F-35 Opinion paper.

[Good2Golf]

I quote from a service paper by a LCol at staff college back in 2015/16:

Fair enough. One does the best with what they have at their disposal. McRae’s paper isn’t bad, but does refer to some material that itself became part of the lore after the fact, and themselves had inaccuracies within them, including Fraser’s AG report of the day. Not laziness on anyone’s part, just a massive amount of info being parsed and analyzed and situated and published.

I can understand the interpretation and misinterpretation of that slide, but the reality of the situation was that rather than having three helicopters performing three distinct roles (light observation, utility and medium lift) only one capability would remain in the CAF by way of the Griffon.

And this was precisley the issue - successive 10 TAG Commanders (then BGens Cuppens and Waldrum) were clear in the 1990-1992 timeframe that the LOH role was not going to be continued, nor the MTH role. In the 1994-1997 period, then BGens Henault and Pennie sought to investigate what the Griffon could do to support portions of the LOH role (the construct was terms A/B-roles, A being UTTH and B being limited LOH/recce…but it didn’t last long as without meaningful EO/IR available, there wasn’t a valid capability to support FOO/FAC/Recce).

While no one expected that it would make a decent light observation helicopter, and it was abundantly clear it couldn't do a Chinook's job, people expected that it would at least do the CH-135's job. It couldn't either.

Hmmm, interesting position. Having flown CH-136, CH-135, CH-146, CH-147 and CH-147F, I’ll differ with that assessment. (Details to follow)

The CH-146 lifts about 3,100 lbs while the CH-135 could mange around 4,400. (all weights approximate - I base the CH-146 lift on the service paper as I can't find a specific reference anywhere else on the web - I assume they are too ashamed to post it)

There is NO WAY a Twin Huey was out lifting a Griffon. Most I’ve put on a Huey’s hook was 2,500lbs…and the old girl was bucking like a bronco. I’m not sure where the 4,400lb figure for the Hury comes from, but it wasn’t reality. I slung L5s and LG1s with Huey’s and Griffons respectively, and the Huey would only do the L5 with the breech and some other components removed during flight, so it wasn’t a release and shoot lift by any means (even Dave Brown, 2 RCHA’s CO of the day cursed the Huey’s sling capacity).

The upshoot was that the Griffon was expected, by the troops on the ground, to do the best it could in all helicopter tasks necessary within its limited specification. Artillery lost two capabilities - aerial observation and transport of light howitzers.

…which FMC’s LGen Foster knew when he endorsed the CH-136’s and CH-147’s removal from service…

The latter comes about with the switching out of the L5 pack howitzer (2,840 lbs which can be reduced by stripping components) and the LG1 (3,350 lbs). An LG1 can be lifted for very short distances if the Griffon reduces fuel and everything possible, including the breech block is stripped.

Don’t forget that the JCSP paper pointed out how much OVERWEIGHT the Artillery’s flashy new LG-1 was above the requirements specifications. Buying a 4-person car then complaining when the family grows to 5 isn’t the car’s fault…

IMHO the acquisition of the CH-148 saved the Griffon from what should have been the scrap heap. With a Chinook you have the capability to lift the guns and logistics that the Griffon can't and its reduce lift of infantrymen can be compensated for. Drones now very adequately, if not more than adequately, replace the light observation role.

I think you mean the CH-147(F)…although if the CH-147F hadn’t come into service when it did, the CH-146 wouldn’t have been going to the scrap heap any time soon.

The army can now get by with the Griffons but it won't thrive.

Maybe the army should have thought about that in 1990/1991 when it pushed for the Chinooks removal from service because it didn’t want to pay for the $400M upgrade to D-model configuration.

#armyowngoalitstilllikestoblameontheairforce34yearslater

There was some discussion about the Griffon transmission being derated. It theoretically is a more capable bird than the older Twin Huey’s - but years ago one of the 148 pilots was telling a few of us, that in order achieve greater longevity of the airframe the transmission was limited — not sure if I’m recalling it correctly but the 412 should be a more powerful 4 bladed version of the 212…

I'm just reading specs off a book here - anyone knowledgeable chip in - Wikipedia says the CH-146 has a Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6T-3D Twin-Pac coupled turboshaft engine, 1,250 shp (930 kW).

The CH 1-35, on the other hand, had a 1,800 hp Pratt & Whitney Canada T400-CP-400 Twin-Pac turboshaft. Bell CH-135 “Twin Huey” | Canada Aviation and Space Museum

Not sure if the shp v hp rating matters here.

