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ISAF Commander Reportedly Seeking Smaller "Tail", More "Teeth"

MedCorps said:
....apx 97 HQ positions (not including ASIC, Eng Unit pers, Air WG....

J5 - Plans (13) (the next battle)
J2 - Int (7)
J3 - Ops (27)

I'm not sure of the current ASIC strength, but the odd time I stuck my face in there, there were at least 35-45 Int types speaking in tongues. I'm not sure why an additional 7 are required in the next building over.

(especially since OC ASIC and J2 didn't seem to play well together)....
 
Journeyman said:
I'm not sure of the current ASIC strength, but the odd time I stuck my face in there, there were at least 35-45 Int types speaking in tongues. I'm not sure why an additional 7 are required in the next building over.

(especially since OC ASIC and J2 didn't seem to play well together)....

I think you gave your own answer - since the J2 and OC ASIC don't get along, we need more duplication of effort so the J2 can have his own staff to boss around.

On the J3/J5 side, I agree with Old Sweat - fire the .ppt rangers, keep those who can do it promptly and well.
 
Infanteer said:
Probably useful, but won't put too much of a dent in the tooth:tail ratio.

You'd be surprised how many staff could be cut if military-tourism were to disappear --- I'd need fewer truckers in theatre to transport them around, less Sup techs (who wouldn't be ordering/issuing "transient weapons/ammo", less RMS clerks to handle in/out clearances from "transient" quarters .... we'd need fewer of them because those fewer could then actually be utilized to do their "operational" tasks.
 
During my career - I did a fair number of Roto Zeros - including Kandahar in 2002.  I did two rotos which were NOT "zeros".  Give me a "Zero" every time.

On a "Zero" - it is accepted (by both the CoC and the troops) that there will NOT be amenities - on a couple of "zeros", those amenities which were missing included showers and laundry facilities (not both on the same tour, by the way).  It gave rise to a "stinky" bunch of troops - but nobody noticed because we were all in the same state.  Does that mean that I don't think there should be any amenities at all?  Of course not - I just think we go "overboard" at times.  You install air conditioning - all of a sudden we need a Fridge Tech (whatever the proper name is for it) to keep them going.  Oh - and to POWER the freakin' things, we need more generators - that implies more FCS, Elec, and Veh techs to keep THOSE going.

HLTA - I've been a proponent of ditching it since my first tour which involved it.  (My first tour - a YEAR long, by the way - didn't HAVE HLTA - neither did my last tour - although the last one was only six months long).

I was a proponent since at LEAST the late '80s of nine month tours - no HLTA.

If all these "amenities" could be got rid of, we'd need fewer CSS troops to run them.  The CQ could draw pop, chips, chocolate bars, dip, and smokes from a central warehouse (staffed by a SMALL number of Sup Techs), and bring them out to the troops - just like they do on exercise.  What's the problem with that?

We (I mean the "corporate we" of the CF) have (at least in my experience) a tendency to turn war-fighting (peace-making, peace-keeping - pick your metaphor) operations into "occupation" exercises - wherein we attempt to bring all the comforts of home into theatre.  The comforts of home belong at HOME, back  there, that place that you're anxious to return to.

I'm saddened to see that we haven't learned anything since I left the CF five years ago.
 
Roy Harding said:
I'm saddened to see that we haven't learned anything since I left the CF five years ago.

Not quite true.  We've now got large standing HQs in Canada for both Domestic and International Operations - neither one of which is deployable or useful, both of which which in turn encourage the development of equally bloated and unnecessary HQs once deployed.

Now, not learned the right lessons in the past five years, maybe...
 
dapaterson said:
Not quite true.  We've now got large standing HQs in Canada for both Domestic and International Operations - neither one of which is deployable or useful, both of which which in turn encourage the development of equally bloated and unnecessary HQs once deployed.

Now, not learned the right lessons in the past five years, maybe...

So true this statement is.
 
In my opinion, there are some folks, perhaps a lot of folks, inside the wire who perform essential operational activities and usually seen as part of the tail. Besides the obvious ones who have the CSS mission in support of the battle group, the OMLT, the PRT and the SOF, I can think of the aviation wing, the FSCC's, ASCC's and TACP's, combat camera, the lessons learned cell and a bunch of other folks I won't mention here.

There is nothing wrong with trying to get a grip on rear echelon creep (the phenomen, not the individual), but wild slashing will accomplish nothing.

Still, I agree with Roy. I have been in on the start up of two successful organizations. We were too frigging busy to worry about voluminous SOPs or painting rocks or whatever. What we did do was establish a cando corporate culture, and that made up for all the other stuff we never missed anyway.
 
