HMCS Montréal part of navy trial to experiment with reducing crews

[Lumber]

I will also produce and run my own ads independently from the recruiting system...

You had me up until here.

While the Trudeau government has resulted in greater openness and transparency, one thing that remains from the Harper government is the centralization of the public message. If highly doubt that ADM(PA) is going to let the Navy run off and produce it's own adds. They'd demand to be briefed and included in every step in the process, making changes left right and centre in order to make sure the Navy's message matched the national narrative, at which point you've just wasted time, effort, and money trying to do it the Navy way.

If I sound bitter, it's the result of having to go through NAVRES PA, MARPAC PA, RCN PA, and finally ADM(PA) to ask if we can set up a recruiting tent at a BBQ.

 

[Halifax Tar]

An interesting question, and good starting point to further discussion, Baz. But there is a misleading aspect here. The RCN is not the one that recruits and train, at least at the basic entry level, its own personnel. The Recruiting system and Training system of the CF does that.

And this means that we are, Navy wide, stuck with the recruiting system's choice of where, when, how frequently and what content the advertisement runs, for instance (for example, is 5 seconds of scene not totally clearly of shipboard life in a 30 sec. ad enough to attract the attention of Canadian youth who might be interested, and if the Navy is in dire need but overall, the recruiting system is attracting a sufficient number of people through its doors, will they run ad more frequently?). And if the processing and then basic training takes forever, how many people do we lose. And should we have the same standards as every body else in the CF, etc. etc.

So here is another question: Would it be better for the RCN to take back full control of its recruiting and training (from scratch) from the CF machine? Is it time for an Admiral to put her foot down and say: "I will use part of my money to reopen (something like) HMCS Cornwallis, and concentrate my simulators / basic training / various fleet schools there and concentrate on modern training of all my people. I will also produce and run my own ads independently from the recruiting system with my own money and provide the recruiting centres with extra resources to process the future seamen. I will pay for this by laying up two thirds of the fleet, which will also give the sea going personnel time to breathe and regroup." ?

Whoa... Who do you think you are ?  The RCN cannot strike out on its own unless the CA is ok with it.  You know that!  That was the whole point of unification!  Come on now OGBD

 

[Eaglelord17]

An interesting question, and good starting point to further discussion, Baz. But there is a misleading aspect here. The RCN is not the one that recruits and train, at least at the basic entry level, its own personnel. The Recruiting system and Training system of the CF does that.

As someone who did a short stint in the Navy until recently, the problem isn't the recruiting system, and it isn't the initial training system. The problem is the Navy itself and its ability to retain people. Before I joined up I did a fair bit of research, I talked to vets, talked to people who had been in and left for good reasons and bad reasons (i.e. why they hated it). I asked them what they liked and what they didn't. I asked what the issues they had with Navy was.

The best time I ever had in the Navy was when I was in my initial training, because after that it went to complete crap. You (this is from my limited prospective as a former jr Stoker) get to the ship, and morale is already in the dumps. The things you were told to expect no longer exist (this is a short list). Things like sliders, drinking on ship (not when I initially joined, however it is the case now), beards (I didn't know those were gone from the ship when I joined), going places and having a good time (now if you go on deployment they are usually dry deployments, with two beers per day allowed in port. I don't know about you but I don't want to spend up to 9 months of the year with the same 240 people in close confinement, and not be allowed to blow off steam every now and again).

The training system for Stokers is broken, you spend 3 1/2 months learning how to make a gasket and file a block of steel, then get to the ship and know next to nothing about your job. You are supposed to almost have a apprenticeship with someone who knows what they are doing teaching you, however those few people left with experience are too busy just trying to keep things running than to be able to train (both themselves and jr members). The 'experts' are now the people who have done it once. Positions which historically had people with 10+ years in filling them are now being filled by people with 3 years as they don't have anyone else. And to top it off as a Stoker for whatever reason we fill billets in Laundry and Scullery despite the fact we are undermanned and we are mechanics not servants.

