Fire Support downsizing continues - blame precision

[Kirkhill]

Thanks for filling me in on the accuracy issues 3rd Horseman.

I take your point on choice.

Can you clarify something for me though with your comments about arty and fire support weights? (I will stipulate that a HEAT, HESH, HE or Thermobaric warheads will all have different effects though they may also weigh the same)

You mentioned that the

105 has little kill capability compared to a 155 yet a 172 has less than a 155. In mortars 120 motar has higher kill capabilty for weight than a 155.

  Doesn't that have a lot to do with the construction of the shell and the necessity of building a bullet (or bomb) that will survive the launch?  The 120 launches less violently than the 155 so it doesn't require as heavy a construction.  When the payload detonates on the 120 it doesn't have to punch its way through as much metal as it does in a 155.

When you go to "soft-launch" systems like missiles and air-dropped bombs you don't need those heavy casings to allow the launch so surely the effect is more directly proportionate to the weight of the warhead (or perhaps more precisely the weight of the filler)?

 

[George Wallace]

Kirkhill

You have to remember that Artillery rounds and Mortar rounds are constructed differently.  Artillery rounds have to have thicker casings than Mortar rounds, cut to the way that they are fired from their tubes.  Artillery rounds have to survive greater forces, from larger charges (in their propellants) to achieve their greater ranges.  Mortars have less range, and have less violent propellant charges involved.

 

[3rd Horseman]

You have good points,

  HEAT and HESH are direct fire so not in the main quiver of a fire support inventory and they are more and extention of the bayonet in the close in fight.

  Weapon (warhead) weight was a determinate for distance and the lowering of casing size and weight was to achieve greater distance on the battlefield. I would suggest that survivability of launch was not a design aspect when air drop and missile was created it was a weight factor that limited distance fired. Thus a good example of comparison would be 120 mm rocket vice 120 mm mortar. You are right the change of delivery will change the amount of explosive in the warhead but the net result wont necessarily be an increase in kill capacity. A person could be 50 meters from a MLRS 120 and alk away but a 120 mortar you would die some 150m away, oh and it hurts very loud.

  The drive towards precision in my mind wont lesson the number of people in the chain it will just change there jobs or location. With an attack on a target that requires no interest in collateral damage I would select a combination of precision and big bombs. The initial stage would be precision strikes to kill specific targets that are HPTs (or is dangerous to the maneuvering Inf) then a combonation of heavy weight to keep the head down and shake the internal organs so the enemy will give up the will to fight. So instead of 4 aircraft dropping 2 bombs each at a weight of 1000lbs each  you wont find less aircraft with precision you would get 2 aircraft dropping precision 250s 8 each and then folowe up with the 2 dropping the big stuff the cause disruption.

 

[Infanteer]

By contrast, I suggest that IF (stressed and stipulated - I will concede that this may not be the state of the art currently) IF the 51 bunkers previously alluded to were to be seen disappearing one after the other,  all bunkers targeted, no rounds wasted, no sense of "luck" in the equation, that this might encourage the rest of the inhabitants of the other bunkers to vacate the premises.  I believe that Gulf War I demonstrated something of that effect as Iraqis surrendered at the first opportunity because they felt that it was only a matter of time before their dug in tank or company disappeared next.

I guess my continued criticism is aimed at the fact that I don't think "Precision" is the revolution it's chalked up to be.   We've had "precision" since WWI - a British Artillery unit new exactly where the Hun was (his friggen trench was only a few hundred meters away) and was competent enough to put a round on whatever he wanted.   The fact that they put an additional 25,000 rounds on that piece of real-estate means that for all the precision in the world, microterrain still provides a foil for anything that technology can put forth.   As I said above, the smart enemies figure out real quick (by watching the dumb ones die) how to avoid our asymmetrical advantage in firepower.   This is why I've quoted the Biddle anecdote extensively.   If a "precision" platform is dropping 2000lb bombs on a bunker and not killing it, then precision means nothing because the value of the terrain makes it impervious to stand-off firepower.   Your 51 bunkers probably don't care if we shell them for 3 days or if we drop 51 precision bombs on their bunkers because if they do things right, they'll more or less survive either way.

This is Stephen Biddle's principle premise with his idea of the Modern System of Force Employment.   The idea is covered in a case study of Afghanistan and fully developed in his book Military Power : Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle.

The Iraq example is the result of the US Air Force foisting the gods of technology upon us in the form of "RMA" - this is best expressed in Richard Hallion's Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War.   However, I feel that this has been successfully put in its place, especially after Kosovo.   Biddle makes Iraq one of his 3 main case studies in his book to prove that.

