The trouble is, defence isn't first and foremost a money problem. I hasten to add that, yes, the CF is underfunded, but's that because of fundamental, underlying policy confusion, so the money problem is more of a symptom than a cause.
I'll offer an analogy. In my civ life, I'm involved in aboriginal economic development. Aboriginal development--the aboriginal "agenda"--is a confusing tangle of economic, social, cultural, health, environmental and legal issues. The federal government approach to aboriginal affairs is based on an obsolete document--the Indian Act of 1912. The government (governments, actually, as there are overlapping federal, provincial and, for some issues, even municipal jurisdictions at issue) have no clear policy vision. Neither do the stakeholders...the various First Nations, aboriginal organizations and lobby groups. The government wishes the whole thing would go away, but it won't; aboriginal activists and high profile events (roadblocks, suicides, confrontations, etc.) keep it in public view. So, faced with an enormously complex problem with no easy or quick solution, the governmental response has been to throw money at it. There have been enormous amounts of public funds invested in aboriginal development, and enormous amounts continue to be invested. The result is a mess of incomplete or poorly considered investments in infrastructure, housing, etc., mismanaged funds, some cases of outright corruption and misappropriation, and almost no impact on the basic issues of chronic unemployment, poor health, below average educational achievement, substandard housing, poverty, etc.
Similarly, defence...
...is a confusing tangle of economic, cultural, legal, regional, diplomatic and foreign policy issues. The federal government approach to defence is based on an obsolete document--the White Paper of 1994. The government has no clear policy vision for defence. Neither do the stakeholders...the various Commands, arms, components and lobby groups. The government wishes the whole thing would go away, but it won't; defence activists and world events (genocide, regional conflicts, WoT, US relations, etc.) keep it in public view. Faced with a complex problem with no easy or quick solution, the governmental response....
Well, it certainly hasn't been to throw money at it. But, as the aboriginal issue suggests, money is often a solution looking for a specific problem. Before defence spending is changed to do more than cover current shortfalls, I'd like to see a fundamental defence review done, culminating in a new White Paper. I'd like to see rational answers, put into a Canadian and allied strategic context, to such questions as:
-what do we want our Army to do? Does Canada want to have a role in future high intensity conflicts? Does that require a general war-fighting capability across the spectrum of conflict, or do we want to focus on providing specifc capabilities to allied coalitions? Maybe this new peacekeeping bde is a good idea...maybe it isn't. How do we know? What sort of estimate was done to tell one way or the other?
-what do we want our Navy to do? Do we want a deep-water capability to project power off-shore, or do we want to focus on coastal defence? What role should the Navy have in sovereignty presence in remote areas? Do we need submarines that can patrol under Arctic ice? Or do some form of aircraft carrier capability, or strategic transport and sustainment?
-what do we want our Air Force to do? Do we need high performance fighters to protect Cdn airspace? Or do we want to focus on strategic lift? What role should the Air Force have in sovereignty presence?
-more generally, to what extent should each of the services have specific roles, versus being integrated into a unified air-land-see capability? Would Canada's strategic interests be better served, for instance, by creating and maintaining something like a "Marine Expeditionary Force", with integrated land, air and naval combat capabilities?
Without such a review, we run the risk of creating capabilities we don't need, can't sustain, or turn out to be of limited value. Canada will never be able to afford, nor would it need, a US style all-singing, all-dancing military capability (even the US can't afford the current US capability). So what we need is a realistic, coherent and rational defence policy that Canadian people will endorse as reflecting a meaningful and realistic role for Canada in the world, and that they can and would support through public financing. Right now, however, our defence investments are ad hoc, mismatched, with things being done in isolated "silos", that are frequently driven by short-term public perception issues (for instance, we need new helicopters to replace the Sea Kings. No disputing the Sea Kings need to be retired...but why do they need to be replaced? Do we actually need the capability they provide? Or should those dollars be used for something else? Without doing some real-world analysis, how will we know?)
