Fields Of Fire - Terry Copp
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Michael Dorosh
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mdh said:
Copp is a solid researcher. I don't have an opinion on Fields of Fire but seem to recall many of the other historians in the community, as well as general readerships, share your opinion. So tell us what parts of the history you feel he did well in revising? I'd be interested to hear more.
mdh
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Hi Michael,
In sum, re-establishing the reputation of First Canadian Army and its leadership during the campaign. I think all of us have grown used to the notion that the Canadian in Normandy was not the equivalent of its German opposition and that Canadian command was second-rate or lacking in many instances. Again especially compared to the German.
I'm doing this off the top of my head here - but I believe that CP Stacey was first in the long lilne of historians who have compared our army to the German and found it wanting. Indeed the concensus has been that without overwhelming firepower - especially in the air - we might not have succeeded.
Copp turns that on its head and although I can't summarize all of his research here I can highlight some examples:
1. Overwhelming firepower? - in fact the beach defenses on June 6 were largely intact when Canadian troops came ashore because naval gunfire had missed most of the targets -most were taken by infantry assault - as for airpower it was overwhelming but wildly inaccurate - leaving most forward troops to deal with armour and strongpoints in the offensive - which of course always favours the defenders. Artillery was formidable but again inaccurate and not always reliable.
2. Superior German doctrine and leadership? - In fact, mostly unimaginative and predictable - Canadian platoon commanders could always rely on German counterattack and take advantage of it to inflict heavy casualties - losses the Germans could not afford. German troops were a mixed bag while the Canadian army - inexperienced as they were, had a far better grip on tactics than they have been credited with.
3. Strategic/Tactical Blunders? In fact the Canadians made impressive - and in some cases spectacular - progress against entrenched and determined German forces in their sector and almost closed the Falaise Gap - they failed due to factors beyond their control which had little to do with their military capabilities. Again the destruction of the German Army of the West was absolute, decisive, and accomplished within the space of three months - a record time by the standards of total war.
4. Superior German weapons? Only to a degree - it turned out that the most lethal weapon in Normandy was the mortar. The Lee Enfield and the Bren were adequate to the task. German tanks were impressive but flawed, ie hard to maintain engines - and of courses not enough of them.
5. Correcting the record - Copp reviews regimental war diaries/letters/testimony with a critical eye and finds a lot facts that have not been taken into consideration or simply distorted by other historians or some of the more self-serving memoirs of the participants.
This is just a quick summary of some things raised by Copp - again it's off the top of my head so forgive some of the inaccuracies. In all a great read and food for thought, cheers mdh
In sum, re-establishing the reputation of First Canadian Army and its leadership during the campaign. I think all of us have grown used to the notion that the Canadian in Normandy was not the equivalent of its German opposition and that Canadian command was second-rate or lacking in many instances. Again especially compared to the German.
I'm doing this off the top of my head here - but I believe that CP Stacey was first in the long lilne of historians who have compared our army to the German and found it wanting. Indeed the concensus has been that without overwhelming firepower - especially in the air - we might not have succeeded.
Copp turns that on its head and although I can't summarize all of his research here I can highlight some examples:
1. Overwhelming firepower? - in fact the beach defenses on June 6 were largely intact when Canadian troops came ashore because naval gunfire had missed most of the targets -most were taken by infantry assault - as for airpower it was overwhelming but wildly inaccurate - leaving most forward troops to deal with armour and strongpoints in the offensive - which of course always favours the defenders. Artillery was formidable but again inaccurate and not always reliable.
2. Superior German doctrine and leadership? - In fact, mostly unimaginative and predictable - Canadian platoon commanders could always rely on German counterattack and take advantage of it to inflict heavy casualties - losses the Germans could not afford. German troops were a mixed bag while the Canadian army - inexperienced as they were, had a far better grip on tactics than they have been credited with.
3. Strategic/Tactical Blunders? In fact the Canadians made impressive - and in some cases spectacular - progress against entrenched and determined German forces in their sector and almost closed the Falaise Gap - they failed due to factors beyond their control which had little to do with their military capabilities. Again the destruction of the German Army of the West was absolute, decisive, and accomplished within the space of three months - a record time by the standards of total war.
4. Superior German weapons? Only to a degree - it turned out that the most lethal weapon in Normandy was the mortar. The Lee Enfield and the Bren were adequate to the task. German tanks were impressive but flawed, ie hard to maintain engines - and of courses not enough of them.
5. Correcting the record - Copp reviews regimental war diaries/letters/testimony with a critical eye and finds a lot facts that have not been taken into consideration or simply distorted by other historians or some of the more self-serving memoirs of the participants.
This is just a quick summary of some things raised by Copp - again it's off the top of my head so forgive some of the inaccuracies. In all a great read and food for thought, cheers mdh
Michael Dorosh
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Interesting - I am at work and will reply in detail later. But do want to point out - Foulkes was the one who suggested to Stacey that the Canadians weren't a match for the Germans; at the time he commanded 2nd Canadian Div (?) The exact quote was words to the effect of "we were no match for them."
Makes one wonder how they managed to not only push through to Falaise, but then cross the Seine and send the Germans reeling back to Belgium...
More as I get time - thanks for the response.
Makes one wonder how they managed to not only push through to Falaise, but then cross the Seine and send the Germans reeling back to Belgium...
More as I get time - thanks for the response.
