Just a reminder that we could stray into OPSEC matters by getting too much into how fires are cleared. I think that we can accept that all fires have some clearance involved and that there are consequences on both ends (some more immediate than others). I can't tell which posts are being sarcastic, condescending or otherwise.
On a ligher note, I figure that the next article will be about how Gen Hillier nixed the Navy's plans for Afghanistan in 2005.
Close air support, to be useful, needs to be low, slow and on station. Fast air at 30 000' (with 500lb bombs or PGMs) fails on all three counts. The F22 and F35 were not designed to offer any of those three elements, and the F-15s,-16s and -18s that perform that task today do it largely as an afterthought - so the key close air support airframe right now is still the 35 year old A-10. To my knowledge (and I'd love to be proven wrong) there is no program in place to design a comparable aircraft to replace the A-10 at the end of its service life in 2028 (Freedom 55, I guess...).
The Key West agreement precludes the US Army from buying their own jets. They are either reliant on the USAF to provide what they will, or must spend a great deal of money on helicopters to provide support that the air-superiority mafia view as beneath them (pardon the pun).
And what if an M777 or Leopard round goes astray? Anybody can screw up, and the slight potential of that happening is not a rational decision-making factor.
The point I am trying to make is that unless a fire mission for some reason pounds a refugee camp or orphange, the optics and spin in the public relations world will not even be in the same dimension when comparing an errant artillery fire mission to a CF-18 on a bomb run causing the same damage.
It's got nothing to do with the "slight potential", everybody accepts there are going to be some unfortunate stray rounds here and there which will at some time produce miserable results. But we also know that our fickle, second guessing MSM's ability to stir up phantom crap in what appears to be be a war of gaining unpopularity at home will defeat this mission long before the fight is good and over.
IMO it would be a rather large assumption that political-optical considerations do not weigh heavily in the decisions over which weapons are deployed. There appears to be very little that is rationale about the way the Canadian military forces have been deployed in Afghanistan- political, military or otherwise. Nothing against the troops or their leaders - it is what it is.
Close air support, to be useful, needs to be low, slow and on station. Fast air at 30 000' (with 500lb bombs or PGMs) fails on all three counts. The F22 and F35 were not designed to offer any of those three elements, and the F-15s,-16s and -18s that perform that task today do it largely as an afterthought - so the key close air support airframe right now is still the 35 year old A-10. To my knowledge (and I'd love to be proven wrong) there is no program in place to design a comparable aircraft to replace the A-10 at the end of its service life in 2028 (Freedom 55, I guess...).
Thanks for the CAS lesson, i'm sure i didnt need it. What does it have to do with your previous point about canadian aircraft supporting Canadian troops ?
Could be wrong but, methinks that DAP was linking Tac Hel resources to the troops... not Fast air.
Helos are limited in the distances they will travel in operations and would stay relatively close to home .... able to continue support to your/our troops.
The point I am trying to make is that unless a fire mission for some reason pounds a refugee camp or orphange, the optics and spin in the public relations world will not even be in the same dimension when comparing an errant artillery fire mission to a CF-18 on a bomb run causing the same damage.
Close air support, to be useful, needs to be low, slow and on station. Fast air at 30 000' (with 500lb bombs or PGMs) fails on all three counts. The F22 and F35 were not designed to offer any of those three elements, and the F-15s,-16s and -18s that perform that task today do it largely as an afterthought - so the key close air support airframe right now is still the 35 year old A-10.
One small correction: the F-35B variant (STOVL) isn't just a fast-mover. Think of a stealthier Harrier. At least, that's the design intent; we'll see how it works out in the field...
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