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I don’t think anyone actually can think that.
Informing the Army’s Future Structure
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Well, we seem to be stepping backwards slowly towards saying that we can probably find a Brigade that can find employment in Europe, even if it is not a Armoured Brigade. Leos, LAVs and M777s are not without their uses. And some "low" cost UORs supplied expeditiously could significantly increase the utility of the Brigade.
In addition we can probably field a couple of light brigades for defensive duties and a light battlegroup for attachment to CSOR if necessary.
GBAD is a ways off. SPHs and CV90s are a ways off. Attack Helos or even Griffon replacements are a ways off.
But if the ask is for Canada to contribute to a NATO Multi National Division, not run one but contribute to one, can you honestly argue that somebody wouldn't find uses for a Brigade with 2 LAV Battalions, a Recce Regiment, a Tank Regiment of 42 Leo2s and 18 to 24 M777s?
We're not going to win any wars on our own. We're not even going to win any battles on our own (although Kapyong was a battalion battle as was Medak and Panjwai). But if all the ask is that we show willing and show up, and that we make a creditable showing without spilling too much Canadian blood....you don't think we can meet that standard?
Because if we were to make that level of commitment then the re-equipping of the deployed brigade, and the cascading of effects to the home brigades and the reserves, I believe, would pick up pace.
The longer we keep arguing that we are incapable then the less likely we are to be upgraded. In my opinion.
And, again in my opinion, I don't think the step from where we are to where we might need to be is necessarily as long as we have feared. In many senses I don't think the step is that much greater than what many, if not most, of our allies are facing. This war is changing a bunch of assumptions of what the end-state might look like.
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From the above this:This article from The Wavell Room suggests that our militaries may be missing key elements in our ORBATS in light of the scale of drone warfare in Ukraine:
Drones and the Close Battle
Recreational drones are changing the character of the close battle. How is this happening and how should the British Army respond?wavellroom.com
One thing I never liked about the Switchblade solution was the need for a compressed air source.
It struck me that the Aussie Defendtec 40 solution was a better model.
Something that could be copied on larger scales through the 60, 81, 120 and 155mm calibres meaning that the ORBAT doesn't need to change and that LAMs and SUASs just become another round launched by the "artillery" - with the "artillery" being available all the way down to the Fire Team and ifs 40mm grenade launcher.
The Aussies have already got the 40, 81 and 155s covered.
Air | DEFENDTEX
Variants of the Hero-120 and Switchblade 600 would seem candidates for a 120 mm mortar team.
And HIMARS/NASAMS/MMLs type systems could launch virtually anything else.
Add in those systems that can self-launch
and Orbats don't need to change to get drones in the air.
Orbats will probably have to change to manage the information and target selection.
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What do all of the following have in common?
:quality(70)/cloudfront-us-east-1.images.arcpublishing.com/archetype/5JNTS4U4ORFARGKGXUYHTIVABU.jpg)
www.defensenews.com
www.l3harris.com
www.kongsberg.com
www.lockheedmartin.com
www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
en.wikipedia.org
www.destroyers.org
www.canada.ca
Commonality.
They are all devices created to launch capabilities. And the trend seems to be to increase the types of capabilities and decrease the types of launchers so that one launcher can launch all capabilities.
BAE Studies Typhoon Common Weapon Rail
BAE Systems is scheduled to deliver a report to the British Ministry of Defence at the end of this month outlining how the Typhoon combat jets could carry multiple weapon types on a single wing-mounted launcher
www.defensenews.com
Pyrotechnic Single Carriage and Release Systems
L3Harris BRU-46/A and BRU-47/A are a matched pair of 14-inch and 14/30-inch pyrotechnic bomb release units (BRUs) in use with the United States Air Force as well as various international users.
Raytheon Family of Missiles Missiles– NASAMS – Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace
The KONGSBERG/ Raytheon team delivers a complete short to medium range missile solution with the Raytheon Family of Missiles in NASAMS. A mix of missile capabilities will provide robust overlapping coverage in both engagement ranges and counter measures, along with a reduction in Cost per kill...
www.kongsberg.com
HIMARS
The HIMARS rocket launcher is a flexible, affordable and highly effective precision fires system designed to meet the demands of the modern battlefield.