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I guess this would count as "revisionism" if you follow the current line of thought that at the operational level, the Canadians bungled their way in Normandy. I haven't seen this book, but I am willing to bet that the author aims much of his criticism at Col John English's superb The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: Failure in High Command. To date, I think English's assessment is the best out there and his premise is backed by excellent and well-rounded citations (including alot of German material/interviews). I'll have to pick up Copp's book in order to put it on the scale with English's definitive work.
Here are my thoughts (based on what I've seen) on the salient features that mdh pointed out.
No one really disputes the hardiness of the Canadian soldiers or their prowess at the tactical level. Operational level leadership was not well regarded at all - look at what figures like Monty, Dempsey, etc have to say - English goes into great detail on this.
The beach weren't the "Schwerpunkt" of the German defence until after the Allies had largely cleared them and consolidated the beachhead - remember, Hitler believed Normandy to be a feint while waiting for Patton's "Ghost Army" to cross the Pas de Calais. While the struggle for the beaches was hard fought (as is any opposed amphibious landing) most of the German strength was in operational/strategic reserve.
As for airpower, one only has to read accounts of German soldiers and commanders about the debilitating effects of the Allied Air Superiority presented. German doctrine relied upon massing a mobile, armoured counter-punch in an operational reserve to deliver a counterattack at the right time - read some of Glantz's work on the Eastern Front battles to see how effective this could be if done right (9th Army's defence under Model of the Ryzev Salient is a good example). It's hard to do this when your armoured forces are forced to travel at night and cannot mass together to be used in a concentrated "punch". To discount Allied Airpower is foolish.
Finally, to disregard the importance of Canadian Artillery is foolhardy as well. Canadian gunners were the last remaining vestiges of professionalism from the hard-hitting Canadian Corps of WWI - the rest of the Army had dissolved into Militia circus-acts during the interwar period. My reading of Normandy left me with the impression that anytime the Germans managed to regain the initiative and either attempt a counter-attack or counter-offensive, the quick and efficient artillery of the Canadians could quickly be poured on to shatter what efforts the Germans could muster.
If Copp is so eager to deny firepower as the key to Canadian (and Allied) success, what does he suppose was the true reason for victory at Normandy? It certainly wasn't maneuver based at dislocating the enemy with rapid spearheads. As unimaginative as the Allied bludgeon at Normandy may seem, there was no denying it was decisive and it worked.
Sure, German troops on a whole were a mixed bag - there were many Static and Garrison units at the Atlantic Wall, and many of these were understrength and recuperating from beatings on the Eastern Front. Remember, this is June 1944 and much of the cream-of-the-crop of the German Forces has been shattered on the Eastern Front. As well, as Normandy is raging, the Germans have a bigger problem when Bagration kicks off and an entire Army Group is suddenly wiped off the map. An Army or two in France isn't going to gather attention of the entire Wehrmacht.
As well, remember that the German units that the Canadian's fought were primarily of the 1st SS Panzer Corps, which had two SS Panzer Divisions, the 1st (LSSAH) and the 12 (Hitlerjugend). I am unsure of how Copp asserts that these formations were full of "unimaginative" and "predictable" leaders. The 12th SS was formed around a cadre of leaders (Officers and NCO's) from the 1st SS that had years of combat experience on the Eastern Front and this leadership was given a recruit pool of young men who had been indoctrinated for years in a paramilitary organization (HJ). The 1st SS was about the same.
Sure, the German counter-attack was predictable - it was just as predictable as the synchronized Canadian artillery barrage followed by an Infantry attack backed by tanks. This synchronized approach by Canadian commanders with little to no real operational talent leads to most histories tagging a good lot of the Canadian generals as "unimaginative" and "predictable". Warring states will get a good measure on each-others doctrine after a few scrapes and figure it out. It is how that knowledge is exploited that counts.
My own personal opinion is that after four years of total war, while sustaining huge losses on the Eastern Front and having their country systematically flattened from the West, the fact that the Germans were able to organize a cohesive defence at Normandy that held up for months a superbly equipped Allied Army that had trained for 4 years for the event, and when beaten, managed to pull back in fairly good order and to set up yet another cohesive defence on the Rhine Frontier which demanded more months of bloody fighting, and doing this while facing successive losses and encroachment on the Eastern Front, should allow us to give the German doctrine and leadership a little more credit then Copp seems prepared to give. See Martin Van Crevald's Fighting Power for more on this.
Tactically, yes - the Canadians were able to overcome a tenacious German defence. But inept command was unable to to turn these tough won tactical victories into operational success. In reading English's survey of Normandy, the record seems to indicate that the initial plan had the Canadian's being primed as the breakout spearhead of the Allied Army Group that was to bring a quick end to Germany. As a breakout vanished in the teeth of a 2-month German defence, the Canadian formations slowly lost their lustre to the higher commanders for being the "Shock Army" that the WWI Canadian Corps was. By the time Crerar and 1st Canadian Army showed up, things got even more muddled and the "breakout" was transferred from Monty's Army to Bradley's, who threw Patton into the "Cobra Offensive" after shattering the German's at Mortain.
I'm not seeing "impressive and spectacular" in the fact that, as English points out, Canada's Army moved from being a spearhead of the Allied Army Group to occupying the Left Flank and clearing out Holland.
As well, I don't see how the German Army of the West was "absolutely and decisively" defeated - sure, in terms of the Battle for France. But the German's succeeded in withdrawing a chunk of their shattered forces from Falaise, moving to the Rhine, and sustaining a cohesive front for another 8 months, inflicting numerous nasty surprises on the Western Allies (Market Garden, Ardennes). How much pressure were the Allies fortunate to have off of them due to the fact that the Soviets had millions of soldiers battering through the Eastern Front (and their is the ultimate strategic blunder)?
