LAV 6.0

[Colin Parkinson]

two reasons:

1) fewer vehicles in a platoon (and similar restructuring elsewhere and upward) creates a division with considerably less vehicles which makes for a more agile division capable of more rapid deployment and redeployment. It also reduces the logistics burden on the division. The rationale that more of everything is always better is not necessarily true.

The platoon is not significantly weakened by losing a vehicle. With four LAV ISC you get at most 28 dismounts, no CUAS capability and no indirect fire capability. Restructured with only one ISC and two non turreted versions you have 25 dismounts plus an AD/CUAS component and a medium loitering munitions carrier.

2) a higher ratio of dismounts to people remaining in vehicles creates greater combat power on the ground. Vehicles that stay far enough forward to provide fire support become magnets for unpleasant fire. It is better to support dismounted troops with indirect fire, whether their own or through battalion mortars and artillery systems. The vehicles are better off to stay back in dead ground or whatever cover is available, from which they can provide air defence and indirect fire support (such as through loitering munitions)

The point here is that the LAV is not an IFV. It's an infantry transport vehicle for infantry that fights, or ought to fight, dismounted. The LAV ISC loses too much dismount space to the turret and keeps three people with the vehicle. A LAV without the turret can hold a crew of two and up to 9 dismounts.

Or so the theory goes.

and if your loaded IFV takes a hit and kill, wounds half the infantry aboard, your attack has now faltered, or it drives over a mine and is stuck halfway to the objective? Soft skin and AFV are going to be pretty much disposable in the next peer to peer conflict.

 

[Kirkhill]

and if your loaded IFV takes a hit and kill, wounds half the infantry aboard, your attack has now faltered, or it drives over a mine and is stuck halfway to the objective? Soft skin and AFV are going to be pretty much disposable in the next peer to peer conflict.

Two crew per vehicle and lots of robots.

Infantry will follow once the ground is secured by robots from robots.

 

[FJAG]

Does adopting a CUAS turret mean giving up Direct Fire Support?

I don't think it does, but admittedly a one man gunner v a two pers turret is less effective.

Because 34 (three sections, a wpns det, and Pl HQ) is relatively proven structure and fits our doctrine. Smaller for the sake of smaller or bigger for the sake of bigger would require some sort of justification and some explainer as to how you think the dismounts would fight (since the proposed structure does not map onto extant doctrine).

Where do 34 dismounts come from? Unless I'm mistaken the LAV ISC has room for 7 dismounts which gives you 28 at best unless people leave the turret only partially manned - And I doubt most platoons these days, or in Afghanistan, have 7 dismounts available anyway.

Doctrine is a living thing (when I started in this game a rifle section was the 11 folks that you could squeeze into a 3/4 ton or M113 and everyone swore that you couldn't do with less - but they had to.) Doctrine has been driven by two immutable things - the occupancy limits of the vehicles we've accepted and the vehicles' ballooning costs. The latter explains why we only have 6 mech battalions.

The question that I'm asking really has to do with getting better weapon systems to our platoons such as an integral AD/CUAS capability and heavier loitering munitions. There are two options - rip turrets off existing ICVs or buy new vehicles FFR'd for MOOG RIwPs which coincidentally provide more room for dismounts.

To me the latter is the better option as it allows for the distribution of existing ICVs further across the army providing for an initiative of adding in anywhere from 3 to 6 mech battalions depending on how you do things. Going to 3 vehs v 4 for the platoon keeps the coys and therefore the battalions smaller in number of vehicles but almost on a level with dismounts - 75% of the number of platoon vehicles but 25/28th (89%) of the platoon dismounts.

Just as a point for your consideration - Bill Owen in his book "Euclid's Army" proposes that the infantry platoon be reduced to 24 all ranks with three 8-man sections: a command section with an officer, a signaller, a medic, a forward observer, a sniper pair plus 2 others including a UAV operator; the two rifle sections with two fire teams each - one with a 7.62 GPMG or MAW the rest with pers weapons and the second team all with pers weapons and a 40mm grenade launcher. This is the dismount portion of the platoon and is vehicle agnostic. The need therefore is to transport 24 dismounts. He suggests a total of 10 vehicles - 3 per platoon and one for the company comd's team of eight dismounts. My configuration meets his requirement. The coy therefore is 80 dismounts and 24 veh crew. Owen suggests that a battalion might have four such companies. (for 40 coy vehs in total v the current 45 vehs)

While there is a modest veh saving, dismounts in the battalion go from roughly (28 x 3 + 7 = 91 per coy x 3 or) 273 per bn to (24 x 3 + 8 = 80 per coy x 4 or) 320 per bn

Note that with the dismounts being vehicle agnostic you could switch the LAVs out with Senators, ISVs or BVs etc and substitute the MOOG RIwP with the lightweight RIwP which can even be mounted on the ISV. Again, the key point here is we are not building a fleet of IFVs and that the aim is to maximize dismounts with Z-vehs that can add to the protection against expected threats.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't think it does, but admittedly a one man gunner v a two pers turret is less effective.

