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Infantry Tactics

b00161400

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Really liked the second article from the Bn Comd. 

This is from the article.  The bolding is mine.  You can find a map of NTC at this link https://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=3599258.  Brigade hill is in the 3200 5000 Grid square (the map is from some game and so the grids are a little weird.  The Eastings are four digits while the Northings are only two):

"The knobby, segmented hill dominates the cross-maneuver
corridor that separates the western and eastern portions of the
box. If the BCT did not own Brigade Hill, it could not continue the
attack to the east. Approaching Brigade Hill mounted presents
a dilemma. Just a single well-placed anti-armor system can
systematically destroy a mounted approach.
Yet those same
systems are vulnerable to an approach by dismounted forces.
The 1-8 IN dismounted a rifle company and maneuvered it
along the southern wall while the BCT set conditions for a
dismounted attack using artillery suppression and smoke."

Is that really true?

Brigade Hill is not a really large feature in terms of width and depth.  Seems to me that a US Arty Bn, particularly if it has attached MLRS, should be able to provide the required suppression for the lead armour to close and then the trailing mech infantry to close the remaining distance, dismount, and start winkling out any ATGMs.

I thought it was interesting to note that this Bn added Stingers to the sections as I mentioned earlier.

In separate threads on here I've discussed re-grouping and the potential advantages of sticking to arm pure sub units vice cbt tms (https://army.ca/forums/threads/129368.0.html). The author hits on this. From the article:

"Fighting pure enabled the battalion to mass tanks and
infantry. We do not generally think about massing infantry,
but most pieces of key terrain on the battlefield require more
than one or two platoons to clear. Therefore, it makes sense
to mass an infantry company (or potentially two or three) to
clear key terrain. It does not make sense in many instances to
mass mechanized teams to perform the same task. We would
do better to employ the tanks as a company in support of the
infantry — as the BCT did when it attacked Razish — and allow
the infantry to perform the heavy lifting of clearing the terrain
systematically."

The Brits Standard Orders Cards show some good examples of how these drills work in terms of a BG on the offense while maintaining pure Companies. Our emphasis on the Cbt Tm, especially the square cbt tm, is a function of our desire to train sub unit commanders in combined arms and to conduct tank-infantry integration. It is, however, not always the best task organization.  With so few tanks in the Army we really need to be thinking about how we want to employ them and their mobility really allows for them to rove around the battlefield smashing problems then moving to the next instead of tying them to the slow grind of the infantry battle.

The author's notes on the impacts of having a paucity of infantry are interesting. Historically, its not really surprising. The Wehrmact steadily moved away from armour heavy formations as they realized they needed a better balance of infantry. The Israelis learned the same thing in '76 when ADA shot their planes from the air and Saggers started plinking their tanks at range.

More generally it made me think about the roles of infantry and armour in these types of formations. Surprise and shock are essential ingredients to achieving disproportionate tactical success. Both surprise and shock can happen independent of each other, however, surprise, when exploited, can also lead to shock. While either arm can achieve both it seems like the infantry is particularly suited to achieving surprise and the armour to shock. The infantry can employ their small signature, capability to operate in all weather, and ability to exploit difficult terrain to attack the enemy at unexpected times and places to surprise the enemy.  Meanwhile tanks can blast holes and move rapidly to exploit their firepower to present new situations to the enemy, thereby imposing shock.  The trick is to identify what situation calls for which effect and how best to have them support each other.
 

b00161400

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Here are two similar articles from experiences at NTC but not strictly limited to infantry tactics.

http://companyleader.themilitaryleader.com/2019/04/04/attacking-razish-part-i/
http://companyleader.themilitaryleader.com/2019/04/05/attacking-razish-part-ii/

Things I noticed:

1. The requirement to get the advanced guard right.  If you can't get through enemy's security forces without committing elements of your main body then the chances of you being successful at your objective are slim.

2.Attacking from multiple directions is all well and good if you have sufficient mass.  Otherwise you risk defeat in detail.

3. Positioning of the Bn RSM.  This article talks about the value of having the sr enlisted member out there circulating in terms of morale but also providing clarity.  I see the morale argument but if the RSM is providing clarity to my OC's during a passage of lines then I've probably done something wrong during battle procedure. It raises the question as well as to where the RSM should be in battle. I've mostly seen him attached to the CO, and on the rare occasion at the Bn CCP when we've played that. I've got no good answers on this yet.

4. Why use codewords when you have crypto? Until the quantum computers bust our crypto I think we should steer clear of these even though they sound cool.

5. As a leader expect failure in training and hang your credibility on how you react to it instead of avoiding failure in the first place. As a Comd design trg that allows for failure and multiple iterations.
 

daftandbarmy

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Haligonian said:
Here are two similar articles from experiences at NTC but not strictly limited to infantry tactics.

http://companyleader.themilitaryleader.com/2019/04/04/attacking-razish-part-i/
http://companyleader.themilitaryleader.com/2019/04/05/attacking-razish-part-ii/

Things I noticed:

1. The requirement to get the advanced guard right.  If you can't get through enemy's security forces without committing elements of your main body then the chances of you being successful at your objective are slim.

2.Attacking from multiple directions is all well and good if you have sufficient mass.  Otherwise you risk defeat in detail.

3. Positioning of the Bn RSM.  This article talks about the value of having the sr enlisted member out there circulating in terms of morale but also providing clarity.  I see the morale argument but if the RSM is providing clarity to my OC's during a passage of lines then I've probably done something wrong during battle procedure. It raises the question as well as to where the RSM should be in battle. I've mostly seen him attached to the CO, and on the rare occasion at the Bn CCP when we've played that. I've got no good answers on this yet.

4. Why use codewords when you have crypto? Until the quantum computers bust our crypto I think we should steer clear of these even though they sound cool.

5. As a leader expect failure in training and hang your credibility on how you react to it instead of avoiding failure in the first place. As a Comd design trg that allows for failure and multiple iterations.

The right answer to this question is 'wherever the RSM feels he/she needs to be to best help achieve the mission.'  ;D
 

a_majoor

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A look at modern FIBUA/MOUT/FISH, especially in the NATO context. One big takaway is modern construction is very strong, so dismounted Infantry are going to need to carry lots of explosives (Carl-G, 40mm grenade launchers, satchel charges, hand grenades) to systematically deal with it, as well as supporting arms trained and equipped to provide extra firepower:

https://strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20201104.aspx

Leadership: City Fight

November 4, 2021: While the new Russian Threat to NATO is quite different from the Cold War version, there is still the possibility of ground combat. The Russians no longer have 30 first rate combat divisions stationed in eastern Germany and the Russian Army is, for the first time, smaller than the American Army in peacetime. To make matters worse, the Americans also have better equipment, better training and more combat experience.

One thing has not changed. While the Russian ground forces are unlikely to reach western Europe, they are a very real threat to eastern European NATO members. The most vulnerable are the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Poland. One thing these NATO members have in common with the original NATO members to the west is the nature of their urban areas. The Baltics and Poland feature lots of new construction since the 1990s and most of the population now lives in urban areas. This annoys the Russians, who have done less well economically since 1991. Attacking the Baltics or Poland will mean a lot of urban warfare.

NATO is very familiar with urban warfare and has been for a long time and appreciates what the Russians would be up against. NATO has long considered MOUT (Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain) a major issue even after the end of Cold War and after the post-2001 fighting, especially in Iraq. In the future, there would be more fighting in urban areas, which means lots of sturdy buildings and narrow streets. The importance of MOUT was noted back during the 1980s when it was realized that a war with the Soviet Union in Europe would involve a lot more fighting in built-up (urban) areas than in the open. That was discovered when a staff study revealed that West Germany was rapidly urbanizing and the construction was largely cement and steel, creating structures that made better bunkers for defenders. Fortunately, NATO was preparing to play defense against an expected Russian invasion. About the same time, Russian planners noted the same urbanization trends in West Europe and realized that there was nothing similar in Russian occupied East Europe, which made the Russians more vulnerable to a NATO counter-offensive. What was discovered after 2010 was that these two trends merged in Eastern Europe with a lot of the most difficult combat taking place in newly built urban areas. Moreover, a lot, if not most, of the growth in urbanization took place in areas that were most likely to be future combat zones.

A few years before the Cold War ended the U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) was established so U.S. commanders use it to determine what works in combat and what doesn't based on past (decades or last week) experience. This is more important than ever in the 21st century, where urban combat and counter-insurgency conflicts dominate, and new technologies appear at a rapid rate. In urban warfare and counter-insurgency, the potential for mistakes to be made is exponentially larger than in conventional, large-scale warfare.

Another major problem with urban warfare has been having a decent place to train for it. The West solved this problem, the Russians could not follow because of budget problem. The U.S. Army and Marines began building training areas for MOUT, at great expense. What drives the cost up is the need to install equipment so you can video most of the action, the better to critique the troops after they win, lose or are "killed." And special building materials are used to allow the use of low power training bullets and practice hand grenades. While having these facilities is great for the units that can be brought in, there is still the hassle of shipping infantry units to them.

One solution to the cost and availability problem is portable urban combat trainers called "Mobile MOUT." Shipping containers were converted to modules that can be endlessly reconfigured for training. The containers are 2.44 meter (8-feet) wide by 2.75 meter (9-feet) high by 6.1 meter (20-feet long) and have movable walls that allow quick reconfiguration for whatever MOUT training is desired. The containers can also be joined side-by-side, or stacked to create multi-story buildings. There are also reconfigurable stairways (open or enclosed), allowing the troops to learn to deal with the tricky business of fighting up and down stairwells.

snip

It turns out that with the revived emphasis on fighting modern combat forces and using MOUT combat experience will prove invaluable for defending as well as attacking. The American solution is not to fight in the city like the Germans and Russians did in Stalingrad. Even during World War II, the Americans realized they had the firepower (bombers and artillery) to level any city that refused to surrender. This was how ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) was driven out of Mosul and Raqqa. Even when forced into a MOUT situation the Americans developed weapons, like tanks specially equipped for MOUT, and heavy use of smart bombs, guided missiles and GPS guided artillery shells. This last weapon was key to the 2017 defeat of ISIL in Raqqa, their capital in eastern Syria. The Kurds provided the ground forces but the U.S. supplied air support and, more importantly, a battery of 155mm howitzers firing GPS guided shells. There were several batteries (each with six towed howitzers) that were rotated into Syria for this support work. Some of those howitzers fired so many shells that the barrels wore out. The city fighting was most intense towards the end but all those precision weapons kept Kurd casualties down (about a thousand dead) while ISIL lost at least 3,000 dead and were forced out of the city.
 

daftandbarmy

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Thucydides said:
A look at modern FIBUA/MOUT/FISH, especially in the NATO context. One big takaway is modern construction is very strong, so dismounted Infantry are going to need to carry lots of explosives (Carl-G, 40mm grenade launchers, satchel charges, hand grenades) to systematically deal with it, as well as supporting arms trained and equipped to provide extra firepower:

https://strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20201104.aspx

The other 'inconvenient truth' is that you will need alot more Infantry too, that is, well trained fanatical teenagers to physically go in with gun, grenade and guts to root out the bad guys. About two or three times as much as you think you'll actually need.

Casualty rates skyrocket in urban/complex terrain warfare and you'll need lots of warm bodies to replace the cold ones that will pile up (hopefully in a tactical manner that will provide defilade opportunities for friendly forces) :)
 

tomahawk6

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As we rediscovered in Iraq that there is no substitute for infantry tank teams in the urban fight.
 

OldSolduer

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daftandbarmy said:
The other 'inconvenient truth' is that you will need alot more Infantry too, that is, well trained fanatical teenagers to physically go in with gun, grenade and guts to root out the bad guys. About two or three times as much as you think you'll actually need.

Casualty rates skyrocket in urban/complex terrain warfare and you'll need lots of warm bodies to replace the cold ones that will pile up (hopefully in a tactical manner that will provide defilade opportunities for friendly forces) :)
And that will drive the need for some very good medics and TCCC.
 

Kirkhill

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Evolution continues?

From Pike and Musket to every man a musketeer.
From Muskets and Rifles to every man a rifleman.
From Rifles and Commandos to every man a Commando?

Daft and Barmy has been preaching the strength of the 4-man Brick and its utility going back to his experience in Northern Ireland - regardless of the size of the parent command.

I note the evolution of down-sized infantry (which is not a new phenomenon - both Romans and Victorians had trouble recruiting to full strength and were forced to work with the people and technologies available).

As near as I can figure the origin of the 4 man brick can be found here:

22 SAS normally has a strength of 400 to 600.[75] The regiment has four operational squadrons: A, B, D and G. Each squadron consists of approximately 65 men commanded by a major, divided into four troops (each troop being commanded by a captain) and a small headquarters section.[76][77] Troops usually consist of 16 men (Members of the SAS are variously known as "blade" or "Operator")[78][79][80] and each patrol within a troop consists of four men



The US Army has 2x "Bricks" +1 comd. The USMC has 3x "Bricks" + 1 comd. The Brits have 2x "Bricks".

The USMC is looking at Plus Upping their 13 men squads to 15 by adding a 2ic and a surveillance operator.


The Royals are playing with different different configurations including companies of 3 troops of 20 formed into bricks of four as well as 12 man groups of 3 bricks of four.


All of this seems to be leading to a new coalescing of F echelon around something that looks more like an SAS squadron than our current Vimy pattern company.

Is it too much to think that the Advancing With Purpose move to supporting the creation of a capable light force, and the expression of a requirement for a vehicle equivalent to that already adopted by CSOR suggests that Canada is heading in the same direction?

Also, from Advancing With Purpose - a curious graphic for the Medium Force

The aggregation of 3 LAVS - Not 4
The separation of the crew of 3 from the dismounts and their aggregation with the vehicles
6 Dismounts per vehicle, implying an empty seat in each vehicle resulting in three specialist pax
The 6 Dismounts include what appears to be a CG-Gunner which would imply that one of the five remaining troops is the loader.
The result is 3 LAVs with three man crews transporting 3 "bricks/teams" of 4 and 3 DFS teams of 2>

With the CG-84 being able to fire from enclosed spaces, porting E/O sights and a laser designator and being able to fire/launch a variety of munitions, including a new Raytheon Carl Gustav Guided Munition (laser designated), out to ranges of 2 km while the 40 mm grenadier in the "brick" could have the option of the 40 mm Raytheon Pike, also laser designated with a range of 2 km, and currently in service with CSOR along with their Dagor ULCVs, does that suggest more of an infantry centric focus with a more "commando - like" emphasis?


The Platoon.jpg


Separating the GIBs from the Vehicles would also allow easier career transitions between the LAV battalions and the Light Battalions as well as offering the opportunity for the Light Battalions to provide operational depth to the CSOR's SOF types taking over some of their missions to free them for others. Likewise it could result in the dissemination of common TTPs for bricks from JTF2 through CSOR, the LIBs, the LAVs and perhaps even the Navy's boarding teams.
 

daftandbarmy

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Evolution continues?

From Pike and Musket to every man a musketeer.
From Muskets and Rifles to every man a rifleman.
From Rifles and Commandos to every man a Commando?

Daft and Barmy has been preaching the strength of the 4-man Brick and its utility going back to his experience in Northern Ireland - regardless of the size of the parent command.

I note the evolution of down-sized infantry (which is not a new phenomenon - both Romans and Victorians had trouble recruiting to full strength and were forced to work with the people and technologies available).

As near as I can figure the origin of the 4 man brick can be found here:





The US Army has 2x "Bricks" +1 comd. The USMC has 3x "Bricks" + 1 comd. The Brits have 2x "Bricks".

The USMC is looking at Plus Upping their 13 men squads to 15 by adding a 2ic and a surveillance operator.


The Royals are playing with different different configurations including companies of 3 troops of 20 formed into bricks of four as well as 12 man groups of 3 bricks of four.


All of this seems to be leading to a new coalescing of F echelon around something that looks more like an SAS squadron than our current Vimy pattern company.

Is it too much to think that the Advancing With Purpose move to supporting the creation of a capable light force, and the expression of a requirement for a vehicle equivalent to that already adopted by CSOR suggests that Canada is heading in the same direction?

Also, from Advancing With Purpose - a curious graphic for the Medium Force

The aggregation of 3 LAVS - Not 4
The separation of the crew of 3 from the dismounts and their aggregation with the vehicles
6 Dismounts per vehicle, implying an empty seat in each vehicle resulting in three specialist pax
The 6 Dismounts include what appears to be a CG-Gunner which would imply that one of the five remaining troops is the loader.
The result is 3 LAVs with three man crews transporting 3 "bricks/teams" of 4 and 3 DFS teams of 2>

With the CG-84 being able to fire from enclosed spaces, porting E/O sights and a laser designator and being able to fire/launch a variety of munitions, including a new Raytheon Carl Gustav Guided Munition (laser designated), out to ranges of 2 km while the 40 mm grenadier in the "brick" could have the option of the 40 mm Raytheon Pike, also laser designated with a range of 2 km, and currently in service with CSOR along with their Dagor ULCVs, does that suggest more of an infantry centric focus with a more "commando - like" emphasis?


View attachment 64754


Separating the GIBs from the Vehicles would also allow easier career transitions between the LAV battalions and the Light Battalions as well as offering the opportunity for the Light Battalions to provide operational depth to the CSOR's SOF types taking over some of their missions to free them for others. Likewise it could result in the dissemination of common TTPs for bricks from JTF2 through CSOR, the LIBs, the LAVs and perhaps even the Navy's boarding teams.

The one problem with 'bricks'?

You need alot of good Junior Leaders, and alot of training, which is likely not possible to maintain in a high intensity conflict, especially in the Infantry.

In the UK Infantry a Corporal is usually the brick commander and the brick 2 i/c is usually a LCpl. This roughly translates to MCpl/Sgt and MCpl/Senior Cpl in Canadian terms.

This works fine in places like NI, or other COIN operations, where the casualty rates are much lower, and the impact a very small unit like a section can have on the overall campaign is magnified, as opposed to full on 'Armageddon type' events like the Schedlt 1944 etc....
 

Colin Parkinson

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A look at modern FIBUA/MOUT/FISH, especially in the NATO context. One big takaway is modern construction is very strong, so dismounted Infantry are going to need to carry lots of explosives (Carl-G, 40mm grenade launchers, satchel charges, hand grenades) to systematically deal with it, as well as supporting arms trained and equipped to provide extra firepower:

Time to bring back the 165mm demolition gun and dozer blade equipped tank with extra armour
 

Kirkhill

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The one problem with 'bricks'?

You need alot of good Junior Leaders, and alot of training, which is likely not possible to maintain in a high intensity conflict, especially in the Infantry.

In the UK Infantry a Corporal is usually the brick commander and the brick 2 i/c is usually a LCpl. This roughly translates to MCpl/Sgt and MCpl/Senior Cpl in Canadian terms.

This works fine in places like NI, or other COIN operations, where the casualty rates are much lower, and the impact a very small unit like a section can have on the overall campaign is magnified, as opposed to full on 'Armageddon type' events like the Schedlt 1944 etc....


On the other hand - another advantage of "bricks" is that they are suitable lego blocks for the Reserves that can be grafted on to more "experienced" groups. Plus Up a 16 man regular platoon to a 24-40 man platoon by the addition of Reserve bricks.

And that gives additional load carriers....
 

Kirkhill

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Meanwhile the SAS is being retargeted at Little Green Men.


There was a 2002 SAS history called Ghost Force by ex-SAS man Ken Connor. He finished his book with the prediction that in future the primary weapon of the SAS would be the credit card - men and women in civilian clothes with a passport and a credit card.

The last 20 years has seen a significant move in that direction.

UKSF Sigs Regiment
SAS with a company sized SBS
Expanded SAS and SBS
Special Reconnaissance Regiment
Para's (with Marines and RAF) reroled in SFSG as junior SAS types
Royal Marines converted to something more like a cross between SBS and Commacchio with forward basing in small groups on ships
Army standing up a Ranger Brigade to manage the training and OMLET roles with allies and potential allies.


The standing up of the ISR brigade

UnitRoleRegular or ReserveLocationNote
14 Signal Regiment (Electronic Warfare)Ground-based electronic warfare and signals intelligenceRegularCawdor Barracks[6]
5th Regiment Royal ArtilleryWeapon Locating Radar, medium and heavy ground-based ISTARRegularMarne Barracks[7]
Honourable Artillery CompanySurveillance & Reconnaissance (SR) Patrols and light ground-based intelligenceReserveFinsbury Barracks[8]
32 Regiment Royal ArtilleryIntegrated Unmanned Aerial Systems (IUAS)RegularLarkhillInitially slated to disband and personnel distributed to other parts of the British Army as part of Army 2020 Refine.[9] In an October 2020 edition of the Soldier Magazine, it was stated the unit would not disband as planned.[10]
1 Military Intelligence BattalionMilitary IntelligenceRegularCatterick
2 Military Intelligence (Exploitation) BattalionMaterial and Personnel ExploitationRegularUpavon
3 Military Intelligence BattalionMilitary IntelligenceReserveHackney
4 Military Intelligence BattalionMilitary IntelligenceRegularBulford
5 Military Intelligence BattalionMilitary IntelligenceReserveEdinburgh
6 Military Intelligence BattalionMilitary IntelligenceReserveManchester
7 Military Intelligence BattalionMilitary IntelligenceReserveBristol[11]
Defence Cultural Specialist UnitSupport to Military Intelligence unitsRegularDenison Barracks[12]
Weapons Material and Personnel Exploitation CapacitySupport to Military Intelligence unitsRegular
Land Intelligence Fusion CentreIntelligence reachbackRegularDenison Barracks[12]
Specialist Group Military IntelligenceProfessional augmentation to intelligence capacitiesReserveDenison Barracks


Years ago I was told that the most dangerous man on the battlefield was the one with the binoculars and the radio. Still true. Perhaps moreso.
 

FJAG

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The one problem with 'bricks'?

You need alot of good Junior Leaders, and alot of training, which is likely not possible to maintain in a high intensity conflict, especially in the Infantry.

In the UK Infantry a Corporal is usually the brick commander and the brick 2 i/c is usually a LCpl. This roughly translates to MCpl/Sgt and MCpl/Senior Cpl in Canadian terms.

This works fine in places like NI, or other COIN operations, where the casualty rates are much lower, and the impact a very small unit like a section can have on the overall campaign is magnified, as opposed to full on 'Armageddon type' events like the Schedlt 1944 etc....
If I take a look at the establishment that Kirkhill sets out above with 3 LAVs then your 3 sections are reduced to 3 "4-man bricks" which would have each led by a sgt and 2ic'd by a MCpl. The +2 dismounts from each LAV would have to include the pl cmd and pl 2ic which leaves only 2 x +2 for CGs etc. (unless of course one of the pl cmd or pl 2ic stays with the LAVs which adds one "fighter/signaler/whatever" dismount to the mix.

That should give you enough leadership but not much depth to absorb casualties. Maybe increase each platoon by three cpl/ptes as LOBs that could provide security in the bn rear until needed as replacements? Just spit-balling here.

🍻
 

daftandbarmy

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Meanwhile the SAS is being retargeted at Little Green Men.


There was a 2002 SAS history called Ghost Force by ex-SAS man Ken Connor. He finished his book with the prediction that in future the primary weapon of the SAS would be the credit card - men and women in civilian clothes with a passport and a credit card.

The last 20 years has seen a significant move in that direction.

UKSF Sigs Regiment
SAS with a company sized SBS
Expanded SAS and SBS
Special Reconnaissance Regiment
Para's (with Marines and RAF) reroled in SFSG as junior SAS types
Royal Marines converted to something more like a cross between SBS and Commacchio with forward basing in small groups on ships
Army standing up a Ranger Brigade to manage the training and OMLET roles with allies and potential allies.


The standing up of the ISR brigade

UnitRoleRegular or ReserveLocationNote
14 Signal Regiment (Electronic Warfare)Ground-based electronic warfare and signals intelligenceRegularCawdor Barracks[6]
5th Regiment Royal ArtilleryWeapon Locating Radar, medium and heavy ground-based ISTARRegularMarne Barracks[7]
Honourable Artillery CompanySurveillance & Reconnaissance (SR) Patrols and light ground-based intelligenceReserveFinsbury Barracks[8]
32 Regiment Royal ArtilleryIntegrated Unmanned Aerial Systems (IUAS)RegularLarkhillInitially slated to disband and personnel distributed to other parts of the British Army as part of Army 2020 Refine.[9] In an October 2020 edition of the Soldier Magazine, it was stated the unit would not disband as planned.[10]
1 Military Intelligence BattalionMilitary IntelligenceRegularCatterick
2 Military Intelligence (Exploitation) BattalionMaterial and Personnel ExploitationRegularUpavon
3 Military Intelligence BattalionMilitary IntelligenceReserveHackney
4 Military Intelligence BattalionMilitary IntelligenceRegularBulford
5 Military Intelligence BattalionMilitary IntelligenceReserveEdinburgh
6 Military Intelligence BattalionMilitary IntelligenceReserveManchester
7 Military Intelligence BattalionMilitary IntelligenceReserveBristol[11]
Defence Cultural Specialist UnitSupport to Military Intelligence unitsRegularDenison Barracks[12]
Weapons Material and Personnel Exploitation CapacitySupport to Military Intelligence unitsRegular
Land Intelligence Fusion CentreIntelligence reachbackRegularDenison Barracks[12]
Specialist Group Military IntelligenceProfessional augmentation to intelligence capacitiesReserveDenison Barracks


Years ago I was told that the most dangerous man on the battlefield was the one with the binoculars and the radio. Still true. Perhaps moreso.

"Troops will also spend more time deployed abroad in a network of bases known as Land Regional Hubs. The government also plans to invest in bases in Kenya, Oman, Singapore, Cyprus, Gibraltar and Germany so forces can respond more quickly — with a new focus on the Indo-Pacific."

I'm sure that will do wonders for retention because of the 'balance' thing, especially because alot of these tours will likely be unaccompanied because of the increased cost. Or not....

 

PPCLI Guy

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...with a map.
Blah blah.

Ever ben a 2Lt with 10-40 weeks training in charge of dangerous people on a mission that cannot fail?

As I get older, I find I have less patience for this rote denegation of people who are doing their jobs....because of their designation.
 

SeaKingTacco

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Blah blah.

Ever ben a 2Lt with 10-40 weeks training in charge of dangerous people on a mission that cannot fail?

As I get older, I find I have less patience for this rote denegation of people who are doing their jobs....because of their designation.
I led troops in Gulf War 1 as a 23 year old Lt, 8,000 miles away from my CO, doing something that had never been done before and managed not to stuff things up too badly.

l too, am impatient with stereotyping, of all kinds.
 

Colin Parkinson

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If you have a focus on urbans ops, then along with the specialised tank I mentioned, you should have HAPC's and up-armoured ARV's. The HAPC protect the infantry which apparently we are short on. Sounds like the US should build up a 79th Armoured Division like unit, full of specialised vehicles that deploy as a team and are manned by people who do nothing but get the most out of their specialisation. You can graft on M1 Abrams, Stryker's or Bradley's equipped units as required.

Also perhaps we (collectively NATO) should each have a Foreign legion/Gurkha type unit where foreigners serve as infantry and get either citizenship or a great for them pension back in their home.
 

FJAG

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940
"Troops will also spend more time deployed abroad in a network of bases known as Land Regional Hubs. The government also plans to invest in bases in Kenya, Oman, Singapore, Cyprus, Gibraltar and Germany so forces can respond more quickly — with a new focus on the Indo-Pacific."

I'm sure that will do wonders for retention because of the 'balance' thing, especially because alot of these tours will likely be unaccompanied because of the increased cost. Or not....
Maybe we need to recruit Incels for this. They'll already come with a level of aggression and have no significant attachments to worry about. Might be some Op Honour issues there but if we keep them deployed away from everyone else ...

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