Yes, only to a degree. While tactically daunting, many of the famous German tanks (Tiger II, Panther) suffered from serious design problems. As well, they weren't present in significant enough numbers to have an effect at the operational level. However, it wasn't so much the quality of the actual weapon systems that mattered, rather it was the way that various systems were incorporated into a cohesive combined arms structure. The Germans, with their Kampfgruppen, were quite effective at this while the Canadians were notorious, especially with regards to Armour/Infantry cooperation, for acting in a "Branch Pure" mindset.
I'm going to have to take a look at Copp's book, because it doesn't sound very convincing. I think you're right with you initial assessment on "revisionism" - it seems he is eager to blow the "rah, rah Canadian" trumpet and, in an effort to do so, eagerly glosses over realities that have been steadily documented since the end of the War up to English's latest coverage of the battle.
Honestly, should we have expected a dramatic and decisive victory for the Canadians? They were green units, with most of the formations having never actually been in combat. They were thrown up against a foe that dedicated to the battle a reformed core of Armoured formations that had years of experience in fighting on the Eastern Front. Our operational level commanders were immature in the art of command due to a combination of the neglect that the military faced in the interwar years and the Militia politics that was the centrepiece of Army activity during peacetime. These are all documented - English spends the entire first half of his book looking at the lead up to the campaign in an effort to point out the sources of our operationally poor showing.
If anything, this should be a testament to the average Canadian soldier and the junior commanders who led them into fire. Despite bungling Generals, doctrine unsuited for combined arms maneuver operations, and little real experience they were able to dig in their heels and go toe-to-toe with a tenacious German defence. Our soldiers were determined and persistent and, in the end, triumphed. It is the soldiers who won Normandy for us, not the Generals. The problem is that when the Generals aren't helping to win the victories, the soldiers pay in unneeded blood. There is no dishonour in pointing out the blemishes of our nations performance at Normandy. If anything, it is important as a "lessons learned" exercise so that in the future, we will be prepared and we won't force the soldier to bear an unequal burden of the battle in order to achieve victory.
Here are my thoughts (based on what I've seen) on the salient features that mdh pointed out.
mdh said:
No one really disputes the hardiness of the Canadian soldiers or their prowess at the tactical level. Operational level leadership was not well regarded at all - look at what figures like Monty, Dempsey, etc have to say - English goes into great detail on this.
The beach weren't the "Schwerpunkt" of the German defence until after the Allies had largely cleared them and consolidated the beachhead - remember, Hitler believed Normandy to be a feint while waiting for Patton's "Ghost Army" to cross the Pas de Calais. While the struggle for the beaches was hard fought (as is any opposed amphibious landing) most of the German strength was in operational/strategic reserve.
As for airpower, one only has to read accounts of German soldiers and commanders about the debilitating effects of the Allied Air Superiority presented. German doctrine relied upon massing a mobile, armoured counter-punch in an operational reserve to deliver a counterattack at the right time - read some of Glantz's work on the Eastern Front battles to see how effective this could be if done right (9th Army's defence under Model of the Ryzev Salient is a good example). It's hard to do this when your armoured forces are forced to travel at night and cannot mass together to be used in a concentrated "punch". To discount Allied Airpower is foolish.
Finally, to disregard the importance of Canadian Artillery is foolhardy as well. Canadian gunners were the last remaining vestiges of professionalism from the hard-hitting Canadian Corps of WWI - the rest of the Army had dissolved into Militia circus-acts during the interwar period. My reading of Normandy left me with the impression that anytime the Germans managed to regain the initiative and either attempt a counter-attack or counter-offensive, the quick and efficient artillery of the Canadians could quickly be poured on to shatter what efforts the Germans could muster.
If Copp is so eager to deny firepower as the key to Canadian (and Allied) success, what does he suppose was the true reason for victory at Normandy? It certainly wasn't maneuver based at dislocating the enemy with rapid spearheads. As unimaginative as the Allied bludgeon at Normandy may seem, there was no denying it was decisive and it worked.
Sure, German troops on a whole were a mixed bag - there were many Static and Garrison units at the Atlantic Wall, and many of these were understrength and recuperating from beatings on the Eastern Front. Remember, this is June 1944 and much of the cream-of-the-crop of the German Forces has been shattered on the Eastern Front. As well, as Normandy is raging, the Germans have a bigger problem when Bagration kicks off and an entire Army Group is suddenly wiped off the map. An Army or two in France isn't going to gather attention of the entire Wehrmacht.
As well, remember that the German units that the Canadian's fought were primarily of the 1st SS Panzer Corps, which had two SS Panzer Divisions, the 1st (LSSAH) and the 12 (Hitlerjugend). I am unsure of how Copp asserts that these formations were full of "unimaginative" and "predictable" leaders. The 12th SS was formed around a cadre of leaders (Officers and NCO's) from the 1st SS that had years of combat experience on the Eastern Front and this leadership was given a recruit pool of young men who had been indoctrinated for years in a paramilitary organization (HJ). The 1st SS was about the same.
Sure, the German counter-attack was predictable - it was just as predictable as the synchronized Canadian artillery barrage followed by an Infantry attack backed by tanks. This synchronized approach by Canadian commanders with little to no real operational talent leads to most histories tagging a good lot of the Canadian generals as "unimaginative" and "predictable". Warring states will get a good measure on each-others doctrine after a few scrapes and figure it out. It is how that knowledge is exploited that counts.