@KevinB, you’re recalling right. Not published frequently, but not unclassified, the CH-146 (B412CF, based on the B412EP) transmission was given a 1,135shp continuous rating (arising from the T400-CP-400’s original max power flat-rating) and 1,250shp takeoff/contingency rating for lifecycle consideration. While the 412EP’s transmission had an additional contingency rating of 1,350shp (and subsequently 20 more shp to 1,370shp in the EPI model), DND chose not to internally certify that rating, because it was close enough to the engine’s 1,250 flat-rated maximum power

To be honest, 1135/1250shp was fine, since that’s all the airframe needed to perform within spec and all the engines were designed to provide in dual-power section mode.

To clarify, a T400-CP-400 IS a PT6T-3#, just a military designation…the Huey and the Griffon had the same engine with a minor variation of the fuel control system, PT6T-3B for Huey and -3D for Griffon. The 1800shp max power rating shared by both PT6T-## Twin-Pac turboshaft engines comes from the fact that it is essentially two separate PT-6 turboshaft engines of 900shp each, joined by a common gearbox. Together, the engines’ fuel is limited by the FCI so as to not exceed transmission ratings. The 1135/1250shp to 1800shp delta was essentially a ‘virtual’ figure, since the only time you’d max out an engine…or ‘power section’ was when the other half of the power-pac failed…then you had 900shp of one section to feed a 1135/1250shp transmission, so about 75% total power with only a single section working. There are some more exact % for OEI (one engine inoperative), but that’s the general idea in Twin-Pac (T400/PT6T) engines.

Overall, with appropriate expectations, the Griffon does what it does decently, and quite well in many cases. There is no way a Twin Huey could have done the same CCA (close combat attack)/escort role in AFG for example as the Griffon did.

Having flown the Twin Huey and Griffon in some ‘demanding’ roles, the Griffon is/was my hands down preference. The only thing I liked the Huey for better was air shows and Friday afternoon, fully rule-compliant passes by certain establishments on the Brigade/base.

Thankfully, a deliberate planned process to assess capabilities required of the tactical aviation future fleet is being conducted and the next Tactical Aviation Capability Set (nTACS), through collaboration and consultation with all existing and potential user agencies will (eventually) result in as best a branch capability as possible (certainly better than the politically-driven, rice-bowled solutions from the late-80s/early-90s.

 

[Rudburg]

#armyowngoalitstilllikestoblameontheairforce34yearslater

LOL.

If the Army appears the victim, it's probably safe to assume that the Army is somehow responsible for its own misfortune.

 

[Good2Golf]

LOL.

If the Army appears the victim, it's probably safe to assume that the Army is somehow responsible for its own misfortune.

Very true.

Although, in fairness to the Army, some leaders were appreciative of other environments support in the joint capability side of things, and supported substantive elements of tactical aviation. I will say that LGen Leslie was good to aviation, supporting introduction of the CH-147F into service in a substantive manner.

 

[dimsum]

Maybe the army should have thought about that in 1990/1991 when it pushed for the Chinooks removal from service because it didn’t want to pay for the $400M upgrade to D-model configuration.

#armyowngoalitstilllikestoblameontheairforce34yearslater

I’m sure it would have turned out better if Tac Hel was under the Army

 

[Good2Golf]

As would have MAG under the Senior Service…

 

[GK .Dundas]

Why in the wide, wide world of sports would you give Maritime Air to the Army ?

 

[FSTO]

As would have MAG under the Senior Service…

Didn't MARCOM "own" MAG for a few years after unification?

 

[FJAG]

I was hoping you'd come back with the facts in this case.

Fair enough. One does the best with what they have at their disposal. McRae’s paper isn’t bad, but does refer to some material that itself became part of the lore after the fact, and themselves had inaccuracies within them, including Fraser’s AG report of the day. Not laziness on anyone’s part, just a massive amount of info being parsed and analyzed and situated and published.

That post was tongue in cheek, simply to point out that the "lore" of what went on even gets into staff college service papers.

And this was precisley the issue - successive 10 TAG Commanders (then BGens Cuppens and Waldrum) were clear in the 1990-1992 timeframe that the LOH role was not going to be continued, nor the MTH role. In the 1994-1997 period, then BGens Henault and Pennie sought to investigate what the Griffon could do to support portions of the LOH role (the construct was terms A/B-roles, A being UTTH and B being limited LOH/recce…but it didn’t last long as without meaningful EO/IR available, there wasn’t a valid capability to support FOO/FAC/Recce).

It was an interesting timeframe when things were changing in a big way for the army what with CFE closing down, 4 CMBG and its equipment being dispersed and the restructure of the army contemplated and eventually implemented. Costs and rationalizing multiple fleets into one were always a factor.