Old Sweat said:
Still, I agree with Roy. I have been in on the start up of two successful organizations. We were too frigging busy to worry about voluminous SOPs or painting rocks or whatever. What we did do was establish a cando corporate culture, and that made up for all the other stuff we never missed anyway.
But...but...how could you tell which ROTO you were if you didn't have a collection of painted rocks?
rock%20painting%202_lowres.jpg


;D
 
Journeyman said:
I'm not sure of the current ASIC strength, but the odd time I stuck my face in there, there were at least 35-45 Int types speaking in tongues. I'm not sure why an additional 7 are required in the next building over.

(especially since OC ASIC and J2 didn't seem to play well together)....

J2 cell was pretty much a waste of time on my Roto, all I saw from them was a copy of reports that was issued 2 days prior from the ASIC. There doesn't need to be 2 cells, everyone loves this ISTAR concept but doesn't want to do away with a redundant J2 cell, which is the reason why the ASIC was created.
 
Old Sweat said:
In my opinion, there are some folks, perhaps a lot of folks, inside the wire who perform essential operational activities and usually seen as part of the tail. ...

Absolutely - no argument from me on THAT point (I WAS one of those folks).

The point I was making, however, is that during my multiple "Roto Zeroes" (five - four of which I was the Chief Clerk for) I NEVER had to appoint a "Leave Clerk", or "R&R Clerk", or "Welfare Clerk".  To be sure - in some cases (Kandahar comes to mind again), we ended up having "Forced Rest" at that location which must not be named - and all my clerks handled that monumental task as a secondary duty - it certainly wasn't accounted for on the TO&E before we left Canada.

On the OTHER hand, on the two "non zero" rotations I was involved with - we had ALL those positions (Leave, R&R, and Welfare) - and that's just the freakin' CLERKS!  What about the Sup Techs (controlling "Welfare Inventory") the MSE Ops (driving the R&R Busses - or at least coordinating the local company hired to provide them), and on it goes.

I understand a lot of these functions have been taken over by PSP - but the support functions (FCS, Veh Tech, Linemn, Sig Ops, etcetera, ad nauseum) required to support these supporters still needs to be in place.
 
MedCorps said:
Thoughts?

I'd question why an Ops staff sit at 27 when a British Brigade in Gulf War I had 2 officers and seemed to bloat to 6 for Gulf War II (recognizing that not all are officers)?

Everyone has their "pet" organization/branch/unit to pick on for weighing down the war effort, and I have been no different in sniping in the past.  I highlighted the idea of combat/logistics/life support/HQ breakdown not to advocate getting rid of any, but simply to show that there is a ratio of functions to running an expeditionary operations.  Here is the paper I mentioned earlier that shows changing ratios throughout the last 100 years in the American Army.

http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/mcgrath_op23.pdf

For myself, I don't know enough about running TFK to make any cuts - I'd be interested in seeing the Army G1 and CEFCOMs J1's assessment and methodology to manning these four elements though.
 
PuckChaser said:
J2 cell was pretty much a waste of time on my Roto, all I saw from them was a copy of reports that was issued 2 days prior from the ASIC. There doesn't need to be 2 cells, everyone loves this ISTAR concept but doesn't want to do away with a redundant J2 cell, which is the reason why the ASIC was created.

It kind of goes against this principle of Intelligence:

a. Centralised Control. Intelligence is centrally
controlled to avoid unnecessary duplication, provide
mutual support, and ensure the efficient, economic
use of all resources.

Sounds like a lot of duplication and less than stellar mutual support...
 
I am somewhat shocked that no Int Branch guys have weighed in on this... 

By fluke (it was planned long before this thread) I had dinner with a Int Branch LCol last night, and brought up some of the questions on this thread.  I showed him some of the material and a copy of the ORBAT of JTF (A) HQ 06-09.  He has been a J2 before so he seems to be in the know.  He also knew what tour everyone was talking about when the J2 did not get along with the CO ASIC (although did not mention to me who or which).  I fact, he was somewhat surprised to see it talked about (which I found funny) and I suggested being an Int guy he might want to have an army.ca account :-)  I know... smart ***...

Here was his input, for posting but not attribution:

The ASIC and the J2 shop provide different functions with respect to the intelligence cycle. The ASIC is a process, analysis, production, and dissemination machine. They also have some links to collection, but not in some of the intelligence disciplines.  What the ASIC CO lacks is the link to the full operational planning process, commanders direction and access to the collection from some of the specialized intelligence disciplines, specially the ones that are not pure Int Branch driven or require multi-branch or multi-element, collection techniques. 

At one time they thought (not all that long ago) that the J2 and the CO ASIC should be the same person (as is done elsewhere in the HQ).  So they war gamed it out at DLSE (or some other experimentation centre in Ottawa) and it turned out to be a bad idea as the J2 became focused on the operation and staff of the ASIC (like any CO/OC). In some cases, as the ASIC is a product producing machine, they became product focused versus need/user driven. The J2/CO ASIC  was not as responsive to the Comd as he would have liked in the experiment, spent notability less time with the J3, and has great Red SA but did not have a good common operating picture with respect to the operations of the TF.  This is compounded by the required isolation of the ASIC from the TOC / main HQ. Hence the two positions remain with the J2 providing the direction and overseeing the planning whilst providing access to collection assets the ASIC does not have. 