My own personal opinion is that after four years of total war, while sustaining huge losses on the Eastern Front and having their country systematically flattened from the West, the fact that the Germans were able to organize a cohesive defence at Normandy that held up for months a superbly equipped Allied Army that had trained for 4 years for the event, and when beaten, managed to pull back in fairly good order and to set up yet another cohesive defence on the Rhine Frontier which demanded more months of bloody fighting, and doing this while facing successive losses and encroachment on the Eastern Front, should allow us to give the German doctrine and leadership a little more credit then Copp seems prepared to give. See Martin Van Crevald's Fighting Power for more on this.
Tactically, yes - the Canadians were able to overcome a tenacious German defence. But inept command was unable to to turn these tough won tactical victories into operational success. In reading English's survey of Normandy, the record seems to indicate that the initial plan had the Canadian's being primed as the breakout spearhead of the Allied Army Group that was to bring a quick end to Germany. As a breakout vanished in the teeth of a 2-month German defence, the Canadian formations slowly lost their lustre to the higher commanders for being the "Shock Army" that the WWI Canadian Corps was. By the time Crerar and 1st Canadian Army showed up, things got even more muddled and the "breakout" was transferred from Monty's Army to Bradley's, who threw Patton into the "Cobra Offensive" after shattering the German's at Mortain.
I'm not seeing "impressive and spectacular" in the fact that, as English points out, Canada's Army moved from being a spearhead of the Allied Army Group to occupying the Left Flank and clearing out Holland.
As well, I don't see how the German Army of the West was "absolutely and decisively" defeated - sure, in terms of the Battle for France. But the German's succeeded in withdrawing a chunk of their shattered forces from Falaise, moving to the Rhine, and sustaining a cohesive front for another 8 months, inflicting numerous nasty surprises on the Western Allies (Market Garden, Ardennes). How much pressure were the Allies fortunate to have off of them due to the fact that the Soviets had millions of soldiers battering through the Eastern Front (and their is the ultimate strategic blunder)?
Yes, only to a degree. While tactically daunting, many of the famous German tanks (Tiger II, Panther) suffered from serious design problems. As well, they weren't present in significant enough numbers to have an effect at the operational level. However, it wasn't so much the quality of the actual weapon systems that mattered, rather it was the way that various systems were incorporated into a cohesive combined arms structure. The Germans, with their Kampfgruppen, were quite effective at this while the Canadians were notorious, especially with regards to Armour/Infantry cooperation, for acting in a "Branch Pure" mindset.
I'm going to have to take a look at Copp's book, because it doesn't sound very convincing. I think you're right with you initial assessment on "revisionism" - it seems he is eager to blow the "rah, rah Canadian" trumpet and, in an effort to do so, eagerly glosses over realities that have been steadily documented since the end of the War up to English's latest coverage of the battle.
Honestly, should we have expected a dramatic and decisive victory for the Canadians? They were green units, with most of the formations having never actually been in combat. They were thrown up against a foe that dedicated to the battle a reformed core of Armoured formations that had years of experience in fighting on the Eastern Front. Our operational level commanders were immature in the art of command due to a combination of the neglect that the military faced in the interwar years and the Militia politics that was the centrepiece of Army activity during peacetime. These are all documented - English spends the entire first half of his book looking at the lead up to the campaign in an effort to point out the sources of our operationally poor showing.
If anything, this should be a testament to the average Canadian soldier and the junior commanders who led them into fire. Despite bungling Generals, doctrine unsuited for combined arms maneuver operations, and little real experience they were able to dig in their heels and go toe-to-toe with a tenacious German defence. Our soldiers were determined and persistent and, in the end, triumphed. It is the soldiers who won Normandy for us, not the Generals. The problem is that when the Generals aren't helping to win the victories, the soldiers pay in unneeded blood. There is no dishonour in pointing out the blemishes of our nations performance at Normandy. If anything, it is important as a "lessons learned" exercise so that in the future, we will be prepared and we won't force the soldier to bear an unequal burden of the battle in order to achieve victory.
mdh
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Hi Infanteer,
Impressive list of counterpoints - I read the book well over a year ago, and I have to say that prior to its publication I would have made almost the identical arguments you did. IIRC Copp addresses almost all these issues - on some he makes a compelling case - others are less compelling. And yes he does take aim at John English's work - along with several others including popular historians like Max Hasting's whose work (Das Reich and Overlord) have perpetuated what he (Copps) would call the status quo interpretation of the campaign and the Canadian role, cheers, mdh
Impressive list of counterpoints - I read the book well over a year ago, and I have to say that prior to its publication I would have made almost the identical arguments you did. IIRC Copp addresses almost all these issues - on some he makes a compelling case - others are less compelling. And yes he does take aim at John English's work - along with several others including popular historians like Max Hasting's whose work (Das Reich and Overlord) have perpetuated what he (Copps) would call the status quo interpretation of the campaign and the Canadian role, cheers, mdh
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Well, I got the book in the mail today (had a few Chapters gift cards burning a hole in my pocket). Looks fairly well done. Maybe I'll read it along side English again and compare the two, since they seem to aim for the opposite thesis.
Brad Sallows
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The German "cohesive defence" lasted from 6 June to 27 July - a little under two months. The Allied Armies had certainly not trained for the event for 4 years; much else happened between June 1940 and June 1944 and a number of the divisions in Normandy spent time elsewhere. The Germans were defending on ground they'd known for four years with the advantage of flanks secure on coastlines. I can't bring myself to describe the subsequent rout as "pull back in fairly good order", after which the Allied armies were stopped by their own logistical limitations, not German strength or fighting prowess.
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Brad Sallows said:
VE Day - May 8, 1945.