Just as an aside, the Cuppens you mention, who was the Comd 10 TAG from 1989 to 1992, was Lou Cuppens who joined the army as a ResF gunner, went RegF and in 1969/70 was a graduate of what would be the last air observation post officer's course in Shilo. When the arty gave up its L-19s and retrained as Kiowa pilots Lou went with them and was transferred into the RCAF. He went on to be a LGen and retired as DComd NORAD. He knew light observation cold and would have had no delusions as to what would happen.

Hmmm, interesting position. Having flown CH-136, CH-135, CH-146, CH-147 and CH-147F, I’ll differ with that assessment. (Details to follow)

That's why I defer to you.

There is NO WAY a Twin Huey was out lifting a Griffon. Most I’ve put on a Huey’s hook was 2,500lbs…and the old girl was bucking like a bronco. I’m not sure where the 4,400lb figure for the Hury comes from, but it wasn’t reality. I slung L5s and LG1s with Huey’s and Griffons respectively, and the Huey would only do the L5 with the breech and some other components removed during flight, so it wasn’t a release and shoot lift by any means (even Dave Brown, 2 RCHA’s CO of the day cursed the Huey’s sling capacity).

My tour with 2 RCHA was from 1972 to 1976 at which time we were a "light" regiment fielding a battery of L5s for AMF(L) and a battery of C1s (borrowed from the reserves). Each year we conducted a 3-4 week winter exercise that was helicopters only using the CH-135s and the CH-113A Voyageurs. The CH-135s lifted the L5s and FOOs while the C1s travelled by Voyageur.

I don't ever recall a weight problem with the L5. We did strip them of their shields but not because of weight but because it was believed that the shields effected the airflow over the gun while in flight. (shields-on and shields-off was always a bone of contention that showed the stupidity of "gunner lore." 3 RCHA and 5 RALC insisted on shields-on because they would protect the crew from a muzzle premature [it wouldn't and they never happened] while the Airborne battery rarely, if ever, had a shield mounted. 2 RCHA generally went shields-on)

Okay. I've spent the last fruitless hour looking for a photo for evidence of an L5 in flight with ammo but I clearly recall that we lifted not only our guns but an underslung load of ammunition. This is one of a Chinook and M2A2 but which illustrates the way we did it with the Huey and L5.

…which FMC’s LGen Foster knew when he endorsed the CH-136’s and CH-147’s removal from service…

I'm sure this was not the first army decision to divest an essential capability on the grounds of funding priorities. It certainly wasn't the last. I guess its easy to look at things with 20/20 hindsight, and while I can't fault the CH-136 divestment decision, the CH-147 one was quite poor when one should have foreseen the move to a light and medium army. Sure, the Canadian brigades were absorbing all the tracked equipment from Germany but the light forces still had the SSF and the contentious 10/90 battalions.

Don’t forget that the JCSP paper pointed out how much OVERWEIGHT the Artillery’s flashy new LG-1 was above the requirements specifications. Buying a 4-person car then complaining when the family grows to 5 isn’t the car’s fault…

Yeah, albeit the CH-146 was ordered in 1992 and delivered from 1995-1997. The LG1 was ordered in June 1994 and delivered in 1996-7. There is obviously some concurrency here but in general, the four passenger car (and its limitations) were known before the decision to buy the gun was made. Besides the weight difference the big issue vis a vis the L5 and the LG1 was their range which was 10,500m for the L5 and 17,000m for the G1. Range was a big issue at the time - see for example the, IMHO, entirely unnecessary conversion of the C1 to the C3 105mm howitzer. The army, and the artillery, likes its new, shiny little baubles. Definitely an own goal albeit that the only real competitors, the L118/M119 variants, were heavier/even more heavier than the G1. Solution: Keep a battery of L5s in storage for air mobile ops. a battery's worth were in fact kept in storage as can be seen in the background from a recent photo of the 2 RCHA gun shed. Three of these were refurbished for salutes at the Vimy 100th. I'm not sure if these were ever contemplated for operational use, but, IMHO, could have been as the gun is still in service elsewhere.

I think you mean the CH-147(F)…although if the CH-147F hadn’t come into service when it did, the CH-146 wouldn’t have been going to the scrap heap any time soon.

Mea Culpa. Off course I did. As mentioned, my experience was with the Voyageurs. I've never been in a Chinook nor been pounded by blowing snow hooking a gun up to one during the winter (a memory of the Voyageur that I can't erase from my mind)

Maybe the army should have thought about that in 1990/1991 when it pushed for the Chinooks removal from service because it didn’t want to pay for the $400M upgrade to D-model configuration.

