Indirect Fires Modernization Project - C3/M777 Replacement

[Kirkhill]

We don't have enough M777's if we suddenly need to grow the army into something that can fight wars. My previous answer was to give us 2x4 gun reg force batteries and 4 Reserve batteries. The reg force also gets all the SPG's . We could buy extra SPG's to be used as a training school for Reservists as well (Also a reserve M777 training battery would be nice). The M118/119 goes to the rest of the Reserves, which allows them to grow back into 6 gun batteries. That gives your artillery park depth, allows for more more opportunities to train new gun commanders, GPO's etc.

Bit by bit grow your reserve artillery so they can provide instructors for the Reserve training batteries on the SPG and M777 focusing on the break in the school year.

What percent of your 17 to 20 regimental batteries are you going to devote to each of

M119
M777
SPH
MRLS
LAA
IAMD?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

No SPG for the Reserve outside of the training battery. I have 4 of the Regiments closest to Reg force training areas to have the M777. I suspect that you could 2-3 Reserve units tasked with MRLS, perhaps even a Reserve battery as well. Depending on numbers, you could reduce the number of guns in the Reserve unit and give them MRLS as well. I think training a MRLS detachment who is already gun qualified will be fairly easy. I think the real work will be training the CP personal and tactical use of MRLS.

LAA, training battery as well, along with several Reserve units tasked with a Troop of LAA, either Manpads or smaller gun/missile system along with simulators.

You have 19 Reserve arty units

4x M777
2-3 x MRLS
12 x M119 with either LAA or UAS Troops

So tubes for Reserve units and training
20 xM777
4-6x 155 SPG (Training school only)
12-16x MRLS
78x M119 (6 more if you also want a summer training battery as well)
18x LAA systems (with 6 located at the training base)

You also need numerous spares of each, so workshops can cycle guns and weapon systems for repairs and upgrades and still keep the units supplied. The Reserve artillery school will eventually be quite large. Either in Shilo or perhaps Suffield?

 

[FJAG]

We don't have enough M777's if we suddenly need to grow the army into something that can fight wars. My previous answer was to give us 2x4 gun reg force batteries and 4 Reserve batteries. The reg force also gets all the SPG's . We could buy extra SPG's to be used as a training school for Reservists as well (Also a reserve M777 training battery would be nice). The M118/119 goes to the rest of the Reserves, which allows them to grow back into 6 gun batteries. That gives your artillery park depth, allows for more more opportunities to train new gun commanders, GPO's etc.

Bit by bit grow your reserve artillery so they can provide instructors for the Reserve training batteries on the SPG and M777 focusing on the break in the school year.

My view on the M777 has everything to do with the range. We definitely need more guns that come with more range. We don't need more M777s (and in fact the IFM is supposed to replace them.

We have somewhere around 33 M777s. At 18 per regiment that gives us one regiment plus two batteries and a few tech guns. I think we can safely form one light, air transportable brigade. One regiment is enough for that.

Assuming we can get all our LAVs and ACSVs on the road we have enough for another 2 to 3 brigades (depending on how you organize them and whether we expand on tanks) - so that's - lets say 3 regiments of SPs or 54 guns. Add another regiment for 18 rockets and another for AD and you've got the whole Cdn army - as it stands - equipped.

IMF is calling for 80 - 102 SPs. That leaves some 26 to 48 unaccounted for. Leaving aside guns for the RCAS and tech and there's probably 2 to 6 batteries of SPs up for grabs.

The reserves (16 fd regts and 3 indep bties) can, at best - as it stands - man 10 - 12 batteries. But we don't really need that many more manned. Maybe another regiment as a GS regiment. What we do need are a lot more air defenders, STA folks, rocket folks and LM folks.

It doesn't matter whether or not you have a separate RegF/ARes establishment, or create hybrid units (my favourite option), there are enough guns between the existin M777s and the IFM SPs and LRPF to equip the deployable tactical elements of the army.

