Indirect Fires Modernization Project - C3/M777 Replacement

[Kirkhill]

British Low-Cost Long-Range Kamikaze Drone SkyLance Completes First Tests

British company Rotron Aerospace announced the successful completion of demonstration tests of its new autonomous long-range strike system, SkyLance.The platform was designed as a relatively low-cost kamikaze drone. It is […]

militarnyi.com

Here's British competitor in the Low Cost Market

300 kg, 1200 km, 600 km/h, GPS denied onboard navigation, AI autonomous seeker

Price as yet undisclosed

1200 km could also mean loitering over a target 100 km away for 3 or 4 hours

 

[GR66]

Not quite - ATACAMS have complex warheads with hundreds of bomblets or 500 lbs of explosives. I just want the roughly 50-100 lbs of the Barracuda. A good sized blast to take out smaller installations or complexes that can be taken out by a small ripple of rockets. Something smaller and lighter but guided that can operate within the range a division is concerned about. I'd leave the heavier, deeper, more strategic stuff to corps.

There are a bunch of trade-offs that don't always result in a cheap solution. ATACMS is a ballistic missile which is more difficult to intercept by enemy AD than a cruise missile but the trade-off is that the guidance systems are more complex. A cruise missile can be cheaper but it is easier to intercept.

What isn't in question is that for striking targets at 300km range you need precision. The question is what type of platform is best to launch what type of munition. A ballistic missile needs more motor to warhead ratio vs a cruise missile. Cruise missiles are more effective when launched from the air because they don't have to waste energy getting airborne.

Personally I'd focus the HIMARS on ballistic missiles for long range precision strike and focus on airborne platforms for launching cruise missiles. Both are important and complement each other but use the platforms that make the most sense for each.

 

[Eaglelord17]

So on the C3 howitzers are dead front... heres the proposed reorg of ARes units that will be learning the Reg F equipment. Courtesy True North Strategic Review (Noah).



View attachment 100326

Does it still make sense to have some of the Arty units where they are, or should they reroll units closer to the main bases to ‘arty’ and farther away units to something which is easier to do stand alone training?

 

[Kirkhill]

Does it still make sense to have some of the Arty units where they are, or should they reroll units closer to the main bases to ‘arty’ and farther away units to something which is easier to do stand alone training?

Does the existing ratio of infantry to artillery still make sense or should a greater number, or even all, infantry units have an artillery component within their formal structure?

3:1?

3 infantry platoons and an artillery troop? Or 3 cavalry troops and an artillery troop?

It seems to me that there are an awful lot of gunnerish type jobs opening up due to the blurrinng of lines with rockets, missiles, cruise missiles, one way attack drones and UAVs, as well as in the counter battles from C-RAM/CUAS to IAMD.

 

[FJAG]

Does it still make sense to have some of the Arty units where they are, or should they reroll units closer to the main bases to ‘arty’ and farther away units to something which is easier to do stand alone training?

It never makes sense to move reserve units closer to the main RegF bases. Arty doesn't need access to ranges full-time. 3 or 4 times per year is sufficient.

42 Field is in Pembroke and is a weak unit. So is 10 Fd in Regina and now 26 Fd in Brandon. There are a number of units within easy driving range of the RegF bases that have difficulty in bringing a battery out to the ranges.

ARes units need to be where the mass of the ARes recruits are - which is big cities by far. What is needed is to place full-time arty personnel in the big cities in order to form solid hybrid units. That may need a change in how armouries are structured in order to hold the equipment locally. Moving guns - especially wheeled SPs - to where the ranges are is merely a road or train move which is just another part of the training. The big issue is to retune the ARes system - structure, facilities, equipment, support - so that viable units can be created and sustained where the population is.

 

[FJAG]

Does the existing ratio of infantry to artillery still make sense or should a greater number, or even all, infantry units have an artillery component within their formal structure?

3:1?

