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Indirect Fires Modernization Project - C3/M777 Replacement

It is and isn't. There are a number of projects ongoing. Indirect Fire Modernization targets the close support systems in the division -i.e. the SP gun and mortars.

There are several other projects that tie in and are high priority for the army:

Land ISR Modernization - an army project to modernize CA ISR along 3 Lines of Effort:
– Networking and Integration
– Digital ISR C2 Software Tools
– Sensors

Joint Fires Modernization - an army - arty oriented - project to improve (digitize) the fires decision-action cycle. To acquire a digital joint fires solution to be able to command and control the full spectrum of effects (lethal and non-lethal, via munition and non-munition means) either
mounted or dismounted.
Deliverables:
  • Joint Fires Command and Control Software
  • Bde HQ targeting support capability
  • Modern/future observer tactical kit (mounted and dismounted)
  • Modern and connected Joint Fires Simulation Systems (Reg F and Res Units)

(There is also Long Range Precision Fires [HIMARS} and Ground Based Air Defence [as yet unspecified VSHORAD and SHORAD systems])

Land ISR and JFM slot into where you are thinking.

🍻

Does somebody need to bundle those projects? Or is that in some of those joint management projects?

And I still like the idea of our own national MDTF focused on Canada and manned by Canadians but co-operating/co-ordinating/integrating with NORAD/Northcom
 
Coincidental timing?

"The MoD’s judgment that future lethality will come roughly 80 per cent from drones and autonomous systems, and only 20 per cent from traditional armoured platforms and artillery, is both bold and correct.
I think that is a wishful thinking pipe dream.

"Some traditionalists may recoil at this, but the evidence from Ukraine is overwhelming. The side that can find, identify and destroy targets fastest is the side that survives. The Ukrainians, despite chronic shortages in ammunition and equipment, have become masters of this new form of warfare and remain streets ahead of most Nato armies in understanding its practical application."
All those who believe that are looking at Ukraine and Russia in a vacuum.
1) Neither side has an reliable degree of Air Superiority, let alone Air Supremacy.
2) It entirely ignores the damage that Artillery (both tube and rocket) have done on both sides, and forced great dispersal (also due to numbers and equipment limitations.

Imagine if either side had significant AD and C-UAS capabilities that could provide an "Iron Dome" like bubble around maneuver divisions.
They would be able to roll forward fairly unfettered.


I am bemused / concerned that any arm is publishing its own plan.

There needs to be an Army plan. That's all. Informed by experts around the table, but no RCA plan, No RCE plan. No Airdrop Systems Technician plan Just an Army plan. Perhaps with annexes for the RCA, RCE, RCCS etc etc.
I would go past just the Army (and JArmy) - and suggested there needs to be a lot of conflicts plan for the CAF, and an overarching strategy to guide them.
Which means interlocking RCN, RCAF, and the CA, in tune with the GoC's desires.

From an Army centric side - there needs to be a realistic look at what Canada needs to be able to field and where.
The earlier guidance about available numbers for missions was a weak start - as it assumed that all formations where the same, and all theatre requirement where the same. The CA appears to have finally broken free of the concept of symmetrical Brigades, but most other countries are working on the Divisional scale and beyond.

Something like that would be so refreshing from our end. The RCAC has been lacking good communicators at the high levels for a long time, I daresay since Uncle Walt. In fact, that might be one of the reasons we're in the state we are now, the alarms were never adequately communicated.
A lot of that was budget driven -- the CA has been very myopic about the "need" to retain 9 Infantry BN's, 3 "Armoured" Regiments, 3 CER's, and 3 RCHA's (well 2 and a RALC) without really looking at where one may need to go, and what equipment that could entail.
The Infantry for reasons no adult can truly fathom gutted it's CS Companies to fill Line Companies (where lets face it any swinging dick can fill #1 rifleman in short order), the Artillery self sabotaged Air Defense, and other positions due to PY caps - rather than lose a gun "regiment", although is 6 guns really a Reg't? The Armoured was about to be tankless - and the Army has a wheeled vehicle fetish on top of that.

I would much rather see a plan that saw the CA need to provide for instance :
1 Armoured Division to Europe (tanks, tracked IFV's etc)
1 Medium LAV Division for Domestic, and non LSCO contingency operations.
1 Light Division with a RDF Brigade and JFE capability, as well as the ability to assist CANSOFCOM.
As well as Corps Enablers to be able to support a Multinational Corps in terms of C6ISR, Theatre LRP, Theatre AD, and Engineering.

I am not wedded to the above -- but I am wedded to the fact that the CA does need Heavy Armoured formations, as well a the LAV fleet for areas like Africa and potentially Southern Asia. Plus a Light capability that can get to hot spots quickly.


Realistically the CA also need to figure out how to blend a workable Reservist model into the above, as doing all of that with Regular Force personnel is unaffordable even at 5% GDP.
 
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