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Generals, Generalship and History; split from Re: The Somme

  • Thread starter Thread starter jimmy742
  • Start date Start date
Recceman:
Well, precisely because the Alps are  mountains that the Germans and Austrians had to come up with alternative tactics to fight the Italians. The most effective was the infilitration and bypassing the defenses by highly mobile units. The trench systems were as 'insurmountable' an obstacle as the Alps. The stormtrooper recreated the same tactics  but these developed independently.. Consequently, had the Germans and Austrians passed on their tactical experience to their counterparts at the Western front, it's quite possible that the  Germans would've incorportated the storm trooper tactics even earlier and the Allies would've been stymied on how best to counter this tactic. The St Michel offensive highlights the just how close the Allies could've been defeated. Now imagine the same offensive in 1916 or 17.

xavier
 
It seems to me that any criticism of Haig must be presented with a viable alternative. Fully one third of
Frances land mass was occupied including a large portion of its heavy industry therfore the French army
had no political or military alternative to attacking the German armies and Britain as Frances main ally
had no alternative but to surpport her.This was the general strategic situation. Visiting any of the battle
fields drives this home,the german positions are much more solidly built very deep with steel and concrete
overhead cover,  ones  first thought is that this is way Germans do things, everything overengieered but
there is somthing deeper here, this is an indication that they were here to stay.The allied positions look in comparision , exactly what they were ,jumping off points for the assault
What are the tactics to fullfil such a strategy, there is but one, the frontal assault.After all one cannot do
flanking movements against a front that stretches from the North sea to the Swiss border ,weak points did not exist. Suprise was also not a factor as the requirement to cut the enemy wire ensured that a prelimanary arty. bombardment had to be used.A word about the British army,the army that fought the
Somme battle was an all volunteers, Kitcheners New army which had 1 1/2 to2 years of training not
enough to do anything too difficult on the battlefield, and this was not just Haigs opinion.
Givern these factors and Haigs orders from his political masters,Loyd George,to support the French
defence of Verdun,it is very difficult to see that he had any room to maneaver and in the end he did his duty
as did thousands of other British soldiers on that warm July morning.
After this battle,and even during its latter stages things began to change the troops, those that survived,
were now more capable and began to use fire and movment tactics,the Lewis machine saw wider use
allowing the advancing troops to more effectiveley deal with enemy machine gun positions and the tank also saw more widespread use. In short they improved,  this took place under the command of Gen. Haig and
a year and half later under the command this same Gen. Haig the British,Australian and Canadian armies
conducted one of the finest fighting advances in history resulting in the capitulation of Germany.
Gen. Haig was not a great comunicator in fact he was somewhat innarticulate he made little effort to
defend himself against the storm of  critisism and ridicule that swept over him in the aftermath of the
partly instigated by the aforementioned Loyd George who did his best to absolve himself of any blame
fore the huge losses suffered by the British,quite successfully it seems ,by placing the responsibily squarely
on Haigs shoulders.
  A couple of books that may help one to form ones own opinion
    TO WIN A WAR ---John Terraine
    TOMMY---Richard Holmes
 
Time expired:
Has any historian looked at the North Sea to outflank the trenchlines? And land troops in either Antwerp or in Holland?
Actually, there was an alternative but absolutely everyone rejected it and caused the Germans to regard the Austrians with suspicions: a n armistace (which provoked the Sextus affair where Clemenceau published private letters from the AustroHungarians  to broach the subject of peace)
The war pretty much denegerated into who would hold out the longest before collapsing. The Germans collapsed and that was thanks in part to the effective blockade that the British mounted.

xavier
 
Given the rudimentary capability for assault landing and littoral support as seen in the Mediterranean climate at Gallipoli, trying an even larger invasion as you suggest may not have been practicable.

I would have to see the detailed estimate based on the existing technology and force capabilities at the time to think it viable even in concept.
 
After this battle,and even during its latter stages things began to change the troops, those that survived,
were now more capable and began to use fire and movment tactics,the Lewis machine saw wider use
allowing the advancing troops to more effectiveley deal with enemy machine gun positions and the tank also saw more widespread use. In short they improved,

It seems to me that any argument that attempts to rehabilitate Haig or any other WWI general usually boils down to two fundamental points:

1. That Haig was no worse than any other WWI general, and there was no alternative;
2. That valuable lessons were learned that justified the Somme.


Of course the first point is undeniable at least in one respect; Haig was certainly a man of his time as we all are. But I don't see how that helps rescue his reputation. If all we can say of Haig is that he was a man of his time and there was no alternative, we're not saying much. (As Time Served noted, his style of command didn't endear himself to the rank and file; but a lack of style is no small thing in a commander.)

As to the second point, I 've always found that line of argument slightly sinister because it smells of post facto justification and memoirist apologia. I'm not sure what lessons really had to be learned in 1916 that required a sacrifice on that scale. That the new artillery techniques the British pioneered were less than effective? That sending mass ranks against fortified positions was suicidal? Shouldn't that have been obvious after the first few hours, let alone forcing the campaign to grind on for months? (For Canadians it also reminds me of Mountbatten's justification for the Dieppe debacle, that lessons were learned.)

I think we need to judge the Somme from the original intent of the campaign. And the original intent was to achieve a breakthrough, not just to relieve pressure on the French at Verdun. In the end the case against Haig is also moral one; should any commander have allowed losses to continue on such an extravagant scale? Many of the participants believed it wasn't, and I've yet to read any revisionism that convincingly overturns their verdict.

cheers, mdh
 
Mdh and Xavier
One thing seems to have been forgotten,Haig was the theatre commander and as such he was only
responsible for the tactics in his theatre,decisions such as amphibian assault on a neautral country
was a strategic decision,and givern the technology available at the time and the Gallipoli experience
it would have been a very questionable undertaking,this decision had to be taken by someone above
Haigs level.These decisions were taken by politicians namely the prime minister and his cabinet,they
also made the a deal with the French to conduct this attack,and supplied Haig with this half trained
army to conduct the assault,they even decided, again in close consultation with the French,where the
attack should take place,Haig wanted to strike in the Ypres area were if a break through had actually  taken
place he could have possibly out flanked the German line.
The point I am trying to make is that a great deal of what Haig was latter blamed for was out of his
hands entirely and as someone ealier in this thread has pointed out,Haig was not unpopular during
the war he only become so some time after, particulaly after Loyd George,a left wing populist politco,
had published his memoires blaming Haig for all that went wrong on the Western Front including
the huge losses. The uninformed public swallowed it up, after all wasnt Loyd George one of them,
he came from a working class back ground, and a new historical myth was born and is still alive and
kicking. 



 
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