I think I referred to the Canadians in particular (which Copp's book focusing on) - if I didn't that was my fault. I was making reference to the Canadian units of II Canadian Corps which had no fighting experience to that date (short of the disaster at Dieppe). I Corps, the "D-Day Dodgers" were still fighting tough battle in Italy.
I was referring to "pulled back in fairly good order" in a strategic sense. After losing at the Low Countries, despite having the Maginot Line and the Sea as flanks, the Allies were completely exhausted and could not offer up any real resistance besides retreat to the British Isles. I look at this and hold it up to the fact that the Germans where just as decisively defeated (although not destroyed) at Normandy, but were able to secure a defence upon the Rhine, repel numerous attempt to pierce it (Hurtgen Forest, Market Garden) and were even "cohesive" enough to organize and launch a large scale counter-attack both in the West (which had no chance in hell of doing anything - but the fact that the capability was still there indicates something) and in the East (in a smaller scale to relieve Vienna and Budapest) - all the while fighting with most of their Forces on the Eastern Front.
As Van Crevald points out (and which Copp guns for in the first Chapter of his book):
"the German Army compensated by developing a high degree of fighting power that enabled it, even though actually inferior in numbers of both men and machines, to defeat France in six weeks, though four months were required for a crushingly superior Allied Force to drive it out again. In Russia a strongly outnumbered Wehrmacht needed only five months to reach the gates of Moscow; to drive it back to its starting line took an (by then immeasurably superior) opponent fully two-and-a-half years....
For here the historian is confronted with an army that, depending on the particular front and category of arms one cares to select, was outnumbered three, five, even seven to one. Yet it did not run. It did not disintergrate. It did not frag its officers. Instead, it doggedly fought on. It fought on even though Hitler's war was never at any time really popular in Germany. It fought on even though its homeland was being bombed to smithereens behind its back. It fought on even though many of its generals - and numerous subsequent historians as well - regarded its commander in chief as little better than a raving lunatic....Yet for all this, its units, even when down to 20 percent of their original size, continued to exist and resist - an unrivalled achievement for any army."
Martin Van Crevald, Fighting Power; pg 5
Although this may seem to put things in more of a glowing light than I would care for, it does raise some salient points. I believe that any advantages that German organization had when it battled its opponents was directly based on its Interwar approach to professionalism. Whereas France resigned itself to a doctrine of complacency, Britain went back to a "Strategic Empire" mindset, Canada dithered with Militia politics, and the US reverted to complete isolationism (and its traditional penchant for obliterating its wartime armed forces), and Russia wrestled with internal strife, the Germans under Seekt were actively furthering the professional capabilities of the German Forces (despite the constrictions of Versailles). While Hart and Fuller were marginalized, Maginot was the buzz, and Tukachevski was purged and executed Guderian and crew were putting their concepts to work, even if in the form of cardboard tanks and other half-measures.
This isn't some mythical property of the Germans, and I don't doubt that any nation could achieve a high degree of "Fighting Power" if they properly prepared for it. The German's of 1944 were still exhibiting the effects of this Interwar Investment, and I believe that the Allies were reaping the harvest of refusing to keep up. This is as relevent today in our current defence debate as it was then - building and planning around a structure that will not exist in Wartime means one has to build from scratch under fire - an expensive proposition in both blood and energy.
On a side note, this argument seems to be focussing around what happened After the Battle of Normandy - since we all agree on the fact that it was a decisive defeat for the Germans. The other book I got in the mail with Copp was Max Hastings' Armageddon: The Battle For Germany, 1944-1945 (Hastings is another author that Copp guns for in his book). Perhaps I'll read it along with Copp and see if there are any links.
Cheers,
Infanteer
Michael Dorosh
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The Canadian divisions did indeed train for four years, though English may have been correct in his assessment of that "training". Actually, 3rd Div arrived in the UK in 1941, and the 2nd in August 1940. 4th Div arrived in UK in 1942, but was mobilized as early as May 1940, originally as an infantry division.
Montgomery also took a dim view of Canadian "training" in the UK - too much emphasis on battle drill, not enough on the phases of war - attack, defend, obstacle passage, relief in place, etc.
The German retreat after August 1944 was not really good order - as Brad points out, if the Allies had pursued north of Antwerp during the critical month of September instead of beating their heads against the Channel Ports (which they never managed to take), there would have been no way the Scheldt (south Beveland and Breskens) could have held out the way it did in October.
I disagree the Allies were hamstrung by ill preparedness. Their artillery doctrine was the best in the world by 1944, and their equipment more than equal to the task of pushing back a beaten army. They simply failed to plan correctly for the enormous wastage of infantry, and possibly failed to better co-ordinate heavy bomber support (the last is arguable). But, because no one had fought a war like the Second World War before, we can probably forgive them for basing their reinforcement estimates on North African desert experience.
Montgomery also took a dim view of Canadian "training" in the UK - too much emphasis on battle drill, not enough on the phases of war - attack, defend, obstacle passage, relief in place, etc.
The German retreat after August 1944 was not really good order - as Brad points out, if the Allies had pursued north of Antwerp during the critical month of September instead of beating their heads against the Channel Ports (which they never managed to take), there would have been no way the Scheldt (south Beveland and Breskens) could have held out the way it did in October.
I disagree the Allies were hamstrung by ill preparedness. Their artillery doctrine was the best in the world by 1944, and their equipment more than equal to the task of pushing back a beaten army. They simply failed to plan correctly for the enormous wastage of infantry, and possibly failed to better co-ordinate heavy bomber support (the last is arguable). But, because no one had fought a war like the Second World War before, we can probably forgive them for basing their reinforcement estimates on North African desert experience.