So the 7 people...

1 x J2 --> needed (someone needs to run the boat)

1 x Int guy on the plans staff (J5). He collects what int is needed or future operations and feeds it to the ASIC.  He then integrates ASIC int products into the planning cycle and wargames the red side. He is very involved with targeting.  He is the only Int expert on the plans staff --> needed.

1 x Int guy in the TOC (J3).  He provides 1/2 of the required coverage (days and peak operations, the ASIC covers at night?) to the current battle staff on the Red SA. He also takes I&W (?) information an feeds it into the current picture. He is also involved with BDA collection.  He is the only Int expert in the TOC --> needed, in fact the LCol said two guys (for 24 hour ops without touching the ASIC capability) would make more sense.

3 x Int / Sigs guys for collection from other specialized int disciplines who are multidisciplinary and cross pure int boundaries. They get input from the J3 and J5 int staff and assist in the tasking sensors and providing the technical guidance as to what can and cannot be done in their respective disciplines. --> needed, these are pretty specialized fields I am told.

1 x civilian who has been placed into the J2 shop from an other government department as an observer.  He would unload this guy in a second as he does not contribute to the operation of the TF HQ all that much... but he is tasked out from the upper levels of government, so he gets to stay. 

I hope that is of some interest... good stuff, and I am learning a ton.  Look forward to input from int guys who are at the working ranks.
 
The more I see justifications for HQ bloat, the more it seems to come down to:

Our people can't multi-task.  Therefore, give us one person per task.  Plus backups.



 
dapaterson said:
Our people can't multi-task.  Therefore, give us one person per task.  Plus backups.

Which definitely screws you come HLTA time (or even worse, repat)

As much as it pains me to say it, as much as I'd love to see numerous positions cut, at the TFK HQ level, especially with the HLTA's, there isn't a lot of fat that you can afford to cut (there are a few positions).

However, at the SigSqn level, manning is a PITA as the issue we're finding is that you base it off the previous rotos, and then demand increases, and you have the same ammount of people doing more.
 
Je grösser die Stäbe, desto schlecter die Führung.

General Bronsart von Schellendorf, The Duties of the General Staff, 3rd edition, 1893
 
dapaterson said:
Je grösser die Stäbe, desto schlecter die Führung.

General Bronsart von Schellendorf, The Duties of the General Staff, 3rd edition, 1893
Translation: The greater the staff, the worse the leadership.

 
The HQ of an American division of 1944 was established for 96 officers.  The equivalent for a German division was 29.  The equivalent figure for a British Division today [ 1998 ] is 173.  The preparation of a divisional operation order required two Wehrmacht officers and about half an hour - one man-hour.  It now takes us something like 11 officers and four hours - 44 man-hours.  War is more complex nowadays.  But not 44 times more!  Officers are overheads.  The relevant question is whether, and up to what point, do those overheads add value.  We are currently well beyond the point at which adding officers adds value, since adding a large number of officers has increased the time required to make decisions.

Taken from "The Embryo of a Wartime Army", Maj JP Storr, RUSI Journal June 1998 p40-44

http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/940696_731515095_791623195.pdf

(Edit to add article link)
 
The Army Journal had a brief piece on the topic of ASIC/J2, written by three Int Ops.  Worth reviewing:

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_11/iss_2/CAJ_Vol11.2_12_e.pdf

As per joint intelligence doctrine, centralized control is described as follows:
Intelligence is centrally controlled to avoid unnecessary duplication, provide mutual support, and ensure the efficient, economic use of all resources. By this definition, the current Intelligence architecture in Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-Afg) falls short of this ideal, and hinders the proper functionality of the intelligence cycle.

However, our doctrine is not working as well as it should. It is counter-productive to keep an intelligence architecture that does not work as efficiently as possible only because it is doctrinal; when this is the case, doctrine must be amended or it will be discarded over time for the sake of operational expediency.

 
....in this respect, courtesy of the Times Online:
The number of British troops in Afghanistan is to stay at 9,000 despite a pledge from Gordon Brown to send 200 more roadside-bomb specialists and to increase the number of Afghan army trainers, defence officials have revealed.

The announcements from the Prime Minister during his brief visit to Helmand on Saturday appeared not to have been clarified in advance with the Ministry of Defence, even though Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the Chief of the Defence Staff, was on the same trip.

It emerged only today that the 200 additional specialists would not increase the overall size of the force. “There will be some rebalancing to make sure the ‘top baseline’ figure of 9,000 troops remains constant,” one defence official said ....

More on link
 
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