Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[rmc_wannabe]

Part of the problem we have is the belief that there is middle ground between fast moving, lightly armoured (and protected), rapidly deployable and redeployable formations... and heavy, large effect, large echelon formations. It's like trying to build the El Camino of forces.... it looks fugly.

Having the right tool in the box is better than trying to build the unwieldy multi-tool that has no functionality.

It also helps with Operational and Strategic planning because you're not trying to shoehorn a capability into a problem set. If you're facing an Armoured Brigade, throw an Armoured Brigade at them. Same deal when facing Light infantry. Having Medium MGS or other in-between systems will either underperform against one or slow down the initiative.

I still hold a belief that the CAF needs desperately to accept that we need 3 asymmetrical CMBGs filling one Armoured Brigade role, One filling the Rapid Response Air Mobile role, and another filling an amphibious/joint role on the coasts.

Instead of doing all 3 poorly, we can build the depth and functionality to specialize to the task.

 

[GR66]

Does anyone see us dropping the LAV 6? Moving away from GDLS as our primary armoured vehicle supplier? Budget means we'll hang on to the LAVs and politics means we'll stick with GDLS.

The only hope I see of Canada moving to a tracked IFV for our mechanized forces is if the GDLS Griffin III wins the OMFV contract in the US. Then we could potentially have those built in London as a replacement for the LAVs (but not until the LAVs have reached the end of their operational life).

Until then I think we need to face reality and assume that we're stuck with the LAV 6 as our primary mechanized platform for the foreseeable future. If we are then we should at least make the we can of it. There are several capability gaps that we have that can be filled by LAV variants. SHORAD, ATGM, mortar, DFS (Centauro II 120mm turret w/40 onboard rounds?), there's even a couple of 155mm SP versions on 8x8 chassis that have been prototyped by IVECO and KMW.

That being said, I personally think that for any new platforms (tanks, MRAD and artillery for example) we should just buy what the US is using for the sake of commonality and interoperability. But for new capabilities tied directly to our LAV infantry (SHORAD, SP Mortars, ATGM vehicles, DFS vehicles, etc.) we should develop LAV-based versions. Wherever possible though we should again try for as much commonality with the US as possible where we can (for example the same RWS as the IM-SHORAD and IM-SHORAD-DE for air defence and maybe the MGS turret on a LAV for DFS?)

 

[Kirkhill]

The whole issue with Medium weight systems is that they start to get pushed beyond their initially levels of planned employment.

Most of the ideas behind the Stryker started from Somalia.
A rapidly deployable light armor system to protect troops in OOTW.
However the employment of them beyond the original scope resulted in the ‘identification’ of a lack of armor, and a need to up armor them.

You can see the same effect on the LAV development More and more armor was added, and they stopped being Medium APC’s and no longer easily deployed.

I’m not a ‘medium weight’ formation fan, simply as they often end up too light to fight the battle they are being used in, and now too heavy to be employed in the role they where designed for.

@Kirkhill has made a number of posts and tables on the growth of the original MOWAG concept from the 6x6 AVGP to the LAV in its current state.

I’d suggest the original Stryker idea was a valid idea to provide Light Armored Mobility for a mostly Light Force to work within certain situations.
It went off the rails when more was wanted from the platform, and without a proper analysis done of what would be lost when trying to add significantly higher levels of protection.

MGS to be was an answer in search of a problem. The 105mm gun had already been proven to be too much for the chassis, and personally I never saw the point to that setup for the Stryker formation, simply because it wasn’t a tank, and shouldn’t be viewed as an anti-tank system, as well as it wasn’t a viable anti-structure system. If instead it had something like a low velocity demolition gun simply intended for anti-structure usage, it would have made a great deal more sense.

If there was an anti-armor requirement for a Stryker entity, there were ample examples of other systems that would have been a better fit to the LAV chassis. Given the ATGM options available in other platforms.
MGS wasn’t even a Jack of all trades, it was more like a 2 of Clubs.

I suggest a review of the history of the Flying Column in continental warfare.

If you are coming from the sea can you protect your rear because navies are expensive and not many people have them.
You can focus on a particular point target - Louisbourg. Quebec. Washington. Caen. Normandie.....

Edit - heck, it is the reason the Vikings and the Greeks and the Brits loved their islands.

If you are a continental army you still have to deal with citadels. But you can't protect your rear. Your best bet is to dominate your rear areas and the solution to that is the solution the Ukrainians have adopted. It comes naturally to them. To their culture. The Flying Column.

