Grand Strategy for a Divided America

[Edward Campbell]

Foreign policy is one of the primary expressions of a nation's Grand Strategy and two analysts* suggest that America's foreign policy is badly broken, further suggesting, to me, that even if there is a coherent grand strategy, which I doubt, it can neither a) be expressed effectively nor b) survive this administration. Their article is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Huffington Post:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andras-simonyi/america-is-not-in-decline_b_4643740.html

America Is Not in Decline, Its Foreign Policy Is... But It Can (Still) Surprise the World

András Simonyi and Erik Brattberg

Posted: 01/22/2014

These days the talk of the town is Bob Gate's gripping memoir Duty about his time serving as Secretary of Defense under two presidents: George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Bob Gates was respected by America's friends, allies and it's enemies alike. To be on the safe side, we must start with a confession: the authors are fans of the former secretary. Unlike us, most Europeans had no idea whether Bob Gates was a Republican or a Democrat. And frankly it did not and does not matter. Most commentaries focus on what Mr. Gates had to tell about Obama and Biden and other U.S. leaders, including former Secretary of State Clinton. All juicy stuff, fun reading, but with little long-term, lasting significance.

In contrast, the most important parts of the book are the ones explaining the polarized nature of the U.S. foreign policy establishment and how and why this makes America weaker. This has a strong message for the future, beyond America. What Bob Gates is talking about is exactly what worries America's allies and friends right now. It should worry Americans too.

As Gates makes vividly clear, page after page, Washington's foreign policy process is broken and dysfunctional, big time. Contrary to the often extreme and divisive positions on Fox News or MSNBC (clearly part of the problem, except for Morning Joe: we kind of like that show!), according to Gates, the current paralysis is not the fault of one party or the other. America's foreign and security policy used to be bipartisan. Today, only the blame is bipartisan.

It used to be that "politics stopped at the waters edge" -- when it came to foreign policy. It used to be that Washington's foreign policy elite could famously simply gather in cigar-smoke filled clubrooms to sketch out a bipartisan foreign policy. It used to be that Tom Lantos, a leading democrat, and Bob Dole, a leading conservative, would travel the world together as best friends. They would explain to their counterparts how different their views were on most things, except for one: no one should count on their differences when it came to America's overall foreign policy objectives.

After World War II, leaders from both political families came together around a hugely ambitious plan to offer security and economic prosperity to war-ridden Western European countries, better known as NATO and the Marshall Plan. Throughout the Cold War, there was little doubt where Democrats and Republicans stood on the issue of the liberation of Eastern Europe. These were great moments of America's leadership of the free world. It was possible because of visionary leaders, and broad political support at home. And most importantly, it was possible because of a broad consensus among Democrats and Republicans.

Whether a bipartisan consensus of such mythical proportions ever existed in reality or not is beside the point. That was the world's perception and it made America stronger. Respected and emulated, at times loathed and even despised, but never considered hesitant on the fundamental values of freedom and democracy, because there used to be one America. It is different today.

Here is why all this is really important, and why we worry.

In a rapidly changing world where China will soon surpass the United States as the world's largest economy, with authoritarian regimes such as Russia on the rise and when the West seems to have lost its way, U.S. global leadership is once again called for. When America fails to lead, the world becomes messy, at times even dangerous. Washington therefore needs a broader, more strategic, more determined and clearly more courageous vision of its global role. It needs to send a strong message to the rest of the world. This will only be possible when true bipartisanship, a willingness to work together in the best American tradition, is back.

After a decade of fighting unwinnable wars in the Middle East and Central Asia, Americans have become war weary. But they must see that it is in their own best interest that America remains engaged globally. Make no mistake: American "declinism" is a myth -- surely one should not fall for the silly comparison between America and the Roman Empire. However, it can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is up to Americans, its leaders, its president and Congress to decide whether the 21st century will be another "American century" or whether it will be dominated by others; nations who do not share our deep beliefs in human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

We do understand the tectonic social (generational and ethnic) changes that have taken place in America, the enormous impact of technology, and the role of social media. All this should make America more courageous, not less -- more determined to lead, not less. But only if Democrats and Republicans will all come together in that weathered, battered, but still so important consensus. While Democrats and Republicans may disagree on the specifics, the broad objectives of foreign policy must be equally shared and equally tirelessly pursued no matter what.