I'll do the math in another direction. We currently have 6 4-gun RegF M777 batteries and 16 ARes regiments which together can form around 10-12 batteries. We also have 3 RHQs and 3 FOO batteries. The level of tactical and tech knowledge is getting to the point where it is hard to fully train a reservist on the essential RHQ, FSCC and FOO tasks - I'll take the view that you need a heavy RegF presence for those. Gun lines are more doable. based on the number of M777s in hand and the number of SPs incoming, we can equip roughly 27 to 32 4-gun batteries or 18-21 6-gun batteries. Either way, we simply do not have enough RegF and ARes combined to man that much less the rockets, STA and AD we need.

I've heard some interesting talk about increasing the size of the ARes and creating a massive SuppRes, but very little of what we're doing in the way of formations and their tasks and roles much less their equipment. IMHO, its plain unproductive to talk in broad-brush numbers without having an outline plan for roles/structure.

Here's the problem the way that I see it. The army still doesn't know what it wants to be when it grows up. The little that I see of Inflection Point on this side of the DWAN reinforces that. It's an organization that stifles mobilization rather than prepares for it.

 

[dapaterson]

Before equipping the Army reserve abandon the thought that the current disposition and numbers of units is correct, or even thought out or planned.

 

[KevinB]

My view on the M777 has everything to do with the range. We definitely need more guns that come with more range. We don't need more M777s (and in fact the IFM is supposed to replace them.

We have somewhere around 33 M777s. At 18 per regiment that gives us one regiment plus two batteries and a few tech guns. I think we can safely form one light, air transportable brigade. One regiment is enough for that.

Lets aim for a 24 gun Reg't then.

Assuming we can get all our LAVs and ACSVs on the road we have enough for another 2 to 3 brigades (depending on how you organize them and whether we expand on tanks) - so that's - lets say 3 regiments of SPs or 54 guns. Add another regiment for 18 rockets and another for AD and you've got the whole Cdn army - as it stands - equipped.

That is the Reg Force -- the PRes have zero AFV's.
They are by nature light - so I would like to see those CBG's at least have a Gun Reg't each - but the ripple effect of that is even worse when looking below.

IMF is calling for 80 - 102 SPs. That leaves some 26 to 48 unaccounted for. Leaving aside guns for the RCAS and tech and there's probably 2 to 6 batteries of SPs up for grabs.

The reserves (16 fd regts and 3 indep bties) can, at best - as it stands - man 10 - 12 batteries. But we don't really need that many more manned. Maybe another regiment as a GS regiment. What we do need are a lot more air defenders, STA folks, rocket folks and LM folks.

It doesn't matter whether or not you have a separate RegF/ARes establishment, or create hybrid units (my favourite option), there are enough guns between the existin M777s and the IFM SPs and LRPF to equip the deployable tactical elements of the army.

Again that assumes using ALL of the PRes Arty to support the Reg Force Brigades.
I don't think either of us see that as viable.

I'll do the math in another direction. We currently have 6 4-gun RegF M777 batteries and 16 ARes regiments which together can form around 10-12 batteries. We also have 3 RHQs and 3 FOO batteries. The level of tactical and tech knowledge is getting to the point where it is hard to fully train a reservist on the essential RHQ, FSCC and FOO tasks - I'll take the view that you need a heavy RegF presence for those. Gun lines are more doable. based on the number of M777s in hand and the number of SPs incoming, we can equip roughly 27 to 32 4-gun batteries or 18-21 6-gun batteries. Either way, we simply do not have enough RegF and ARes combined to man that much less the rockets, STA and AD we need.

Again very worrisome given the fact that there are not enough Gunners (Reg and Res) simply to support the Reg Force.

I've heard some interesting talk about increasing the size of the ARes and creating a massive SuppRes, but very little of what we're doing in the way of formations and their tasks and roles much less their equipment. IMHO, its plain unproductive to talk in broad-brush numbers without having an outline plan for roles/structure.

Without an operational plan to train and equip that is all smoke and mirrors and the Good Idea Fairy waving the wand of dumb ideas.