The Flying Column is the tactic of the Hussars, Cossacks, Arabs, Indians, Mongols, Parthians, Scythians..... the tactic of the horse and the open plain. It is the preferred tactic of the Eastern Front and it was the successful tactic of North Africa.

A flying column is a small, independent, military land unit capable of rapid mobility and usually composed of all arms. It is often an ad hoc unit, formed during the course of operations.

Flying column - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

They are typically company-battalion sized although occasionally brigade sized.

The Italian army in North Africa, was bagged by a Wheeled Brigade made up of the the Recce Squadrons of a half dozen Regiments, including the RAF, backed by a towed battery of 25 pounders and a battery of 37mm Bofors in the Anti Tank Role - Combe Force.

Combeforce - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Combe Force

Jock Columns were smaller and more numerous.

Jock column - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The LRDG and the SAS and Popski's Private Army also fought the same fight. Containing, screening, shaping, attriting, denying.

Long Range Desert Group - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Special Air Service - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Popski's Private Army - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In April 1919 Maczek was withdrawn from his unit and became the organizer and commander of the so-called 'flying' company (Polish: lotna kompania) as part of Gen. Aleksandrowicz's 4th Infantry Division. This unit, created on Maczek's initiative, was modelled after the German Sturmbataillone of World War I and was highly mobile, with horse-drawn vehicles (in the singular, taczanka, podwoda) from Austrian Army depots, and well-equipped with heavy machine guns. The unit was formed mostly from battle-hardened troops of the Krosno battalion, and its combat value was well above the average of the Polish Army of the time. Hence it served in a "firefighter" capacity, plugging holes that appeared in defensive lines, but also fighting with distinction in the Polish spring offensive. It took part in some of the heaviest fighting of the war, including the battles for Drohobycz, Stanisławów, Buczacz, and finally the ZUNR capital, Stryj.[citation needed]

Stanisław Maczek - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

William Gott - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Richard O'Connor - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

A Stryker Brigade operating as 9 Company Combat Team sized Flying Columns could cover a lot of ground.
If you want a Cavalry Force there it is.

I believe the US has 6 Stryker Brigades bringing a total of 54 potential Flying Columns to the fight.
We have 3 Brigades with 2 Battalions with 2 Companies for a potential of 12 Flying Columns - CMRs and NWMP
The Aussies I guess, with their ASLAVs could generate as similar force - a natural for their Light Horse tradition
The Kiwis add in another 3 or 4.
The Brits - Their entire 7th Brigade with its 5 Light Mechanized Infantry Battalions and its Light Cavalry Regiment with a Light Artillery Battalion
And their Deep Strike Brigade Recce Regiments.

Those are the forces that fight the wars of the steppes, the prairies, the plains, the deserts (hot and cold) and the veldt.

And we should be f*cking good at it.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

@Kirkhill agreed.

The issue stems from the risk aversion we have developed in the past 30 years about losses. Case in point was from allowing lighter, faster units to do cav scout recce, to the lumbering columns that were easy pickings for IEDs and ambushes.

I would agree that an independent, fast moving, self sustaining force at the Coy/Sqn level is perfect for the kind of battle we're most likely to face in Europe. Have we done a good enough job enabling and training that kind of tactic is a completely different one.

Our C2, CS, and CSS all favour a larger BG or higher centralization. I can see a lot of growing pains to retrain and redevelop our command and support systems to permit the kind of mission command and ADO required for the flying column.

 

[Kirkhill]

Vlad's Problem

1st Armored Division (United States) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Vlad's DS Solution

Tactical nuclear weapon - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Hammer, The Fist, The Iron Fist, The Mailed Fist aka

Forlorn hope - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

While we are concentrating our forces into one mighty hammer, focusing on our objective, developing a zen like focus, ignoring everything else as a distraction, watching our hole of interest from our tunnel, putting on our blinders, looking through our stovepipe, our straw, our scope, putting the cross hairs on the hole and waiting for our shot....who is watching all the other holes?

There are moles in abundance. There are even more holes. And while you are waiting for a mole a gopher or a sealion may appear, a badger or a worm. Or it could just be a hole.

We are preparing a Hammer to smite a mole. But there are many moles, many holes, and many things that make holes and exploit holes.

They are not just the background to be ignored.

If that focal point, that hole, that citadel is the Positive Space, everything else is the Negative Space. And it is by eliminating the Negative Space that the Positive Space is clarified, defined and isolated.