America can still surprise the world. You can do it! Just take the lead from your Duty, á la Bob Gates.

Messers Simonyi and Brattenberg are right that the consensus that seems to have prevailed for decades (from 1945 to, say, 1985 or even 1995) was mythical in its proportions ... but there was one on the broad, general principles: contain communism (not just the USSR); reward capitalist democracies; and promote American hegemony. The differences, and there were real ones, usually centred on the second matter ~ many Americans were less interested in rewarding capitalism and democracy than in supporting any tinpot, kleptocratic dictator who was an anti-communist.

I agree with them that America is not in any sort of serious "decline" ... no more than Rome was in 115 AD or Britain in 1835. But, by those dates, Rome and Britain had each reached a zenith in their power and influence; each remained powerful but always less and less so in relation to other, emerging powers.

I doubt that Democrats and Republicans can, even if they want to, "come together" any time soon. The culture wars that are shredding America's socio-political fabric are already weakening its strategic ways and means. The rise of China, which ought to be a cause for socio-economic renewal (as the coincident rises of Germany and America were not for a complacent and often distracted (by Ireland) Britain), poses a real threat of leading America into a strategic blunder which can do real, serious harm to America's power in the world.


_____
* Ambassador András Simonyi (60) is the Managing Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR) at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C. He is an economist by training, has a long career in the diplomatic service where he has gained experience in both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. He has built an extensive network in the Euroatlantic community. His ambassadorial assignments include NATO and Washington. He has spent time in the private sector.

Erik Brattberg is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC. He is also a Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. He has published widely on various European and transatlantic political and economic issues. Originally from Sweden, Mr. Brattberg holds a Master of Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.

 

[pbi]

An interesting discussion on Secretary Gates new book, and the sorts of positions and ideals that drove him while serving:

Excellent piece. Some random thoughts:

He thinks that George W. Bush, under the influence of Cheney and Rumsfeld, made some significant blunders in his first term,

I was very surprised to discover, both during my time with the US HQ in Afghanistan and during a visit to CENTCOM, the utter hatred many senior officers had toward Rumsfeld. I don't think he was missed by too many people.

and he thinks that elected officials in general and members of the legislative branch in particular are often contemptibly selfish, lazy, parochial and short-sighted.

Totally unlike their fine Canadian counterparts....

Gates nevertheless belongs to the tradition of moderate Republican realism that Scowcroft represents. These people rarely run for public office and often find career politicians distasteful, but they believe, deeply, in public service, and are mostly found in appointive offices in the executive branch. Though the breed shows a tendency to degenerate over time, by and large they cling more closely to the personal and ethical standards of earlier WASP generations influenced by high New England ethics in a way that our current political culture does its best to escape.

Well said. Were the Republican Party ever to restore itself to that calibre, and deep-six marginal rubbish like the Tea Party, religious fanatics, Sarah Palin and the other members of the Proudly Ignorant, etc. I could imagine a great day in American politics. I would probably vote for them if I was an American.

First, Gates’s tradition of public service values putting patriotism ahead of partisanship in that quaint, old fashioned way, especially in time of great need and, above all, in war

It's not just the US that sorely needs ideals of service and statesmanship amongst its leaders, instead of ideologically driven wedge- and special interest attack politics...

ates’s harshest observation of both Secretary Clinton (whom in general he seems to have found quite congenial and who sided with him on most policy issues) and President Obama is that at times they confessed, or by their actions revealed, that their decisions and public positions on matters of national security were shaped by political rather than policy considerations. In particular, Gates reports both the Secretary and the President as having said that their public opposition to the surge in Iraq (a deeply unpopular policy, one must not forget, that Secretary Gates supported and helped to push through despite the cynical opposition of tub thumping politicians) was motivated by concern for their political fortunes.

Sadly, not really a new thing in democracies, especially the US. Harry Truman once commented to the effect that foreign policy is nothing more than domestic politics "with its hat on".

 

[tomahawk6]

The US military to make a generalization,is a pretty conservative group.It must be the nature of the business.I am fine with the Tea Party and Palin.Not so much with the progressives currently running the gong show in Washington.The democrats used to have a conservative wing,but gradually since Vietnam they either became Republicans or independents.What I find shocking is that the Communist Party USA seems sympatico with the democrats and vice versa.

