With regard to the size of the Reserve Force:-
The MND has repeatedly stated that the number one raison d'etre of the Reserve Force is to provide the mobilization base for the CF. Until 1939, that meant (in the case of the Militia) a Reserve of over 100,000, and a very small Regular Force. In fact, the Militia in 1939 was the Canadian Army. I don't wish to argue specific numbers, but it is logical that if you are going to have a pool from which to draw in an emergency, the pool must be significant.
The concept of "forces in being" developed during the Cold War relegated the Reserves to the back bench (so far back that they became irrlevant). And the Reserves have never recovered.
In Boldstep 84, planners (of which I was one) accepted the fact that on Day 1, no matter what the size of the Militia, about 1/3 would be availible immediately (medical, training, etc), 1/3 would be available in 60 days, and 1/3 would not be employable (medical, discipline, marital, etc). I'm not sure how you can validate this assumption, but it seems reasonable (look at a regular formation warned for overseas duty, and how fast numbers drop).
I would argue that if the Militia were to be of a meaningful strength on general mobilization, it should be 4 to 5 times the strength of the Regular Army, and for the most part mirror it in rank and trade. Otherwise, on a mobilization, by day five there would be no mobilization pool from which to draw.
It's interesting to note, that Reserves 2000 now estimates that there are so many Militiamen on full time service, the Army is now well into stage two of mobilization. That means the well draws dry even faster.