We need to spend more effort controlling that Negative Space and that control comes from working with local eyeballs, supplying diplomats, Security Force Assistance people - civilian and military, exploiting surveillance technologies, supplying military trainers, and supplying roving forces and regional SWAT teams. And, God love them, Forlorn Hopes. Buy them all the armour they want and wish them well.

 

[Kirkhill]

World's first drone strike companies being formed in Ukraine

The world's first strike companies of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are being formed in Ukraine. — Ukrinform.

www.ukrinform.net

Ukrainian army forms 3 new strike drone companies

The Ukrainian army has formed three new strike companies that will deploy Ukrainian-made drones. Source: Mykhailo Fedorov, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation, on Telegram Quote: "The Ukrainian army is undergoing active transformations and receiving unique new experience...

news.yahoo.com

8 more strike drone companies formed in Ukraine

Eight new strike drone companies have been formed in Ukraine; they were purchased within the UNITED24 platform and with the funds of the state budget.

www.pravda.com.ua

There is the screen.

The accompanying troops are riding in these:



And these

BTR-4 Armored Personnel Carrier | Military-Today.com

The BTR-4 armored personnel carrier was developed in Ukraine as a private venture. It was approved for production in 2008 and first deliveries to Ukrainian Army are expected in 2009.

www.military-today.com

You can't conduct raids like the 2014 one with tracks.

Raid of the 95th Brigade - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[KevinB]

I suggest a review of the history of the Flying Column in continental warfare.

If you are coming from the sea can you protect your rear because navies are expensive and not many people have them.
You can focus on a particular point target - Louisbourg. Quebec. Washington. Caen. Normandie.....

Edit - heck, it is the reason the Vikings and the Greeks and the Brits loved their islands.

If you are a continental army you still have to deal with citadels. But you can't protect your rear. Your best bet is to dominate your rear areas and the solution to that is the solution the Ukrainians have adopted. It comes naturally to them. To their culture. The Flying Column.

The Flying Column is the tactic of the Hussars, Cossacks, Arabs, Indians, Mongols, Parthians, Scythians..... the tactic of the horse and the open plain. It is the preferred tactic of the Eastern Front and it was the successful tactic of North Africa.

Flying column - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

They are typically company-battalion sized although occasionally brigade sized.

The Italian army in North Africa, was bagged by a Wheeled Brigade made up of the the Recce Squadrons of a half dozen Regiments, including the RAF, backed by a towed battery of 25 pounders and a battery of 37mm Bofors in the Anti Tank Role - Combe Force.

Combeforce - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Combe Force

Jock Columns were smaller and more numerous.

Jock column - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The LRDG and the SAS and Popski's Private Army also fought the same fight. Containing, screening, shaping, attriting, denying.

Long Range Desert Group - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Special Air Service - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Popski's Private Army - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Stanisław Maczek - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

William Gott - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Richard O'Connor - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

A Stryker Brigade operating as 9 Company Combat Team sized Flying Columns could cover a lot of ground.
If you want a Cavalry Force there it is.

I believe the US has 6 Stryker Brigades bringing a total of 54 potential Flying Columns to the fight.
We have 3 Brigades with 2 Battalions with 2 Companies for a potential of 12 Flying Columns - CMRs and NWMP
The Aussies I guess, with their ASLAVs could generate as similar force - a natural for their Light Horse tradition
The Kiwis add in another 3 or 4.
The Brits - Their entire 7th Brigade with its 5 Light Mechanized Infantry Battalions and its Light Cavalry Regiment with a Light Artillery Battalion
And their Deep Strike Brigade Recce Regiments.

Those are the forces that fight the wars of the steppes, the prairies, the plains, the deserts (hot and cold) and the veldt.

And we should be f*cking good at it.

I would argue that none of that is related to this day and age conventional force disposition for 95% of situations.

It sounds romantic, and this is a role for that sort of activity, but designing your entire army around that is a fools errand.

Light Armored Recce went out with the shut down of 4CMBG, it wasn’t viable beyond that due to changes in technology if fighting a peer or near peer foe.

I’m not suggesting throwing all the LAV’s off a pier (I did suggest that to a CO once who actually agreed), but building one’s Army entirely around the LAV isn’t smart at all.