The best decision of my life was choosing to leave the Navy, I have not regretted it once since I left. It is funny talking with those same people I talked to before I joined and asking what the issues they had were, they don't even register on the radar anymore as they were such minor issues in comparison to the ones facing the sailors at the moment.

 

[jollyjacktar]

As someone who did a short stint in the Navy until recently, the problem isn't the recruiting system, and it isn't the initial training system. The problem is the Navy itself and its ability to retain people. Before I joined up I did a fair bit of research, I talked to vets, talked to people who had been in and left for good reasons and bad reasons (i.e. why they hated it). I asked them what they liked and what they didn't. I asked what the issues they had with Navy was.

The best time I ever had in the Navy was when I was in my initial training, because after that it went to complete crap. You (this is from my limited prospective as a former jr Stoker) get to the ship, and morale is already in the dumps. The things you were told to expect no longer exist (this is a short list). Things like sliders, drinking on ship (not when I initially joined, however it is the case now), beards (I didn't know those were gone from the ship when I joined), going places and having a good time (now if you go on deployment they are usually dry deployments, with two beers per day allowed in port. I don't know about you but I don't want to spend up to 9 months of the year with the same 240 people in close confinement, and not be allowed to blow off steam every now and again).

The training system for Stokers is broken, you spend 3 1/2 months learning how to make a gasket and file a block of steel, then get to the ship and know next to nothing about your job. You are supposed to almost have a apprenticeship with someone who knows what they are doing teaching you, however those few people left with experience are too busy just trying to keep things running than to be able to train (both themselves and jr members). The 'experts' are now the people who have done it once. Positions which historically had people with 10+ years in filling them are now being filled by people with 3 years as they don't have anyone else. And to top it off as a Stoker for whatever reason we fill billets in Laundry and Scullery despite the fact we are undermanned and we are mechanics not servants.

The best decision of my life was choosing to leave the Navy, I have not regretted it once since I left. It is funny talking with those same people I talked to before I joined and asking what the issues they had were, they don't even register on the radar anymore as they were such minor issues in comparison to the ones facing the sailors at the moment.

You forgot to add that Stokers seem to treat their new kids like shit too.  I've seen many a new kid come in, all starry eyes and really, really bright, intelligent, outstanding quality, only to see them get beaten down and after a few years leave.  I could think of a good dozen really amazing youngsters that we should have done everything to keep in be driven out like some sort of witch from the Salem era.  What a loss.

 

[Baz]

So here is another question: Would it be better for the RCN to take back full control of its recruiting and training (from scratch) from the CF machine? Is it time for an Admiral to put her foot down and say: "I will use part of my money to reopen (something like) HMCS Cornwallis, and concentrate my simulators / basic training / various fleet schools there and concentrate on modern training of all my people. I will also produce and run my own ads independently from the recruiting system with my own money and provide the recruiting centres with extra resources to process the future seamen. I will pay for this by laying up two thirds of the fleet, which will also give the sea going personnel time to breathe and regroup." ?

That is also a good question: it would go a long way to answering my basic question.  The response you would get, if done properly, would be indicative of the publics appetite to have a Navy.

So a follow on question: if the response indicated that we should have a largely "domestic" Navy, say Frigates and AOps only because that's all we could man, would the Admirals accept that and scale down the HQ overhead accordingly (thereby having less Admirals as well)?  Should they accept that?

By the way, that would also mean that the community I supported for 26 years of my life also becomes largely redundant, making those 26 years (even more) useless.  So I'm not throwing barbs here, just asking the hypothetical.  If not enough people in the population want to do it or pay for it, then as Military / Industrial professionals should we just accept that?

But you are absolutely correct, it would remove central bureaucratic influence on what should be a RCN issue (to the extent the RCN actually legally exists).


Tangent: this has been discussed elsewhere, but I *feel* it is time to actually properly reconstitute the RCAF, RCN, Canadian Army, Communications "Command," and Support "Command."  But get rid of ADM(Mat), ADM (IM), ADM(Pers), etc (or whatever they are called now).  Make those 5 "Service Chiefs" responsible for all aspects of Force Generation, with reach back into PWGSC (or whatever they just turned into) and SSC (and probably an HR center of expertise).

