Inf Cbt Sp - Which Capability is MOST needed again (split from CASW)

[GnyHwy]

I think we have it right; capabilities go beyond arms training.  Although there are many details that are unanswered, these details can certainly be figured out.

Our Infantry soldiers are second to none.  To ask them to do more with less does not make sense to me.  That is why we have other arms.  I am proud to support my manoeuvre cmdr, and I will bring every bit of firepower that I can to support his mission.

I do not have to be in his regiment.  When his regiment requires it, I will be in direct support.

 

[Infanteer]

But the Bde Comd may feel that Battalion doesn't warrant your support at the time as it belongs elsewhere...too bad the CO didn't have those integral mortars anymore.  :dunno:

 

[Infanteer]

To take this one further into left field, what are people's thoughts on Cbt Spt for the Armoured Regiments.

An Armd Regiment CO will, in the event of a Bde deployment, likely be a Battlegroup Comd as well, commanding a mixed force of Armoured and Infantry sub-units.

Armoured already have Recce assets.  They have assault troop which fills their pioneer function.

Should, in an ideal world, Armoured units possess mortars as well?  Just as an Inf BG comd should desire an integral indirect fire capability should the guns be needed elsewhere, the Armd BG comd is likely to want/need the same.

Thoughts?

 

[vonGarvin]

I just checked the ORBAT of a US tank battalion in the mid 1980s, and they did have mortar platoons, according to my source (Game Designer's Workshop game "Assault")

 

[Kirkhill]

During my recent excursion through US Orbats (and Brits and Aussies) I discovered that ALL US "Close with and destroy" force elements include a self-contained High Angle (as opposed to INDIRECT for you purists) fire capability.

M203/40 mm at Team/Section
60 mm at Pl/Coy
81 mm at Coy/Bn
120 mm (previously 107 mm) at Bn
105/155 mm at Bde/Div
MRLS at Div/Corps....
ATACMS at Corps/Army

Armor Bns carry 120 mm Mors on strength as do the Heavy Combined Arms Battalions.

Cavalry forces all carry mors of the largest calibre compatible with their primary platforms (foot, HMMWV, MRAP, Bradley.....)

Brits tend to use 40/60/81 as infantry support and rely on the 105/155s of the Brigade to support the Brigade assets of the Recce Squadrons and Tank Squadrons.  The Armoured Infantry  that cooperate with the Recce Squadrons and Tanks squadrons carry their own mounted 81s.

Useful Brit Reference: http://www.armedforces.co.uk/armyindex.htm

Useful US Reference (Pay site): http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/index.html

 

[Kirkhill]

Further to my last and this discussion:

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?134254-Commando-21-and-FSG-organisation-vs-traditional-way

As an aside:  In the discussion there is reference to the incorporation of the 5 man Manoeuvre Support Section that was supposed to become part of the establishment of the Platoon (a larger weapons det).  This element (with the GPMGs, Long Range Rifle and 51/60mm Mor) has apparently not been fielded in its original form.  I suggest that is because the Brits have reverted to Status Quo Ante and reissued the GPMGs to the Sections (1-2 each).  In addition they have fielded 1-2 7.62mm AR-10 Variant Designated Marksmen rifles per Section.  The LRRs have gone to the Bn Snipers and the rest of the Weapons Det seems to be focused on 60mm mortar operations.  M72-LAW-CG84s are fielded at the Section level.  Javelin is fielded by a specialist platoon at Bn level.

Re: Royal Marines ca 2008?

.....the book "3 Commando Brigade", which is about a Commando Battle Group in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The Commando was reorganized from 2 Close Combat Companies and 2 Stand-Off Companies to 4 combined arms companies.
Commando 21 Organization:
2 x Close Combat Company
- 3 x Close Combat Troop (Rifle Troop)
2 x Stand-Off Company
- 1 x Close Combat Troop (Rifle Troop)
- 1 x Anti-Tank Troop (Javelin ATGM)
- 1 x Heavy Machine Gun Troop (.50-calibre HMG/40mm GMG)

Afghan Deployment Organization:
4 x Combined Arms Company
- 2 x Close Combat Troop (Rifle Troop)
- 1 x Fire Support Troop (Javelin ATGM, .50-cal HMG & 40mm GMG, sometimes with attached 81mm mortars from the unit mortar troop)

There is still a recce/sniper troop, a 9-tube 81mm mortar troop, an anti-tank troop and a medium machine gun troop in the command company.....

