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Drones, the Air Littoral, and the Looming Irrelevance of the USAF

And jobs for AC-130s - a bit more reach.


As well as


 
And the C-UAS fight


The Pentagon’s Replicator project is asking industry for ways to detect and down enemy drones that can be used without harming surrounding areas—like American territory.


Lawmakers and military officials are increasingly concerned about the rise of illicit drone sightings around military bases, as well as the vulnerability of critical security infrastructure. In 2024, the Defense Department requested $10 billion for counter-drone tech, according to a September report from AUVSI.

But the threat from drones is rising faster than the Pentagon can deploy defenses, Rear Adm. Paul Spedero, vice director for operations for the Joint Staff, told the House oversight subcommittee on military and foreign affairs last week.

"The homeland is no longer a sanctuary. And should our adversary choose to employ drones for surveillance or even attack, we would not be prepared to adequately defend our homeland and only marginally capable to defend our military installations.”

The paper noted the limitations of traditional methods of drone detection such as radar, radio frequency analysis, acoustic sensors, and visual cameras. Radar systems often struggle to identify small, low-flying drones. Radio-frequency analysis doesn’t work on autonomous drones that operate without active communication links. Acoustic sensors detect drones’ sounds but have trouble in noisy settings. Visual cameras’ effectiveness is limited by lighting conditions, weather, and obstructions, and they may struggle to distinguish drones from other small airborne objects.

The paper argues for a hybrid approach fusing these and other data. But that presents an enormous data challenge in synthesizing and analyzing large volumes of dissimilar data. That’s a challenge that the commercial tech sector has been focused on for years, less so the U.S. military.

“The AI-enabled decision support is really a critical area because the volume of data and the speeds that we're talking about…is truly astronomical,” Beck said.
 
Article concerning "sticker shock" on the USAF CCA programme.


The results reaffirm that procurement unit cost offers an astonishingly incomplete picture of the total resources required to field a weapon. Even the least expensive CCA included in the analysis ($9 million per aircraft) would have total lifecycle costs through 2045 in the $35 billion to $55 billion range. The most expensive CCA ($37 million per aircraft) would have total costs in the $80 billion to $125 billion range.

I think this comes back to a very simple question:

Is the CCA an aircraft or a munition?

If it is an aircraft designed for multi-mission use then you get one answer.
If it is a munition designed for single-mission use then you get another answer. Even if the munition is recoverable and designed to reuse and recycle.

If the latter case then the life cycle costs are best appreciated, I would think, by comparing the craft to either/or the Tomahawk or reusable target drones.

The USAF seems to be having a discussion between those looking at 3 MUSD solutions and those looking at 30 MUSD solutions.
 
We will build up to 7,000 new long-range
weapons in the UK to provide greater
European deterrence and support
around 800 jobs.

UK SDR 2025

....


....

The Tomahawk missile weighs 1300 kg without a booster and delivers a 450 kg payload out beyond 1600 km when air launched.
The MQ-58 Valkyrie has an empty weight of 1134 kg and a maximum take-off weight of 2722 kg.
Subtract the 1300 kg Tomahawk weight from the 2722 kg MTOW and you are left with 1422 kg of MQ-58 plus fuel.
1422-1134 = 288 kg of fuel.

The hard points may need some fiddling.
I wonder how much range can be achieved by using the Valkyrie as a booster?
What happens if you add more RATO/JATO rockets?

It would double the cost of a one way attack mission. But that could be reduced if the Valkyrie were recoverable.

....

I have no idea what the effect on the ranges would be but I suspect that a modified Valkyrie type vehicle, which has a purported range of 5600 km, could be engineered to carry a Tomahawk to a launch point.

5600 km plus 1600 km = 7200 km

Tomahawk cost = 2-4 MUSD
Valkyrie cost = 2 MUSD (>100 per year) to 4 MUSD (50 per year)

Distance from Bagotville QC to Dover UK = 4982 km
Distance from Cold Lake AB to Tokyo = 7983 km (Comox to Hokkaido is 6639 km)

....

Caudle urged caution in launching into a “shipbuilding arms race,” saying the focus should be on US capabilities per vessel.

You don't defeat knights with knights. You defeat knights with arrows. Mass quantities of arrows produced on an industrial scale.
 
More on the 30 MUSD aircraft vs 3 MUSD weapon discussion.

USAF may be tilting towards the weapon end of the debate.


A few lines in the Mitchell report pointed in that direction. ‘We steered clear of the term “attritable”,’ said study director and author Mark Gunzinger, because the willingness to lose aircraft depended so much on the scenario. It wasn’t just a matter of aircraft design.

