring methods, isotope energy (despite the weight/cost of it for very small amounts of energy), a drogue prop generator system, the bases to be developed at Resolute and Nanissivik, the submarine tender function that could be incorporated into the planned APV's, the lower stores support of a small crew, potential energy generation in the region for the aluminum or hydrogen/oxygen, a small refueling station at Iqaluit and possibly near Goose Bay as well, mutual submarine search and rescue and two boat patrols, and a number of other factors could provide enough critical mass of support to station the boats there (ie. four of the ten-twelve suggested).

Even if money was found for all of that (and we're talking about more than the Naval budget), who would man them? You're talking about actually basing them up there. That means sending crews and their families. That's a lot of infrastructure and cost for a marginal capability.

I would even suggest that little effort should be expended initially on the question of arming the boats beyond leaving space for it, not because it would not be required at some point, but that it could slow the development of simply building a boat that can operate under all these demanding factors.  HMS Terror and Erebus were lost due to tragic underestimation of the difficulties of functioning in that environment, but their presence was a pivotal event in establishing our sovereignty over the region today, and we need to reassert that sovereignty as soon as possible or it will slowly erode away due to inaction.

There are a lot better ways of establishing sovereignty than using submarines.

It will not be easy, and probably the deciding factor will be as much the competence of the people doing the feasibility studies now as much as the technology required itself, and that is not in any way to even hint at critiquing the competence of the people selected to do this work.  A major challenge for the people involved, but their is a lot at stake.

The deciding factor will be the lack of money.

 

[Neill McKay]

Your answer lies in a question......

"What is a submarine's best asset ?"

Yes, true enough.  On the other hand, might there be something to be said for making a statement along the lines of "we have a submarine in the neighbourhood, and it may or may not be in any particular part of the area over the next month"?  I understand the US Navy makes a certain amount of public fuss over their submarine deployments -- shortly before the submarine disappears under the waves for the duration of the patrol.

 

[T.S.Rea]

The Arctic exercise last year (?) involved operations around Lancaster Sound, well inside the mouth of the NW Passage; where the submarine went I could not be certain.

Although I agree with conducting these patrols, having a patrol frigate venture timidly to the edge of the ice to offload a platoon or two of light infantry in inflatable boats could tend to offer the impression of sovreign impotence and a lack of any real resolve.  Sovreignty is more than just amassing a large force and demonstrating the capacity to use it, but taken in the opposite direction without it all that remains is just talk and surrender to any real challenge to it.

As it is today, they only real sovreign force of consequence are the Canadian Rangers.  If you can't find and train a few dozen submariners to operate the boats, you are not trying.  I would rather see the money spent giving some of the 30,000 residents of Nunavut a solid income and skills training that can be used directly or indirectly after their military service rather than paying much of the same amount on social assistance that serves only to undermine their self sufficiency.  The Rangers have done as much to entrench our sovreignty on land as much as anything else, its time the same was done on the waterways, and surface ships alone can not fully accomplish that due to the low freedom of navigation in the area year round.  Moreover, surveying in depth what we have taken for granted for so long is a necessary step in laying claim to it.  The maps first created in the mid 1800's are no longer enough.

Four small submarines standing guard over more area than many of the countries of the world combined costing most of the naval budget?

It won't be cheap, but protecting anything of value isn't cheap. 

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

The Arctic exercise last year (?) involved operations around Lancaster Sound, well inside the mouth of the NW Passage; where the submarine went I could not be certain.

Although I agree with conducting these patrols, having a patrol frigate venture timidly to the edge of the ice to offload a platoon or two of light infantry in inflatable boats could tend to offer the impression of sovreign impotence and a lack of any real resolve.  Sovreignty is more than just amassing a large force and demonstrating the capacity to use it, but taken in the opposite direction without it all that remains is just talk and surrender to any real challenge to it.

As it is today, they only real sovreign force of consequence are the Canadian Rangers.  If you can't find and train a few dozen submariners to operate the boats, you are not trying.  I would rather see the money spent giving some of the 30,000 residents of Nunavut a solid income and skills training that can be used directly or indirectly after their military service rather than paying much of the same amount on social assistance that serves only to undermine their self sufficiency.  The Rangers have done as much to entrench our sovreignty on land as much as anything else, its time the same was done on the waterways, and surface ships alone can not fully accomplish that due to the low freedom of navigation in the area year round.  Moreover, surveying in depth what we have taken for granted for so long is a necessary step in laying claim to it.  The maps first created in the mid 1800's are no longer enough.

Four small submarines standing guard over more area than many of the countries of the world combined costing most of the naval budget?

It won't be cheap, but protecting anything of value isn't cheap. 

Careful how you word your posts you make it sound like the CO and crew of said patrol frigate were cowards.