And 2 Royal Anglian

2ND BATTALION

Z COMPANY
by Maj Nick Chambers

No sooner had Z Company settled into Cyprus than we re-organised
into 3 Manoeuvre Support Groups (MSGs). An MSG is a platoon sized
group with a section from each of the Support Platoons; Mortars,
Machine Guns, Javelin and Recce (including snipers). Each MSG is
commanded by one of the support platoon commanders with the 2IC
coming from another of the platoons – to give a spread of knowledge.
The Mortar Platoon HQ was kept integral to run a Fire Planning Cell
for Battle Group deployments. Each MSG was allocated to a rifle
company to form a “Company Group” giving the numbers and fire
power required on operations. Training and integration started in
earnest, procedures and tactics were refined and lessons were soon
learnt by both the Z Company men and their associated rifle company.
To date two MSGs have deployed with their companies (A and B
Company) and the Mortar Platoon HQ has deployed with the Battalion
HQ. As I write C Company and their MSG are moving to Afghanistan to
complete 2 weeks of in theatre training. Below are articles from 2 of
the MSGs which describe the training and operations that they have
conducted. All show how busy the MSGs have been but also how
inherently flexible the fire support platoons are and the immense
capability that our heavy weapons give to the rifle companies.

B COMPANY MANOEUVRE SUPPORT GROUP TRAINING
by Capt Lachlan Bucknall

At the end of 2007, B Company 2PWRR was fighting conventional
battles on TESEX, support weapons platoons were operating
independently and my troops - the MMG Platoon had been temporarily
re-roled to Javelin. As I write, B Company Group is deployed in Garmsir
in 3 separate patrol bases (PBs). Each has .50” calibre Heavy Machine
Gun (HMG), Grenade Machine Gun (GMG), General Purpose Machine
Gun (Sustained Fire) (GPMG(SF)), 81mm and 60mm mortars, Javelin
anti tank missiles, Snipers, Recce and Assault Pioneers; all are fully
embedded and working alongside each other in the Company. Since the
Company’s arrival there have been 13 Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs) found in the Coy Area, small arms fire shoots or indirect fire
attacks onto all 3 of the PBs and the suicide IED threat against our
vehicle checkpoints is significant. The transition to get to this stage
has been the challenge of this year.

The Manoeuvre Support Group (MSG) concept makes sense; group all
the normal punchy support weapons systems together with a platoon
command structure, add some heavier weapons and give it to a rifle
company. Suddenly a company commander has an immense amount of
firepower at his disposal with the command and control structure to
make it work. In order to work as an MSG all of the support weapons
soldiers needed to cross-train on the other MSG weapons, train on 2
completely new weapons, train with their normal weapon system
alongside the other MSG weapons and then the MSG needed to train
with the Company! A short timeline, a move to Cyprus and a lack or
resources complicated this.
Cyprus provided a good training environment to prepare, the terrain
and temperature was similar to Afghanistan so acclimatisation has not
been too much of an issue. B Company conducted a number of exercises
using the assets that were available but these were scarce. The MSG
did not get to see a HMG, GMG, 60mm mortar or a WMIK (up gunned
Landrover) until it was in Afghanistan.