The other pointer was that the Blue teams requested far more expendable systems than recoverable ones and highlighted their logistics advantages. ‘Designing CCA to be more like fighters increases their logistics footprints,’ the report states, whereas ‘designing CCA to be more like weapons significantly reduces their logistics footprints—it’s like a sliding scale.’

Runway-independent CCAs ‘helped operators to remain unpredictable’ and complicated Red’s airbase attacks. And, clearly, expendable systems can be much smaller than CCAs that must make a return trip, and, like munitions, they need no maintenance.

In short, expendable CCAs launched without runways are a different approach to the game of adding mass to the force, one that doesn’t involve buying a lot of logistical problems.

The conclusion is that powerful operational incentives are pushing towards one-way vehicles. Technology is helping them: small, cheap but effective payloads such as Brite Cloud, generic software-defined radio systems for communication, and unjammable optical navigation.
 

While laying out how the AI-enabled “recoverable” and “expendable” CCAs will complement the service’s diminishing fleet of Generation 4, 4.5 and 5 aircraft to confront China’s massive fleet, the study also focused on the logistics of operating CCAs while forward-basing them in the First Island Chain.
representatives from Kratos, Anduril and General Atomics, the industry representatives called for rapid and immediate fielding of the CCAs, at least the Increment 1 variants, to allow units to begin experimenting and figuring out how to use them.
The report and the TTX are explicit that these CCAs, and their future variants, are not “cheap fighters” that should neither “replace” the Air Force’s F-22s, F-35s, F-15s, F-16, F-47 NGAD penetrating counter-air aircraft (PCA), nor “constraining them as ‘loyal wingmen’. Rather, they should “complement” them for creating “unique effects in highly contested environments.”

The push for both weaponized kinetic and non-kinetic CCAs comes

the CCAs should “pose a diverse threat that is more difficult for adversaries to accurately characterize and counter in highly dynamic, time-compressed environments.” This “uncertainty” could be exploited “to disrupt an adversary’s counterair operations and react in ways that increase the survivability and lethality of all U.S. forces.”

CCAs forward based “closer to the fight” in southern Japan and Philippines in the First Island Chain and those launched from the air, closest to the Taiwan Strait, can help the Air Force “generate counter air sorties […] despite the increased threat of PLA missile attacks,” which the TTX teams accepted, since the CCAs have smaller ground logistics footprints.

The three TTX planning teams independently selected forces for their missions using inventories of Air Force fighters, bombers, electronic attack aircraft, and eleven notional CCA designs, labelled as CCA-1 to CCA-11. CCA-1 to CCA-6 were counterair drones and, except for CCA-5 which was “expendable,” the others were of the “recoverable” types, with all being in the $2 million to $ 40 million price range. CCA-7, CCA-8 and CCA-9 were “strike” aircraft, with CCA-7 being recoverable, while the last two are expendable loitering PGM types. CCA-10, meanwhile, is a recoverable ISR aircraft, while CCA-11 is an expendable drone for electronic attack roles.
a new CCA-12, derived from the CCA-8, would be a loitering munition acting as the decoy to force Chinese warship radars to track and engage them

So,

CCA - 1 recoverable counter-air
CCA - 2 recoverable counter-air
CCA - 3 recoverable counter-air
CCA - 4 recoverable counter-air
CCA - 6 recoverable counter-air
CCA - 7 recoverable strike
CCA - 10 recoverable ISR

CCA - 5 expendable counter-air
CCA - 8 expendable strike (loitering PGM)
CCA - 9 expendable strike (loitering PGM)
CCA - 11 expendable electronic attack
CCA - 12 expedable strike (loitering ASuM PGM)

CCA numbers emerged as another factor, with the teams assuming the presence of thousands of airframes of some of the CCAs. In the podcast with Col. Robert “Otis” Winkler, USAF (Ret), Vice President at Kratos Defense; Anduril’s director of Air Dominance Systems Andrew “Scar” Van Timmeren; and Scott “Fug” Gilloon, the sector vice president of Air Force Strategic Development and Capability Assessments at General Atomics, it was stressed how ordering large numbers of CCAs now itself and getting them out into the field allow refining many of these and identifying early on.

....

lots of low cost simple ones today moving to complex, expensive one tomorrow.
 
https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php.../06/20/ai-mq-20-avenger-first-simulated-kill/

The second test of the MQ-20 Avenger with Shield AI’s autonomy software saw the UCAV conducting more complex missions with both live and virtual aircraft.​

A “first-of-its-kind” test of a General Atomics-Aeronautical Systems, Inc (GA-ASI) MQ-20 Avenger using Shield AI’s Hivemind autonomy software program, conducted on Jun. 11, 2025, saw the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) completing a “simulated autonomous shootdown,” a GA-ASI release said. During this second test, GA-ASI mentioned the MQ-20 Avenger was part of an “exercise involving multiple live and virtual aircraft,” with Shield AI adding that the UCAV’s digital twin was also involved.