So you would have:
MND
/---^---\
CDS    DM---> What ever ADM's he needs to fulfill his policy and financial roles
/---^---\
CFG    CFE(Chief of Force Generation, LGen)---> whatever structure needed to Command forces in operations, but separate and distinct from CFG (ie *NO* dual hatting)
(Chief of Force Generation, LGen)
^---|---|---|---|---|
ComdRCN    ComdCA    ComdRCAF    ComdCC    ComdSC    (Commanders of the Force Gen elements, all MGens)

CFG and the element Commander's generate combat ready forces, CFE employs them; never the two shall meet.

... and I would put MH under full command of the ComdRCN, with Airworthiness responsibility to the ComdRCAF...

... but I digress.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

There is also a tangential, but important, issue: "ship to shore" ratio; or, more correctly, the ratio of people on long deployments.

If you reduce man the ship's that are alongside in work periods and do local ops, but up the crew for long deployments, you have a higher percentage of people deployed at one time.  That isn't sustainable (the rest of the country isn't at war, so how are you going to convince just a few to be continuously "at war" and away from their families).

The basic problem is at the leadership level and the refusal to not properly brief that it isn't sustainable to have a higher op tempo with fewer people; the entire organization needs to take an operational pause and regen.  It's not just numbers, its also experience and the underlying professionalism.  No proper force development (like weapon system change and tactics development) is being done.

The Commander (maybe the DComd) of the RCAF, one of the last times I saw him at a town hall, said that it is obvious that Force Employment is going to be the biggest priority, everything else has to pigeon hole.  Colloquially though, what was the Allies biggest priority during World War II, for instance: Force Generation.  Even on 6 Jun the pipe still had to turn out follow on forces.  The signal that Germany was done was when they could no longer turn out follow on forces.  However, so that nobody has to say "if we do that we are going to break" the entire system is being brought to the breaking point.

More simply, I would submit: if the RCN is unable to recruit and train to meet it's operational appetite, then is that a sure sign that the appetite is not in tune with the wishes of the population?

I think this is a post that is applicable to our entire Force, in one way or another. 

The Cold War ended.  Pay and equipment has become costly.  Result?  Downsize, across the board.

Then, we get into a sustained op (Afghanistan, Iraq, etc) and all of a sudden, we face burnout of the remaining 'pers/crews' who have to go out the door more often because we don't have enough crews to do otherwise.  We look for ways to reduce our crew size, to counter the burnout.  People get too burnt out they will leave, because there is grass out there and it can be greener, or at least green enough.

The RCN is not the only group in the CAF facing this situation, if that is any conciliation.  The collective "we" have been hacked and slashed and cut to IMO, beyond the 'minimum required' force size.  Yet, we are constantly pushed to 'do more with less'.  Less equipment, less training budgets, less people and (IMO) when this combination of things all join, you are start facing the 'less people who also have less of a GAFF', because they are tired of constantly 'making it work' for the same governments that underfund them in the first place.

:2c:

 

[Kirkhill]

I am going to throw one word into the mix:  Reserves.

Reserves - the place where skills are/should be/could be held at zero/minimal cost until required.

The failure to properly integrate Reserves into the FG/FE mix is at the heart of many of your problems. - True of all three services and the government's planning.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

To a point, I agree.  However, even having 'a reserve' isn't the best answer.  It's better than 'not having a reserve', but if the average reservist doesn't have the same baseline skill/knowledge/capability that their Regular counterpart does, they can't contribute to the same level when the SHTF.

 

[dapaterson]

Canada's military is grossly overranked and over-headquartered.  The Army is at best a single division, implying command by an MGen, not a LGen, with the related downranking and elimination of supporting staff.  So too is the RCN; with twelve surface combatants and four submarines, that would generously be a command for a Rear Admiral, not a Vice Admiral.  Culling HQs, both in number and in size, would free up positions to be reinvested into the fleet (and into other evolving capabilities).