It was vital for the MSG to embed with B Company as soon as possible
and all exercises, physical training and live firing were conducted
together. The rifle company soldiers also trained on the support
weapons and by the end of the training the rifle company had a
workable knowledge of all the support weapons should they need to fill
a gap somewhere. The exercises varied but included staying on the
ground in ‘light’ order with just day-sacks and webbing for 3 days,
something we expected we might have to do. Soldiers and officers slept
on the floor in nothing but the limited warm kit they had brought with
them; noting the harsh difference between the heat of the day and the
cold of the night. Platoon groups were sent on patrols with a Platoon
commander now given elements of the MSG to control, this got
everybody used to working with each other and highlighted the
complexities of working in conjunction with long range weapon
systems. The platoons soon discovered the real joys of resupplying
ammunition to the GPMG(SF) guns on the top of the hill!

The MSG soldiers also needed to brush up on rifle company skills so
they could work equally as well in the normal infantry rifleman role. As
well as the normal shooting and Fire and Movement training, the
company ran Enhanced House Assault instruction, effectively urban
close quarter battle (CQB). This gave riflemen the skills needed to enter
compounds softly or aggressively, taught them to angle their body to
use the protection of their front body armour plate and allowed a fire
team to systematically clear each room. This dry training was all
brought together in an excellent CQB range on the In Theatre Training
Package at Camp Bastion.

OPTAG was the culmination of all the pre-deployment training. The
package was excellent for the whole Company Group with some good
serials that tested everyone. Of particular note was the advance to
contact in the ‘green zone’, the most dense and boggy bit of woodland
on Thetford training area that proved to be a good test of procedures for
fighting in the close country that exists in parts of Afghanistan.
Command, control and communications was difficult, the casevac
chain was really tested and Capt Ed Hunter had to be dragged cursing
and swearing out of the waist deep bog by his laughing soldiers on a
number of occasions! B Company ended up clearing it twice (no it
wasn’t a re-show!), once from each direction.

A Company deployed straight after OPTAG but for B Company there
was more time to train in Cyprus with some ‘top tips’ coming back from
the front line. Training in the heat of the day was a big one, so B
Company Group tabbed with helmets and Osprey body armour in 40OC
on a regular basis, something that has paid off since our arrival,
demonstrated by having no serious heat casualties. We also conducted
Op BARMA training, the life saving procedure for sweeping for IEDs
using visual checks for ground sign and metal detectors. These drills
developed in Northern Ireland are still saving lives in Afghanistan
today.

The training has worked; B Company with their integral MSG deployed
with soldiers confident in themselves and those around them and
despite the initial lack of kit during training had the attitude of ‘we’ll
just get on with it’. Thus far B Company has kept ahead of the enemy
and when they have attacked, in whatever form, it has been ineffective;
hopefully for the rest of the tour it will stay that way. Good discipline
and adherence to proven and taught procedures without taking
shortcuts, invariably, saves lives.

And again 2 PWRR

C COMPANY’S MANOEUVRE SUPPORT GROUP
A NEW CONCEPT FOR 2 PWRR
by Capt Ben Plenge

Traditionally fire support platoons, Recce, Mortars, Anti-Tank, and
Machine Guns work directly to the Commanding Officer as formed
units each with their own role to play on the conventional battlefield;
however the contemporary operating environment, and in particular
the battlefield of Afghanistan, does not require a conventionally
configured battalion. Over the last few years the concept of the
Manoeuvre Support Group (MSG) has been developing in infantry
battalions. It was on my return from my Recce Platoon Commanders
Course in June that I assumed command of the MSG for C Company.
The Battalion had never operated in this manner before and the first
step for training the MSG was to find out just what they were supposed
to be able to do. Articles in the Infantryman and post operational
reports were a massive help and made it clear that it was no black art.
Together, myself and my 2IC, CSgt Lee Baldry (Machine Gun Platoon)
set about writing a training programme based around training
objectives that we had identified. First, the new grouping needed a
name and so MSG CHARLIE was born giving the soldiers an identity.
This was crucial as they had all been taken from their usual platoons
and chains of command, mixed up and then grouped with a rifle
company. Although they were excited about the prospect of
deployments most missed the old Z Company way of life.