 

[pbi]

The US military to make a generalization,is a pretty conservative group.

Yes, I would agree with you, and not based solely on my contact with US officers over the years. I read a study done a few years ago that compared the social, political and religious views of US and Canadian senior officers (0-6 and above). The differences were quite significant. By and large, US officers tended to be much more conservative, on every issue, than their Canadian counterparts. This probably accounts for the overwhelmingly Republican nature of the US officer corps, and the rather strong predilection for conservative religious views.

In my experience, a Canadian  officers' political, religious or social views have never been of much importance to the chain of command  (as long as he obeyed the law, was a good officer, and was not seditious). Our last Commander of  the Army went off to be an advisor to the Liberal Party of Canada: hard to imagine the former COS of the US Army lining himself up with the Democrats. Having sat on a few merit boards during my time in uniform, it would be unthinkable for any of  these issues ever to come up when considering an officer for promotion or selection to a position, even in the most casual way.

This is not to say that character isn't considered in our system: it definitely can be, and IMHO should always be. It's just that we don't see religion, politics or social views as being essential parts of an officer's character.

By contrast, I once had a US Army O-6 say to me that "No American officer would ever be caught dead listening to National Public Radio". I can't imagine during my time in uniform my superior ever telling me what media I should/should not listen to, or even caring about it. When I was at Quantico, I was surprised to discover that at parties, receptions, etc. the first question many US officers asked was "what Church are you attending?". To most Canadian officers this would be an extremely unlikely question to ask anybody unless you knew them very well.

As officers we are of course expected to serve the nation and to uphold the Government of the day, to avoid direct partisan political activity (Reserve officers excepted), and not to publicly make disloyal comments. Beyond that, in my experience, nobody much cares, nor should they.

 

[a_majoor]

I see that as more of a distillation of the American national "Culture" more than anything else. Most Americans self identify as being religious, and church goers (even urban blacks, who are most likely to support "Progressive" political candidates and programs), and the demographics that the US Military draws most heavily from is conservative and religious, so the process is self reinforcing inside the uniformed culture. I have even worked with an American officer from southern California (epicenter of hippiedom) who was pretty much as you described in terms of attitudes and beliefs. If that individual had been a "granola eater" in civilian life, it was certainly ironed out while in uniform....

I don't know that such a generalization can be made here, but then again, being inside the bubble makes it hard to see the true scale and scope of the culture. Canadian "culture" is fairly amorphous anyway, so it is difficult to think of what sorts of "national" traits would be reinforced inside the uniformed service. Regimental "culture" is much stronger, hence the various cartoon versions of the RCR, PPCLI and Van Doos we love to toss about.

 

[pbi]

..I don't know that such a generalization can be made here, but then again, being inside the bubble makes it hard to see the true scale and scope of the culture. Canadian "culture" is fairly amorphous anyway, so it is difficult to think of what sorts of "national" traits would be reinforced inside the uniformed service. Regimental "culture" is much stronger, hence the various cartoon versions of the RCR, PPCLI and Van Doos we love to toss about.

You raise a very interesting question here. We have always heard (ad nauseam) that the CAF must reflect the society it comes from. While I have never fully accepted this (there are behaviours and norms that, IMHO, are not transferable in either direction and probably couldn't be), on reflection our representativeness might only become clear when we compare ourselves to the military of another nation.

For example, I might offer that the strain of egalitarianism that runs in Canadian society (sometimes known sarcastically as the "Crabs in The Bucket" syndrome) is also reflected in our military (but in a more positive way). Our relationship between officers, NCOs and soldiers is much more egalitarian than a number of the armies I've witnessed.  We are overwhelmingly a middle class force: there are graduations of exactly where in the middle class people come from, but this lack of any "real" social difference is, I think reflected in our Army society.

Maybe we are more representative than we think.

 

[Old Sweat]

You raise a very interesting question here. We have always heard (ad nauseam) that the CAF must reflect the society it comes from. While I have never fully accepted this (there are behaviours and norms that, IMHO, are not transferable in either direction and probably couldn't be), on reflection our representativeness might only become clear when we compare ourselves to the military of another nation.