That said, further splitting of functions serves no one's interest.  Building an RCN Recruiting and basic training capacity would merely build overlap and unnecessary bloat into the system.  As previously noted, it's not the Recruiting group that decides what and where and when to advertise, but ADM(PA).  A seperate RCN recruiting and training group would merely encounter the same roadblocks.  And would begin competing with the CAF.

There are foundational problems with the current CAF establishment that no one seems willing to address; building more redunant capacity would only worsen the situation.  The recent CAF establishment study laid out many of those issues; as I don't believe it has been released, I won't cite chapter and verse, but I will observe that training timelines contribute to a need for more people on the BTL/SUTL than there are positions for, and that the number of positions identified to hold the ill and injured are below the current population.  As long as the CAF is bound within a certain target strength, overages in some places will translate into shortages in others.  The solution is multi-faceted: mercilessly cull organizations to find unneeded and redundant positions; accept that a nation Canada's size cannot do everything; and revisit training with a view to identifying what is truly necessary and what is no longer relevant or required.

Or we can continue to muddle along and refuse to change.  Based on past experience, I fear we'll pursue the latter COA.

 

[Kirkhill]

To a point, I agree.  However, even having 'a reserve' isn't the best answer.  It's better than 'not having a reserve', but if the average reservist doesn't have the same baseline skill/knowledge/capability that their Regular counterpart does, they can't contribute to the same level when the SHTF.

I agree entirely.  The point is how to create and maintain a skilled reserve that can contribute. 

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Another problem that will appear to be 'a priority' in the defence review...and will have all kinds of paragraphs and sentences about puppies and butterflies when the final report is out...and...

then it too will ease its way into the shadows.

IMO, the Canadian taxpayer doesn't care about defence and the job of this government will be focused on 'getting re-elected in 4 years' instead of governing for 4 years.  We in the CAF are too small in numbers to make a difference in their voting cares.  We don't have a strong voice that carries weight IMO so we will get whatever leftovers are tossed under the kitchen table. 

Seeing all that as 'very likely' from the window I see the world thru, the senior CAF leadership will have hard choices to make yet again, but with (likely) less $.  If you have to cut funding to your reserve structure to sustain your regular one, you do it.  I was in the 'Mau when we went from 2 trg nights a week and 1 wknd exercise a month one year to half that cut away, and then some.

The cutting, reducing, etc won't stop until we are unable to squeeze anymore blood from the stone. 

 

[Underway]

An interesting question, and good starting point to further discussion, Baz. But there is a misleading aspect here. The RCN is not the one that recruits and train, at least at the basic entry level, its own personnel. The Recruiting system and Training system of the CF does that.

And this means that we are, Navy wide, stuck with the recruiting system's choice of where, when, how frequently and what content the advertisement runs, for instance (for example, is 5 seconds of scene not totally clearly of shipboard life in a 30 sec. ad enough to attract the attention of Canadian youth who might be interested, and if the Navy is in dire need but overall, the recruiting system is attracting a sufficient number of people through its doors, will they run ad more frequently?). And if the processing and then basic training takes forever, how many people do we lose. And should we have the same standards as every body else in the CF, etc. etc.

So here is another question: Would it be better for the RCN to take back full control of its recruiting and training (from scratch) from the CF machine? Is it time for an Admiral to put her foot down and say: "I will use part of my money to reopen (something like) HMCS Cornwallis, and concentrate my simulators / basic training / various fleet schools there and concentrate on modern training of all my people. I will also produce and run my own ads independently from the recruiting system with my own money and provide the recruiting centres with extra resources to process the future seamen. I will pay for this by laying up two thirds of the fleet, which will also give the sea going personnel time to breathe and regroup." ?