World's first drone strike companies being formed in Ukraine

The world's first strike companies of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are being formed in Ukraine. — Ukrinform.

www.ukrinform.net

Ukrainian army forms 3 new strike drone companies

The Ukrainian army has formed three new strike companies that will deploy Ukrainian-made drones. Source: Mykhailo Fedorov, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation, on Telegram Quote: "The Ukrainian army is undergoing active transformations and receiving unique new experience...

news.yahoo.com

8 more strike drone companies formed in Ukraine

Eight new strike drone companies have been formed in Ukraine; they were purchased within the UNITED24 platform and with the funds of the state budget.

www.pravda.com.ua

View attachment 77796View attachment 77798View attachment 77799


There is the screen.

The accompanying troops are riding in these:

View attachment 77800View attachment 77801View attachment 77803

And these

View attachment 77805

BTR-4 Armored Personnel Carrier | Military-Today.com

The BTR-4 armored personnel carrier was developed in Ukraine as a private venture. It was approved for production in 2008 and first deliveries to Ukrainian Army are expected in 2009.

www.military-today.com

You can't conduct raids like the 2014 one with tracks.

Raid of the 95th Brigade - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

No one in their right mind makes Light Armored Wheeled Vehicles their primary force.

There needs to be a blend.
Heavy Armor (Tank, Tracked Infantry Vehicle, AT, and SPA/SPAA systems to provide weight to both blunt attacks and punch through when needed.

Medium forces for OOTW and Protected Mobility in larger conflicts that aren’t designed to go toe to toe with enemy heavier forces - and can exploit holes made by blue force heavy elements.

Light Forces to rapidly deploy to hot spots, as well as provide static defense forces if need be.

All have different capabilities and roles, and are complementary to each other not exclusionary.

 

[Kirkhill]

I would argue that none of that is related to this day and age conventional force disposition for 95% of situations.

It sounds romantic, and this is a role for that sort of activity, but designing your entire army around that is a fools errand.

Light Armored Recce went out with the shut down of 4CMBG, it wasn’t viable beyond that due to changes in technology if fighting a peer or near peer foe.

I would suggest that you are wrong.

I would further suggest that that is how the Ukrainians managed to contain the Russian multi-Battle Group invasion plan. The Ukrainians do not seem to have concentrated against a dispersed enemy. They dispersed a large portion of their force even further WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, retaining a reserve of small hammers that were used judiciously.

The Russians attacked with 120 Battle Groups, the Ukrainians countered with 24 Brigade Groups dispersed across 24 Oblasts. The Russians concentrated their 120 Battle Groups across 8 of those Oblasts (Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv and Kyiv).

The Ukrainians met the Russians with their regional brigades where they had to and where they could but they also met the Russians with Flying Columns of guys in pickups and with Citizen Soldiers with NLAWs holding the streets.

I’m not suggesting throwing all the LAV’s off a pier (I did suggest that to a CO once who actually agreed), but building one’s Army entirely around the LAV isn’t smart at all.

No one in their right mind makes Light Armored Wheeled Vehicles their primary force.

And I never suggested making the US Army, the Canadian, the Brit, Aussie or Kiwi armies singularly medium force armies. You want to put a match to that strawman before I do.

There needs to be a blend.

We agree.

Heavy Armor (Tank, Tracked Infantry Vehicle, AT, and SPA/SPAA systems to provide weight to both blunt attacks and punch through when needed.

Medium forces for OOTW and Protected Mobility in larger conflicts that aren’t designed to go toe to toe with enemy heavier forces - and can exploit holes made by blue force heavy elements.

Light Forces to rapidly deploy to hot spots, as well as provide static defense forces if need be.

All have different capabilities and roles, and are complementary to each other not exclusionary.

Again, agreed.

I would just point out the American Heavy fixation is as wrong-headed as the Canadian Medium fixation.

Heavy Rock, Medium Scissors, Light Paper.

And Nukes take the match.

You will not dominate 7 Billion People with 10 Divisions. Or even 3 times that.
And that is what we are talking about. Getting 7 Billion People to a state where they are all moving in the same general direction. And doing it with a light touch.

The Army is one part of the answer, military force in general is only part of the answer. Even Unicorns have their part to play. But they too, are only part of the answer.

The Mounties don't use their 9 pounder much these days. There are more of them, dispersed more widely, riding 100 mph vehicles equipped with all sorts of radios, computers, cameras and an assortment of weapons of varying lethality.