Here's the problem the way that I see it. The army still doesn't know what it wants to be when it grows up. The little that I see of Inflection Point on this side of the DWAN reinforces that. It's an organization that stifles mobilization rather than prepares for it.

110%

 

[KevinB]

Before equipping the Army as a whole with abandon the thought that the current disposition and numbers of units is correct, or even thought out or planned.

FIFY.

To @FJAG 's point the key aspect before anything is what is the Army supposed to be, that really needs to be addressed before any equipment (etc) goes anywhere. Or you will end up with more TAPV type of issues.

That is on the CCA and their staff to distill down to what is needed to answer the Governments needs, in conjunction with the ground realities of the world today.

 

[PrairieFella]

FIFY.

To @FJAG 's point the key aspect before anything is what is the Army supposed to be, that really needs to be addressed before any equipment (etc) goes anywhere. Or you will end up with more TAPV type of issues.

That is on the CCA and their staff to distill down to what is needed to answer the Governments needs, in conjunction with the ground realities of the world today.

It kills me that the TAPV will forever be known as a cautionary tale lol. The LSVW for the new millenium.

Hopefully we get some proper cav vehicles soon, that way we can finally use the TAPV as God intended, as hard targets.

 

[FJAG]

Before equipping the Army reserve abandon the thought that the current disposition and numbers of units is correct, or even thought out or planned.

I think both the numbers and locations were relatively well thought out and planned - as part of the Dundonald reforms of 2002-2004. The 1936 reforms also looked at the issues in a coherent manner. By the time we got to the Suttie commission in 1964 the army had lost the plot. Unfortunately since Suttie all that's been done is fine tuning and numbers crunching so you are absolutely right.

The kindest thing that one can say about the current disposition and numbers is that it still provides a potential core of moderately trained and poorly equipped folks to lead Stage 4 National Mobilization (Something that until a few months ago no one in Ottawa that mattered gave a hoot about.)

I'm a firm believer that DND needs reservists to a) augment/round out existing RegF units; b) have trained and equipped units and formations to expand the RegF army when mass matters; and c) have partially trained but properly equipped units and formations for homeland defence and national mobilization.

The folks in a) can come from an individual ready reserve or properly trained SuppRes list;

Those in b) need to be a well thought out organization for which proper capital costs and subsequent O&M cost properly provided. IMHO, these units and formations should all be 1) located in major city centres where a proper recruit base exists; and 2) have a healthy RegF leadership and admin component so as to provide them with an acceptable tiered readiness capability - this is where the mass of the army's artillery should be.

Those in c) should be widely dispersed with well defined tasks and roles commensurate with their numbers and location.

 

[Kirkhill]

Here's another heretical thought in an infantry heavy army...

In the event of Flood, Fire, Earthquake or Riot a hundred gunners with trucks and radios are as useful as a hundred infanteers.

Why not prioritise arty over infantry?

Conversely, if everybody is subject to the UAS threat and needs to be provided with their own LAA-CUAS umbrella, then why not leave the LAA role to the support platoons and troops of the infantry and cavalry and free up gunners for GS, LRPF and GBAD/IAMD work?

 

[KevinB]

I think both the numbers and locations were relatively well thought out and planned - as part of the Dundonald reforms of 2002-2004. The 1936 reforms also looked at the issues in a coherent manner. By the time we got to the Suttie commission in 1964 the army had lost the plot. Unfortunately since Suttie all that's been done is fine tuning and numbers crunching so you are absolutely right.

The kindest thing that one can say about the current disposition and numbers is that it still provides a potential core of moderately trained and poorly equipped folks to lead Stage 4 National Mobilization (Something that until a few months ago no one in Ottawa that mattered gave a hoot about.)

I'm a firm believer that DND needs reservists to a) augment/round out existing RegF units; b) have trained and equipped units and formations to expand the RegF army when mass matters; and c) have partially trained but properly equipped units and formations for homeland defence and national mobilization.