#armyowngoalitstilllikestoblameontheairforce34yearslater

See above about poor foresight. Everything in the army is live-in-the-moment financial coping rather than long term strategy. Why a financial crunch leads to divestment of still serviceable equipment rather than preservation storage, I'll never understand.

@KevinB, you’re recalling right. Not published frequently, but not unclassified, the CH-146 (B412CF, based on the B412EP) transmission was given a 1,135shp continuous rating (arising from the T400-CP-400’s original max power flat-rating) and 1,250shp takeoff/contingency rating for lifecycle consideration. While the 412EP’s transmission had an additional contingency rating of 1,350shp (and subsequently 20 more shp to 1,370shp in the EPI model), DND chose not to internally certify that rating, because it was close enough to the engine’s 1,250 flat-rated maximum power

To be honest, 1135/1250shp was fine, since that’s all the airframe needed to perform within spec and all the engines were designed to provide in dual-power section mode.

To clarify, a T400-CP-400 IS a PT6T-3#, just a military designation…the Huey and the Griffon had the same engine with a minor variation of the fuel control system, PT6T-3B for Huey and -3D for Griffon. The 1800shp max power rating shared by both PT6T-## Twin-Pac turboshaft engines comes from the fact that it is essentially two separate PT-6 turboshaft engines of 900shp each, joined by a common gearbox. Together, the engines’ fuel is limited by the FCI so as to not exceed transmission ratings. The 1135/1250shp to 1800shp delta was essentially a ‘virtual’ figure, since the only time you’d max out an engine…or ‘power section’ was when the other half of the power-pac failed…then you had 900shp of one section to feed a 1135/1250shp transmission, so about 75% total power with only a single section working. There are some more exact % for OEI (one engine inoperative), but that’s the general idea in Twin-Pac (T400/PT6T) engines.

Overall, with appropriate expectations, the Griffon does what it does decently, and quite well in many cases. There is no way a Twin Huey could have done the same CCA (close combat attack)/escort role in AFG for example as the Griffon did.

Having flown the Twin Huey and Griffon in some ‘demanding’ roles, the Griffon is/was my hands down preference. The only thing I liked the Huey for better was air shows and Friday afternoon, fully rule-compliant passes by certain establishments on the Brigade/base.

Thankfully, a deliberate planned process to assess capabilities required of the tactical aviation future fleet is being conducted and the next Tactical Aviation Capability Set (nTACS), through collaboration and consultation with all existing and potential user agencies will (eventually) result in as best a branch capability as possible (certainly better than the politically-driven, rice-bowled solutions from the late-80s/early-90s.

My understanding is that the CH-146's current upgrade will extend the aircraft to extend the remaining 85 to 2031.

IMHO, there is no longer a need for a light observation (and perhaps even an AH role) with the proliferation of drones in their various forms. A utility lift with a complimentary medium lift capability seems sufficient. With the CH-147's ability to lift and resupply an M777 with its extensive range, the CH-146's ability to lift an LG1 has become a mostly mute point.

I'm not sure what exactly the CH-146s future life-cycle management post-2013 will be, but, IMHO, the selection of any replacement aircraft should certainly be done slowly, thoughtfully and deliberately in conjunction with the doctrine for the future of the army's light forces. The army and RCAF have a chance to get it right the first time. The army has had over two decades to sort that out their light forces. I'm not overly optimistic that there will be any major progress so long as the army stays symmetric and leaves the light capability as the poor cousin to the LAV capability.

 

[Quirky]

Looks at thread topic....scrolls through to see talk about helicopters....yup, seems about right.

 

[Kirkhill]

Looks at thread topic....scrolls through to see talk about helicopters....yup, seems about right.

Hang tough! Reserve uniforms to follow.

 

[Good2Golf]

Looks at thread topic....scrolls through to see talk about helicopters....yup, seems about right.

On the plus side, tactical aviation usually adheres to proper dress policy regarding glove, raincoats and fleece toques.

And nTACS assets will be nicely integrated with JADC2 digital battle space in which the F-35 will also operate.

 

[dimsum]

On the plus side, tactical aviation usually adheres to proper dress policy regarding glove, raincoats and fleece toques.

What policy…?

 

[armrdsoul77]

One less F35 in U.S. inventory

"An F-35B enroute from Fort Worth, Texas, to Edwards Air Force Base, California, crashed after a refueling stop at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. The pilot safely ejected. Safety is our priority, and we will follow appropriate investigation protocol."

Marine Corps F-35B Crashes In New Mexico (Updated)

The mishap took place outside the Albuquerque International Sunport and the pilot reportedly safely ejected.

www.twz.com

 

[dapaterson]

The USMC and the F35B are the source of a not inconsiderable number of problems with the JSF program.