The LAV is a cruiser for a less forgiving population. Canada has the LAVs. They should offer the use of their LAVs where they will do the most good.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I am not sure what to make of this thread - it seems to be a fever dream oscillating from moles and sealions to flying columns and Wikipedia entries. I thought I'd offer a sense of what the Canadian Army has been up to, perhaps in an effort to inform those who seek to inform. For the most part I will steer clear of operations, but I will go there in a couple of places.

To provide some context, here are some highlights of what the CA has been up to this year so far.

In January, the 3 R22eR BG, augmented by close to 100 reservists, deployed to the Joint Readiness Training Centre (JRTC) in Louisiana as part of a US SCBT in a very challenging instrumented force on force exercise with the difficulty setting at "hard mode." Supported by OCTs from CMTC, this validated them to Level 6 (Battle Group).

In February the CA conducted Exercise UNIFIED RESOLVE (UR) 23, run by CMTC Formation Training Group with HQ 5 CMBG as the primary training audience and 2 CMBG as the secondary training audience. Using the DATE Europe operating environment, UR 23 validated HQ 5 CMBG along with the HQs of 5 CER, 5 RALC and 5 Svc Bn for the following year.

In March, the ARCG of 2 Division (2XX) deployed to the Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Training Centre (CAFATC) at Resolute Bay for Ex GUERRIER NORDIQUE, accompanied by members of the US ARNG. The 5XX ARCG conducted MAROON SOJOURN at Goose Bay accompanied by elements of three NATO allies. The 4XX ARCG along with the RCD deployed to the Canadian High Arctic for Operation NANOOK-NANULIVAT. What about the 3XX ARCG? We'll talk about them in a moment.

While this was going on, CMTC and elements of 4XX supported the Integrational Capstone Exercise (ICE) Combat Readiness Evaluation (CREVAL) of the 1 PPCLI-led EFP BG in Latvia.

In late March and early April, A Coy 3 PPCLI exercised as part of 11th (US) Airborne Division as part of their IBCT-level validation at the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Centre (JPMRC) Alaska. They were augmented by by the 3XX ARCG for this Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) instrumented exercise conducted in extremely challenging conditions. This included a JFE with 11th ABN. The ARCG elements ended up supporting multiple units with mobility and CASEVAC in conditions where moving 1km cross country was a major endeavor.

So if you were in an ARCG this past winter you were busy!

In April, 5 CMBG with the LdSH conducted their Combat Team live fire exercise in Wainwright Alberta, followed by Ex MAPLE RESOLVE 23. This instrumented capstone training event executed in a DATE Europe environment validated the mechanized elements of 5 CMBG for their NRF tasks in the coming year. So if you were in 5 CMBG (and CMTC) you were very busy this year.

The CA's Managed Readiness Program will undergo adaptation in the coming year, and Collective Training will also evolve significantly as we try to square the circle of reconstitution and readiness for missions that we know (EFP) and those that we cannot put on a calendar (Global Response Task Force). More to follow.

I now return you to your regularly scheduled programming. If I forgot to mention your training event please sort me out!

 

[Fabius]

During the course of those exercises what trends has the Army identified as needing improvement and how are those observations being integrated into future force structures, doctrine and equipment?

Yes the Army is busy conducting training but that’s not a useful metric of its own.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I am not sure what to make of this thread - it seems to be a fever dream oscillating from moles and sealions to flying columns and Wikipedia entries. I thought I'd offer a sense of what the Canadian Army has been up to, perhaps in an effort to inform those who seek to inform. For the most part I will steer clear of operations, but I will go there in a couple of places.

To provide some context, here are some highlights of what the CA has been up to this year so far.

In January, the 3 R22eR BG, augmented by close to 100 reservists, deployed to the Joint Readiness Training Centre (JRTC) in Louisiana as part of a US SCBT in a very challenging instrumented force on force exercise with the difficulty setting at "hard mode." Supported by OCTs from CMTC, this validated them to Level 6 (Battle Group).

In February the CA conducted Exercise UNIFIED RESOLVE (UR) 23, run by CMTC Formation Training Group with HQ 5 CMBG as the primary training audience and 2 CMBG as the secondary training audience. Using the DATE Europe operating environment, UR 23 validated HQ 5 CMBG along with the HQs of 5 CER, 5 RALC and 5 Svc Bn for the following year.