Mk-41 Vertical Launching System VLS Missile Tomahawk ESSM
mk-41 vertical launching system vls navy destroyer cruiser frigate
www.seaforces.org
Virginia Payload Module to Give Subs More Firepower
Virginia Payload Module to Give Subs More Firepower
Korean Vertical Launching System - Wikipedia
The 21-in Quintuple MK 14 and MK 15 Torpedo Tubes - Tin Can Sailors
The 21–in Quintuple MK 14 and MK 15 Torpedo Tubes By Robert F. Sumrall (DD 762) From their inception, destroyers have always carried a heavy torpedo battery for their size...
www.destroyers.org
C3 105-mm Howitzer - Canada.ca
The C3 Howitzer is a close support, field artillery weapon that is mobile, general purpose, and light towed and has the capability to fire extended range munitions up to 18 kilometres.
Commonality.
They are all devices created to launch capabilities. And the trend seems to be to increase the types of capabilities and decrease the types of launchers so that one launcher can launch all capabilities.
FJAG
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Not to say "I've told you so", but "I told you so."
It seems abundantly logical to me that forward observers, whether FOOs or MFCs or recce patrolmen or what have you should be able to have a weapon of choice deliver the appropriate effect without having to lug a whole bunch of kit with them. At the battalion level a mortar platoon that can deliver area neutralization or illuminating by way of mortar bombs, and a precision guided projectile by way of a mortar tube launched UCAV (or even a specially equipped vehicle to launch them that is part of the platoon's establishment) is the way to go.
Add to that artillery with the same type of weapon choices to reach out further and harder and, once again, Bob's your uncle.
It never ceases to amaze me that we identified the need for UAVs in 2004 and have hardly progressed from the doctrinal concepts we lashed together almost twenty years ago. Maybe slightly better gear but that's about it.
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It is bad form to quote yourself, I know, but this is more in the form of a refresher before I go off on my next thought.
If we are going to continue as we have gone on in the past and mix and match troops to meet the needs of the situation should we be worrying so much about creating static organizations specialized in particular fields or should we be intentionally aiming at building flexible organizations?
Is the biggest fault of the system that it doesn't train its Headquarters (Battlegroup, Brigade, JTF, Division) with troops in the field in enough varied situations.
If LAV troops are going to be used in a light role, or conversely Light troops are going to marry up with Carriers, sometimes an entire Brigade, sometimes perhaps just a company per Brigade (eg a heliborne company in a LAV-Leo Brigade) shouldn't we be regularly training, not for a particular scenario but in a way that allows HQs to plan for LAV today Light tomorrow, Battlegroups on Thursday and Brigades on Sunday next?
I know about money and I understand proficiency. But I also appreciate the value of the 80% solution. Three, or even 4 brigades with a generalist level of proficiency of 80% may be more suitable for our needs than three impeccably ordered and trained specialist brigades that are highly skilled in a specific set of scenarios.
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Not to say "I've told you so", but "I told you so."
It seems abundantly logical to me that forward observers, whether FOOs or MFCs or recce patrolmen or what have you should be able to have a weapon of choice deliver the appropriate effect without having to lug a whole bunch of kit with them. At the battalion level a mortar platoon that can deliver area neutralization or illuminating by way of mortar bombs, and a precision guided projectile by way of a mortar tube launched UCAV (or even a specially equipped vehicle to launch them that is part of the platoon's establishment) is the way to go.
Add to that artillery with the same type of weapon choices to reach out further and harder and, once again, Bob's your uncle.
It never ceases to amaze me that we identified the need for UAVs in 2004 and have hardly progressed from the doctrinal concepts we lashed together almost twenty years ago. Maybe slightly better gear but that's about it.