Sgts Chris Earl (Recce Platoon) and Kev Turner (Sniper from Recce
Platoon) helped to add experience and imagination to the training and
the MSG started to develop well. We concentrated on weapon skills and
cross training so that anybody could operate the General Purpose
Machine Gun (Sustained Fire) or the Javelin Missile System and all of
this through the gruelling heat of the Cypriot summer months. Our
first test was when the Company Group deployed to Salisbury Plain to
take part in 3 Commando Brigade’s final Mission Rehearsal Exercise.
Under the new OC of C Company, Major Mark Hickman, the MSG was
inserted by helicopter into a defensive position. Using our optics and
weapon systems we were able to keep any enemy threats at a longer
range than the Company would have been able to alone. It was a
relatively short and simple deployment that nonetheless identified
some valuable lessons for us, not least the difference between a flock of
sheep and a team digging in an IED!
Back in Cyprus it was now even hotter and we started to train more
with C Company, getting to know the soldiers and commanders better
and really working on Afghan specific drills and skills. One of the
highlights of the training was the MSG CHARLIE live firing package
run locally on Pyla training area. This focused on developing the
weapon skills of all members of the MSG on the GPMG both in the light
and Sustained Fire roles, along with night firing and fire and
movement. The MSG worked hard throughout this two-day package
and got a lot of benefit from it. We even had a mock-house built from
wood that the Recce boys were able to assault with covering fire from
the GPMGs.
The final stages of pre deployment training involve the MSG deploying
as a fully integrated part of the C Company Group. These exercises will
form the final part of training in Cyprus prior a move to Afghanistan to
conduct a range package in October. We are certainly well prepared in
terms of our basic skills and knowledge of the Afghanistan battlefield,
however, it will be a steep learning curve to get to grips with the
additional new weaponry and vehicles that we will be presented with
on deployment.

 

[a_majoor]

The creation of a "Combat Support Squadron" in the armoured corps has no arguments from me, indeed, given the special nature of AFV's i'd almost say this is as big of an issue in the Black Hat side of the house as it is in the Infantry, even if the layout is different.

The biggest caveat I would have for a "CSS" (or whatever you wish to call it) is the capabilities need to be matched to the same level of protected mobility as the tanks. This would be the CCV in the Canadian context (whatever vehicle that turns out to be), perhaps with several troops of close protection dismounts, a troop of mounted mortars and the assault troop to provide pioneer capabilities. The protected mobility requirments would need a CV-90 as a minimum, and I would even favour the PUMA IFV or a HAPC like the Achzarit/Namer as the prime chassis for this role. IF people are shooting at our Leopard 2 tanks, then anything nearby in support would also be at risk from large calibre tank canon, heavy artillery, heavy ATGMs and so on. Given the nature of the Armoured Corps, this capability might be better as an integral part fo the Squadron the way the "Support Troop" with its supply trucks, fuel bowsers and maintainence vehicles is.

Of course I would go farther and say the Artillery needs something similar as well to provide close protection, suport on the move and assist in preparation of the fireing line when conditions are beyond the capability of the battery.

 

[McG]

But the Bde Comd may feel that Battalion doesn't warrant your support at the time as it belongs elsewhere...too bad the CO didn't have those integral mortars anymore. 

If the Bde Comd decides he wants mortars to be somewhere else, it really does not matter the capbadge or the garrison organization - he will have them detached to where he wants them.

Purists might want to argue here that the Bde Comd should give the task to the CO who would give the task to Cbt Sp Coy where the OC would ....  In practice, that is not going to prevent the Bde Comd ordering a tactical grouping that puts the the Mortars OPCOM to where ever the Comd's higher priorety is.

 

[Infanteer]

If the Bde Comd decides he wants mortars to be somewhere else, it really does not matter the capbadge or the garrison organization - he will have them detached to where he wants them.

The capbadge isn't the issue; an Infantry Bn could have a mortar platoon made up of Fridge Techs and Naval Sensor guys for all I care.  The important point is that the gun batteries ultimately belong to the Bde Comd and that it is probably better if manoeuvre units own their own integral indirect assets should they not have that Bde support available to them.

 

[Good2Golf]

Infanteer, you hit on something that plays a significant part in the discussion, the issue of "will the Bde always be there, and if not, then what?"

Even from what we've seen in Bosnia and Afghanistan, we may talk "Bde", but we really know it's more like BG(+), so the question is will we ever see those IF enablers in Direct Support to the Inf Coy (or Inf Coy-based BG)?  It seems like many folks quickly fall back onto the "Well, you have the 25mm's!" argument as though that were a panacea.  Heck, look at the discussion about the HMG and CASW to see how the issue of a gap in IF/DF capability at Coy and Bn level goes to appreciate.

The issue isn't quite as simple as an equipment-based "give the INF back 81's and HMGs", but rather more of an integral capabilities issue for the potentially likely situation when those other enablers (Arty with close DS IF, Engrs with Trps of sappers to help with Coy-lvl mobility and ctr-mobility) aren't there to help.

Yes, a switched on Bde Comd can mold the minds of his Bn/Regt COs to encourage a combat groupings mind-set, but IMO, that's a bit like using "Hope" as a COA...and that isn't part of the current DS-solution.

Take the next statement for what it's worth, but as a partial out-sider, even I think there should be consideration to re-establish IF and Engr capabilities within the F-ech of the Inf units/sub-units.

Regards
G2G

 

[Infanteer]

[

They have the unique mortarman occupation.  It might not make for a clean comparison to the Canadian Army.

It's still in the 11-series MOS.

Infanteer, you hit on something that plays a significant part in the discussion, the issue of "will the Bde always be there, and if not, then what?"

Even from what we've seen in Bosnia and Afghanistan, we may talk "Bde", but we really know it's more like BG(+), so the question is will we ever see those IF enablers in Direct Support to the Inf Coy (or Inf Coy-based BG)? 

I still believe the Bde is the "blueprint" for how we intend to really fight should we have to.  If the BG had usurped the Bde, then the Optimized BG would have been implemented.  There is a reason we have an Arty Regt that belongs to the Bde Comd and not 3 Independant Batteries.

The Bde is a combined arms organization that possesses all the assets to manoeuvre through the battlefield.  Note, we're talking about systems and effects here and not capbadges.  The units and sub-units have seen this ability degraded over the last 10-20 years; we've been able to get away with it because we don't deploy the Bde in small wars and can cut-and-paste from other organizations to make up for those shortfalls.

I believe that every manoeuvre unit and sub-unit needs, like the Bde, integral combined arms assets for the battlefield should the Bde's assets be focused elsewhere (or not deployed).  I'd prefer smaller Bdes and fewer Battalions if it meant they were organized in a more robust fashion.

I think the Stryker Battalion is a good representation of an organization with good combined arms systems integral to the unit and sub-unit level.  The British example of the MSG is another good example, although it is pushing Bn assets down to the Coy level (whereas a Stryker bn has assets integral to both levels).

 

[Kirkhill]

Perhaps the Brits are setting themselves up to apply the MSG concept to the Brigade Gp level of operations.

Their current format is based on 7 formations each comprising 4 Lt Infantry Battalions of 3 Rifle Coys each with a "Traditional" (ca 1945) Combat Support Company that can be concentrated, deployed indepently or formed into MSGs as the situation warrants.

5 of those formations, in addition to the 4 Lt Infantry Bns, also include an Armoured Group of a 3 Squadron Armoured Recce Regiment, 2 Battalions of Armoured Infantry in Warriors, and a 3 Squadron Tank Regiment.  Together with the AS90 Arty Regiment they constitute a heavy version of the Combat Support Company for the formation.  They call the formation a Brigade Gp.  In 1945 they called an equivalently sized formation (1x Div Recce Regiment, 3x Tank Regiments, 1x Motor Infantry Battalion, 3x Rifle Battalions and an Anti-Tank Regiment) an Armoured Division.

http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/British/Divisions/Armd%20Divs/british_armoured_division%20mid%201942%20to%201945.htm

The other two formations, also built around 4 Lt Infantry Bns, 3 RM Cdo Bde (40, 42 and 45 Commandos with 1 Rifles added)  and 16 Air Asslt Bde (2 and 3 Para with 1 RIR and 5 RRS), don't have the Armoured Group.

16 Air Assault makes do with AH-64s and Lynxes instead of Challengers, Warriors and (soon) ASCODs.

3 RM Cdo has to make do with the Royal Navy, a few Lynxes, and their own Vikings.

If the Bn Commander downloads his Manoeuver Support Assets to the Rifle Coys that leaves the Brigadier the option of downloading the Armour to the Battalions for local support  (Bosnia, Iraq-Late and Afghanistan).  Alternately they can be  held concentrated and deployed forward while the Lt Infantry secures the rear and Lines of Communication (Kuwait and Iraq-early).

 

[Infanteer]

Their current format is based on 7 formations each comprising 4 Lt Infantry Battalions of 3 Rifle Coys each with a "Traditional" (ca 1945) Combat Support Company that can be concentrated, deployed indepently or formed into MSGs as the situation warrants.

5 of those formations, in addition to the 4 Lt Infantry Bns, also include an Armoured Group of a 3 Squadron Armoured Recce Regiment, 2 Battalions of Armoured Infantry in Warriors, and a 3 Squadron Tank Regiment.

You calculations for the Infantry bns are off.  Going by your breakdown, you give the Bdes about 11 more Inf bns then exist in the British Army (37 of which one is a local defence unit in Gibraltar).

The British Brigade structure is actually a lot less clean cut then it appears; definitely more loose then a Canadian or American structure.  None of the Bdes have an identical structure, but generally, the 2 x Armoured Bdes will have 3 Inf Bns in Warriors (not 6 as you've suggested).  The 3 x Mech Bns will have 3 Bns in the Armd, Mech and Light Roles (not 6 as you've suggested).  The other 3 x Bdes (19 Light, 51 Inf, 16 Air Assault) will have anywhere from 4-6 Bns in a variety of roles.  Bde HQs will be tapped to deploy and, it appears, will put together a hodgepodge of battalions based upon the mission (ie:  11 Light Bde commanded a force composed of 12 different Regiments in Afghanistan).  New Brigade HQs will be temporarily stood up for deployment (such as 52 Inf Bde and 11 Light Bde), cherry picking various units from other Brigades for a mission and then disbanding upon return.

The current talk is that the 7 deployable Bdes will be consolidated under the SDR into 16 Air Assault Bde and 5 Multi-role Bdes consisting of an Armd Inf Bn, a Mech Inf Bn and 2 Light Inf Bns with accompanying tanks and armd recce.  Doing the math on this leads one to the obvious conclusion that there will be a cutting of more battalions from the order of battle.

So, the so what of this?  Unlike American or (to a lesser extent) Canadian Brigades, don't look to how the British structure their Brigades in peacetime for any indications on tactical employment.

 

[Kirkhill]

Perhaps I'm off on the numbers - but they were drawn from a review of the info supplied here:


Equally it is likely that units will be attached and detached so some formations will be below strength and others over strength.  Perhaps some could even lose their Infantry and gain an Armoured group from another formation.

The groupings below are entirely notional, with the exception of 3 RM Cdo Bde and 16 Air Assault Brigade (currently serving in Afghanistan and heavily reinforced).  The notional groupings do reflect the SDSR Structure and the latest reorg of the Infantry and Artillery.

NOTE - 1 Duke of Lancaster's is not currently an Armoured Infantry Battalion but there were 21 Light Bns and only 9 Armoured/Mech Bns so I took the liberty of moving the Dukes to the Armoured Infantry column as they were the only regiment that didn't have an Armoured Infantry Battalion.

Yes there is an element of speculation here but I don't believe the numbers are far off the mark. 

Edit - And I wouldn't be surprised if each formation DID indeed lose 1 or even 2 "Feeder" Battalions of Lt Infantry.





32 Royal Artillery TUAS
47 Royal Artillery TUAS
5 Royal Artillery STA
39 Royal Artillery MLRS
16 Royal Artillery Rapier
12 Royal Artillery Starstreak

1 Royal Horse Artillery AS90
Household Cavalry Recce
Royal Scots Dragoon Guards Armour
1 Scots Guards Armoured Infantry
4 Royal Regiment of Scotland Armoured Infantry
1 Grenadier Guards Light Infantry
1 Coldstream Guards Light Infantry
1 Irish Guards Light Infantry
1 Welsh Guards Light Infantry

3 Royal Horse Artillery AS90
Queen's Dragoon Guards Recce
Royal Dragoon Guards Armour
1 Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment Armoured Infantry
1 Duke of Lancaster's Regiment Armoured Infantry
1 Royal Regiment of Scotland Light Infantry
2 Royal Regiment of Scotland Light Infantry
3 Royal Regiment of Scotland Light Infantry
2 Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment Light Infantry

4 Royal Artillery AS90
9th/12th Royal Lancers Recce
Queen's Royal Hussars Armour
1 Royal Regiment of Fusiliers Armoured Infantry
1 The Royal Anglian Regiment Mechanized Infantry
2 Duke of Lancaster's Regiment Light Infantry
2 Royal Regiment of Fusiliers Light Infantry
2 The Royal Anglian Regiment Light Infantry
1 Royal Gurkha Regiment Light Infantry

19 Royal Artillery AS90
Light Dragoons Recce
King's Royal Hussars Armour
3 The Yorkshire Regiment Armoured Infantry
3 The Mercian Regiment Armoured Infantry
1 The Yorkshire Regiment Light Infantry
2 The Yorkshire Regiment Light Infantry
1 The Mercian Regiment Light Infantry
2 The Mercian Regiment Light Infantry

26 Royal Artillery AS90
Queen's Royal Lancers Recce
2 Royal Tank Regiment Armour
2 Royal Welsh Armoured Infantry
5 The Rifles Armoured Infantry
1 Royal Welsh Light Infantry
2 The Rifles Light Infantry
3 The Rifles Light Infantry
4 The Rifles Light Infantry

7 (Para) Royal Horse Artillery Lt Gun
3 Regiment Army Air Corps
4 Regiment Army Air Corps
9 Regiment Army Air Corps
2 Parachute Regiment Light Infantry
3 Parachute Regiment Light Infantry
5 Royal Regiment of Scotland Light Infantry
1 Royal Irish Regiment Light Infantry

29 (Cdo) Royal Artillery Lt Gun
1 The Rifles Light Infantry
40 Commando Royal Marines
42 Commando Royal Marines
45 Commando Royal Marines

2 Royal Gurkha Regiment Light Infantry

 

[daftandbarmy]

Perhaps I'm off on the numbers - but they were drawn from a review of the info supplied here:


Equally it is likely that units will be attached and detached so some formations will be below strength and others over strength.  Perhaps some could even lose their Infantry and gain an Armoured group from another formation.

The groupings below are entirely notional, with the exception of 3 RM Cdo Bde and 16 Air Assault Brigade (currently serving in Afghanistan and heavily reinforced).  The notional groupings do reflect the SDSR Structure and the latest reorg of the Infantry and Artillery.

NOTE - 1 Duke of Lancaster's is not currently an Armoured Infantry Battalion but there were 21 Light Bns and only 9 Armoured/Mech Bns so I took the liberty of moving the Dukes to the Armoured Infantry column as they were the only regiment that didn't have an Armoured Infantry Battalion.

Yes there is an element of speculation here but I don't believe the numbers are far off the mark. 

Edit - And I wouldn't be surprised if each formation DID indeed lose 1 or even 2 "Feeder" Battalions of Lt Infantry.





32 Royal Artillery TUAS
47 Royal Artillery TUAS
5 Royal Artillery STA
39 Royal Artillery MLRS
16 Royal Artillery Rapier
12 Royal Artillery Starstreak

1 Royal Horse Artillery AS90
Household Cavalry Recce
Royal Scots Dragoon Guards Armour
1 Scots Guards Armoured Infantry
4 Royal Regiment of Scotland Armoured Infantry
1 Grenadier Guards Light Infantry
1 Coldstream Guards Light Infantry
1 Irish Guards Light Infantry
1 Welsh Guards Light Infantry

3 Royal Horse Artillery AS90
Queen's Dragoon Guards Recce
Royal Dragoon Guards Armour
1 Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment Armoured Infantry
1 Duke of Lancaster's Regiment Armoured Infantry
1 Royal Regiment of Scotland Light Infantry
2 Royal Regiment of Scotland Light Infantry
3 Royal Regiment of Scotland Light Infantry
2 Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment Light Infantry

4 Royal Artillery AS90
9th/12th Royal Lancers Recce
Queen's Royal Hussars Armour
1 Royal Regiment of Fusiliers Armoured Infantry
1 The Royal Anglian Regiment Mechanized Infantry
2 Duke of Lancaster's Regiment Light Infantry
2 Royal Regiment of Fusiliers Light Infantry
2 The Royal Anglian Regiment Light Infantry
1 Royal Gurkha Regiment Light Infantry

19 Royal Artillery AS90
Light Dragoons Recce
King's Royal Hussars Armour
3 The Yorkshire Regiment Armoured Infantry
3 The Mercian Regiment Armoured Infantry
1 The Yorkshire Regiment Light Infantry
2 The Yorkshire Regiment Light Infantry
1 The Mercian Regiment Light Infantry
2 The Mercian Regiment Light Infantry

26 Royal Artillery AS90
Queen's Royal Lancers Recce
2 Royal Tank Regiment Armour
2 Royal Welsh Armoured Infantry
5 The Rifles Armoured Infantry
1 Royal Welsh Light Infantry
2 The Rifles Light Infantry
3 The Rifles Light Infantry
4 The Rifles Light Infantry

7 (Para) Royal Horse Artillery Lt Gun
3 Regiment Army Air Corps
4 Regiment Army Air Corps
9 Regiment Army Air Corps
2 Parachute Regiment Light Infantry
3 Parachute Regiment Light Infantry
5 Royal Regiment of Scotland Light Infantry
1 Royal Irish Regiment Light Infantry

29 (Cdo) Royal Artillery Lt Gun
1 The Rifles Light Infantry
40 Commando Royal Marines
42 Commando Royal Marines
45 Commando Royal Marines

2 Royal Gurkha Regiment Light Infantry

So, in the Canadian context that could be: armoured infantry in CCV, Light infantry in LAV, tankies in Leo II, Commandoes etc on foot/truck/rotary wing/parachutes/small boats/skate boards.

Makes  sense to me.

 

[Kirkhill]

Done and done.  :-\

 

[a_majoor]

So, in the Canadian context that could be: armoured infantry in CCV, Light infantry in LAV, tankies in Leo II, Commandoes etc on foot/truck/rotary wing/parachutes/small boats/skate boards.

Makes  sense to me.

Second the motion!

Now give the LAV Infantry LAV mortar carriers and the dismounts this generation man portable ATGMs and we are getting close to where we want to be.

Armoured Infantry can also use CCV mortar carriers, since Tanks can deal with other tanks.

The Commandos can manpack 60mm's with advanced tubes, ammunition and fire control to make the maximum possible effect (lightweight tubes, baseplates and bipods made of titanium or composites as a minimum, and a lightweight day/night/thermal rangefinder so you can dial in the correct elevation as the minimum fire control system. Ammunition utilizing the latest technologies for going BOOM!).

 

[Danjanou]

D&B above looks good except for one major point. We could not refer to them as "skateboards" that's just not military sounding enough. They would need a cool acronym maybe UMVLW (Urban Mobility Vehicle Light Wheeled) perhaps. I now envision several under employed senior officers in their cubicles at Disneyland on the Rideau salivating at the project to develop the name for this and the PYs they can utilize.  8)