Korean War Insignia

[je suis prest]

On the other hand, our troops had access to alcohol, which the Americans didn't.  It made, I gather, for some interesting bartering sessions among the units.

 

[2551]

I have found confirmation that the story about our troops in Korea being issued American helmets is true.  It was part of "Operation Trojan", and truly was an effort to dupe the Chinese into thinking that American troops had moved into position on Hill 355.  It was hoped that this would prompt a Chinese attack, giving our troops an opportunity to capture some of them.

Other than that, it seems that our troops didn't like either the British or American pattern helmets, and usually did not wear a helmet at all.

There have not been any studies done to date to prove/disprove that the use of a helmet reduces head injuries, or which pattern was "better".

 

[AJFitzpatrick]

There have not been any studies done to date to prove/disprove that the use of a helmet reduces head injuries, or which pattern was "better".

Kind of hard to find the volunteers for the control group. However, I thought there was a change in the distribution of fatal wound locations following the wide scale introduction of helmets in WWI. Will try to find a source.

 

[Michael OLeary]

There have not been any studies done to date to prove/disprove that the use of a helmet reduces head injuries, or which pattern was "better".

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m1-steel-pot.htm

During the period from 9 January to 1 March 1953, a study on the battlefield performance of the M1 steel helmet was conducted in Korea. The study was made by collecting all available helmets hit on the battlefield by enemy fire. The helmets were then forwarded through Graves Registration channels to the Central Identification Unit, Kokura, with information on (1) the type of missile that hit the helmet (grenade, mortar, "burp" gun, and so forth), (2) a complete description of what happened to the individual wearing the helmet, (3) the type of wounds sustained, and (4) the exact location of the wounds. After proper coordination with the Medical and Quartermaster Sections, an order implementing this was published by the Adjutant General, Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea, and sent to all division surgeons for their information and coordination with their battalion aid station personnel.

A total of 45 helmets were received during this period of time. It had been hoped that many more helmets would be recovered and forwarded with the information requested. Personal contact with battalion aid station surgeons at a later date revealed the numerous difficulties involved in recovering the helmets. Soldiers who had sustained hits on their helmets without receiving a wound did not want to give up their helmets and in many instances did not turn them in. There was also added danger in attempting recovery of damaged helmets from exposure to enemy fire during the time required for recovery.

In 16 of 45 cases were killed as a result of helmet defeat by the missile. In 13 of 45 cases the missile was defeated successfully, although some of these cases resulted in death from wounds elsewhere on the body. Many of the 16 nonlethal wounds sustained through the helmet were potentially lethal. This was judged from the direction the missile was traveling. Therefore, in assessing the effectiveness of helmet protection, these reductions in wound severity must be considered. In over half the cases studied, possible death resulting from head wounds was prevented by the helmet.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

There have not been any studies done to date to prove/disprove that the use of a helmet reduces head injuries, or which pattern was "better".

He said "Pardon me? WTF kind of statement is that"?

They are called 'lanes'. Stay in them.

Milnet.ca Staff

 

[2551]

Please note that my comment about the use of helmets was not intended as a criticism of their use.  While tracking down information about Operation Trojan, I came across an article which commented on the fact that an unsuccessful attempt had been made to compare the value of the American versus the British pattern helmet.  Apparently there was so much difference in the injury reporting methods used that such a comparison was impossible.

I am trying to find that source, and will post it here once found.

 

[Old Sweat]

David Bercuson mentions it in his book on Korea. I think it is titled Blood on the Hills. As I recall the passage, the British Commonwealth Division stopped wearing helmets. An attempt was made to compare head injuries between the Commonwealth and US forces, who wore their helments, but as you stated, the difference in methodology in compiling statistics put an end to it.

My personal comment is that helmets were introduced in the First World War for a reason. It may have been is that before and after statistics in the Commonwealth forces in Korea and/or previous wars might have provided an indication.

Recce Guy, sorry to head down another lane, but the subject of helmets and the policy re wearing them seems to be worthy of dicussion here in the context of dress in korea.

 

[Michael OLeary]

Recce Guy, sorry to head down another lane, but the subject of helmets and the policy re wearing them seems to be worthy of dicussion here in the context of dress in korea.

It is worthy of discussion, but there's a big difference between saying "there have been no studies" and "I have not found any studies ...".

 

[XMP]

In his book <i>Tin Lids</i> Roger Lucy quotes a 1952 test:

<b>The Canadian-made Mk.II helmet was made from Hadfields man­ganese steel 0.033" (0.825 mm) thick. With chin-strap and lining it weighed about 1,100 grams (approx. 2 1/4 Ibs). According to the DS&M's official report, the Canadian Mk.II was supposed to resist penetration from a .303 bullet at 12 feet. This seems improbable. Tests carried out in England in October 1942 showed it could resist penetration from a pistol bullet at 1 yard and from a Thompson SMG at 3 yards. Ballistic tests, carried out at the US Army arsenal at Watertown in April, 1952, using a .22 calibre 17 grain fragment sim­ulating projectile and 17 grain USA and Soviet shell fragments showed the WWII Canadian Mk.II had a v50* of about 900 ft/sec (270 m/s). By comparison a US M-1 hel­met had a v50 of 350 m/s and today's new generation of ballistic composite helmets have v50s of up to 700 m/s. A Mk.II variant that does not seem to have reached production is illustrated in the 10 December, 1942 Hamilton Spectator. Reportedly made of a "new type steel", it is shown, relatively unscathed from a burst of Tommy-gun fire (the range is not specified), beside a somewhat perforated regular Mk.II. No other details are known about
this.