3 infantry platoons and an artillery troop? Or 3 cavalry troops and an artillery troop?

It seems to me that there are an awful lot of gunnerish type jobs opening up due to the blurrinng of lines with rockets, missiles, cruise missiles, one way attack drones and UAVs, as well as in the counter battles from C-RAM/CUAS to IAMD.

The basic 3:1 ratio is a start when you figure in 1 close support regiment per 3 manoeuvre battalion/regiment brigade. (Please, please, stop thinking in platoons and troops.) In my opinion that needs to be upped for a divisional concept with a rocket regiment, a TA/LM strike regiment and probably two air defence regiments. That brings the arty to manoeuvre ratio closer to 2:1.

 

[Eaglelord17]

It never makes sense to move reserve units closer to the main RegF bases. Arty doesn't need access to ranges full-time. 3 or 4 times per year is sufficient.

42 Field is in Pembroke and is a weak unit. So is 10 Fd in Regina and now 26 Fd in Brandon. There are a number of units within easy driving range of the RegF bases that have difficulty in bringing a battery out to the ranges.

ARes units need to be where the mass of the ARes recruits are - which is big cities by far. What is needed is to place full-time arty personnel in the big cities in order to form solid hybrid units. That may need a change in how armouries are structured in order to hold the equipment locally. Moving guns - especially wheeled SPs - to where the ranges are is merely a road or train move which is just another part of the training. The big issue is to retune the ARes system - structure, facilities, equipment, support - so that viable units can be created and sustained where the population is.

I am thinking of where kit is stored and access to said equipment as well as the travelling to train part.

Take 49th field. Makes sense currently because of Grayling, if they had to drive to Pet for every gun ex I doubt the unit would be remotely viable (7+hour drive one way, which for a weekend ex kills participation). With these reforms will the equipment needed to be used be within easy access for them or will it be drive to Pet to use it?

 

[Kirkhill]

It never makes sense to move reserve units closer to the main RegF bases. Arty doesn't need access to ranges full-time. 3 or 4 times per year is sufficient.

42 Field is in Pembroke and is a weak unit. So is 10 Fd in Regina and now 26 Fd in Brandon. There are a number of units within easy driving range of the RegF bases that have difficulty in bringing a battery out to the ranges.

ARes units need to be where the mass of the ARes recruits are - which is big cities by far. What is needed is to place full-time arty personnel in the big cities in order to form solid hybrid units. That may need a change in how armouries are structured in order to hold the equipment locally. Moving guns - especially wheeled SPs - to where the ranges are is merely a road or train move which is just another part of the training. The big issue is to retune the ARes system - structure, facilities, equipment, support - so that viable units can be created and sustained where the population is.

The entire issue of fretting over moving people to tasks in Canada is ridiculous from the get go.

This is Canada. This is what you bought. A massive chunk of real estate for a very small population. (And if that goes for us "settlers" it goes manifold for the "natives").

The cost of moving people and goods is the cost of living in Canada and enjoying its advantages.

A transportation plan needs to be written into every Canadian plan.

...

Here's a thought.

Mandate the 4 day work week. There is enough support for it.
Three day weekends would get a lot of popular support.

It would also open up second job opportunities, including 300,000 reserve positions and effective remote training.

 

[Kirkhill]

The basic 3:1 ratio is a start when you figure in 1 close support regiment per 3 manoeuvre battalion/regiment brigade. (Please, please, stop thinking in platoons and troops.) In my opinion that needs to be upped for a divisional concept with a rocket regiment, a TA/LM strike regiment and probably two air defence regiments. That brings the arty to manoeuvre ratio closer to 2:1.

I will be happy to stop thinking in platoons and troops if armouries start getting filled with battalions and regiments.

I like the idea of a mixed unit under one roof because it breeds familiarity and opportunity.

There is no difference between a trainee gunner standing security at a VP and a trainee infanteer.

