This post is made up of two articles from
www.stratfor.com . I find them particularily interesting since there is so much confusion surrounding the operations against Iraq. If article posts are not accepted here, let me know. I apologise in advance.
THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
19 March 2003
by Dr. George Friedman
Beyond the Iraq Campaign
Summary
If the Iraq campaign ends as most expect, in a U.S. victory, the
most critical questions will be: What will be the next American
campaign in the war, and when will it happen? There are deep
pressures on the United States to call an extended halt to
operations while it regroups. However, events may not permit
this, and the place to be most concerned about is Iran.
Analysis
There are wars. There are campaigns. There are battles. Winning
battles is the key to winning campaigns. Winning campaigns is the
key to winning wars. Knowing which you are fighting is the key to
making sense of the situation and planning strategy. If you
confuse winning a battle with winning a war, that could lead to
disaster. So too, confusing a victory in a campaign with a
victory in a war could lead to defeat in the war. Clarity is
indispensable.
The United States is in a war with al Qaeda. The war began on
Sept. 11, 2001. It will conclude when the ability of al Qaeda or
related or follow-on forces, to attack the United States has been
sufficiently diminished that the United States has returned to a
state of relative security -- relative, since absolute security
does not exist in this world. The Iraq campaign is not that war.
It is a campaign within that war. It follows a previous campaign
-- Afghanistan -- and it will be followed by other campaigns.
In other words, Iraq is a means toward an end. It is not an end
in itself. It achieves nothing definitive by itself. Its purpose
is to enable the United States to achieve other ends later, ends
that will bring the nation closer to winning the war -- or so
Washington hopes. It is useful to think of Iraq in terms of the
New Guinea campaign of World War II: U.S. and Australian troops
fought there not because of any intrinsic value in New Guinea,
but because of its geographic and strategic value. The New Guinea
campaign helped block a Japanese invasion of Australia and served
as a springboard for later offensives. New Guinea‘s value was in
what it made possible later on, not in its intrinsic value. It
was not a war, just a campaign within a war.
Iraq, too, is a campaign within a war. It will not, by itself,
settle anything. Readers of Stratfor know it is our view that the
primary purpose of the Iraq war is to set the stage for
undermining the foundations of al Qaeda in particular and of
radical Islam as an effective paramilitary force in general. The
United States has found it enormously difficult to attack al
Qaeda directly. Mapping out the al Qaeda network -- a sparse
global system of operatives -- is intrinsically difficult. Taking
effective action against it on a global, retail level has proven
even harder.
The United States has tried to find the center of gravity of al
Qaeda -- the one spot which, if struck, would cause the system
itself to collapse. Al Qaeda is structured to deny an attacker
the luxury of a center of gravity. The closest the United States
could get to one would be the support systems upon which al Qaeda
depends -- financial support and distribution, recruitment,
command and control centers, training centers. Al Qaeda doesn‘t
float on air. It is connected to the earth through its support
systems. Those support systems, in turn, have locations. If the
United States can cause the host countries to attack these
operations, then al Qaeda‘s ability to operate will be severely
curtailed. Victory in the war will become possible.
Al Qaeda shrewdly has distributed these operations in several
countries. Instead of depending on state support, they have
simply relied upon non-governmental entities to cooperate with
them in providing facilities. These non-governmental entities are
not necessarily supported by local governments, but they normally
consist of individuals with sufficient standing and influence
that acting against them would cause political instability.
Therefore, the host countries have chosen not to act, fearing
instability resulting from suppression more than they have feared
the United States.
These countries -- Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and so
forth -- cannot simply be said to be working with al Qaeda. Quite
the contrary, some, like Pakistan, have taken at least some steps
against al Qaeda. But they share this in common: Whether
unwilling or unable, they have not taken definitive steps to
render al Qaeda‘s support systems inoperative within their
territory. Moreover, in the case of Iran, for example, the danger
that Iranian weapons of mass destruction will be transferred by
some means to al Qaeda remains substantial.