In March, the ARCG of 2 Division (2XX) deployed to the Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Training Centre (CAFATC) at Resolute Bay for Ex GUERRIER NORDIQUE, accompanied by members of the US ARNG. The 5XX ARCG conducted MAROON SOJOURN at Goose Bay accompanied by elements of three NATO allies. The 4XX ARCG along with the RCD deployed to the Canadian High Arctic for Operation NANOOK-NANULIVAT. What about the 3XX ARCG? We'll talk about them in a moment.

While this was going on, CMTC and elements of 4XX supported the Integrational Capstone Exercise (ICE) Combat Readiness Evaluation (CREVAL) of the 1 PPCLI-led EFP BG in Latvia.

In late March and early April, A Coy 3 PPCLI exercised as part of 11th (US) Airborne Division as part of their IBCT-level validation at the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Centre (JPMRC) Alaska. They were augmented by by the 3XX ARCG for this Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) instrumented exercise conducted in extremely challenging conditions. This included a JFE with 11th ABN. The ARCG elements ended up supporting multiple units with mobility and CASEVAC in conditions where moving 1km cross country was a major endeavor.

So if you were in an ARCG this past winter you were busy!

In April, 5 CMBG with the LdSH conducted their Combat Team live fire exercise in Wainwright Alberta, followed by Ex MAPLE RESOLVE 23. This instrumented capstone training event executed in a DATE Europe environment validated the mechanized elements of 5 CMBG for their NRF tasks in the coming year. So if you were in 5 CMBG (and CMTC) you were very busy this year.

The CA's Managed Readiness Program will undergo adaptation in the coming year, and Collective Training will also evolve significantly as we try to square the circle of reconstitution and readiness for missions that we know (EFP) and those that we cannot put on a calendar (Global Response Task Force). More to follow.

I now return you to your regularly scheduled programming. If I forgot to mention your training event please sort me out!

Thanks!

Do people like you have to pull this together on your own, or is there a short sitrep produced by the Army on a regular basis that might perform a similar service?

Oh, and I found the CMTC entry in Wikipedia helpful in fleshing out your helpful note

Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[FJAG]

During the course of those exercises what trends has the Army identified as needing improvement and how are those observations being integrated into future force structures, doctrine and equipment?

I don't think that Canada's Lessons Learned processes are the problem. The Army captures those lessons and has potential solutions.

The problem that I perceive is getting the solutions actioned. There is a lack of sufficient funding to implement everything what's needed. That leaves completion for funds. Whenever you have competition you have a host of champions pushing their own programs and trying to get buy in from their peers even before you even get to the stage of convincing the government.

Add to that the fact that there are legitimate opposing viewpoints as to what direction the Army should go. You only have to review this thread to see the conflicting viewpoints. Those don't stop in Internet forums. At the turn of the century the "dump heavy, go medium" movement was near religious in its fervour. The Cold Warriors likewise. We're still arguing about whether it kept the Army relevant at a critical time or whether it was shortsighted and continues to lead it in a death spiral.

Yes the Army is busy conducting training but that’s not a useful metric of its own.

I think that's a very true statement.

We have developed processes and standards and metrics to ensure that we are meeting those standards. The fact that your metric tells you that you are meeting the standard does nothing to confirm that in fact, the process or the standard is an appropriate one.

You need a very healthy system that is capable of critically examining doctrine and charting a new course when needed to meet the nation's defence objectives. That's getting harder to do when defence objectives themselves are vague and masked under terms like "flexible", "agile" and "full-spectrum". You can make those mean whatever you want.

The trouble, I think is that we are watching what's going on in Ukraine and we are getting mixed signals out of it. Those of us who are bullish on deterrence take Ukraine as a lesson that we aren't doing nearly enough nor are we being serious enough about our defence posture. Then there are those who detest defence spending who are reading the lesson from Ukraine as being that Russia is a paper tiger that cannot realistically challenge NATO security. Add to that an ambivalent China policy and it's not difficult to see that in certain circles the view is that our defence posture is: "we're doing alright, Jack. Stay the course."

The fact that we're adrift at high levels makes me appreciate all the more those in the middle who are doing their best to keep holding things together.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

During the course of those exercises what trends has the Army identified as needing improvement and how are those observations being integrated into future force structures, doctrine and equipment?

Yes the Army is busy conducting training but that’s not a useful metric of its own.

I wouldn't call validating operational outputs as just being "busy", so perhaps I should have listed out Battle Task Standards by name and number to provide a useful metric for you? Each of these events represents a formation, unit or sub-unit being put through Battle Task Standards on a exercise that they (the element being validated) does not control. I certainly don't expect a Level 5 Combat Team live fire to fundamentally change our understanding of modern land warfare. I do expect, it though, to put the training audience through their paces - and it might well be the first time they have done that activity in their current position.