To me the Reg Force should be at 100% (min) War time manning all of the time, from units to schools and staff.
I think it is farcical to use the PRes as a bandaid to a broken system. Permanent Class B should be eliminated.
To me the PRes should emulate the ARNG down here - able to field formed units at Bde level at least. I am fine with Class C usage of formed subunits for Deployments, and I think that should be encourage both to limit burn out of the Reg Force, but also create a large experience base inside the PRes as well.
If that requires a significant number of Reg Force initially - then so be it.

The folks in a) can come from an individual ready reserve or properly trained SuppRes list;

Those in b) need to be a well thought out organization for which proper capital costs and subsequent O&M cost properly provided. IMHO, these units and formations should all be 1) located in major city centres where a proper recruit base exists; and 2) have a healthy RegF leadership and admin component so as to provide them with an acceptable tiered readiness capability - this is where the mass of the army's artillery should be.

Those in c) should be widely dispersed with well defined tasks and roles commensurate with their numbers and location.

I don't see the viability of any mass mobilization without a exponential increase in capital equipment acquisitions.

 

[FJAG]

Aaaargh - The Dundonald reforms of 1902-04. It's far more effective to be a smart ass when you get your typing right.

To me the Reg Force should be at 100% (min) War time manning all of the time, from units to schools and staff.

I somewhat agree. For units I think they should be for no other reason than you need the spare bodies (like ammo truck drivers who have limited use in peacetime) to fill in for all the DAG Red guys. You'll still always be backfilling for blank files and you better have a plan to rapidly fill those for VHR units (probably from other RegF units.

I disagree on schools. Schools always have fluctuating staff needs from month to month based on course loads no matter how well you program. I see a big difference between DP 1 and 2 NCM courses and DP 3 and 4 NCM and DP 1-4 Offr trg. I personally think DP 1 and 2 NCM should be done at battle schools and/or units (yes - units) There's a big difference between peace and war school course loads. Any war plan MUST have a preplanned system to decentralize training in order to surge it. Only the most technical/comprehensive courses should remain at schools. Lower level courses including DP 3 NCM and DP 1 officer should go to battle schools or specially designated OTUs.

I think it is farcical to use the PRes as a bandaid to a broken system. Permanent Class B should be eliminated.

Agreed

To me the PRes should emulate the ARNG down here - able to field formed units at Bde level at least.

Agreed albeit I think that in place of a full-time Active Guard Reserve component we should plug in a robust RegF element in all ARes units and formations.

I am fine with Class C usage of formed subunits for Deployments, and I think that should be encourage both to limit burn out of the Reg Force, but also create a large experience base inside the PRes as well.

Yup.

If that requires a significant number of Reg Force initially - then so be it.

It will, and, while one could reduce that once a well-enough trained Class B could take that on a la AGR, I think using RegF helps cross-pollinate the organization in both directions. Currently the establishment for a CBG HQ is 77 of which 12 are annotated RegF and 25 Class B(A); a unit HQ is established at 42 with 4 RegF and 5 Class B(A); and a subunit around 105 to 128 with a sole Class B(A) clerk. I think the bde HQ ratio is fine, but the RHQ and subunit full-time numbers need to come up. How those numbers come up depends very much on whether or not the unit is a hybrid one or how the "parading" regime operates. It's a delicate balance with having bored full-timers for much of the month or ones who can balance their "non parade days" with other responsibilities.

I don't see the viability of any mass mobilization without a exponential increase in capital equipment acquisitions.

That's so glaringly obvious that it will probably be missed by the bean counting hand wringers

I don't know what it is but I just have little confidence in how well this works out. I think we're a bureaucratic sinkhole that overcomplicates everything to the point where it is near paralyzed. It has trouble producing any substantial defence outputs with the resources it currently has. I have troubles seeing that increasing in a manner commensurate with the new funding it gets.

 

[quadrapiper]

I disagree on schools. Schools always have fluctuating staff needs from month to month based on course loads no matter how well you program.