Firepower in any form and at any level is half the equation - I know we both believe this to be true.   However, I'm concerned that efforts of the "Firepower RMA" crowd are using precision as a replacement for boots on the ground (Biddle's paper take special aim at this).   We're seeing this leech out into things like the MMEV; its proponents think they can turn the LAV into some precision wielding death machine.   I'm really not concerned about how accurate these weapons systems are - our Gunners can put a dumb round where they want to; I'd be just as happy having a full Regiment of M777 155mm guns on line with a full "quiver of arrows" instead of chasing the dream of increasing precision.

 

[Kirkhill]

Good stuff, thanks again.

I think what I have been skating around as much as anything may be that with the evolving technologies it seems to me that "effect" is becoming less dependent on the missile, the launcher and the platform carrying the launcher and more "just" a function of the warhead.

I do understand what you said and I know this may sound like I am contradicting you but I'm trying not to.

Hellfire and TOW are both direct fire systems that deliver warheads to a target.  Originally they delivered HEAT warheads to defeat tanks.  Now they are being used to deliver bunker-busting and thermobaric warheads.  I see them as being analogous to single-use UAVs.

The Air Force fills their bombs with all manner of interesting concoctions just as the Arty fills their bullets.  The filling (& the construction) of the bullets determine the effects.

In the past each of the above systems evolved from the specific needs of particular services, were dependent on available technologies and resulted in envelopes of capabilities that were often entirely distinct from each other.  Now technologies seem to be widening those envelopes of capability so that there is an increasing degree of overlap between systems and services.  Are we getting to the point where some of the systems are less critical in planning?

I'll stick with the HIMARS/LIMAWS-R GMRLS/ATACMs for a moment here.  Its envelope seems to be expanding to encompass some of the missions that might be flown by Close Air Support forces (small bombs attacking precision targets).  It also is capable of its earlier mission of seeding the ground with grenades and mines.  This is usually done, so I gather in one fell swoop of number of rounds.  

One of the attributes of guns and mortars is that they can sustain fire.  Can't a rocket troop/battery sustain fire just by spreading out the launch times?

With the Lockheed producing loitering missiles, with rockets carrying brilliant sub munitions to kill tanks, why not carry a cargo of 10x 10 lb charges with programmable precision seekers instead of one 200 lb charge as an alternative?  The dumb grenades and the unitary charge, the mines and the thermobarics, as well as the brilliant tank killers could all still be available - driving that choice of effect.  

Perhaps I can ask it another way - how might you develop systems so as to increase the choice of effect while at the same time reducing the logistical burden?  Can advantage be taken of the increasing size and overlapping natures of the capability envelopes?

In a specific case do you see it possible for Canada to deploy to places like Darfur or Kandahar (minimal air threat) without taking along fixed wing support but instead taking along something like HIMARS?

By the way,  while HEAT and HESH are currently direct fire  what might you call a HEAT warhead attached to a vertically launched missile that can attack on any azimuth for 0 to 6400 mil and has a range of 40 km with the intent of taking out tanks and bunkers.

- And George - how did you get that post in AFTER my post?  

Infanteer:  Chalk and Cheddar - I am NOT talking about substituting precision for boots.  Full stop.  We can stop "violently agreeing" - apologies to 2B ;D.

Nor am I saying that accurately placing an ineffective charge will make the resulting explosion any more satisfactory.

What I am saying is that one of the reasons big bombs have been used in the past is that even if they missed by a mile they created enough of a draft to blow the house down.  On the other hand there are targets that even now require a nuke dropped right on their heads to make a dent.

With missiles becoming more precise then, in addition to the issues I was asking 3rd Horseman about, it increases the number of weapons that are available to effectively engage particular targets.  It also forces the enemy to spend more resources digging in and building overhead protection making hasty defences less effective. 

Ultimately (we violently agree again I think) the conventional WWI/WW2/Iran-Iraq battlefield becomes less tenable and the enemy chucks his uniform, gets a credit card and an adjustable wrench, heads to an Ontario Hydro substation and drains all the coolant from the transformers.  In the meantime the enemy has been denied the conventional battlefield.  Leave it up to Ontario Hydro to make sure all their plugs stay in place.

While they're worrying about that you can spend your time making sure that his poorer brothers without the credit card aren't getting up to mischief at home.

Keeping in mind that an SDB can punch through a foot or two of reinforced concrete to get to the aircraft within for $100,000 how much overhead protection can build over your position?  TOWs and MILANs that are comparably priced are being used to defeat machine gun positions on a regular basis so its not as if you're not worth the investment  .

 

[3rd Horseman]

The majority of forward thinking fire support people don't subscribe to the precision replacing boots argument.