Where do 34 dismounts come from? Unless I'm mistaken the LAV ISC has room for 7 dismounts which gives you 28 at best unless people leave the turret only partially manned - And I doubt most platoons these days, or in Afghanistan, have 7 dismounts available anyway.

Doctrine is a living thing (when I started in this game a rifle section was the 11 folks that you could squeeze into a 3/4 ton or M113 and everyone swore that you couldn't do with less - but they had to.) Doctrine has been driven by two immutable things - the occupancy limits of the vehicles we've accepted and the vehicles' ballooning costs. The latter explains why we only have 6 mech battalions.

The question that I'm asking really has to do with getting better weapon systems to our platoons such as an integral AD/CUAS capability and heavier loitering munitions. There are two options - rip turrets off existing ICVs or buy new vehicles FFR'd for MOOG RIwPs which coincidentally provide more room for dismounts.

To me the latter is the better option as it allows for the distribution of existing ICVs further across the army providing for an initiative of adding in anywhere from 3 to 6 mech battalions depending on how you do things. Going to 3 vehs v 4 for the platoon keeps the coys and therefore the battalions smaller in number of vehicles but almost on a level with dismounts - 75% of the number of platoon vehicles but 25/28th (89%) of the platoon dismounts.

Just as a point for your consideration - Bill Owen in his book "Euclid's Army" proposes that the infantry platoon be reduced to 24 all ranks with three 8-man sections: a command section with an officer, a signaller, a medic, a forward observer, a sniper pair plus 2 others including a UAV operator; the two rifle sections with two fire teams each - one with a 7.62 GPMG or MAW the rest with pers weapons and the second team all with pers weapons and a 40mm grenade launcher. This is the dismount portion of the platoon and is vehicle agnostic. The need therefore is to transport 24 dismounts. He suggests a total of 10 vehicles - 3 per platoon and one for the company comd's team of eight dismounts. My configuration meets his requirement. The coy therefore is 80 dismounts and 24 veh crew. Owen suggests that a battalion might have four such companies. (for 40 coy vehs in total v the current 45 vehs)

While there is a modest veh saving, dismounts in the battalion go from roughly (28 x 3 + 7 = 91 per coy x 3 or) 273 per bn to (24 x 3 + 8 = 80 per coy x 4 or) 320 per bn

Note that with the dismounts being vehicle agnostic you could switch the LAVs out with Senators, ISVs or BVs etc and substitute the MOOG RIwP with the lightweight RIwP which can even be mounted on the ISV. Again, the key point here is we are not building a fleet of IFVs and that the aim is to maximize dismounts with Z-vehs that can add to the protection against expected threats.

The saw-off is that you are only putting two people at risk and not three - and there is always AI to pick up some of the slack.

 

[KevinB]

What is the mission you need conducted by a Section and then also the Platoon and Company ?

Those answers will dictate how many people need to be in it, which will also drive vehicles and support side issues.


I don’t think wheeled vehicles make good assault vehicles. So I’ll see myself out out on the various LAV configurations possible.

 

[FJAG]

The saw-off is that you are only putting two people at risk and not three - and there is always AI to pick up some of the slack.

I bought a new car last May and I'm still learning all the AI features in it. The breadth of inexpensive sensors available these days is becoming mind boggling.

 

[KevinB]

I bought a new car last May and I'm still learning all the AI features in it. The breadth of inexpensive sensors available these days is becoming mind boggling.

I have a 2022 Suburban.
The sensors are pretty neat, but rain and high winds can make the lane change system think something is next to me, and any off-road usage has them pretty next to useless in a short period of time, heck even stuff that is pretty tame like range roads the dust renders them inoperable inside 5-10 min.

Light can also play tricks on the frontal collision avoidance system. Driving into the setting sun can be ‘alarming’ when cresting a hill.

While the passive sensors on Mil vehicles are significant more robust they are also not infallible by the elements.