* v50 is a common unit for the measure of protection offered by a helmet or body armour it repre­sents the velocity at which the helmet will stop half of all 17 grain steel -or 9 mm bullet- fragments fired at it.</b>

Lucy continues with a number of reports on Canadian trials of metal and composite helmets in the 1950s and 60s.

 

[Michael OLeary]

But what about protection from blast and shrapnel?  Simply examining the protection provided against point-blank small arms fire doesn't exactly represent wound statistics very well.

For example, see this chart (Source):

TABLE 9. - Percentage distribution of wounding agents, and deaths therefrom, in 71,000 casualties admitted to Fifth U.S. Army hospitals, 9 September 1943-31 May 1945

And for Korea (Source):

Two important elements relating to fatality of hits and the lethality of weapons are the causative agent and the nature of traumatism. When comparison is made between the various agents causing wounds and deaths in World War II and in the Korean War (table 40), lower proportions were caused by explosive projectile shells (artillery, mortar, and bazooka), rockets and bombs, and boobytraps in the Korean War than in World War II. Conversely, relatively higher proportions in Korea were caused by small arms, grenades, land mines, and other fragments and explosions. The differences are more pronounced among the wounded than among the deaths. In Korea, 27 percent of the nonfatal wounds were from small arms (bullets) compared to 20 percent for all of World War II. The proportion from explosive projectiles (51 percent) was lower in Korea than the 58 percent for World War II, while the proportion from grenades (9 percent) was markedly higher than the World War II figure.

See source page for a table of wound stats by cause.

 

[XMP]

But what about protection from blast and shrapnel?  Simply examining the protection provided against point-blank small arms fire doesn't exactly represent wound statistics very well.

Absolutely. But the report Lucy cites does indicate that the tests were a simple comparison of the ballistic protection provided by Cdn Mk II and US M1 helmets.

There <i>was</i> an attempt to simulate Soviet shell fragments.

Ballistic tests, carried out at the US Army arsenal at Watertown in April, 1952, using a .22 calibre 17 grain fragment sim­ulating projectile and 17 grain USA and Soviet shell fragments showed the WWII Canadian Mk.II had a v50* of about 900 ft/sec (270 m/s).

My post wasn't intended as a in depth study of the ballistic protection offered by either helmet, but a reference to a known Korean War period comparison of the two.
In any event, Canada ceased production of the MkII in 1953 and adopted the M1 as standard in 1960.

 

[1feral1]

He was more than a little bitter that the American army had access to supplies that our fellows could only dream of - but were such poor fighters in spite of it.

US soldiers in Korea poor fighters eh?

How posting a reference to that link!

I find this accusation in very poor taste, an insult to all who served, fought, wounded and were killed.

OWDU

 

[1feral1]

and truly was an effort to dupe the Chinese into thinking that American troops had moved into position on Hill 355.  It was hoped that this would prompt a Chinese attack, giving our troops an opportunity to capture some of them.

Sir, kindly provide a link to back this up, its the first time I have heard of such a statement.

OWDU

 

[2551]

Sir:

With regard to the first issue you have raised:  the statement was made by my father. 

Even with some verification of its accuracy, as provided by another poster, I decided to see if this event was actually done "officially", or otherwise.

I have found two references to "Operation Trojan":

The Official History of the Canadian Army - Strange Battleground (pages 225 and 226), by LCol H.F. Wood of the Army Historical Section, 1966

The other is found in Deadlock in Korea, 1999, by Ted Barris, (pages 197-198)

 

[geo]

“Trojan” was a deception scheme aimed at giving the enemy the impression that American troops had replaced Commonwealth units about Hill 355. It was hoped that the Chinese would be tempted to investigate this curious occurrence and that casualties could be inflicted and prisoners taken as a result. U.S. Army steel helmets had been temporarily issued to the Canadian infantry prior to their movement into the line, and, in the early morning hours of 9 August, all brigade wireless stations began to transmit on new frequencies, using U.S. Army wireless procedure. The subterfuge apparently met with some success, for a week after it began Chinese voices were heard on one of the brigade’s wireless sets, calling “Hello American, hello American”. The deception was maintained until 24 August when normal procedure was resumed,15 but no enemy raids occurred.

http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/oh-ho/detail-eng.asp?BfBookLang=1&BfId=35

 

[Cuffs]

I had this uniform for a while and thought I would share it This is missing one pice and its the shoulder strap for the belt.Enjoy                                                                             

 

[Cuffs]

Heres a picture of the left sleeve This is a corporals uniform but what is the single on the bottem of the sleeve                                                                                                     

 

[Old Sweat]

It is the good conduct badge awarded for 18 months crime free service.