The Shield AI's Hivemind has also been used with the V-Bat and with the Kratos drones.

This raises the prospect of this team operating in defence of Canada

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1750696228063.png1750696278036.png

All operated without pilots but supervised from a cubicle in Ottawa. Hivemind.
 
I think a lot of the proponents of drones are unaware of the staggering loss rate they suffer of all types and sizes.

What is the loss rate on 155mm rounds? Recovery rate?

The whole point of drones is that they need to be IDGAF rounds.

Those that are shot down are also doing their job.
 
What is the loss rate on 155mm rounds? Recovery rate?

The whole point of some drones is that they need to be IDGAF rounds.

Those that are shot down are also doing their job.
That's an awfully broad brush you're painting with. Most military unmanned systems are not intended to be used that way.
 
Ukrainian manufacturers have the capacity to produce over 5 million first-person-view (FPV) drones per year, presidential advisor Alexander Kamyshin said in an interview with Radio Khartia published on March 28.Mar 28, 2025


Ukraine plans to purchase 4.5 million first-person-view (FPV) drones this year as part of a large-scale effort to equip its military with advanced technologies, the Defense Ministry reported on March 10.

The total cost of the procurement exceeds Hr 110 billion ($2.6 billion), with Hr 102 billion ($2.4 billion) allocated through the Defense Procurement Agency.

2,600,000,000 USD
4,500,000 drones

$578 per FPV drone


All told, Ukrainian artillery fires 5,000 or more 155-millimeter rounds every day for an annual total of around 2 million shells.

Unit cost of 155mm shells

$8600 per shell

155 mm shells price is growing – $8.6 million for 1,000 units​

The head of the NATO military committee, Admiral Rob Bauer, announced the current prices of conventional artillery 155mm ammunition, which can really just shock
 



2,600,000,000 USD
4,500,000 drones

$578 per FPV drone




Unit cost of 155mm shells

$8600 per shell


That's a lot of words to say "I don't understand the differences between weapon systems and their effects."


What you posted is essentially the same as comparing .22LR to .50BMG.

At the surface level, .22LR is the ultimate military round because you can buy hundreds for the cost of a .50BMG. When you factor in terminal effects, and use case, suddenly the comparison reveals itself to be pointless and misleading at best.
 

Eyeing the Pacific, Lockheed unveils low-cost $150,000 cruise missile​

WASHINGTON, March 3 (Reuters) - Lockheed Martin (LMT.N), opens new tab plans to unveil a new "affordable" cruise missile on Monday with a cost of about $150,000 and a range of over 500 miles (800 km) as the defense contractor works to tap a U.S. need to deter Chinese ambitions in the Pacific.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has pushed U.S. and other countries' thinking about armaments toward a new strategy known as "affordable mass," meaning having plenty of relatively cheap weapons at the ready.


Kratos officials have said the company could produce 250 to 500 Valkyries per year.

It can be produced at a unit cost of $4 million at an annual production rate of 50 aircraft,

and possibly for less than $2 million if over 100 airframes are built per year.

....

Not a few brilliant craft.

Millions of kind of bright munitions.
 
What is the loss rate on 155mm rounds? Recovery rate?

The whole point of drones is that they need to be IDGAF rounds.

Those that are shot down are also doing their job.
A lot of those drones are not meant to be one use vehicles, the US lost some 6-11 large reconnaissance drones in Yemen, the large Turkish reconnaissance drones in Ukraine have to be used very carefully to keep the loss rate down. Whereas in the Armenian and Azerbaijan conflict you saw a much lower rate of loss. Reminds me very much of the early use of aircraft that flew with impunity over the lines, till pilots brought pistols.
 
Excellent analogy.

The counter to a counter to a counter…

And the counter to a King Tiger was 5 Shermans.

That war was one by mass. Big battalions win.

My underlying point about Ukraine's low cost drones is the low cost of supplying a two way comms link to a vehicle that permits the operator to view the target, and the route to the target, conduct manoeuvres in flight, and decide to abort or prosecute. Up until now those capabilities were associated with 5 or 6 zeroes. Now we are down to 2 or 3.

And the nature of the propulsive power is irrelevant. Rocket, jet, prop or gravity.

All aircraft are subject to lift plus thrust equals pull plus drag.

If they can be managed for less than 1000 dollars on an FPV then the cost of the management system , the software, on larger systems can be equally cheap.

That area, the management, has been a highly profitable part of contracts and a cost driver.

If it is established that an 80% solution for less than 1000 dollars that cost reduction will translate into production lines for tens of thousands a month, if not a week.