 

[FJAG]

I have a 2022 Suburban.
The sensors are pretty neat, but rain and high winds can make the lane change system think something is next to me, and any off-road usage has them pretty next to useless in a short period of time, heck even stuff that is pretty tame like range roads the dust renders them inoperable inside 5-10 min.

Light can also play tricks on the frontal collision avoidance system. Driving into the setting sun can be ‘alarming’ when cresting a hill.

While the passive sensors on Mil vehicles are significant more robust they are also not infallible by the elements.

So far I've been a fair weather driver. The only interesting issue has been the lane following function which tends to veer you to the right when approaching an intersection and the curb/white line becomes a turn lane. I don't use that anymore.

I particulalry like the cruise control that adapts to a slower vehicle ahead of me but immediately accelerates when you pull out to pass. That's a keeper.

 

[Kirkhill]

What is the mission you need conducted by a Section and then also the Platoon and Company ?

Those answers will dictate how many people need to be in it, which will also drive vehicles and support side issues.


I don’t think wheeled vehicles make good assault vehicles. So I’ll see myself out out on the various LAV configurations possible.

So what level of prorection do you reckon is appropriate for a Troop Transporter?

Myself, I like the idea of resistant to shrapnel and blast, effective DFS to keep UAVs and local terrorists at bay, ie a nice compact RWS with passive sights and an M230 LF would suit.

The ability to get off road would be nice so more than 4 wheels.

And if that bridge is out ability to swim would be handy.

 

[GK .Dundas]

So what level of prorection do you reckon is appropriate for a Troop Transporter?

Myself, I like the idea of resistant to shrapnel and blast, effective DFS to keep UAVs and local terrorists at bay, ie a nice compact RWS with passive sights and an M230 LF would suit.

The ability to get off road would be nice so more than 4 wheels.

And if that bridge is out ability to swim would be handy.

I believe your looking for a modern MTLB ....and if I'm not mistaken the Finns have built one .

 

[Kirkhill]

I believe your looking for a modern MTLB ....and if I'm not mistaken the Finns have built one .

One or tother

Trackx

Patria TRACKX | Patria

www.patriagroup.com

CAVS

Common Armoured Vehicle System (CAVS) programme | Patria

www.patriagroup.com

I can see the Trackx north of 60 and the CAVS running southern roads.

 

[McG]

Where do 34 dismounts come from? Unless I'm mistaken the LAV ISC has room for 7 dismounts which gives you 28 at best unless people leave the turret only partially manned - And I doubt most platoons these days, or in Afghanistan, have 7 dismounts available anyway.

34 comes from your math of 9 dismounts in a section carrier and seven in the comd vehicle. A platoon in not just a quantity of people without structure. Two section carriers and a comd vehicle give you two sections, a sp det, and an HQ. That is not going to be effective on the objective even if the sections are bigger than today. So keep the same number of vehicles - your dismount numbers now total 34 and organized into three sections plus sp det & HQ.

Edit to correct autocorrect

 

[FJAG]

34 comes from your math of 9 dismounts in a section carrier and seven in the comd vehicle. A platoon in not just a quantity of people without structure. Two section carriers and a comd vehicle give you two sections, a sp det, and an HQ. That is not going to be effective on the objective of ben if the sections are bigger than today. So keep the same number of vehicles - your dismount numbers now total 34 and organized into three sections plus sp det & HQ.

Sorry,

 

[FJAG]

34 comes from your math of 9 dismounts in a section carrier and seven in the comd vehicle.

Sorry, I thought I made it clear in my first post that the LAV ISC (infantry section carrier) has a crew of three and seven dismounts for a max possible total of 28 dismounts per platoon. I've never worked with a LAV company and am relying on the data on Wikipedia. Happy to be corrected if I'm wrong.

The American Stryker M1126 ICV (infantry carrier vehicle) has no turret but an RWS and a crew of two with nine dismounts therefore a platoon of four can dismount 36 pers.

If one used one LAV ISC with seven dismounts and three M1126 ICVs then you do get 34.

A platoon in not just a quantity of people without structure. Two section carriers and a comd vehicle give you two sections, a sp det, and an HQ. That is not going to be effective on the objective of ben if the sections are bigger than today.

There are some who study and advise armies on this who disagree with that concept. Admittedly there is general disagreement. I'm still trying to work my way through the various arguments.