Recruiting unfortunately is beholden to the Treasury Board for most of their rules, not the CAF, which sounds weird but it's true.  That includes advertising and more importantly branding (which believe it or not is pretty good).  The CAF is one of three federal organizations that is allowed to advertise, and only because we follow those rules very religiously. 
The problem is retention more than or equal to recruiting.  Retention issues are many but we loose on average 25-35% of recruits in basic alone, that doesn't even include trades training.  The Command team don't get promoted based on retention so you often see CO's running their teams to death to achieve the mission, leading to miserable people.  I've seen it so many times.  The ones who show up with dedication and competence get more and more things piled on their plate end eventually leave at the first opportunity.

 

[dapaterson]

Retention issues are many but we loose on average 25-35% of recruits in basic alone, that doesn't even include trades training.

No.  We do not.  What's the source of your numbers?

 

[Baz]

Canada's military is grossly overranked and over-headquartered.  The Army is at best a single division, implying command by an MGen, not a LGen, with the related downranking and elimination of supporting staff.  So too is the RCN; with twelve surface combatants and four submarines, that would generously be a command for a Rear Admiral, not a Vice Admiral.  Culling HQs, both in number and in size, would free up positions to be reinvested into the fleet (and into other evolving capabilities).

That said, further splitting of functions serves no one's interest.  Building an RCN Recruiting and basic training capacity would merely build overlap and unnecessary bloat into the system.  As previously noted, it's not the Recruiting group that decides what and where and when to advertise, but ADM(PA).  A seperate RCN recruiting and training group would merely encounter the same roadblocks.  And would begin competing with the CAF.

DAP:
Agree in principal, and certainly defer as you are one of the people in the center of this.

However, I would point out that is exactly why I organized it the way I did (and these aren't my ideas by a long shot).  One LGen for FE, one LGEN for FG; the environmental chiefs are one level lower (a MGen for each of the RCN, RCAF, CA, Comms, and Support).

But put *all* of the FG under the Chief of Force Gen, and move the functions under him.  Absolutely have a *staff* function inside there that is an expert on pers, and have reach back into PW and SSC for expertise in those areas.

But make one person responsible for the whole thing, and then make one person responsible for each of the elements.  And you noticed I kept Comms and Support separate to gain the benefit of a center of expertise for development of those joint functions.

Again, just an idea, and not mine

 

[mariomike]

Retention issues are many but we loose on average 25-35% of recruits in basic alone, that doesn't even include trades training. 

For reference,

PREDICTING BASIC TRAINING ATTRITION
Dr. Jennifer E.C. Lee
Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis & Directorate of Force Health Protection, Department of National Defence (DND), Ottawa, ON, Canada

 

[Eye In The Sky]

I agree entirely.  The point is how to create and maintain a skilled reserve that can contribute.

I believe the PRES needs to be reduced in HQ size and #s as well.  How many CBGs do we have?  How many do we REALLY need?  I suggest we need the same # of CBGs as we have CMBGs. 

It's time to modernize the Reserve Army structure IMO.  Everyone wants to hold onto the cap badges, great.  let units keep their name, BUT let's get rid of the bloated crap.  How many reserve Regiments are or ever will be a "Regiment" again?  Do a review; any reserve unit that is say, a Regiment but has had the unit strength of a Coy - for the last decade or 2, downsize their ARE strength and command levels to that of a Coy.  If the PEIR wants to maintain their cap badge and history, fine let them!  But...they are only a Sqn at best, so let them be under a Maj vice a LCol.  Do away with RHQ, maintain a SHQ. 

As part of that, PEIR is part of 36 CBG.  The 8CH is part of 37 CBG.  Does Atlantic Canada need 2 CBGs?  2 CBG HQs?  Not IMO.  Amalgamate the 2 CBGs in 5 Div ( :facepalm: to the whole 'Div' BS...).  2 is ridiculous.  Now, with your newly formed 5 Div RBG (Reserve Bde Group, Res Battle Group, something like that), under 1 RBG HQ per Div, you would also form the 5 Div RBG Armd Regiment.  PEIR, Hfx Rifles and 8 CH form it. 

Do the same for the Inf, Arty, et al.  Sorry to all the Res COs, RSMs and Reserve Regimental Mafia's Associations out there.  Do the same for all the Div's. 