For example, I might offer that the strain of egalitarianism that runs in Canadian society (sometimes known sarcastically as the "Crabs in The Bucket" syndrome) is also reflected in our military (but in a more positive way). Our relationship between officers, NCOs and soldiers is much more egalitarian than a number of the armies I've witnessed.  We are overwhelmingly a middle class force: there are graduations of exactly where in the middle class people come from, but this lack of any "real" social difference is, I think reflected in our Army society.

Maybe we are more representative than we think.

Excellent points, PBI.

I came from at best a not very well off (in fact we were pretty poor) lower middle class small town Ontario background, but managed to progress quite well in an army that was much more class conscious than we are today. Ten years ago I was a guest at the changeover of a friend from CLS to an officer who will go nameless, but his first name is Rick. Mike J - now that let it all out - said with considerable emotion how grateful he was that his family had emigrated to Canada shortly after the war. His dad had been an OR in the RA during the war and in the social climate in the UK during the sixties Mike never would have been able to go from apprentice soldier to officer cadet. In my book on Normandy I addressed officer production in the wartime Canadian Army and roughly half of the officers came from the ranks. It may be a national characteristic, but we are probably as close as one could come to an egalitarian meritocracy. It ain't perfect by any means, but it is more than reasonably fair.

One last thought, once we got over the characteristic wailing, look how well the acceptance, and that word isn't quite strong enough, of female members worked.

 

[pbi]

Excellent points, PBI.

.. It may be a national characteristic, but we are probably as close as one could come to an egalitarian meritocracy. It ain't perfect by any means, but it is more than reasonably fair....

The number of senior Army officers over the years (LCol and above) who started in the ranks is indicative of this. Note also that, compared to GOs in other militaries, ours have very few of the "perks" that are seen elsewhere. "Official residences", servants, batmen, permanently assigned drivers, etc are not necessarily a "gimme" for GOs in our military.

One last thought, once we got over the characteristic wailing, look how well the acceptance, and that word isn't quite strong enough, of female members worked.

When I was a rifle coy OC in 1 PP I had the experience of receiving one of the first female 031 to graduate from the PPCLI Battle School. She was met by quite a bit of scepticism (and other things, I'm fairly sure...) but she proved herself quite well and the troops (and my CSM!!!) came to accept her. I was sorry when she took a release for unrelated personal reasons. A couple of years ago I met the first female RegF 23A Inf coy OC. It is a dificult go for females (I've seen the crash and burn episodes, too...) but those that prove themselves do well. And now we have lost our first women in combat, so it's sealed in blood.

 

[tomahawk6]

With regard to advancement in the CF is it knowing the right officers that determine promotion ? The US Army uses a board system and the members review files in the zone of consideration.It does help if you know the President of the Board.Its a fair system.My big gripe with the system is the treatment of officers with low efficiency reports.A negative OER can be a career ender.It needs to be viewed in context.I always believed in learning by making a mistake.Sadly our system lost that object many years ago.

 

[Journeyman]

It does help if you know the President of the Board. It's a fair system.

Do you not see a contradiction between these two sentences? It seems unfair to anyone not knowing the Board President.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Going further  ff topic:

Some years ago an officer who would, soon, become CDS proposed, only half in jest, that the CF stop wasting money on the performance review process. Annual reports, he suggested, were fine but the system needed to be changed, every four or five years, to prevent rank inflation. There are, he suggested, 25 or 30 "attributes" that almost all of us agree can be and should be measured. Any given report ought to include 15 to 20 of them, he said, graded from 1 to 7 or 1 to 8 or 9 or 10 ~ both the attributes reported upon and the number of "grades" for each one could change every four or five years.

I think he was probably right. I'm guessing we spend millions of dollars and dozens of person-years, every year, thinking about a system that works well enough and would work just as well if totally arbitrary changes were made by, say, a sergeant clerk, on a periodic but irregular basis.

 

[tomahawk6]

Do you not see a contradiction between these two sentences? It seems unfair to anyone not knowing the Board President.

Yet officers are selected despite not knowing anyone on the board.During the GWOT we had very high promotion rates:

"In a recent memo to senior leaders, Odierno said the Army is preparing to return to the selection opportunity levels that were in place before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Those were 90 percent selection opportunity for promotion to captain, 80 percent for major, 70 percent for lieutenant colonel and 50 percent for colonel."