I've wholeheartedly bought into the arguments that divisions need to be smaller to be effective - roughly 10,000 folks with roughly 2,000 vehicles. That puts a battalion at around 6-700 with 100 vehicles. (There are around 22 units in the division)

It's the division that matters as the tactical unit. It's ability to "march, disperse, concentrate, sustain and manoeuvre" that matters and all of those are tied to vehicle numbers. "Lower number of vehicles force simpler unit structures which, in turn, enable useful outcomes . . . with little or no reduction in combat power but an overall reduction in friction. . . " Finally, "you cannot employ any formation you cannot afford to procure, train, deploy, and sustain in combat regardless of combat power."

The question isn't so much how large is the platoon, but how effectively it can be controlled and supported. No platoon works in isolation.

Owen makes it clear that the size of a platoon is an interesting debate but generally unsolvable as other factors such as manpower costs v budgets, vehicle types etc steer the debate. His view is that when discussing platoon effectiveness three conditions predominate: 1) Training and leadership trump all other considerations; 2) operational conditions, mission type, casualties, demand that the platoon is able to adjust and conform to function in a variety of multiples and teams to suit the situation; and 3) while organization and manning are vital for budget and administration, casualties and chaos will strip away certainty at every level. Whether organized and trained as 32- or 24-man platoons on the day in question you will only have 16 and two trained and experienced section commanders.

So keep the same number of vehicles - your dismount numbers now total 34 and organized into three sections plus sp det & HQ.

I sometimes wonder if our thinking about "fat" platoons comes from the fact that we don't train enough as brigades and divisions. We want everything including the kitchen sink in the platoon because that's what we know best. We don't have mortars and anti-tank; we rarely see tanks or artillery; we never see AD; we've got no UAVs or CUAS; we never have to sustain a whole division with fuel and ammo so logistics aren't understood either. But platoons we see and train with so they better be armed and manned to the hilt.

Personally, I'd prefer to see more battalions with 100 vehicles each than a few with 200.

Incidentally, I feel the same way about tanks. I prefer a 14-tank squadron to a 19-tank squadron simply because that way we can have more squadrons for whatever number of tanks we arbitrarily end up buying. Those extra five tanks will give you 4 squadrons instead of three or four armoured regiments instead of three. Four armoured regiments gets you a division.

 

[McG]

I sometimes wonder if our thinking about "fat" platoons comes from the fact that we don't train enough as brigades and divisions.

Canada used the three section platoon in 4 CMBG. There was no lack of brigade level training there … and they even trained up to within a corps context. It’s hard to imagine that aversion to a two section platoon is rooted in a modern lack of collective training above the battalion level.

 

[FJAG]

Canada used the three section platoon in 4 CMBG. There was no lack of brigade level training there … and they even trained up to within a corps context. It’s hard to imagine that aversion to a two section platoon is rooted in a modern lack of collective training above the battalion level.

There are some interesting discussions about platoon size as well in Jim Storr's "Battlegroup" which discusses the Cold War armies and analyzes them. As to platoon structures he discusses the drift towards large platoons and suggests that it would be better to discuss alternative based on overall effectiveness. He suggested that it might be better to organize the 81 men formed by nine sections of nine into ten sections of eight like the Germans did under Army Structure 4 and that "24 men might be more effective if employed in four sections of six rather than three of eight." The US Army recommended that section size be six men at least twice. So if a smaller section is more effective, how many can one platoon commander realistically control? 3? 4? 5?

He goes on to state that from 1945 to 1980 plus there was a gradual dumbing down of Brit (and thereby Cdn) inf doctrine where a platoon attack which had originally taken 5 minutes to plan now took 20.

Incidentally did you know that in 1993 a Bradley platoon only had two squads? Basically the dismounts from two vehicles formed one 9-man squad plus provided space for the four habitual attachments to the platoon. In 2002 it became the abomination that it is now where there is no space for the habitual attachments in the platoon's vehicles.

Not everyone argues for smaller platoons. Watling by contrast wants an assault platoon of three sections of 12 men each plus ten in the platoon headquarters. He has three platoons to the company plus enablers with three companies to the battalion. Much of this relates to urban warfare.

All that to say that there is no magic formula. There are clearly very subjective views on the subject but overall comes the almighty PY shuffle and $ spent on capital equipment. All things PY and $ being equal I like smaller units that provide more units for the same PY and $ than large units that produce less units. I think back of the turn of the century when the infantry had to give up PYs. They chose to protect the PYs in their rifle companies by giving up mortars, atgm and pioneers with the hope that the arty, armour and engrs would fill the bill. I don't consider that experiment a raving success. Others might differ.