The only real change over time is range? (Precision and range are closely tied - more precision generally means longer ranges)
The one area I would still challenge you is on the issue of mortars, guns and missiles. I think we need to keep pushing larger calibres and longer ranges further down and forwards. For example moving the 81 forwards to the Company and replacing the 81 at battalion with either the 120 or the 105 and moving the 155 forwards to the Battlegroup to give the Battlegroup a 70 km range. Bring the HIMARS - GMRLS/GMRLS-ER Forwards to Brigade to give the Brigade a 150 km range give the Brigade Group/Division a 500 km range with HIMARS - PrSM/Cruise Missiles.
And, concurrently, expand the diameter of the air defence umbrellas at all levels.
This means more vehicles and less feet to carry the extra weight of the additional kit but that seems to be a general, and ancient, trend in any event. Wagons have been following armies since before David smote Goliath.
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We've been focused on these multi-million dollar solutions while the war in Ukraine is being fought with thousand dollar solutions like these
Marines Train With Handheld Swarming Drones That Can Also Be Fired From 40mm Grenade Launchers
Images shared online show Marines conducting training exercises with the Drone40, a tiny quadcopter that can carry a wide variety of payloads.
www.thedrive.com
And these
Edit - judging from the size of those munitions that Mavik is delivering the same defilade effect that this 25mm rifle was supposed to deliver but at greater ranges and with the benefit of target spotting.
XM25 CDTE - Wikipedia
FJAG
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I obviously disagree here.
The primary reason is that all these systems that deliver longer range and greater effects come with a logistics burden that makes it impractical to put into front line battalions and even brigades that need to be lean and mean.
There is no doubt in my mind that you can pile dozens of different highly efficient weapon system on a battalion commander, but why would you if in the process you make the battalion a bloated pig that can barely drag itself across the battle field.
It's all a balancing act. If you can deliver the effect to the front line infantryman without putting the burden of its care and feeding on him then why not. Supporting arms are exactly that - supporting.
Afghanistan created a strange disease that I call battle-groupitis. And in fairness to Afghanistan we were already seeing the trend for modularized battle groups before Afghanistan. Afghanistan just made it a common thing. We need to break that trend. The Americans have already realized that at the next level up by realizing that not even the brigade needs to be an all-singing all dancing entity. Enablers from outside the brigade have a number of advantages in making the brigade itself a more agile and manoeuvrable entity. We have a whole bundle of command and control terminology that ensure that a battle group that doesn't have HIMARS as part of its TOE, has it available as a priority item when it needs it. The same applies to every other support system.
FJAG
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I try to avoid jumping on the new equipment bandwagon, but this vehicle checks all my boxes, starting with the diesel/electric engine. These things have been powering locomotives for almost a century - what took so long?
Being GDLS one can even push a contract for assembly in London.
One question. Why do all remote weapon stations have to add three feet of height to the basic vehicle?
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Shocked am I.
Can I borrow your line? "Obviously I disagree".
My take is that the launcher doesn't need to up with the OiC of the tactical group. It needs to be on his radio net and it needs to deliver on time on target on demand. Does it really matter if the distance from the storage to the OiC is travelled on wheels, tracks or in the air?
That's kind of your argument in any case, isn't it?
As to the round sailing towards the OiC's target does it need to be forged steel launched from a high pressure rifled barrel with a secure breech block - all of which demand very expensive manufacturing and materials with equally expensive QC procedures an a lot of surplus mass to absorb the violence of the chemical reactions.
If I can deliver a tin can of buckshot and TNT to a target 70 km with an electric motor and a battery, a mortar tube and a low pressure, low velocity, pop-up charge why do I need 38 tonne M109A7 and a 26 tonne M992 resupply vehicle with a total of 156 onboard rounds.
Each round carries 10 to 20 kg of useful payload (20 kg of mines or 10 kg of HE plus that portion of the shell that turns to shrapnel).
Hero 120 carries a 4.5 kg warhead while the Hero 400 carries a 10 kg warhead and the Javelin an 8.4 kg warhead
Hero 120 weighs 18 kg
Hero 400 weighs 50 kg
Javelin weighs 15.9 kg
An M109A7 + M992 delivers 121 rounds to target for an in-theatre mass of 64 tonnes and a crew of 6 (4+2).