I will say, though, that the previous iterations of these activities have certainly informed their most recent form. MAPLE RESOLVE and UNIFIED RESOLVE both benefit from improvements based on previous iterations as well as OCTs working with other Combat Training Centers on their exercises. Some have produced observations that have gone into the machine. JRTC 22 did spur a report on equipment issues that was seen at the highest levels. Having worked in Lessons Learned for three years it is often a case of moving the drinks cabinet a few feet closer to Berlin each time...

For the units that went through these exercises there are take-home packages that highlight areas for the training audience. Those are not really my tea to spill here, but trust when I say that they are done. My sense, though, is that the war in Ukraine has people taking warfighting exercises much more seriously than before.

For the elements that went to the Arctic there were certainly lots of observations, many of which were shared collectively at the Arctic Training Planning Group last week. We brought the practitioners together to discuss the year that was and what is ahead.

For those that conduct exercises, I will point that there is a Post Activity Report (yes, another PAR...) that can be done by industrious officers to inform the rest of the army about what you learned.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Thanks!

Do people like you have to pull this together on your own, or is there a short sitrep produced by the Army on a regular basis that might perform a similar service?

Oh, and I found the CMTC entry in Wikipedia helpful in fleshing out your helpful note

Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Thanks! Tracking these activities are in my job description, so any lack of a CA SITREP is on me...For those in the CA, you can browse the Army CT (Army Collective Training) page on the CMTC site to get a sense of what has been done and what is upcoming.

I should also try to unpack some of the acronyms! I got some of them, but not all...

One important one that I did not spell out is the Arctic Response Company Group (ARCG). This is a roughly decade-old initiative that has each Division maintaining a sub-unit of Reservists (usually composite but with a unit or CBG in the lead) for, well, arctic response. It is a success story!

 

[ueo]

The whole issue with Medium weight systems is that they start to get pushed beyond their initially levels of planned employment.

Most of the ideas behind the Stryker started from Somalia.
A rapidly deployable light armor system to protect troops in OOTW.
However the employment of them beyond the original scope resulted in the ‘identification’ of a lack of armor, and a need to up armor them.

You can see the same effect on the LAV development More and more armor was added, and they stopped being Medium APC’s and no longer easily deployed.

I’m not a ‘medium weight’ formation fan, simply as they often end up too light to fight the battle they are being used in, and now too heavy to be employed in the role they where designed for.

@Kirkhill has made a number of posts and tables on the growth of the original MOWAG concept from the 6x6 AVGP to the LAV in its current state.

I’d suggest the original Stryker idea was a valid idea to provide Light Armored Mobility for a mostly Light Force to work within certain situations.
It went off the rails when more was wanted from the platform, and without a proper analysis done of what would be lost when trying to add significantly higher levels of protection.

MGS to be was an answer in search of a problem. The 105mm gun had already been proven to be too much for the chassis, and personally I never saw the point to that setup for the Stryker formation, simply because it wasn’t a tank, and shouldn’t be viewed as an anti-tank system, as well as it wasn’t a viable anti-structure system. If instead it had something like a low velocity demolition gun simply intended for anti-structure usage, it would have made a great deal more sense.

If there was an anti-armor requirement for a Stryker entity, there were ample examples of other systems that would have been a better fit to the LAV chassis. Given the ATGM options available in other platforms.
MGS wasn’t even a Jack of all trades, it was more like a 2 of Clubs.

Isn't the Striker a direct descendant of LAV which is from AVGP family which owes parentage to MOWAG sys? Just checking facts here.

 

[ueo]

Thanks! Tracking these activities are in my job description, so any lack of a CA SITREP is on me...For those in the CA, you can browse the Army CT (Army Collective Training) page on the CMTC site to get a sense of what has been done and what is upcoming.

I should also try to unpack some of the acronyms! I got some of them, but not all...

One important one that I did not spell out is the Arctic Response Company Group (ARCG). This is a roughly decade-old initiative that has each Division maintaining a sub-unit of Reservists (usually composite but with a unit or CBG in the lead) for, well, arctic response. It is a success story!

Good idea, who is the Ontario RF rep in this? Seems as tho G&SF are the lead.

 

[ueo]

I suggest a review of the history of the Flying Column in continental warfare.