 

[pbi]

Yet officers are selected despite not knowing anyone on the board.During the GWOT we had very high promotion rates:

"In a recent memo to senior leaders, Odierno said the Army is preparing to return to the selection opportunity levels that were in place before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Those were 90 percent selection opportunity for promotion to captain, 80 percent for major, 70 percent for lieutenant colonel and 50 percent for colonel."

Tomahawk: to answer your earlier question, yes: in our system it does help if you are known by board members, because then people are better able to make accurate judgements about you. Since in the Infantry our boards are done regimentally, the chances of being known are quite high unless you have been stuck off in some forgotten dead-end job somewhere away from where anybody can see how you did. The chances go down a bit in the Branch boards such as Artillery, Armour and Combat Engineers, but as they are small branches it is still possible. It is in the larger "purple" branches such as Logistics that people can get lost. In hte end, the human factor will always have some effect on the selection and promotion system, and IMHO that is as it should be, as long as things are fair, open and above board.

Ref the high US promotions rates during GWOT: when I was attached to USCJTF 76, I was chatting with the CHOps one day (an Inf LTC) who mentioned that on the last board 75% of Inf MAJ were promoted to LTC. 75%!!!! An astronomical figure like this this would be unheard of for us, except possibly at Lt to Capt. A Infantry regiment (three battalions and those officers "Extra-Regimentally Employed" (schools, staffs, recruiting, foreign exchange, etc) usually counts promotions to LCol at a fraction of that. Either you have officers of amazingly high quality (which is quite possible...) or your OER system is not picking up the weak ones who shouldn't be getting through.  Which do you think it is?

 

[tomahawk6]

or your OER system is not picking up the weak ones who shouldn't be getting through.  Which do you think it is?

The latter.

 

[a_majoor]

The disastrous American Foreign policy of this Administration (Smart Diplomacytm) will certainly leave the new Administration in 2016 with some very difficult rebalancing work to do. Since I am reading Walter Russel Mead's "God and Gold" right now, I take some solace that the "Maritime" system built by the British and Americans over the last 300 years is actually quite flexible and robust, and even nations at odds with America or the greater Anglosphere (which corresponds quite closely to all the nations that created, contribute or are tied directly into the "Maritime System") are heavily tied into global institutions which protect and support the greater goals of the Maritime System. Since the Maritime System has survived even armed assaults by some of the greatest and most formidable collations of nations and military power ever assembled (going back to the Spanish Armada), We will have a rough ride, but should be able to weather this storm as well:

http://pjmedia.com/richardfernandez/2014/02/07/the-emperor-has-no-clothes/?singlepage=true

The Emperor Has No Clothes

February 7th, 2014 - 1:52 am

In late January, four former U.S. ambassadors to the Ukraine penned an open letter in the New York Times. In it they asked the leaders of the West to stop Ukrainian president Yanukovych while restraining immoderate actions from the opposition. They wrote:

Ukraine is on the verge of spinning out of control. A pro-European protest that began more than two months ago in Kiev’s central square has flared into broad, angry opposition to the authoritarian policies of President Viktor F. Yanukovych. If the United States and European Union wish to encourage a peaceful resolution, they must use their leverage now. Otherwise the situation could degenerate further, to the point where the West will be no more than a spectator.


The first days of February saw John Kerry meeting with Ukranian oppositionists to express their support. At about the same time the Obama administration began to negotiate with Congress on the possibility of imposing sanctions on the Ukraine in order to pressure that government “in response to the bloodshed touched off by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to rebuff a long-awaited trade deal with the European Union.”

Two days ago the US ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, announced his resignation. His departure was widely regarded as signalling the failure of the “reset” policy which he advocated. The Post wrote:

McFaul never wavered in his defense of the “reset” despite the increasingly rocky trail of U.S.-Russian relations in recent years. In a blog post titled “It’s Time, My Friend, It’s Time,” written in Russian and English, which he said would be his last as ambassador, he listed what he argued were the reset’s accomplishments.