 

[T.S.Rea]

'Timidly' would be a poor choice of wording.  What was meant by it is the very obvious fact that the frigate's hull was never designed for grinding through ice, and probably would get ripped open very easily.  The sonar would been readily prone to damage as well.  Moreover, free ice floes are dangerous to navigate near because they can rollover at any time, and many are much larger than the ship itself.  It would have been reckless to not slowly dodge these hazards along the way, avoiding almost all contact with the ice.  As for the landing party, the ships were never designed for transporting any significant force over the distances involved and then disembark them in a very hostile environment.  These problems are part of the fundamental origin of what I have termed an SOE 'Frigate' (which in that regard, HMCS Montreal (?) would be termed an sO Frigate).  Projecting into the Arctic shares most of the problems of projecting an expeditionary force anywhere. 

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Unless you are an SSN or SSBN chances are you are not going to operate in the deepest recesses of the Arctic. While AIP has its advantages, I would submit that the poor mans nuke boat is not a safe alternative for the crews in this case.

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

The Arctic exercise last year (?) involved operations around Lancaster Sound, well inside the mouth of the NW Passage; where the submarine went I could not be certain.

The Lancaster Sound operation was in 2006. The 2007 exercise was in the Hudson Strait, well to the South of the NW Passage.

Although I agree with conducting these patrols, having a patrol frigate venture timidly to the edge of the ice to offload a platoon or two of light infantry in inflatable boats could tend to offer the impression of sovreign impotence and a lack of any real resolve.  Sovreignty is more than just amassing a large force and demonstrating the capacity to use it, but taken in the opposite direction without it all that remains is just talk and surrender to any real challenge to it.

There isn't a set requirement for sovereignty, you just need to be doing more than the other claimants. If they're not doing anything, landing a few people in a RHIB is more than enough.

As it is today, they only real sovreign force of consequence are the Canadian Rangers.

Agreed.

If you can't find and train a few dozen submariners to operate the boats, you are not trying. 

The CF has struggled for years to man the boats we have, and that's with a lot more to entice submariners than a port visit to Thule. Even if you could find the submariners, what are you going to do with their families? Do you think they're going to want to move to the Arctic?

I would rather see the money spent giving some of the 30,000 residents of Nunavut a solid income and skills training that can be used directly or indirectly after their military service rather than paying much of the same amount on social assistance that serves only to undermine their self sufficiency. 

Wouldn't that work out better with surface ships? There's not a whole lot of civilian demand for submarine qualifications.

The Rangers have done as much to entrench our sovreignty on land as much as anything else, its time the same was done on the waterways, and surface ships alone can not fully accomplish that due to the low freedom of navigation in the area year round. 

If surface ships can't do it, why does it need to be done? Submarine operations don't mean a thing for sovereignty purposes.

Moreover, surveying in depth what we have taken for granted for so long is a necessary step in laying claim to it.  The maps first created in the mid 1800's are no longer enough.

Why?

Four small submarines standing guard over more area than many of the countries of the world combined costing most of the naval budget?

Definitely. Probably more. You've mentioned developing new propulsion technologies, new weapons, new UUV's, new methods of carrying weapons and UUV's, new hulls, we'll need the infrastructure to support the boats, etc. All that for four little boats, only one of which will be available for patrol.

It won't be cheap, but protecting anything of value isn't cheap. 

What value? There aren't any resources up there worth committing that kind of budget to protecting.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Oh I don't know, let say oil, gold, diamonds, other minerals not to mention transportation routes, fisheries, sovereignty is a case of show or lose it, we are in danger of screwing ourselves out of a huge chunk of our country.

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

Oh I don't know, let say oil, gold, diamonds, other minerals not to mention transportation routes, fisheries, sovereignty is a case of show or lose it, we are in danger of screwing ourselves out of a huge chunk of our country.

Sovereignty is only a case of "show it or lose it" if someone else tries to claim the area. Otherwise, there's no requirement for that large of a commitment. We have very few disputes in that area, and most of the ones we do have are with the US. No matter how large a force commitment we make we'll never be able to face them down, and none of the other disputes require a major show of force. There's nothing there worth a major commitment on anyone else' part either, so it's unlikely they'll just take the disputed land.

 

[T.S.Rea]

My mistake concerning Lancaster 2006/2007.

I can understand the argument concerning the cost of Arctic/coastal/task force boats, however, IMHO it follows the same train of thinking as dispensing completely with tanks in favour of armoured cars.  Don't need a huge fleet of them, just a basic effective force.  Spending more would than necessary diminishes the creation of wealth needed to fight full-fledged conflicts.

Got other priorities right now, so take care for the time being.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Sovereignty is only a case of "show it or lose it" if someone else tries to claim the area. Otherwise, there's no requirement for that large of a commitment. We have very few disputes in that area, and most of the ones we do have are with the US. No matter how large a force commitment we make we'll never be able to face them down, and none of the other disputes require a major show of force. There's nothing there worth a major commitment on anyone else' part either, so it's unlikely they'll just take the disputed land.