 Precision is about the whole package that includes the director of the fire support to the selection of the weapon and last but not least the big boom on the target. The US has a very poor record of using the full package and I would suggest that they do not have the skill set to do the task. Kosovo was a failure of skill and not precision. I would suggest that the better skilled soldier would select a better weapon to defeat a cave. The use of a high precision weapon with good flight capabilities in the hands of a skilled operator would kill or incapacitate a cave dweller. That attack in combination with an Inf attack would result in a success. The US like to drop bombs the day before and a bunch of bad weapons no matter how big (below nuc) wont kill a dug in enemy.

WW1 did not have much precision and the result is as has been described.

A 250 SDB flow into the mouth of a cave with a delay fuse would result in a kill collapse or incapacitation of the dweller. Giving the Inf a chance to enter and closewith the enemy with a safer result.

EDIT it would appear we are all agreeing....

 

[Infanteer]

I guess I'm trying to say that to me the value of precision isn't that it will kill the enemy any better (which I don't think it will) but rather that it won't kill people around him quite so much.   This is why I thought 51 bombs on 51 bunkers was irrelevent.

 

[Kirkhill]

EDIT it would appear we are all agreeing....

On this site its the journey as much as the destination...

Cheers and thanks again.

 

[3rd Horseman]

Agreed, bad example thou the US like to drop big bombs on hills to make themselves feel good. No doubt it did not work.

The precision argument not killing his next trench over mate is valid that is why selection of weapon is so important. Precision is for the HPT dangerous target for the maneuver Inf and the rest of the quiver is for the assult so the Inf can get close without getting shot at.

As for the good question of overlap or using HEAT weapons in softer missions I would disagree never go to a knife fight with a knife you want to use the big stuff. Always arrive prepared for overkill it is a slippery slop to tailor a force for a mission that is why we are in the pickle we are in now. A full up mech cold war brigade can take on anything tayloring will get you killed when your enemy shows up with a bigger gun then you cause he bought it from a black market.

 

[Infanteer]

3rd Horseman, the quiver analogy is a good one - I'd like to see artillery being versatile enough that even systems could be included in the quiver.  81mm and 120mm mortars, 155mm howitzer, MLRS; a good artillery team can be put on any system and use it as the mission requires.

Now show me the money!  We need more than 6 M777's!

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Now show me the money!   We need more than 6 M777's!

Or perhaps one more light infantry battalion with 6 snipers.  Again - it depends on the effect.  if the effect that you desire is taking the fight to the bad guy, and slotting him, then give me the 6 snipers every time...

 

[Infanteer]

Or how about 17 snipers as per the LIWG proposal? 

 

[3rd Horseman]

If the desired effect is death of the enemy then a mech battalion against a light battalion the light unit will die very fast even if all the battalion are snipers thats the effect.

I see your 6 snipers and raise you 1 fire support team.

 

[Infanteer]

If the desired effect is death of the enemy then a mech battalion against a light battalion the light unit will die very fast even if all the battalion are snipers thats the effect.

I see your 6 snipers and raise you 1 fire support team.

Yeah, I bet you the Russians were saying that after Grozney I. :tsktsk:

 

[3rd Horseman]

Bad soldiers is no example but they did win that war anyway even with bad soldiers. The example is better made with two equally trained units if one was mech and one was light. Just check out casualty rates in Iraq for light troops compared to mech vast difference never take a knife to a gun fight.

Have you seen the movie road to Grozni or $%#&* column (weird Russian name) the title is bad translation from the Russian it profiles a Russian mech battle group as it fights through Chechnya. They slaughter all they come upon it is mech violence at its best against light troops. It was filmed by the unit itself on hand held video cam.

 

[Kirkhill]

All this assumes that the mech battalion can get to the fight......and can find a place to fight once it gets there.

In fact the whole issue is a discussion of overmatch - how do you get more to the fight than the other guy can get and how do you get it there faster.  Not just to get into theater but to "change flanks" once you get there and wrong foot the other guy.

 

[3rd Horseman]

Yes you are so right that is why a mech bn can dismount and go light if it desires. The way we used to be way back when in the 80s.  But I think I have gone off topic sorry I digress.

 

[Kirkhill]

In the 80s we weren't so much Mech Inf as it has come to be meant now (Armoured Inf or Panzergrenadiers) as Light Inf with armoured transport. 

 

[Acorn]

And "going light" meant carrying less and walking. There's a bit more to Light Infantry than that. Or so I'm told.

 

[Kirkhill]

There's a bit more to Light Infantry than that. Or so I'm told.

That seems to be the question of the hour, doesn't it?