One of the three non-firing troops or platoons could be your new entries and two your active on-call troops. The firing troop or platoon, Guns, Rockets, UAVs, Mortars, DFS, Infantillery, CUAS, LAA, VSHORAD, SHORAD, MRAD, IAMD, sensors or whatever, would be the aspirational focus of the members of the Company.

I just referenced the old British Home Guard structure.

60 per platoon
300 per company in 5 platoons
1200 per battalion in 4 companies.

Garrison does not have to reflect field.

Field can be drawn from garrison.

 

[FJAG]

I am thinking of where kit is stored and access to said equipment as well as the travelling to train part.

All of those are factors which ought to be considered. If equipment is kept close to train with then maintenance for that kit must be guaranteed by way of full-time staff. But again, population is key.

Take 49th field. Makes sense currently because of Grayling, if they had to drive to Pet for every gun ex I doubt the unit would be remotely viable (7+hour drive one way, which for a weekend ex kills participation). With these reforms will the equipment needed to be used be within easy access for them or will it be drive to Pet to use it?

49th Fd is currently not viable, regardless. The last count I've seen (Dec 2024) had 43 all ranks on strength including 1 LCol, 1 Maj, 3 other officers, 1 CWO, 3 WOs, 8 Sgts 7 MBR/Cpls, 17 Bdrs and 1 Gnr. The regiment is, in effect, a highly over ranked troop.

@KevinB and I keep saying that it is necessary for the army to know what it wants to be when it grows up. IMHO, Inflection Point 2025 isn't a growth model, its a rearranging of deckchairs model which does have some positive points to it. Unfortunately the army's inability to address the ARes's weaknesses and instead just work with them cascades down to the artillery. Aimpoint 1 has some good points (including making 49 Fd a TA unit [perhaps with LMs]) . . . some very good points, but unfortunately it falls far short in utilizing the ARes because the ARes, as currently structured and supported will continue to be inadequate regardless of where located.

Sorry. My cynicism is showing again.

 

[PrairieFella]

So on the C3 howitzers are dead front... heres the proposed reorg of ARes units that will be learning the Reg F equipment. Courtesy True North Strategic Review (Noah).



View attachment 100326

Man I wish the Armoured Corps would release something like that. The uncertainty is killing us.

 

[FJAG]

Man I wish the Armoured Corps would release something like that. The uncertainty is killing us.

Here's the whole arty way forward - Aimpoint 1.

 

[PrairieFella]

Here's the whole arty way forward - Aimpoint 1.

Something like that would be so refreshing from our end. The RCAC has been lacking good communicators at the high levels for a long time, I daresay since Uncle Walt. In fact, that might be one of the reasons we're in the state we are now, the alarms were never adequately communicated.

 

[dapaterson]

I am bemused / concerned that any arm is publishing its own plan.

There needs to be an Army plan. That's all. Informed by experts around the table, but no RCA plan, No RCE plan. No Airdrop Systems Technician plan Just an Army plan. Perhaps with annexes for the RCA, RCE, RCCS etc etc.

 

[Kirkhill]

I am bemused / concerned that any arm is publishing its own plan.

There needs to be an Army plan. That's all. Informed by experts around the table, but no RCA plan, No RCE plan. No Airdrop Systems Technician plan Just an Army plan. Perhaps with annexes for the RCA, RCE, RCCS etc etc.

Back in the 80s, when the Infantry lusted after Marders, they were concerned about their place on the battlefield. The future was Armoured and they wanted to be in that fight.

I sense that, today, neither the Infantry, nor the Armoured, have a good grip on what their next fight is going to look like.

An Arty led plan isn't the worst idea for the present era given, what I perceive, as the relative absence of traditional close-combat in current conflicts. The Ordnance (Arty, Eng and Survey) seems to be the dominant force currently.

....

I do think the Arty plan needs to be more adventuresome and incorporate more explicit plans for Long Range Precision Fires (including Long Range UAVs regardless of means of propulsion) and for CUAS and IAMD.