Among them were the New START accord limiting nuclear arms, the opening of the Northern Distribution Network allowing the United States to send supplies to its troops in Afghanistan by way of Russia, cooperation on Iran and North Korea, and Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization — which Washington wanted on the grounds that it requires Russia to commit to international trade rules.

The situation had been worsening unnoticed, masked by the cascade of other failures and the earnest efforts of the media to spare the administration from embarasment. But the lid is off. Today Russia denounced alleged interference by the U.S. in what they termed the internal affairs of the Ukraine. The Russians leaked the recording of a telephone call from Victoria Nuland, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, and Geoffrey Pyatt, the U.S. ambassador to the Ukraine, as part of a campaign to persuade the international public that Washington was engaged in adventurism. The Boston Globe describes the background and the tape.

The tit-for-tat has been going on since November, when Yanukovych spurned a trade deal with Europe and accepted a $15 billion loan from Moscow. Months of street protests have threatened his government, and US officials are now trying to broker a settlement — an effort the Kremlin seems determined to block.

The posting of the audiotape represented a striking turn in the situation. It was posted anonymously on YouTube on Tuesday under a Russian headline, “Puppets of Maidan,” a reference to the square in Kiev occupied by protesters, and then tweeted Thursday by a Russian government official who called it “controversial.”

The tape captured a four-minute telephone call on Jan. 25 between Victoria Nuland, the assistant secretary of state for European affairs, and Geoffrey Pyatt, the ambassador to Ukraine, trading their views of the crisis, their assessments of various opposition leaders, and their frustrations with their European counterparts. At one point, Nuland used an expletive to describe what should happen to the EU.

The two were discussing Yanukovych’s offer to bring two opposition leaders, Arseniy P. Yatsenyuk and Vitali Klitschko, into the government as prime minister and deputy prime minister. The two Americans favored Yatsenyuk, a former economics minister, and Nuland said Klitschko, a former world heavyweight boxing champion, should not go into government.

The tape was calculated to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its European allies. SFGate reports it as: “‘F–k the EU,’ Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland said in a private phone call, expressing frustration with European Union efforts to resolve Ukraine’s political turmoil.” The National Interest notes some inflammatory language from the Russians as well.

Meanwhile, tempers are running hotter than ever in Moscow, where Kremlin adviser Sergei Glazyev is saying that Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych should just get it over with and crush the “putschists.”

USA Today has got more incendiary language to throw into the pile: “Russian adviser threatens Ukraine with military force”:

KIEV, Ukraine — Ukrainian protesters said Thursday they have no doubt Russia will intervene militarily in the unrest here if the Moscow-aligned president gives in to demands for more freedoms and stronger ties to the West.

“Everyone knows that Russia is going to send troops to Ukraine – we have known it for a long time now,” said Kateryna Chorna of Kiev who has regularly taken part in the anti-government protests that started in November.

“And everyone knows that some of (the Russian troops) are already here…

Sergei Glazyev accused the United States on Thursday of funding the Ukrainian “rebels” by as much as $20 million a day for weapons and other supplies. He urged the Ukrainian government to put down the “attempted coup,” or Russia may have to intervene under the terms of a 1994 agreement between the United States and Russia, according to the Ukraine edition of the Russian daily Kommersant.

Glazyev was alluding to the Budapest Memorandum, a treaty in which Ukraine agreed to turn over a nuclear arsenal on its soil left over after the fall of the Soviet Union, of which Ukraine was a part until it dissolved in 1991.

In return, the United States, United Kingdom and Russia, nuclear powers all, guaranteed to respect the independence and the borders of Ukraine and reaffirmed their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action should Ukraine become a victim of an act of aggression.

The memorandum, which is not binding, refers only to “nuclear aggression” and it requires the signatories to consult each other if other unspecified aggression arises.

Glazyev said the agreement binds Russia and the United States “to intervene when conflicts of this kind arise. And what the Americans are doing now, unilaterally and crudely interfering in the internal affairs of Ukraine, is a clear breach of that treaty.”

With any luck these utterances are simply bluff words employed in a game of diplomatic brinksmanship. But taken at face value the fireworks represent an emergent crisis of very serious proportions, made more shocking by its suddenness; a bolt out of the blue; a dark, threatening thundercloud intruding on the happy-talk diplomacy of the Obama administration. The problems over the Ukraine come almost as a caboose to a long train of disasters, with a disconsolate State Department pulling along a whole string of derelicts — Libya, Syria, Iran, the Arab Spring and growing tension in the Western Pacific — so that the troubles with Russia pass almost unnoticed as the last car in the series.