I will stipulate that the manpower burden is not going to get any smaller.
But.
Perhaps the training burden will since we are dealing with "wooden rounds".
On the other hand 64 tonnes =
1280 Hero 400 on target or
3554 Hero 120 on target or
4025 Javelin on target.
I can use a C17 to ship an M109A7 and an M992 to theatre and serve 121 targets
OR
I can use a C17 to ship 1280 Hero 400s to theatre and serve 1280 targets, from over 120 km, and have them staged in Cab Ranks with operators flying them into the targets.
The M109s have to close to 20 to 30 km for most rounds and has a CEP of 139m at max range.
I don't want to pile more weapons onto any commander. I want every commander to have more weapons on call to serve his targets.
My ideal warfighting kit comprises a radio and a beverage.
Absolutely.
Afghanistan created a strange disease that I call battle-groupitis. And in fairness to Afghanistan we were already seeing the trend for modularized battle groups before Afghanistan. Afghanistan just made it a common thing. We need to break that trend. The Americans have already realized that at the next level up by realizing that not even the brigade needs to be an all-singing all dancing entity. Enablers from outside the brigade have a number of advantages in making the brigade itself a more agile and manoeuvrable entity. We have a whole bundle of command and control terminology that ensure that a battle group that doesn't have HIMARS as part of its TOE, has it available as a priority item when it needs it. The same applies to every other support system.
Not a problem for me.
I lean towards the other ad absurdum solution - no concentration of troops at all. The troops should be widely dispersed and observing the field while calling in lots of all types of explosives until they can put down their beverage of choice, get out of their vehicle and walk into the enemy's position.
Please note that I said that is my preferred absurdity. Not my expected reality.
Cheers.
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Are organizations for tasks or are tasks for organizations?
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Fighting structures have been tailored in way to make them effective for tasks.
Too little and they can’t do tasks, but the opposite is also true. I’m going to wander from Individual Infantry soldier to Div in this so bear with me.
Let’s start our look at the Section/Squad. It’s been IVO of 10 personnel in most Armies for a while. Growing recently in a lot of Militaries not just to add enablers but also to ensure that its mission can be achieved with casualties.
Cardinal Rule of 2 is 1 one is None.
In the section one has at least 4 fire teams, of 2 personnel, and generally you don’t do anything under 4 personnel.
The Platoon is generally 3 Sections with a support/HQ section.
The Company is 3 Platoons with a support Platoon.
If you start to try to push certain equipment down, you end up with either larger support structures and less “Bayonets”. Or very large entities that aren’t nearly as flexible, and have a large footprint requiring more support (requiring even larger support structures higher).
The “Bayonets” actually seize and hold ground.
Let’s reflect that the Division is the largest Maneuver element, Corps and Armies aren’t considered Maneuver elements. So your Division don’t have all the bells and whistles to achieve everything. Generally that comes at Corps level, not much else comes at Army level, just more support and fires support.
I ‘grew’ up in the large CMBG model years. It was really a pocket Division. Something I really liked for years, but @Infanteer and some others have shown me that packing everything into a Bde makes the Bde very unwieldy, as it doesn’t then have the power of a Division, and gets even more awkward to conduct Bde tasks due to the overhead.
The BattleGroup is supposed to be a short term Combat detachment from the Bde for a task. To be a quick and shortened command structure to move out and conduct its task.
It can’t support itself (in truth neither can a Bde,) the Bde is viewed generally the smallest viable separate formation, when formed into a Bde Group.
The Canadian enamorment with the Bde Group I believe comes from 4 CMBG as simply because we didn’t have the will to put 1 CND Div in Germany. That CMBG was part of other Divisions however.
GWOT gave all of us some very important Lessons Learned, but also contributed to a poor belief that Battle Groups and Brigade Groups were a method of deploying and fighting.
Back to the point about enabling Commanders with weapons.
We don’t put a Fighter Bomber or AH Squadron in a Rifle Company, but we have structures that allow the Company to have those assets in support.
So let’s go back to the Section/Squad.
Range Band: 300m for Point Targets, and 500M for area targets with small arms.