If you are coming from the sea can you protect your rear because navies are expensive and not many people have them.
You can focus on a particular point target - Louisbourg. Quebec. Washington. Caen. Normandie.....

Edit - heck, it is the reason the Vikings and the Greeks and the Brits loved their islands.

If you are a continental army you still have to deal with citadels. But you can't protect your rear. Your best bet is to dominate your rear areas and the solution to that is the solution the Ukrainians have adopted. It comes naturally to them. To their culture. The Flying Column.

The Flying Column is the tactic of the Hussars, Cossacks, Arabs, Indians, Mongols, Parthians, Scythians..... the tactic of the horse and the open plain. It is the preferred tactic of the Eastern Front and it was the successful tactic of North Africa.

Flying column - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

They are typically company-battalion sized although occasionally brigade sized.

The Italian army in North Africa, was bagged by a Wheeled Brigade made up of the the Recce Squadrons of a half dozen Regiments, including the RAF, backed by a towed battery of 25 pounders and a battery of 37mm Bofors in the Anti Tank Role - Combe Force.

Combeforce - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Combe Force

Jock Columns were smaller and more numerous.

Jock column - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The LRDG and the SAS and Popski's Private Army also fought the same fight. Containing, screening, shaping, attriting, denying.

Long Range Desert Group - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Special Air Service - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Popski's Private Army - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Stanisław Maczek - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

William Gott - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Richard O'Connor - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

A Stryker Brigade operating as 9 Company Combat Team sized Flying Columns could cover a lot of ground.
If you want a Cavalry Force there it is.

I believe the US has 6 Stryker Brigades bringing a total of 54 potential Flying Columns to the fight.
We have 3 Brigades with 2 Battalions with 2 Companies for a potential of 12 Flying Columns - CMRs and NWMP
The Aussies I guess, with their ASLAVs could generate as similar force - a natural for their Light Horse tradition
The Kiwis add in another 3 or 4.
The Brits - Their entire 7th Brigade with its 5 Light Mechanized Infantry Battalions and its Light Cavalry Regiment with a Light Artillery Battalion
And their Deep Strike Brigade Recce Regiments.

Those are the forces that fight the wars of the steppes, the prairies, the plains, the deserts (hot and cold) and the veldt.

And we should be f*cking good at it.

We're not, IMHO!

 

[daftandbarmy]

One important one that I did not spell out is the Arctic Response Company Group (ARCG). This is a roughly decade-old initiative that has each Division maintaining a sub-unit of Reservists (usually composite but with a unit or CBG in the lead) for, well, arctic response. It is a success story!

I recall the planning for that. All my troops were keen to do it.

The only thing standing in the way at the time was, as always, money and kit.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Good idea, who is the Ontario RF rep in this? Seems as tho G&SF are the lead.

Yes - G&SF within 31 CBG has the lead for the 4XX (Ontario) ARCG. They were involved in Op NANOOK this year.

 

[KevinB]

Isn't the Striker a direct descendant of LAV which is from AVGP family which owes parentage to MOWAG sys? Just checking facts here.

Yes.
My main point was the LAV from the initial 6x6 and then 8x8 chassis has had significant changes.

Using wiki for weights

Grizzly: 10.7t
LAV 2.0: USMC LAV-25 @14.4t, Bison 13t and Coyote 14.4t


LAV III: CAF 16.95t and the original US Army Stryker 18.16t (I am curious why the Stryker weight is higher as they where build on the same chassis and the CAF turret is over 1.4t)

LAV 6.0: 20.436t and 28.6t (with add on armor)


Having been in Grizzlies thru LAV III on ex and deployed there is a major difference in the systems in both armor and weapons, I’ve only walked into a LAV 6.0 when on static display.

As well LAV 7.0 is 32t with add on armor

Size (length, height and width) have all increased as well as weight from the original version of the LAV 2.0.

The M2A4 Bradley is 40t as a comparison.

Bradley Fighting Vehicle — M2A4 - USAASC

DESCRIPTION: The Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems (BFVS) M2A3 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) features two second-generation, forward-looking infrared sensors, one in the Improved Bradley Acquisition Subsystem and another in the Commander’s Independent Viewer. These provide “hunter-killer target...

asc.army.mil

I would suggest that at some point the desire to field a Medium LAV force got lost as the LAV is really no more transportable by air or sea than a tracked IFV.
While it has better road mobility than the Bradley the cross country abilities aren’t as good in my experience.