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Michael Dorosh said:
Alot of the opinion of Montgomery's views seem to rotate around whether one views Monty as an excellent commander or a twit. I haven't seen many historical commanders with such an ongoing controversy on performance like him.
So German incompetence in getting pinned in Normandy was offset by Allied incompetence to exploit the opportunity. Although this statement risks devolving into a useless "What If?" game, I think that the fact that the Germans were able to recover from a decisive victory and the Allies were unable to really exploit should account for something.
Well, artillery (or bombers) don't win wars - and the usual criticism seems to focus on the fact that operationally and up, the Allies would give into the tactic of "enormous wastage" of infantry against a numerically inferior foe - to me, "wasting lives" (which today would be you and me) spells out that one has surrendered "out-thinking" the enemy and is somewhat tacitly admitting inferiority in professional capability (Van Crevald looks at the way manpower is managed to bolster his claim of "Fighting Power"). If this is truly the case, then I think there is good grounds for the criticism, such as English's book, on the approach that operatonal level leadership took in Normandy (or in any other battle).
Michael Dorosh
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Infanteer said:
Rubbish. His strengths were as a trainer of troops - his competency at command is irrelevant.
What were we talking about again? I think this is exactly what I was saying.
What percentage of casualties in wW II was inflicted by artillery? I think you may be wrong here. Artillery was crucial in Normandy - you've read Blackburn, I hope.
Rubbish again. I said no such thing. What I said was that what infantry casualties WERE suffered were not anticipated - mostly because there was no way to do so. Casualty rates were in excess even of WW I infantry battle wastage, much less the western desert.
War is a costly business. To make an omelette you have to break some eggs. Insert your own cliche here....the Canadian Army wasn't brilliant in Normandy , nor were they completely poor. My point is that we can excuse them for how bad they were without laying the blame at interwar unpreparedness, as you attempted to do. It isn't remotely true. What could the Black Watch have done, or done differently, in 1935 to prevent the debacle at Verrierres Ridge in July 1944? If you can't answer that, you have no case.
Brad Sallows
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>VE Day - May 8, 1945.
Copp's book is about the fighting in Normandy, and I figured since you took note of the hiatus between the Normandy defence and the West Wall defence you would acknowledge the collapse in the west for what it was.
>I was making reference to the Canadian units of II Canadian Corps
Most of the elements which were subsequently part of the Canadian corps and army in northwest Europe were still in a defensive posture in Britain through the winter of '42-'43 and had only started to develop and participate in training schemes to prepare for campaigns on the continent from summer '42 onward. There was ample preparation time to be sure, but the 2nd through 5th divisions and other elements such as 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade didn't exactly arrive in Britain formed and start training for invasion in the summer of 1940.
>I was referring to "pulled back in fairly good order" in a strategic sense.
I still can't determine from what evidence you make that characterization. The German forces withdrawing before the Allied landings in southern France were making a good job of it, but the German armies in Normandy effectively ran. A sizeable prisoner bag was taken post-Falaise - an outcome rarely mentioned alongside the usual boasts about the Allied failure to bag them in the Falaise pocket itself - and the Germans were glad of the breathing space to scratch together new defences. Had the Allies the means to deliver sufficient fuel to the leading formations, I can not see exactly where the Germans should have stopped them. There has been plenty of counterfactual discussion about what the Allies might have done differently to squeeze out a few more miles, but I have yet to encounter the suggestion that the Germans were in much of a position to bring influence to bear. It is clear to me from German descriptions of the situation they had no forces on hand to organize a defence quickly and needed time.
>On a side note, this argument seems to be focussing around what happened After the Battle of Normandy
What is "after"? In my view, the battle includes the pursuit. Whatever price the Allies paid to break the German line, the benefits reaped include everything achieved right up until the Allies could no longer sustain the drive. Monty's concept, to which the Allied high and political command consented, saw the Allies facing a German defence in good order along the Seine at D+90. In the actual event, at D+90 the German army was on the run with the Allies well past the Seine. I frankly hold no respect for authors who chastise Allied commanders for slow advances (compared to the intended phase lines and objectives) up to the point of the Falaise battle and then ignore everything after that as if it bore no relation to the campaign.
For the Allies to have done better would have required them to adopt, for at least one course of action, the assumption that the German army in northwest France would break and run for the German border. Perhaps, in view of the usual German performance through the spring of 1944, the planners can be forgiven for failing to make that rather bold assumption.
Copp's book is about the fighting in Normandy, and I figured since you took note of the hiatus between the Normandy defence and the West Wall defence you would acknowledge the collapse in the west for what it was.
>I was making reference to the Canadian units of II Canadian Corps
Most of the elements which were subsequently part of the Canadian corps and army in northwest Europe were still in a defensive posture in Britain through the winter of '42-'43 and had only started to develop and participate in training schemes to prepare for campaigns on the continent from summer '42 onward. There was ample preparation time to be sure, but the 2nd through 5th divisions and other elements such as 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade didn't exactly arrive in Britain formed and start training for invasion in the summer of 1940.
>I was referring to "pulled back in fairly good order" in a strategic sense.