*C8/M4 and C9/M249 Para, and 2 40mm GL’s
Those are pretty much the typical NATO Army weapons, and ranges. Some add a C6/M240 type GPMG (or M60E6 for the Danish), to push to a 800/1200m envelope, and most have added a 7.62mm DMR as well with similar range.
So max DF range of the Dismounted Squad is 1200m, which is the same as the Platoon as Armies that don’t have a 7.62 GPMG or DMR at the Squad level generally have one at the Platoon level.
Now at the platoon we also generally see a 60mm Mortar (sorry Canada), personally I’m not a fan of these at the Platoon level as the ammo is awkward and the payload is meh. As well as an AD MANPAD (4-6km) an ATGM (4-6km) and a CUAS system (*I don’t see an OS range band for the one I am familiar with, so I’ll ignore it for now.
So the Platoon has a 5km zone for AT and AD.
Most Platoons (again sorry Canada) have a UAS like Puma or Raven Puma™ 3 AE Group 1 Small UAS | Military Battlefield Drone | AeroVironment, Inc.
*Some Platoons also have M2 and 40mm HV AGL, but generally vehicle mounted - which in purposely avoiding for now.
The Company doesn’t generally see much more, just the 3 Rifle Platoons and a Weapons Platoon with generally more of the same stuff as the Platoon had, though M2 and Mk19/GMG are now available for most Military’s even if moved by ATV so the range band is IVO 2,500m
If you were to add the 81mm Mortar to the Coy Weapons Platoon, you then need to add support for that. Which means MFC’s directly attached to the Rifle Platoons, and a larger CQ to support the ammo. The 81mm isn’t exactly light either, so you require even more vehicles. As well it makes the Mortar element part of the Company area - which limits them as far as deployment and greatly expands the footprint of the company on the ground.
For a Light entity, you are now at least tripling the vehicles required for the CQ and requiring even larger staff. That also ripples through the BN.
I don’t really think the juice is worth the squeeze. Even if you have vehicles for the entity you’re adding a lot of bodies and size. Plus the OC now has another entity to factor in, and support.
One would be better simply having some Pl Comd and Section Commanders trained as MFC’s and leaving Mortar Platoon in the Bn in Combat Support Coy
For the LAV Bn’s I would suggest a 120mm LAV variant would give the best flexibility. The 81’s retained for the Lt Bn’s.
I do think a 60mm Troop at Coy level makes a lot more sense than putting individual pieces at Platoon.
I was going to jump back to the Div and Bde and their operations areas - but this is already way too long a post.
AmmoTech90
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4 CMBG also had FMSU behind it and other assets such as ammo storage and personnel at the US ammo depot in Miesau (spelling). So it a portion of the support a div would provide.
Of course that was disbanded as a peace dividend.
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I think a bit of our disconnect might be this:
looking at achieving limited objectives with unlimited resources versus looking at unlimited objectives with limited resources.
If you get to pick your fights and have all the latest tools available to you, the support of a couple of million trained professionals and an annual budget of a trillion dollars all focused on winning the fight of the day you might come to different conclusions than somebody who has no choice in the where, when and how of the fight and is forced to fight with whatever they can lay their hands on.
The person fighting for their life will seize on any thing that can be used as a weapon. Those things that work will be duplicated and those that don't will be eliminated. The new tools will attract new support and create new organizations. New orbats if necessary but not necessarily new orbats.
If an existing section can be adapted to a new weapon, for example converting a rifle squad to serve a 105mm gun, then good. If the old structure doesn't work then a new structure will evolve, rapidly and a new organization will evolve.
It is argued that the CA has battlegroupitis. Possibly. The battlegroup, and the square combat team could have been institutionalized in the Canadian Army. But can't the same be said about the 1917 Division adopted by the Americans? That institution has won wars. It is successful. It is hard to argue against it.
But.
The Ukrainians are having to fight against the Russian version of those Divisions with whatever they can build, beg, borrow or steal and trying to figure out how to inflict damage and survive.
In Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam and elsewhere the other guys looked for and successfully exploited weaknesses in the Divisional organization and did "the other thing". I have heard people argue against static defences on the grounds that they are easily templated. But the Divisional attack is also easily templated. In the ancient days once you spotted the first three BRDMs and a PT76 you could reliably predict what was behind them. Equally NATO's enemies know what to expect when they meet a NATO division. That is why they are doing everything in their power to do "the other thing" - Wolf Warriors, Little Green Men, economic warfare and interfering in elections by exploiting our own rules come to mind.
The 1917 Division did not exist in 1914. A Division in 1914 was less a Combined Arms grouping than it was a large body of soldiers under a unified command. The 1913 Battalion most certainly wasn't a Combined Arms entity. It was 8 to 10 companies of 50 soldiers each and platoons were ad hoc tactical structures similar to the later battlegroups. Just like battlegroups have ossified into institutions I would argue that platoons and divisions have shared the same fate.
All of our structures fundamentally serve one goal, to kill as many enemies as possible while saving as many Canadians as possible.
It is right to look to success and build on that success. The 1917 Division works. But it doesn't work in all situations. And it is something that we Canadians don't have and aren't apparently willing or able to buy. We can moan about that but the reality remains that we are dealing with threats without that particular tool in the toolbox and no prospect of having one, let alone 3 or 4 of them.
So how do we deal with 80% of the known knowns and known unknowns with what is available to us? And what novelties can we exploit?
looking at achieving limited objectives with unlimited resources versus looking at unlimited objectives with limited resources.
If you get to pick your fights and have all the latest tools available to you, the support of a couple of million trained professionals and an annual budget of a trillion dollars all focused on winning the fight of the day you might come to different conclusions than somebody who has no choice in the where, when and how of the fight and is forced to fight with whatever they can lay their hands on.
The person fighting for their life will seize on any thing that can be used as a weapon. Those things that work will be duplicated and those that don't will be eliminated. The new tools will attract new support and create new organizations. New orbats if necessary but not necessarily new orbats.
If an existing section can be adapted to a new weapon, for example converting a rifle squad to serve a 105mm gun, then good. If the old structure doesn't work then a new structure will evolve, rapidly and a new organization will evolve.
It is argued that the CA has battlegroupitis. Possibly. The battlegroup, and the square combat team could have been institutionalized in the Canadian Army. But can't the same be said about the 1917 Division adopted by the Americans? That institution has won wars. It is successful. It is hard to argue against it.
But.
The Ukrainians are having to fight against the Russian version of those Divisions with whatever they can build, beg, borrow or steal and trying to figure out how to inflict damage and survive.
In Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam and elsewhere the other guys looked for and successfully exploited weaknesses in the Divisional organization and did "the other thing". I have heard people argue against static defences on the grounds that they are easily templated. But the Divisional attack is also easily templated. In the ancient days once you spotted the first three BRDMs and a PT76 you could reliably predict what was behind them. Equally NATO's enemies know what to expect when they meet a NATO division. That is why they are doing everything in their power to do "the other thing" - Wolf Warriors, Little Green Men, economic warfare and interfering in elections by exploiting our own rules come to mind.
The 1917 Division did not exist in 1914. A Division in 1914 was less a Combined Arms grouping than it was a large body of soldiers under a unified command. The 1913 Battalion most certainly wasn't a Combined Arms entity. It was 8 to 10 companies of 50 soldiers each and platoons were ad hoc tactical structures similar to the later battlegroups. Just like battlegroups have ossified into institutions I would argue that platoons and divisions have shared the same fate.
All of our structures fundamentally serve one goal, to kill as many enemies as possible while saving as many Canadians as possible.
It is right to look to success and build on that success. The 1917 Division works. But it doesn't work in all situations. And it is something that we Canadians don't have and aren't apparently willing or able to buy. We can moan about that but the reality remains that we are dealing with threats without that particular tool in the toolbox and no prospect of having one, let alone 3 or 4 of them.
So how do we deal with 80% of the known knowns and known unknowns with what is available to us? And what novelties can we exploit?
Colin Parkinson
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T14USA