That logic, I believe, is already showing up in the cruise missile and short range ballistic missile markets.
 
And the counter to a King Tiger was 5 Shermans.

That war was one by mass. Big battalions win.

My underlying point about Ukraine's low cost drones is the low cost of supplying a two way comms link to a vehicle that permits the operator to view the target, and the route to the target, conduct manoeuvres in flight, and decide to abort or prosecute. Up until now those capabilities were associated with 5 or 6 zeroes. Now we are down to 2 or 3.

And the nature of the propulsive power is irrelevant. Rocket, jet, prop or gravity.

All aircraft are subject to lift plus thrust equals pull plus drag.

If they can be managed for less than 1000 dollars on an FPV then the cost of the management system , the software, on larger systems can be equally cheap.

That area, the management, has been a highly profitable part of contracts and a cost driver.

If it is established that an 80% solution for less than 1000 dollars that cost reduction will translate into production lines for tens of thousands a month, if not a week.

That logic, I believe, is already showing up in the cruise missile and short range ballistic missile markets.
Don’t mistake Ukraine’s wartime economic policies with what would happen elsewhere.
One maybe able to push out significant volumes of items at ‘low cost’, but when you see what is subsidizing the economy, you will see that the model for that will not work elsewhere.

The West pours billions of dollars of non military economic aid into Ukraine. That offsets a lot of issues for acquiring materials and labor would drastically change the calculus elsewhere.

Furthermore, I’m not as concerned about UAS issues, or a lot of the ‘not smart’ munitions, as we have significant counters available in terms of C-RAM, and DE C-UAS that can make the already rather weak success rates of UAS drastically smaller.

Logistics drains from mass are a thing, for example: if I can accomplish the task with one device (lets call it J) even if it costs 100x of Y item, and while Y item is smaller than J, it’s not going to be 100 times smaller, and let’s say it’s 1/3rd the size, and 1/10 effective, you are now taxing your logistics system to provide 10 y, and it’s taking three times the space to ship as J. The other aspect is that the time and effort to make a kill goes up, and if J has a PKill of 98% inside 20 seconds, and it takes 10 Y 1min 30 to get the same PK, you also need to see what the enemy is going to be doing in the extra 1min 10 seconds it has to act using Y as opposed to to J.

All of a sudden I need to dramatically increase my logistics burden, potentially my medical evacuation and troops losses also go up so that time delta for the PK.

When you get into high level strategic planning, the logistics aspects of supporting a war takes on significantly more importance than the various tactical planning elements.

This all gets war gamed out as best as can be modeled to make decisions as to the optimal force construct.
 
Don’t mistake Ukraine’s wartime economic policies with what would happen elsewhere.
One maybe able to push out significant volumes of items at ‘low cost’, but when you see what is subsidizing the economy, you will see that the model for that will not work elsewhere.

The West pours billions of dollars of non military economic aid into Ukraine. That offsets a lot of issues for acquiring materials and labor would drastically change the calculus elsewhere.

Furthermore, I’m not as concerned about UAS issues, or a lot of the ‘not smart’ munitions, as we have significant counters available in terms of C-RAM, and DE C-UAS that can make the already rather weak success rates of UAS drastically smaller.

Logistics drains from mass are a thing, for example: if I can accomplish the task with one device (lets call it J) even if it costs 100x of Y item, and while Y item is smaller than J, it’s not going to be 100 times smaller, and let’s say it’s 1/3rd the size, and 1/10 effective, you are now taxing your logistics system to provide 10 y, and it’s taking three times the space to ship as J. The other aspect is that the time and effort to make a kill goes up, and if J has a PKill of 98% inside 20 seconds, and it takes 10 Y 1min 30 to get the same PK, you also need to see what the enemy is going to be doing in the extra 1min 10 seconds it has to act using Y as opposed to to J.

All of a sudden I need to dramatically increase my logistics burden, potentially my medical evacuation and troops losses also go up so that time delta for the PK.

When you get into high level strategic planning, the logistics aspects of supporting a war takes on significantly more importance than the various tactical planning elements.

This all gets war gamed out as best as can be modeled to make decisions as to the optimal force construct.

Kev your logic also applies in spades to conventional forces. The logistics required to sustain a 10,000 round per day artillery force are massive. Dumb rounds are cheap but apparently not as cheap as FPV drones.

And the cost of adding a flight control module to a dumb round are dropping from JDAM-Excalibur levels to those of the APKWS-PGK(M1156)-PGMM-RGK122, down into the 3-zeroes range.

A good chunk of the Sopwith pilot's time was spent just keeping the Camel in the air, managing the flight. That process has been automated and reduced to a package that can be added to anything thst has the potential for flight to a few hundred dollars.

That changes the way things are done and increases the range of possibilities.
 
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