There's a big difference between peace and war school course loads. Any war plan MUST have a preplanned system to decentralize training in order to surge it. Only the most technical/comprehensive courses should remain at schools.

What sort of capacity would you need to make this work?

 

[FJAG]

What sort of capacity would you need to make this work?

That really depends on the army that you want to have. I'm of the mind that your plan must call for an "army for today" and an "army for tomorrow."

The army for today is structured just large enough to meet your day to day peacetime operational needs and to allow for the development of the NCM and officer leadership that you need to be able to continuously properly lead the army for today and also to be able to form the leadership core of the army for tomorrow. A point here. You may not need special forces today nor an air defence arm but you can predict that you will need both if there is ever a war so you have to have both a school system and a unit or two of special forces and air defence where both those branches develop and maintain the appropriate doctrine for the future and to allow for them to exercise and hone their skills all the way up to the appropriate rank level. Again, your schools will need to be big enough and offer all the requisite courses to allow that career development to happen.

The army for tomorrow is a very different beast. The army for today is develops on a near horizon and the operational missions it is to fulfill are more discretionary in nature and therefore capable of failing without threatening the country. The army for tomorrow OTOH needs to be one built for a vague future which presumes threats to the country's very existence. I presumes that you will go to war at some point. It has several components. The first is an element that can reinforce the army for today on occasions where a small temporary surge in peacetime is needed. The second is a force in being, manned and equipped but in a part-time status so as to save costs and at various states of tiered readiness depending on the threat level. One of its main purposes is to serve as a deterrent to possible adversaries in order to prevent a war but, if required, can be. The third is a core around which national mobilization can occur in the event of a prolonged and major conflict. It has to be able to build an as yet undefined mass from both the civilian population and defence industries. It requires a plan for the populations mobilization and training as well as an existing manufacturing base that can be mobilized.

While the army for today is relatively small and can benefit from the efficiencies that centralized school and training facilities can provide, the army for tomorrow has a different need. Being a reserve force, it is distributed across the country more than the army for today is. Facilities need to be decentralized to local areas where the troops live their civilian lives. As well, army for tomorrow's larger size would overwhelm a centralized system's infrastructure. This again calls for decentralization. Lastly unlike the schools for the army for today which can, to a large extent, operate year round, those for the army for tomorrow, being targeted on citizen soldiers, must in large part work at volume during the restricted summer months and at much lower volumes at other times of the year albeit for national mobilization it will become a year-round affair.

As such, from the very start, it should be a system that is decentralized and capable of decentralizing even more if necessary. In addition it needs to have a teaching staff which for much of the year does other things. While in part, young reserve force NCMs can be found to teach lower level NCM courses, the senior reserve force staff needed to teach more advanced NCM and officer courses is rarely available. That presupposes a need for a large influx of more senior RegF NCMs and officers.

So, to get back to the capacity question, which is one of political decision, my response to it is to build a force structure based on hybrid units, like this:



Within each hybrid unit is a RegF component of a headquarters and at least one fully manned RegF subunit (and perhaps elements of a combat support company) The purpose of the headquarters and the company is to provide army for today elements on rotational tasks and to be a battlegroup building block core as many of the Afghanistan rotations were. Over and above peacetime operational deployments, these cores provide a career development structure for their RegF personnel and the foundation to which 2 or 3 ARes companies are attached. Sept to April the RegF core trains itself, May to Aug the core takes leave, APS and provides individual AND collective training to the reserves.

The hybrid unit is designed:

• firstly to provide individual augmentees from its ARes personnel to its RegF coy or to other deploying units;
• secondly to provide force expansion as a fully deployable unit; and
• thirdly, in the event of national mobilization, a hybrid unit may be reformed into a brigade where 1/4 to 1/3 of the force is made up of the RegF and ARes personnel from the unit and the remaining 2/3 to 3/4 of newly enrolled recruits who are trained and led entirely from within the brigade

Voila. My long-worded answer to your short question.