The occupation of Iraq will provide the United States with a base
of operations from which to influence -- and coerce -- regional
powers into attacking internal sources of support for al Qaeda.
It also will help to deter state support. Therefore, the real
question now is what will happen at the close of the Iraq
campaign and where United States‘ war on al Qaeda will lead it
next.
The politico-military logic of the situation argues for a very
rapid exploitation of the Iraq campaign, and a rapid evolution to
new confrontation in the region. There are a number of reasons we
think this won‘t happen.
1. The United States is exhausted by the Iraq campaign at all
levels. The American public has been dealing with this issue for
months. The Bush administration has gone through intense internal
and external struggles that will require a period of reevaluation
and possibly reorganization and personnel changes. U.S. troops
are exhausted. The military reserve system has been stretched to
the limits. It needs radical surgery if it is to sustain the
United States through the rest of the war.
2. It is important for the lessons of the Iraq campaign to sink
into countries like Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran. If the campaign
goes well, two points will sink in: First, that the international
system, alliances and institutions cannot contain American power;
there is no protection there. And second, that the American
ability to exercise warfare at extreme distances is overwhelming.
Therefore, resistance to the United States is less rational than
accommodating the United States. Since Washington seeks a change
of behavior -- and war is merely a means toward that end -- time
must be taken to allow the lessons of Iraq to be absorbed.
3. The United States has issues outside of the Iraq region. The
North Korean affair is orders of magnitude less serious than the
war against al Qaeda, but it must be attended to. Of far greater
importance is Pakistan, which remains the critical center of al
Qaeda operations. Each time the Musharraf government appears to
collaborate with the United States, it becomes a bit less stable.
There are forces in Pakistan that would like, for a range of
reasons, to overthrow Musharraf. Some are simply ambitious,
others want to reshape Pakistan in a secular mode. The most
important of these forces are radical Islamists who want to halt
Pakistani cooperation with the United States. Washington has a
vested interest in the Musharraf government. It has no desire to
see another ambitious general in charge, and it has no belief
that a secular government would produce anything beyond a civil
war that would make attacks on al Qaeda even more difficult. It
does not want to see an Islamist government. Washington has
interests to manage in Pakistan. It has issues in the Philippines
and Indonesia. Time is needed to tend to these.
4. There are tremendous opportunities for the United States in
Europe. The Franco-German bloc has maneuvered itself right up
against a brick wall. Washington has opportunities to consolidate
its relationships in Europe in the wake of successful war --
particularly one in which proof of Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction would be available. Pushing Europe into another
campaign prematurely would undermine that process. Waiting could
well create broad European support for the war. The dynamics are
there in Europe, but it will take time to bring them to fruition.
The problem that the United States faces right now is that, while
a pause in operations makes both operational and political sense,
enemy actions dictate whether this option will be available.
Syria and Saudi Arabia are not really concerns. The Syrians, who
shortly will be surrounded on all sides, are nothing if not
practical. They understand reality. Saudi leaders already have
capitulated to the war, allowing U.S. forces to be based within
the kingdom. The Saudis will go through a very painful time, but
in the end the royal family consists of realists -- and whatever
dreams some of the younger members might have had, U.S. divisions
on Saudi Arabia‘s northern border will breed moderation. The
regime will cooperate more avidly than before.
But Iran is the basic issue. U.S. officials said last week that
they are concerned about Iran‘s nuclear weapons program. That was
not a casual statement. The Iranians said they knew that they
were next on Washington‘s target list. That wasn‘t a casual
statement either. One might think the logical move would be for
Tehran to reassure Washington about both its nuclear program‘s
security and its ability to control al Qaeda -- but that isn‘t
all that easy to do either.
The United States is not concerned with the current intentions of
the Iranian state. Washington is concerned about what those
intentions will be in the future. It is concerned about who will
constitute the Iranian state in the future. It is concerned about
the internal political processes in Tehran and whether the state
apparatus can control quasi-state and non-state processes. In
other words, the United States must, by the logic of the campaign
in Iraq, be deeply concerned not only about the intentions of the
Iranian government, but also the intentions of a host of non-
governmental actors. Iran is inherently unpredictable. It is also
a complex, sophisticated and -- on many levels -- competent
country.