Actually there are several disputes involving several countries, and it's not just land, it is the control of the waterways and of the mineral rights of the seabed beneath them. I will agree that nuke subs are not likely the answer for our problems and there are better more cost effective ways to exert control including:
expanded bases in the north, along with more patrols and exercises
expanding the Rangers
Naval reserves with small patrol boats stationed in Tuk and the eastern Arctic for seasonal use.
Seabed sensor net on the west and east entrances, along with surface radar
A ice class II patrol vessel
Likely UAV flights in the future

AIP tech is moving along and we may be able in the future allow a limited movement in the arctic with our subs, however I do expect that Hunter AUV's will be the way of the future to exert undersea control of the arctic waterways, along with smart mines, if things start getting messy.

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

Actually there are several disputes involving several countries

Agreed. However, there's no reason that they'd rise to the level of armed disputes. There's just not enough resources up there to bother fighting a war over, which means it's unlikely to rise beyond sending a patrol vessel around once in a while.

it's not just land, it is the control of the waterways and of the mineral rights of the seabed beneath them.

Not really. The dispute is whether the NW Passage is an international strait or not. If it is an international strait, we can regulate passage but not deny it. If it isn't an international strait, we can deny passage. In either case, we own the seabed rights in our EEZ and that's not disputed by anyone.

there are better more cost effective ways to exert control including:
expanded bases in the north, along with more patrols and exercises
expanding the Rangers

Agreed.

Naval reserves with small patrol boats stationed in Tuk and the eastern Arctic for seasonal use.

That's not realistically going to happen. We have p[roblems manning the MCDV's as it is, and that's with the incentive of visiting good ports. A highlight of a port visit to Thule 2 months into a 4 month patrol is not going to make the crews happy campers.

Seabed sensor net on the west and east entrances, along with surface radar

That's also unlikely to happen. Those sensors cost a lot, and would need a lot of maintenance. There's also an issue with a very low signal to noise ratio in ice conditions. That's going to require a lot of very expensive development to fix. None of those issues are insurmountable with enough money, but is it really worth it?

A ice class II patrol vessel

If the intention is for year-round access, we probably need more than one.

Likely UAV flights in the future

Agreed. This is probably the most cost-effective way.

AIP tech is moving along and we may be able in the future allow a limited movement in the arctic with our subs, however I do expect that Hunter AUV's will be the way of the future to exert undersea control of the arctic waterways, along with smart mines, if things start getting messy.

Why would we need submarines and smart mines at all? If the NW Passage situation gets that bad, we'll be fighting the US. That's not a fight we can win.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Everyone focuses on the US issue, but frankly I think that if we do nothing you will see quite a few other countries in the area, including China, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Korea, Russia. The movement of goods and fisheries will be 2 big issues, as this is a sub thread I won’t get into a how I think Canada could maintain patrol boats up there.

Dragging ourselves back to topic, a few quotes from others on Tanknet re AIP

What I've read so far:

CCD seems to be a quite sound approach and cost-effective solution, as it retains the standard diesel engines and uses normal diesel fuel, plus stored oxygen and an inert gas like argon. This would make a refit of existing conventional diesel submarines relatively easy. Thyssen Nordseewerke TNSW and RDM (for the Moray class submarine) offered solutions, which however found no takers. A drawback seems to be the higher noise level for high underwater speeds when the diesel has to take over.

Stirling is the oldest AIP technology (diesel fuel and liquid oxygen), with the least power output and the highest noise level.

MESMA uses a steam-turbine system, which burns ethanol and liquid oxygen to create the steam needed to drive a turbo-electric generator. It provides the highest power output of all AIP systems. The very high pressure-firing allows exhaust carbon dioxide to be expelled at any depth without an exhaust compressor, and very deep diving depths of up to 600m can be achieved. However, the efficiency grade is quite low, and therefore the oxygen consumption is correspondingly higher. Quieter than the diesel powered AIPs, but noisier than fuel cell AIPs.

Fuel cell technology is offered by HDW and Siemens in Germany (U212/U214) and uses hydrogen and liquid oxygen and seems to be the most advanced and quietest technology currently available. The problems are the inherent danger of using hydrogen, therefore storing it in several metal hydride tanks, and the cost to produce it.

The Canadian Ballard fuel cell technology uses methanol which can be stored in a single tank. The necessary hydrogen is extracted from the methanol using a so-called 'reformer'. The advantage is that ethanol is a renewable resource and that it apparently holds 40 percent more hydrogen atoms than a similar volume of metal hydride. The disadvantage is the added complexity of the 'reformer' and a compressor for carbon dioxide exhaust disposal, otherwise limiting the diving depth of the submarine.

The Siemens fuel cells in the HDW designed fuel cell boats, as was already stated, use hydrogen stored in metal-hydride form. United Technologies is developing a fuel cell under contract to the Spanish Navy, for their S-80 class, that uses ethanol and a reformer to generate the hydrogen.

The reformer has been designed in Spain and seems to be working fine, UT is contracted to design an new fuel cell design. The fuel used is bioethanol, safer than conventional ethanol and also produced from plant waste. They claims it is also less toxic than standard sthanol....