Can the CF be innovative? 100%. Does that mean that large elements don’t see the LRPF as a tool for the Bde to conduct deep fires? I am not sure that the answer to that question is no.
I'm quite sure the answer is still, yes. We're slowly building to a brigade in Latvia but as part of a multinational divisional structure. I don't see much information on MNDNorth but it strikes me that even though it reached FOC some time ago, it doesn't bring much to the table as a division beyond the command and control aspects of a division as opposed to the CS and CSS that you would expect a division to have. It seems to me to be more a sum of its constituent brigades.
Latvia is acquiring some HIMARS and the Danes have a few PULS albeit I do not know if they will part of the MNDNorth - assume that they will be but don't know. In any even, I see the addition of an LRPF battery as a logical and necessary addition to the division/brigade however it is eventually organized.
The Canadian Army has spent decades telling itself that it won’t fight as anything above Bde. It doesn’t have a recent pool of experience in effectively training or employing units outside of a Bde context.
I can't disagree with that although it depends on how big the pool has to be. We have sent people out of country for years to train with , and in many cases, be posted into other people's divisions and corps. I tend to believe fighting happens in the brigade and at division you are looking more at battle management - the link between the fighting elements and the CS/CSS linkage. IMHO, the weakness goes down into the brigade level as well as the brigades are under resourced. I'm thinking particulalry in artillery and armour, have concerns about infantry CS and even coy support weapons, and worry about whether our logistics chain from factory to battlefront won't collapse rapidly.
It's not so much that the army has been telling itself, but that it has been told and therefore, in order to meet the priorities it has to, it can't commit itself to building robust fighting brigades.
The Army will need to get back into doctrine and will need to learn to effectively contribute to Division and Corps level operations with Div and Corps level units. For a Bde centric force that will need innovative ideas in a number of areas.
Very definitely - most important, it will take practicing. 4 CMBG was our centre of excellence for that for some time. In Canada we were much like we are now until the brief foray into the 1 Div model we had. There is no 4 CMBG now. We do have some people in MNDNorth and the new bde being formed which may, in time, make a difference.
Doctrine is a mutable thing. Our two main models, the Brits and Americans have very different viewpoints (and have had over the last few decades). Honestly, when I think of a stable divisional model I take a look at the Poles (albeit I know little of what the supporting structures above their six divisions is). I think we need to pick a model so that when we train or deploy, we have a clear understanding of where we do and don't fit in. It brings me back to the conundrum of the 1980s where we had the academic Corps 86 model but in practice had a slapped together 1 Div for most of that time. We need to have a harmonized academic and
de facto structure.
Finally I am most certainly critical of the Army, it can certainly be argued (likely successfully) that perhaps too much so. However if the Army can demonstrate with concrete actions at an institutional level that the criticism is unwarranted then I am happy to be more optimistic.
There are a number of institutional restraints above the army level that come into play here as well. As I said: I'm a cynic (as are several other members of this forum. Luckily we are balanced by a few Pollyannas which helps keep us honest. here is a fundamental argument which shows up here quite often: the side that sees the primacy of the defence of Canada where the Navy and Air Force have the dominant role; and NATO forward defence as the primary deterrence vehicle where the army has the major role. Both of these are merely theories. You can make sound arguments for or against each one. And they have major effects in defence resource allocation and what the army is actually able to do - or even asked to do. You can't just pick one and you can't have the whole force be "agile, flexible, all singing and dancing." That's one reason I'm an advocate of the concept of two very different divisions - one structured for expeditionary operations as a land force in Europe within a divisional context; the other structured for homeland defence in whatever form that may take. All supported by a national robust CSS structure.
When HIMARS shows up I will be happy to see how we employ it.
Me too. I've been waiting since we packed up 1 Surface to Surface Missile Battery on 1 July 1970.