Competence and unpredictability are the things that most endanger
the United States in the Islamic world. Therefore, if the United
States has its way, months, perhaps a year, will elapse before it
chooses to confront Iran. However, Washington may not have this
luxury, depending on the pace of Iranian weapons programs and the
degree of control that President Mohammed Khatami‘s government
has over them. The ideal evolution for the United States would be
to reach a stable understanding with the Khatami regime over
Iran‘s weapons programs and its relations with al Qaeda. However,
as in other cases, it is not clear that the president of Iran has
the ability to deal authoritatively with the United States.
Therefore, depending on how rapidly events evolve in Iran, the
United States might find itself embroiled in a crisis there. The
U.S. military is certainly not ready for another campaign against
a country the size of Iran at this time. It is capable of
attacking known weapons of mass destruction facilities in Iran --
so long as they are known. Which brings us back to where we came
in -- next door, in Iraq.
It would appear to us that the United States will try to spend
the next year reconstructing Iraq, building military facilities
there and probing the responses of neighboring countries. It will
use the time to exploit the French miscalculation in Europe and
to deal with peripheral issues in places like North Korea or the
Philippines. Pakistan must now be a focus. The United States
certainly will want time to regroup and reorganize its forces. At
the same time, the probes can result in rebuffs. Campaigns are
not always planned.
It appears to us that, sooner or later, the settlement of the
Iraq issue must lead to Iran, whatever the detours might be.
The American Empire
Al Qaeda’s goal always has been to unify the Islamic world under an Islamic government—to create, in effect, an Islamic empire that is ready to both protect the interests of the Islamic world and to expand Islamic influence. It is doubtful that al Qaeda will achieve this goal. Indeed, it is Stratfor’s view that al Qaeda’s actions will, contrary to its intentions or expectations, generate the exact opposite effect -- the creation of an American empire.
In a sense, the American empire already was created by the nearly simultaneous fall of the Soviet Union and the Japanese economy. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States became the only power capable of projecting military force globally. With the crash of Japan’s economy and the extraordinary expansion of the American economy in the 1990s, the United States also became the dominant global economic power, the primary source of capital and innovation. These two forces combined to give the United States overwhelming political power and with that came the ability to shape the international order as it wished.
American power did not match the American appetite for power. The U.S. did not perceive itself as having major global interests and its economy was less dependent on either imports or exports than were those of other major powers. Nevertheless, the United States had an interest in maintaining the stability of the international economic order. In general, this meant maintaining and expanding market capitalism in other countries and developing an international free trade regime with the inevitable protectionist aspects that domestic American politics had come to require.
On another level, the United States, no longer riveted by any serious threats to its national security, had the luxury to focus on the moral character of regimes. It intervened in Somalia to end appalling hunger; in Haiti to put a stop to a brutal and repressive regime; in Bosnia and Kosovo to limit Serbian excesses. All of these were elective operations. The United States did not undertake these missions because it had any overriding interests at stake, but because it had a massive surplus in politico-military power and could afford to indulge. When Somalia proved more complex and painful than the United States was prepared to endure, it withdrew. When the Haitian operation failed to provide the promised blessings, the government changed its focus.
The central reality of the 1990s was this: while the United States had the ability to impose a global order, it clearly did not need one and the cost of imposing one outstripped any benefit that the United States might derive from it. Although the U.S. was clearly the world’s leader in every sense, and even thought of itself as the leader, it did not wish to take on the disciplines of leadership or assume the cost of forming a global order. Leadership includes developing coherent principles for governing the international system, deploying the power to impose that system and the willingness to create appropriate institutions with which to govern.
The lack of American appetite for power in the 1990s resulted in a subsequent lack of any predictable, coherent behavior in the international system. Instead, Washington‘s principles were vague, its political and military power was diffuse and the institutions it chose to operate through (namely the United Nations and NATO) were both relics of the Cold War and were fundamentally unsuited to the tasks at hand.
Nothing is more dangerous than power without appetite or fear. Appetite and fear focus power, make it predictable and make it possible for other nations to craft policies that accommodate, avoid or resist that power. Where there is neither appetite nor fear, power is unfocused and therefore inherently unpredictable. That unpredictability was the mark of U.S. policy between the fall of the Berlin Wall and Sept. 11.
For most of the rest of the world, the 1990s was like living with a huge gorilla whose intentions were generally good if somewhat addled. It was impossible to predict what the gorilla might become interested in next, what it might do and the consequences of its actions. For other nations, the United States potentially could be the solution to their problems, but, if unfocused, also could be dangerous.
Other countries therefore had two predominant goals. One was to try to take advantage of a relationship with the United States. The other was to try to form coalitions large enough to focus the U.S. or at least render it predictable to some degree. The latter was difficult. Working with the United States was more profitable than resisting it. Thus every time a coalition started to form, the U.S. government would shift its policy slightly, perhaps seducing one of the potential coalition members, and the effort would collapse.
The rest of the world did not find this situation amusing. U.S. power and indifference posed a threat to their national interest. The problem did not derive from any defect in the American character, but from geography and power. The United States was physically secure from the rest of the world and so powerful and prosperous that it needed little from that world. American self-sufficiency and the power to secure what little it needed collided with the very different experience of the rest of the world.
Nowhere was this clearer than in Somalia. The United States, under former President George Bush, intervened for humanitarian reasons, stayed to try to build a nation, then pulled out when the nationals resisted. From the American point of view, this was a humanitarian mission that just didn’t work out.
From the standpoint of the Islamic world -- and particularly that of al Qaeda’s founders -- this was an example of the random and unpredictable nature of U.S. foreign policy, coupled with a lack of moral fiber. Washington’s actions may have been well intended, but were perceived as an unwarranted, imperial intervention. Worse, the intervention was perceived as an imperial move by a nation with no appetite for empire.
Somalia led directly to Sept. 11. Al Qaeda was part of the international community that found U.S. behavior erratic, unpredictable and ultimately weak. Al Qaeda’s goal -- building an Islamic empire -- required that it challenge the U.S. and demonstrate that the United States was both inherently weak due to moral corruption and that it would be incapable of destroying al Qaeda. For al Qaeda, challenging the United States would change the psychology of the Islamic world, thereby undermining the perceived power of the United States.
Sept. 11 redefined the world for the United States. It turned the world from a vaguely irrelevant, generally harmless place in which there were economic opportunities and the chance to do good deeds into one that was deadly. It also created a focus for U.S. power that changed the dynamic of the entire international system. Prior to Sept. 11, the United States had only a vague interest in the international system; after the attacks this international system -- and the destruction of al Qaeda, to be precise -- became an obsession.
The problem for the United States, however, is that destroying al Qaeda is not a straightforward action. The group has dispersed itself globally, which forces the United States to follow suit. Prior to Sept. 11, the United States completely dominated the world’s oceans and space. This allowed it to go anywhere and see everything, but its ground forces were deployed fairly randomly. For example, thousands of troops were still deployed in Germany, more from habit than from need. The U.S. presence in Eurasia was essentially without a mission and not particularly deep.
Over the past 10 months, the United States has not only dispersed its forces throughout Eurasia and the surrounding islands, but also has moved deeply into the governments, intelligence agencies and security apparatus of many of these countries. U.S. forces have been deployed, in small numbers, to areas ranging from Europe and Georgia to the "stans" and the Philippines. More important, in many of these countries small numbers of U.S. forces are "advising" (i.e. commanding) native forces while U.S. advisors monitor and influence decisions from the these countries’ Ministries.
Sept. 11 created an unintended momentum in U.S. foreign policy that has led directly to empire-building. Empires are not created by salivating monsters seeking power. Such empires usually fail. The Romans did not intend to build an empire, but each step they took logically led to the next and in due course they had an empire. In turn, being an empire profoundly changed their institutions and their self-definition. Aside from a deep belief in their own virtue, becoming an empire was not an intention but an outcome.
