German doctrine

[gate_guard]

Okay, as some of you may know, I've been working on a history term paper regarding German tactics in WW2. I've started a new thread because the other one "Blitzkrieg" sort of evolved into its own discussion. Because of the insightful input I've received here, my prof has been kind enough to alter my topic to:

"What were the political and tactical implications of German operational doctrine [in the early years of] World War II?"

Any thoughts?

 

[pbi]

Okay, as some of you may know, I've been working on a history term paper regarding German tactics in WW2. I've started a new thread because the other one "Blitzkrieg" sort of evolved into its own discussion. Because of the insightful input I've received here, my prof has been kind enough to alter my topic to:

"What were the political and tactical implications of German operational doctrine [in the early years of] World War II?"

Any thoughts?

"They Kicked A**"

How's that?  Cheers

 

[Freedom_Rider]

Basicly, they believed they were the true pure arien "Super Race" and it was their place to rule over all others.

 

[FormerEnlisted]

well it had different effects on everyone...
French= got ready to surrender
Russians= sat around and ate borscht
Brits= 'nothing to offer but blood sweat and tears'
Germans= rediscovered interest in baking and decided to invest in ovens
Canucks= got the 'ol canoes out of storage
Yanks= sold old canoes to canucks
Japanese= declared 'seppuku' national sport....

 

[a_majoor]

Political implications: The OKW had started the war reluctantly, but given the amazing success of their early campaigns, became more agreeable to Hitler's plans and fantasies. This led to a vast overstretch of German military, economic and political power.

The German military-industrial complex was held to pre-1939 era equipment, and many promising ideas were put on the back burner simply because no one felt the war would go on long enough for them to be useful. Rocketry and jet aircraft are the best known examples. The German economy was not put to "war" status between 1939-1942(?), which also hindered the build up of forces later in the war, as they were building from a narrower base then was possible (and becoming narrower as it was attacked by bombing and ground assault). 

Tactical seems too far down "in the weeds", maybe you should look at the operational level instead.

 

[pbi]

What were the political and tactical implications of German operational doctrine [in the early years of] World War II?"

I have to echo a majoor here: you have hacked yourself off a huge slice. Further, you may have blurred the hierachy of  concepts. Poliitical issues usually have their closest relationship to the conduct of war at the strategic or "grand strategic" level, at which a nation or alliance decides how its political aims will be met through war. "Operational" doctrine is that body of though that, in broad conceptual terms, lays out how forces will achieve the conditions for success and the endstate for the particular strategy.It is usually the concern of commanders from the Field Army-Division level, although in reality it is not sliced quite so neatly as that. Tactics (or TTPs as we're increasingly coming to call them....) are those lower-level actions taken to fight a particular battle, and are usually the concern of commanders below Division level.

I suggest you might want to re-draft your thesis question to focus your initial research: otherwise you may find yourself facing a monster. Cheers.

 

[gate_guard]

Note:
Read "strategic" in place of "tactical." I noticed the error and understand they cover two completely different levels of operations. The gyst of what my professor seems to be aiming for with regards to my paper is the relationship between Hitler's foreign policy with regards to expanding German borders and the doctrine employed by his generals to enable Hitler's plan to succeed. More specifically, how did the strategy employed by his generals allow for Hitler's plans for expansion to succeed ?

 

[pbi]

It is an eternal argument as to just how well the Germans understood strategy at all, given the fact that twice within a single career length they dumped themselves into a clasically unwinnable situation: a two-front war against major powers. I don't really feel qualified to say much more: there are some very knowledgeable folk here who can, I am sure, debate this with you at length. Cheers and good luck with your paper.