It’s easy to forget the other points of friction with Russia: Syria, the northern supply route to troops in Afghanistan, Iran, Snowden. Lawmakers who listened to a classified briefing on Snowden’s disclosures were shocked at the extent of the damage he caused.

Armed Services Chairman Buck McKeon (R-Calif.) read his statement rather than making comments on the fly “because of the seriousness of this issue and the sensitivity” of the information they’d just heard.

“Ed Snowden isn’t a whistleblower; he’s a traitor,” McKeon said.

No matter what opinion people hold of the data collection programs, he added, people should be “shocked and outraged to find that a substantial amount of the information has nothing to do with the NSA.”

“He’s given our enemies an edge and put American lives at risk,” said the chairman.

Only a few days ago Russia threatened to quit the START talks as the U.S. deployed an Aegis anti-ballistic missile ship to Spain. All on the back pages, yet taken together one can adventure the thought that a comprehensive failure has overtaken the foreign policy of Barack Obama. The irony is that Obama campaigned on the platform of “smart diplomacy.” But as things have turned out, he was smart only in his own mind.

Under his watch the 70-year-old Pax Americana has fallen apart. Al-Qaeda has flourished. President Benigno Aquino of the Philippines caught the tone of rising concern when he warned, in an interview with the New York Times, that China was doing to Southeast Asia what Nazi Germany did to Central Europe in the late 1930s. “At what point do you say, ‘Enough is enough’? Well, the world has to say it — remember that the Sudetenland was given in an attempt to appease Hitler to prevent World War II.”

But you wouldn’t know it for the panegyrics still being sung by the mainstream media.  To read some papers you would think the world’s biggest problem was gay rights at the Sochi Olympics.

The Sudetenland? Things are not as bad as that yet. But the operative word is “yet.” Someone — perhaps the elders of the Democratic Party — have got to put some competence back in the White House. Someone needs to stop the rot. An administration too inept to roll out a website; too obtuse to do much more than watch a US consulate burned by — dare we say it? — video protesters — such an administration may be overmatched in a contest of brinksmanship with a rival nuclear power.

Barack Obama is in trouble and so are we all. It’s time to stop the Happy Talk and for Republicans and Democrats to face the facts. The emperor has no clothes.

 

[pbi]

What happens to the Maritime System when the slate of payers is re-arranged to include three nations with large (or massive)  populations, growing economies and access to resources? I'm proposing China, Brazil and India, none of whom were ever serious players in the Maritime System before.  All of these countries, in the approximate order I've listed, are at least regional naval powers and have aspirations to increase their maritime reach.

Isn't there a danger inherent in this theory, that it argues from what has been to what will be?
Doesn't that presuppose no significant change of conditions?

 

[a_majoor]

That is a very good question, but WRM argues that the Maritime system is a cultural system as well as a political and trading system. As he describes it, the three legs are self reinforcing, but the all important cultural leg needs to be there first. After all, Spain had a very powerful maritime Empire with a vast population and access to a literal mountain of silver ore in the New World when embarking on its series of wars against the Low Countries, England and the Ottoman Empire. By any objective accounting, the European wars against England and the United Provinces should have been a quick one-two knockout followed by the "main event" against the Ottomans.

Instead, the United Provinces and England had cultures which provided superior ability to identify and utilize all resources (especially the all important human resources), and Spain was locked into a grinding series of wars which eventually sapped huge amounts of time and resources, destabilized the Imperial structure and sent Spain into a terminal decline.

This is true even before the establishment of the modern Maritime system; Ancient Athens had a sort of "maritime system" in place during the Peloponnesian Wars, and despite a huge imbalance in power between the Delian League and Sparta and Her Allies (backed by the financial resources of the Persian Empire), especially after the disaster in Sicily, the Athenians were still able to marshal the manpower and resources to carry on the fight for almost a decade after losing the flower of her army and fleet, and most of her allies as well. The Serenìsima Repùblica Vèneta was similarly unbalanced against the Ottoman Empire (and various unfriendly city states in Italy proper), yet still remained competitive for 200 years, and in the modern age, the "Tiger" economies stack up quite well against China despite a vast disparity in population and access to resources.