The United States does not intend to become an empire. Its birth was the first great anti-imperial exercise. It certainly has little economic need for empire because, like the British, it can trade for what it needs. But the logic of empire does not consist of avarice nearly as much as fear. The Romans’ first impulse to empire was defensive. So, too, the American impulse is entirely defensive. The United States is not trying to build an empire: It simply wants to stop al Qaeda. However, to do so is to follow the classic imperial process.
Driven by the need to defeat al Qaeda, American forces are deploying to scores of countries around the world -- sometimes overtly, sometimes secretly; sometimes in uniform and sometimes as secret agents. In all of these countries, the United States is engaged in reshaping domestic policies. Al Qaeda cannot be rooted out unless the social fabric of these countries can be managed.
Few will dare resist. The United States is enormously powerful and has been transformed from a vaguely disinterested gorilla into a brutally focused and deadly viper, ready to strike anywhere. Given U.S. power and the American mood, few nations are prepared to risk U.S. displeasure by refusing to cooperate in the fight against al Qaeda. Indeed, many see it as a chance to profit from collaboration with Washington.
In practice this means that, in the course of defeating al Qaeda the United States is becoming an integral part of the domestic policy process and implementation in virtually all countries around the globe. Those that resist are potential targets for American attack. This was an inevitable -- but unintended – consequence of the attacks of Sept. 11.
The intention is to defeat al Qaeda; the means to do so is a global war against them. This requires the United States to be present in a majority of countries, overseeing processes that are part of a sovereign nation’s purview, therefore, in effect, usurping its sovereignty. Since the war itself requires reconstructing social orders, the American presence will have to intrude deeply into these societies. Since the war against al Qaeda could take a generation, the U.S. will be there for a long time.
Most American policymakers would deny that this is their intention. All would be sincere, but the unintended consequence is the nature of politics. In this case, the unintended consequence is empire. U.S. power, having met an obsessive need, is moving throughout the world. Where it meets resistance, it has no choice but to plan war. The United States can neither decline combat with al Qaeda nor avoid the consequences of such combat.
The United States has been a democratic republic, an anti-imperial power. Now it is an imperial power, not in the simplistic Leninist sense of seeking markets, but in the classical sense of being unable to secure its safety without controlling others. The paradox is that al Qaeda -- ultimately a very minor power -- is driving the world‘s greatest nation toward this end.
The problem, of course, is that all of this is visible tactically to Americans. They see the deployments into each country. They see the acceptance of advisors into ministries. They have come to expect cooperation by police in Yemen, bases in Kyrgyzstan, information from Egypt and accommodation from Germans or Russians. They expect it, but have not yet constructed a coherent picture or named what they are getting into: empire. Empires begin not with rabid manifestoes, but with short-term solutions leading only one way.
The dispersal we see today will last at least as long as the Cold War dispersals, and will be even harder to abandon. There will be resistance to an American empire, from great powers as well as small. There will be burdens to be borne in holding this empire that cannot be abandoned. The American dilemma is that it is better at winning an empire than explaining it or even admitting what has happened.
The United States is taking control of countries throughout the world, bringing benefits and making threats. But the United States has no theory of empire. How can a democratic republic and an empire coincide? Once, this was an interesting theoretical question. Now it is the burning -- but undiscussed -- question in American politics.
The issue is not whether this should happen. It is happening. The real issue, apart from how all this plays out, is what effect it will have on the United States as a whole. A global empire whose center is unsure of its identity, its purposes and its moral justification is an empire with a center that might not hold. As the obvious becomes apparent, this will become the focus of a pressing debate in the United States.
, there have been 160+ wars, since the UN was formed. Only 2 have had UN backing. The Korean conflict, and the first Gulf War. Most would agree that neither of those was resolved appropriately, in spite of the UN‘s guidance, which you two seem to hold in such high esteem. Regardless of your position on the war, this is not anything new.