Who would command the 5 Div RBG Inf Bn, Armd and Arty Regiments?  Well, the COs could be embedded into the CBG HQ structure, or they could be selected from the RBG Majors and 'compete' for the single LCol CO posn.  Something like that, but whatever it would work out to be, will imperfect, would certainly be better and more efficient than the imperfect mafia's that exist today. 

Now that you've re-org'd your CBG structure in RBGs to reflect reality (somewhat more than it is now at least)...

1.  Determine a realistic 'task set' that the reserve Bde Groups are expected to carry out.  At the Bde, sub-unit and individual trade/troop level.
2.  Determine what kit, equipment and funding are needed to be able to do all of #1.
3.  Issue orders to train for the tasks/caps, in order of priority, to Bde's. 

The chances of something like this happening are likely slim to nil because of politics and regimental mafia's that exist throughout the PRES world.  But, this or something like this needs to happen IMO if the Reserves are going to be worth their bang for the buck when it comes to the defence of Canada and Canadians interests abroad in what is very likely going to be a ever-shrinking Reg force and CAF budget in the near future (now til 2025?).

I am not familiar with how the NAVRES works, but is this something that should happen for them as well?  Review, re-org, re-task?

 

[Kirkhill]

EITS -

In some respects I agree with you.  IF the Reserve force budget/PYs/plan for employment remains the same then, absolutely, there are too many HQs.

BUT

I think there is another way of doing things.

I like the idea of a tiered response CAF that is based on a large number of General Service Volunteers (unpaid but trained to basic standards), a "Flank" or "on-call" force of fully trained personnel that is heavy on ex-full timers that is paid to be on-call and with current service (no more than 5 years since their last deployment?),  and finally a full time force that is actively employed.

The GSV pool supplies a recruiting base for the Active force and is available for domestic crises when the local economy crashes to a halt due to fire-flood-plague or tax-revolt.

The Flank pool is available, on short notice, to beef up the Active force.

The Active Force is the Immediate Response and Standing Force.

Only the Active Force draws full time wages.  All force members are covered for disability and death.  All force members would be eligible for benefits such as education and tax relief.

I don't think the concentration of PYs and Budget into an ever diminishing Regular Force is getting Canada the capability it needs. 

I would sooner that the training budget turned out a larger number of basic trained volunteers that can be of some use in some circumstances but cost nothing to maintain. 

I would also like to see more Reg force Cpls, who don't like hanging around barracks but still enjoy the field work be kept available by putting them on reduced pay in the Flank force while they pursue a civilian life rather than losing them entirely.

The system already works for some countries.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

If we can't maintain a paid service Reserve Force to "PML" numbers, I am not sure how we'd ever get 'unpaid volunteers' into the fold.  Canadians are patriotic, sure.  Mostly during the National Anthem at hockey games and in beer tents on Canada Day, etc. 

I just don't see the average Canadian willing to be an unpaid 'member of the military' in any shape or form.  I also think any kind of 'unpaid volunteer' group should be separate from the CAF.  Mostly because of the 'A' in CAF. 

 

[dapaterson]

I am one of the first to endorse a culling of the CBGs and Reserve structures.  And, with regards to LFAA 5 Div, the official Army plan was for a single CBG.  As an "interim" measure, two were stod up, and the staff merely waited for those in the Army HQ to go through a posting cycle or two, and the "interim" label was forgotten.

I will note, however, that Reg F mafias are well entrenched as well...

 

[Eye In The Sky]

I will note, however, that Reg F mafias are well entrenched as well...

I have to agree.  One thing we are good at in the CAF is building mini-empires that contribute 0 to added capability.  They do, however, give us somewhere to park the 25% total strength of the CAF that is the Officer Corps though. 

One of the reasons an operator like me who lives down at the tactical, operational unit level hates seeing the word leaner; it usually means 'reduction in funding for FG/FE at the cost of maintaining HQs'.  We trim muscle to keep fat.  rly: