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Infantry Tactics

Weinie

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Anti-Tank Exercises (Javelin, NLAW and HMG)





I have taken my time responding, in part because I found this discussion appallingly shallow. We are debating how we participate in a shooting war of unspecified intensity, but appear to think it will start and remain what used to be called a "come as you are" conflict. Any potential enemy, and thank all that is holy, there ain't too many potential bad guys around, would be fairly large, pretty well equipped, and serious about winning. So, that suggests, hell, it bellows from the rooftops, that the old way of doing things with a minimal force-in-being is over. Just a couple of things to ponder, but I'm pretty sure you all can think of a lot more, recruiting and training replacements for the casualties, and there probably will be a lot of them, to fill up the troops fighting, and to conduct a rotation, or worse, build up the forces from a battle group or brigade group to perhaps a division or more. Also, care of our casualties and looking after them and their families. Harping on casualties, we suffered what only would be considered light casualties in each roto in Afghanistan. Ian Hope in his book stated 1 PPCLI Battle Group lost 14 KIA in its tour in 2006. In 1953 3 RCR and atts lost 28 KIA in one battle, and even that was not excessive by the standard of our other wars. Not every fight is going to be another Verrieres Ridge, but we will loose a lot of soldiers, and will have to replace them in the field.

One other - gearing up the industrial base to arm and equip our force, and to keep the flow going.

Lets start considering the big picture. It will conjure up very unpleasant images, but I don't think we are doing ourselves any favours by not considering the really unpleasant parts. I could rant on, but I won't, and I apologize for not raising these issues earlier in the debate.
I had mentioned my concern about attrition/casualties in a different thread, but got crickets. My post:

The fallacy, as I see it, with this NTM COA is that it doesn't account for casualties/attrition.

When we were working CBP, no one factored in that we could likely expect extensive/massive attrition, across all domains in a near peer/peer environment. We likely would not have enough time, or the sp chain, to train/equip/re-equip a follow-on force before hostilities finished.
 

blacktriangle

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Why doesn't the CAF seem to care about ATMs?
ATMs or ATGMs? Most of the people I served with in the CAF definitely cared about ATMs - in particular when said ATMs no longer wanted to dispense money. :sneaky:

More seriously, the lack of a modern ATGM like Javelin or Spike speaks volumes about how seriously Canada takes its Army.
 
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Kirkhill

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I had mentioned my concern about attrition/casualties in a different thread, but got crickets. My post:

The fallacy, as I see it, with this NTM COA is that it doesn't account for casualties/attrition.

When we were working CBP, no one factored in that we could likely expect extensive/massive attrition, across all domains in a near peer/peer environment. We likely would not have enough time, or the sp chain, to train/equip/re-equip a follow-on force before hostilities finished.


The reason for the crickets at this end is - there is no answer. We have a government that reflects its clients and the clients would rather not be interrupted from their lives.

Accordingly the best I think we can do is to focus on adjusting some thinking in the regular forces.

My preferred model for the Reserves is still the volunteer home guards of Europe. Citizens that are engaged sufficiently to care and that can be organized according to the needs of the day. Now if only we could guarantee some time to get them and the reg forces on to a war footing with enough UORs, transport and 90 day training programmes.
 

Weinie

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The reason for the crickets at this end is - there is no answer. We have a government that reflects its clients and the clients would rather not be interrupted from their lives.

Accordingly the best I think we can do is to focus on adjusting some thinking in the regular forces.

My preferred model for the Reserves is still the volunteer home guards of Europe. Citizens that are engaged sufficiently to care and that can be organized according to the needs of the day. Now if only we could guarantee some time to get them and the reg forces on to a war footing with enough UORs, transport and 90 day training programmes.
Yup.

But we still have no answer for casualties/attrition. Until we answer that we are a one shot( albeit late) answer to the show.
 
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Kirkhill

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Yup.

But we still have no answer for casualties/attrition. Until we answer that we are a one shot( albeit late) answer to the show.

What will it take to motivate the nation to launch a crusade?
 

FJAG

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I had mentioned my concern about attrition/casualties in a different thread, but got crickets. My post:

The fallacy, as I see it, with this NTM COA is that it doesn't account for casualties/attrition.

When we were working CBP, no one factored in that we could likely expect extensive/massive attrition, across all domains in a near peer/peer environment. We likely would not have enough time, or the sp chain, to train/equip/re-equip a follow-on force before hostilities finished.
I think its both a cyclic and an attitude thing.

The first factor is that our brigades are fairly large and with the limited PYs available we have a hard time filling them properly which means that in the event we need to deploy one full brigade we would have to cannibalize elements of the other two just to get the one out of the door. That leaves even fewer people in those two brigades to draw on to cover attrition or to create a follow-on force.

That of course leaves the reserves, and from the Op Broadsword example above we'd need to use all of our reservists which again leaves nothing for a "follow-on" force.

I think the attitude thing is one where we simply haven't gathered the will within the Army to push hard for a larger and better reserve. We've generally been prepared to live with what we have. The cyclical nature comes in because from time-to-time we do push the idea of a larger, more competent reserve up the chain and when we do succeed with the argument like we did in the 1990s then we don't resource it properly, bleed off funds for admin Class Bs, and never do push for the legislative changes needed (like a decent employer protection legislation) and even more importantly the regulatory and directive changes to properly implement it. We never sustain the effort. Effectively every initiative taken results in status quo ante.

We all recognize that the Res F has substantial systemic weaknesses. We all know that stupidity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. When it comes to creating a more effective Res F, Canada has been stupid for over a half a century.

What bothers me more than anything is that while a bunch of us who are musing about these things around this website clearly see the issue, I'm convinced that the folks who sit around the cabinet table believe they have more military options than they really do. My guess is when the Op Broadsword data was handed up there was more than one dropped jaw. (And I don't mean just within cabinet - I presume within the higher reaches of NDHQ and CFHQ as well) For as long as I remember, when we were heavily into 4 CMBG we never rehearsed attrition (Op Pendent expansion - yes; but attrition - no)

I found it frustrating on CRes and Cadets Council and for some strange reason now that I'm retired I still find it frustrating.

😠
 

OldSolduer

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What will it take to motivate the nation to launch a crusade?
It would have to be very extreme. An existential threat to Canada or humanity and even then I think it would be tough.

Afghanistan to most Canadians was a sideshow. I'm genuinely sorry to say that - its evident that most Canadians could care less about military matters.
 
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