I still can't determine from what evidence you make that characterization. The German forces withdrawing before the Allied landings in southern France were making a good job of it, but the German armies in Normandy effectively ran. A sizeable prisoner bag was taken post-Falaise - an outcome rarely mentioned alongside the usual boasts about the Allied failure to bag them in the Falaise pocket itself - and the Germans were glad of the breathing space to scratch together new defences. Had the Allies the means to deliver sufficient fuel to the leading formations, I can not see exactly where the Germans should have stopped them. There has been plenty of counterfactual discussion about what the Allies might have done differently to squeeze out a few more miles, but I have yet to encounter the suggestion that the Germans were in much of a position to bring influence to bear. It is clear to me from German descriptions of the situation they had no forces on hand to organize a defence quickly and needed time.
>On a side note, this argument seems to be focussing around what happened After the Battle of Normandy
What is "after"? In my view, the battle includes the pursuit. Whatever price the Allies paid to break the German line, the benefits reaped include everything achieved right up until the Allies could no longer sustain the drive. Monty's concept, to which the Allied high and political command consented, saw the Allies facing a German defence in good order along the Seine at D+90. In the actual event, at D+90 the German army was on the run with the Allies well past the Seine. I frankly hold no respect for authors who chastise Allied commanders for slow advances (compared to the intended phase lines and objectives) up to the point of the Falaise battle and then ignore everything after that as if it bore no relation to the campaign.
For the Allies to have done better would have required them to adopt, for at least one course of action, the assumption that the German army in northwest France would break and run for the German border. Perhaps, in view of the usual German performance through the spring of 1944, the planners can be forgiven for failing to make that rather bold assumption.
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Michael Dorosh said:
Which I agree with. I'm only commenting on what I perceive from the general "Monty" debate.
Ok, we agree (I guess)?
If you're going to measure deceive success by an absolute number of casualties, then I believe your taking the wrong approach. Look at all the dominance that Artillery had when it ruled the field in WWI; what decisiveness did that achieve? Read the Van Crevald quote again - the reason many people regard German capability is that they maintained "Fighting Power" even when reduced to 50-20% of their original strength - numbers were irrelevant with regards to functional capability.
And no, I've yet to read Blackburn - I've assumed it is more of a memoir, is it not (my mistake if it isn't)?
Is it rubbish? Should the Allies have tolerated such high casualties by facing an Army that was preoccupied with a massive Russian Offensive, bombed and wasted after 4 years of Total War and that was by 1944, as Copp points out in the book, varied in regards to unit quality? This is what I'm getting at. There has to be something beyond "secure flanks and familiar ground" about German organization and experience that contributed to this.
Ok, I'm sure the Generals of WWI were saying the same thing at the Somme.
Again, I think it is all in preparedness. Since were looking at Verrierres Ridge, going off memory the two problems seemed to a have been a complete lack of inter-arms coordination and an inability to translate operational orders into tactical success (time for orders, coordination). Reading these problems, I can see the same trends affecting the outcome at Le Mansil Patry, among others.
By failing to prepare in 1935, Canada's unit and formation doctrine and experience was mineralized and unprepared (as Monty's criticism seemed to indicate). Forgetting all that the Canadian Corps of Currie in WWI had achieved through mastering the combined-arms approach to winning battles, they played Militia politics and let the McNaughton clique basically stagnate any development of all-arms capability (with small exceptions like the Simmonds/Burns debates) at the alter of some sort of Douhet-esque form of "The Guns will always get through". The Canadian Army that went into Normandy brought this institutional baggage with it, and as a result, Verrierres Ridge, Le Mensil Patry, the failure to exploit Falaise, etc were to come about.
Conversely, the German Army was actively working on its unit and formation level tactical and doctrinal thought (even with an "underground Staff College" to get around Versailles) and maintaining an institutional mindset of "two levels up" and "operational decisiveness". Reflecting on the success of the WWI Stossegruppe experience, they worked with and refined their inter-arms coordination and developed air power when they were forbidden to have an Air Force. They ensured that their organizations and their professional culture were fresh and focussed on the battles they were preparing for - the result was the successes of '39, '40, '41, and '42 - and the ability to, in the face of decisive and smashing defeat in the face of overwhelmingly superior forces, maintain the ability to fight for '43, '44, and '45. As I said, this has to count for something, and I think its roots are in Interwar approaches and preparedness (on a professional, rather then a resource, level).
If anything can be said, it is that Dandourand's "fire-proof house" permitted the Canadians to fight the Germans on the ground of our choosing. As well, the Germans displayed the usual complete lack of any strategic thought what-so-ever, a trait they seemed to have possessed since Moltke the Elder and Bismarck stepped down. Strategic blunders like Stalingrad, Kursk, and North Africa are Verrierres Ridge on a grand scale. However, I feel these strategic shortcomings were not in the realm of military capability but more concerned with the domain of higher order civil-military planning of ways and means which, thankfully for the world, was in the hands of criminals, party hacks, and ideological twits.
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Brad,
Good points on the "post-battle" or "post-Falaise" aspects of the campaign, I will readily admit that the majority of the stuff that I've reviewed is, as you pointed out, more focused on the battle as opposed to the pursuit. I'm sure a more detailed study of the Western Theater from Falaise to Market Garden will be a good way to round out ideas on the Battle of Normandy (puts that on list of things to do).
Interestingly enough, Hastings has the following to say in his Intro to his book Armageddon, which is a follow on to his first work Overlord:
"I concluded Overlord:
- The battles in Holland and along the German border so often seem to belong to a different age from those of Normandy that it is startling to reflect that Arnhem was fought less than a month after Falaise; that within weeks of suffering one of the greatest catastrophes of modern history, the Germans found the strength...to prolong the war until May 1945. If this phenomenon reveals the same staggering qualities in Hitler's armies which had cause the Allies such grief in Normandy, it is also another story. -
The early part of this book is that story. The starting point was a desire to satisfy my own curiosity about why the German war did not end in 19944, given the Allies' overwhelming superiority. It is often asserted that in the west they had to overcome a succession of great rivers and difficult natural features to break into Hitler's heartland. Yet the Germans' 1940 blitzkrieg easily surmounted such obstacles. In 1944-45, the Allies were masters of armoured and air forces greater than the Nazis ever possessed."
Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945; pp xi-xii
The book should be interesting.
As well, the logistical hamstring of the pursuit makes sense. It seems that the Allies were just as poor as the Germans in a strategic sense in supporting operational victory with proper logistics. I am assuming the comment on "usual German performance in the Spring of 1944" refers to the Eastern Front?
Anyways, I still maintain that adopting the position that the "Allies Landed in 1944 and won the war from there" fails to recognize the fact that a German Army could essentially fist-fight for almost 1 year against Western Allies who were armed with a bat, all the while having one arm and leg being chewed up by the Russian bear and taking a shin-kick in Italy. This is why I maintain the position that I do (along with many historians) - it doesn't discredit the fact that Allied Forces were strong and capable (especially when they got experienced), only that it underlines that the German Army must have been doing something right to avoid an all out institutional collapse in the face of overwhelming defeat that was witnessed in France and (very nearly) in Britain.
Regardless, I'm going to read the books and see what they have to say.
Good points on the "post-battle" or "post-Falaise" aspects of the campaign, I will readily admit that the majority of the stuff that I've reviewed is, as you pointed out, more focused on the battle as opposed to the pursuit. I'm sure a more detailed study of the Western Theater from Falaise to Market Garden will be a good way to round out ideas on the Battle of Normandy (puts that on list of things to do).
Interestingly enough, Hastings has the following to say in his Intro to his book Armageddon, which is a follow on to his first work Overlord:
"I concluded Overlord:
- The battles in Holland and along the German border so often seem to belong to a different age from those of Normandy that it is startling to reflect that Arnhem was fought less than a month after Falaise; that within weeks of suffering one of the greatest catastrophes of modern history, the Germans found the strength...to prolong the war until May 1945. If this phenomenon reveals the same staggering qualities in Hitler's armies which had cause the Allies such grief in Normandy, it is also another story. -
The early part of this book is that story. The starting point was a desire to satisfy my own curiosity about why the German war did not end in 19944, given the Allies' overwhelming superiority. It is often asserted that in the west they had to overcome a succession of great rivers and difficult natural features to break into Hitler's heartland. Yet the Germans' 1940 blitzkrieg easily surmounted such obstacles. In 1944-45, the Allies were masters of armoured and air forces greater than the Nazis ever possessed."
Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945; pp xi-xii
The book should be interesting.
As well, the logistical hamstring of the pursuit makes sense. It seems that the Allies were just as poor as the Germans in a strategic sense in supporting operational victory with proper logistics. I am assuming the comment on "usual German performance in the Spring of 1944" refers to the Eastern Front?
Anyways, I still maintain that adopting the position that the "Allies Landed in 1944 and won the war from there" fails to recognize the fact that a German Army could essentially fist-fight for almost 1 year against Western Allies who were armed with a bat, all the while having one arm and leg being chewed up by the Russian bear and taking a shin-kick in Italy. This is why I maintain the position that I do (along with many historians) - it doesn't discredit the fact that Allied Forces were strong and capable (especially when they got experienced), only that it underlines that the German Army must have been doing something right to avoid an all out institutional collapse in the face of overwhelming defeat that was witnessed in France and (very nearly) in Britain.
Regardless, I'm going to read the books and see what they have to say.
Brad Sallows
Army.ca Legend
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>It seems that the Allies were just as poor as the Germans in a strategic sense in supporting operational victory with proper logistics. I am assuming the comment on "usual German performance in the Spring of 1944" refers to the Eastern Front?
No, it is my way of stating I don't think the Brits (at least) would have accepted that assumption readily after several years of hard fighting.
I don't believe the Allies were poor logistical planners at the strategic or operational levels. The German collapse in Normandy was unexpected and the Allies advanced much more rapidly than their plans to rebuild infrastructure anticipated. It should be obvious that if an intact rail net led directly from intact ports in Britain to and through Normandy the war in the west would have ended much more quickly. Even despite the obstacle of the Channel, the Allies were dumping sufficient tonnage over the beaches and through the working port facilities they did control at least through September but couldn't move it forward quickly enough.
No, it is my way of stating I don't think the Brits (at least) would have accepted that assumption readily after several years of hard fighting.
I don't believe the Allies were poor logistical planners at the strategic or operational levels. The German collapse in Normandy was unexpected and the Allies advanced much more rapidly than their plans to rebuild infrastructure anticipated. It should be obvious that if an intact rail net led directly from intact ports in Britain to and through Normandy the war in the west would have ended much more quickly. Even despite the obstacle of the Channel, the Allies were dumping sufficient tonnage over the beaches and through the working port facilities they did control at least through September but couldn't move it forward quickly enough.
Michael Dorosh
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Brad Sallows said:
The end of the fighting in Normandy was expected to take place on D+90, with an assault crossing of the Seine River. The crossings were done more peacefully, and in advance of that schedule, which I think is perfect evidence of Brad's statement.
The port at Dieppe was put into operation in September 1944, but the tonnage it was able to process was tiny compared to what Antwerp might have handled that same month had it been cleared. Again, the success of Allied armies in the field ensured that this didn't happen. Of course, Dieppe was really not much closer to the front than the Mulberries in Normandy.