India I will propose is a special case. It is part of the Anglosphere (if only as an associate member) and has many of the characteristics of the other modern nations in the Maritime system. So long as her culture continues to follow the British inheritance, India can become a much larger player in the Maritime system. Even if India becomes "less" British in her institutions and culture, she still will be tied to the Maritime system by trade and institutional bonds, since they are of more benefit to members than trying to establish separate institutional regimes (as Napoleon how the Continental System worked out).

China and Brazil do not have the cultural background of the Maritime nations (and China does not really have clear access to the oceans either), which will hamper their ability to marshal resources. As well, even if they did have the resources and ability to marshal resources against the Maritime system, being members of the institutional structures of the Maritime system provide far more benefits than trying to go it alone.

 

[Edward Campbell]

One of the most important things that the Dutch and the English mobilized, and something which the Spanish failed even to comprehend, was: capital.

The Dutch figured out public debt and used it to offset some of the HUGE Spanish advantages. Both England and Holland used their immensely superior financial systems to counter all of their Catholic enemies, and a few others, too.

 

[pbi]

... After all, Spain had a very powerful maritime Empire with a vast population and access to a literal mountain of silver ore in the New World when embarking on its series of wars against the Low Countries, England and the Ottoman Empire. By any objective accounting, the European wars against England and the United Provinces should have been a quick one-two knockout followed by the "main event" against the Ottomans.

Instead, the United Provinces and England had cultures which provided superior ability to identify and utilize all resources (especially the all important human resources), and Spain was locked into a grinding series of wars which eventually sapped huge amounts of time and resources, destabilized the Imperial structure and sent Spain into a terminal decline...

One of the most important things that the Dutch and the English mobilized, and something which the Spanish failed even to comprehend, was: capital.

The Dutch figured out public debt and used it to offset some of the HUGE Spanish advantages. Both England and Holland used their immensely superior financial systems to counter all of their Catholic enemies, and a few others, too.

Just reading Churchill's "Marlborough-His Life and Times", which reinforces over and over again the points raised by Thucydides and ERC above. Marlborough, that great 18th century soldier, fought against both France and Spain. Spain, by the time of the War of the Spanish Succession, was already having difficulties. France, although somewhat better off and with a reasonably more efficient administration, still lacked the dynamism and focused energy of either England or the United Provinces.

Dutch finances, combined with English finance and growing manufacturing power, enabled the creation and sustainment of sea and land forces that challenged the "Catholic Powers" at every turn.

So, maybe culture and internal politics really do have something to do with it. But, things can change. At the time of the Franco-Prussian War, nobody would have seriously predicted that Germany would make a serious bid (twice, actually) to sweep the Royal Navy off the seas.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Just reading Churchill's "Marlborough-His Life and Times", which reinforces over and over again the points raised by Thucydides and ERC above. Marlborough, that great 18th century soldier, fought against both France and Spain. Spain, by the time of the War of the Spanish Succession, was already having difficulties. France, although somewhat better off and with a reasonably more efficient administration, still lacked the dynamism and focused energy of either England or the United Provinces.

Dutch finances, combined with English finance and growing manufacturing power, enabled the creation and sustainment of sea and land forces that challenged the "Catholic Powers" at every turn.

So, maybe culture and internal politics really do have something to do with it. But, things can change. At the time of the Franco-Prussian War, nobody would have seriously predicted that Germany would make a serious bid (twice, actually) to sweep the Royal Navy off the seas.

But I'm not sure that 19th/early 20th century Germany ever wanted, much less planned, to "sweep the Royal Navy off the seas."

They wanted, I think, to be able to counter any threatened British blockade of Germany or its overseas possessions. There is, I think, an analog with China vs the USA today. I doubt the Germans thought, even in 1916, that they could defeat the Royal Navy globally - at Jutland, in one place, at one time, yes, they could win or, at least not lose a great naval battle, but a global victory was always beyond both their reach and, in my opinion, even their wishes. Ditto China, today, I believe: it wants to be able to confront the USN in the China Seas (Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea) and stalemate it there, but it does not even dream of sweeping the USN off the seas.