LAV 6.0

[Kirkhill]

The wheeled Boxer apparently has a max GVW of 41 tonnes.
The tracked Puma has a similar max GVW of 43 tonnes.

800 kW, 900 l, 600 km, 70 km/h - Puma
530 kW, xxx l, 1050 km, 103 km/h - Boxer.

 

[MilEME09]

The wheeled Boxer apparently has a max GVW of 41 tonnes.
The tracked Puma has a similar max GVW of 43 tonnes.

800 kW, 900 l, 600 km, 70 km/h - Puma
530 kW, xxx l, 1050 km, 103 km/h - Boxer.

Now whats the difference in ground pressure between them? Except when talking about a bv206 replacement we seem to ignore ground pressure, but as we have seen during mud season of eastern europe, it is still important

 

[Kirkhill]

Now whats the difference in ground pressure between them? Except when talking about a bv206 replacement we seem to ignore ground pressure, but as we have seen during mud season of eastern europe, it is still important

Apparently the mid range setting for the Boxer CTIS, intended for poor or soft ground, is 43 psi or just under 3 barg.


I can't find a ground pressure for the Puma beyond statements that it is low.
Typical ground pressures for similar tracked vehicles range from 7.5 psi at the lower end for the CV90s and 15 at the upper end for the Abrams.

The Challenger 2 claims 12 psi and the BvS10 Viking is below 5 psi. The new Patria Trackx is similar to the Viking at just under 5 psi.

Trackx claims a road speed of 80 km/h which is at the top end of the 65 to 80 range claimed for the Viking.


....

It appears that some armies are ensuring that they have a large operational envelope by buying a variety of vehicles. Logistics be damned.

 

[FJAG]

Except, you already decided that you want section carriers for nine dismounts. Mixing fractions of sections in carriers is not an optimal solution.

No. I propose leaving one ISC for the platoon HQ with 7 dismounts. The two ICVs each carry one section complete with nine dismounts. Two ICVs; two sections - no mixing.

The Americans are making things work with the Bradley. Why would we propose to bake that sort of nonsense into the organizational design when not pre-constrained by an in-service system?

And, why are you concerned about seats for “habitual attachments”? Those are the specialists that come company level when fighting conventionally. You talk of fat platoons, but call the US organization an abomination because it has not allocated seats for the fat. Meanwhile, that organization is designed to fight intimately with their carriers.

In the US system, the medics and the FOs are allocated down to the platoon level on a habitual attachment in the field. They do not come with their own vehicles. They are not considered "fat."

You want the Canadian vehicles in a Z harbour, but you are not allocating seats for dismounted weapons to compensate for the absence of mounted cannon & machine gun.

We haven't talked about dismounted weapons at all. I certainly expect dismounted weapons. I have no idea what you mean about the absence of the mounted cannon and MGs - do you expect those to be providing fire support in every case - that's not how I understand Canadian tactics to operate. They may have had more use against a relatively poorly armed Taliban but that was then - this is now. Even then most operations there were dismounted without LAV fire support.

I’m of the opinion you can have a lean formation at the top of the pyramid, but depth on the base is very important). So the 2 Maneuver Brigade, Division structure is very workable, as long as the Squad/Sections, Platoons and Companies are sufficiently sized.

There is one other consideration - smaller platoons don't act independently. They form part of a larger company-sized task which is a part of a larger battalion-sized effort. In other words they are given a task appropriate for their size in the overall scheme of things.

I recall my time with the Germans in Shilo - yes, there was a brief interlude of platoon and company training but all of that was directed to the battlegroup-level mission which operated fast, with much violence and roughly the way we did combat-team operations but with more resources and more granular command and control.

I'm wondering how much the CA wargames these concepts or do we simply amble onwards with a "same as yesterday" sense of satisfaction?

 

[Kirkhill]

And now I think we are back to the mounted/dismounted dichotomy.

The mounted force is predicated on a 700 HP engine and all that it can bring to the fight. Principally that means stuff that can't be man-packed. In turn that means longer ranged sensors and longer ranged effectors with greater effect and in greater quantity.

Those are high value targets that attract attention.

I would be inclined to minimize the number of people associated with each target and minimize the number of targets.

For me that means minimizing the crew size and minimizing the number of targets in a packet. It also means creating many packets and distributing them over the largest area possible.

That mounted force needs some dismounted capability. How little capability can it get away with? And does that dismounted capability have to be on-lin with the main force or can it be a bound or two behind?.

The risk with a large number of troops in a small number of vehicles in the front rank is that much of the time they will be idle and when you need them they will be eliminated quickly.

....

The dismounted force just needs a lift to a point where it can infiltrate on foot and take up positions. Supplies and heavy weapons can be provided by a mixture of autonomous delivery systems and caches.

The less they have to carry the further from their positions they can be before they start their infiltration.

My primary working assumption is that a vehicle is easier to spot and hit than a soldier.

 

[McG]

No. I propose leaving one ISC for the platoon HQ with 7 dismounts. The two ICVs each carry one section complete with nine dismounts. Two ICVs; two sections - no mixing.

Well, your comments to this point have focused on a fleet of three vehicles that disgorge 25 pers without consideration for structure, and (offered more recently) that you prefer dismounted sections of 6 or 8 pers. So now we have a structure for your dismounts - Pl HQ, 2x rifle sect, and sp det. So the “fat” in a rifle platoon that you keep referencing is a rifle section?

 

[KevinB]

No. I propose leaving one ISC for the platoon HQ with 7 dismounts. The two ICVs each carry one section complete with nine dismounts. Two ICVs; two sections - no mixing.

3 Casualties and your platoon is combat ineffective.

In the US system, the medics and the FOs are allocated down to the platoon level on a habitual attachment in the field. They do not come with their own vehicles. They are not considered "fat."

FOO's do have their own vehicles these days with the Bradley FIST's at 2/CAB.
Each Platoon gets a medic (or 2) but the Medical Evacuation is primarily conducted by the BSB though, as the Pl Sgt then Coy 1st Sgt handle movements back to a Bn CCP.

We haven't talked about dismounted weapons at all. I certainly expect dismounted weapons. I have no idea what you mean about the absence of the mounted cannon and MGs - do you expect those to be providing fire support in every case - that's not how I understand Canadian tactics to operate. They may have had more use against a relatively poorly armed Taliban but that was then - this is now. Even then most operations there were dismounted without LAV fire support.

I think this is where the LAV stumbles. The IFV was expected to operate with the Infantry in both Offense and Defense. As I understand CA doctrine generally for the defense, the LAV's are in a Zulu harbor and not expected to provide fire support. In the offense the LAV are likely to firebase, but not assault onto the objective - which is where I see a breakdown of tank/infantry cooperation/coordination.
AP Mines, Artillery, Wire and general shittiness of the battlefield are going to play havoc with a dismounted assault. This is where things like the Bradley excel at with the cohesive assault on the objective and either dismounting just shy or in the objective.

There is one other consideration - smaller platoons don't act independently. They form part of a larger company-sized task which is a part of a larger battalion-sized effort. In other words they are given a task appropriate for their size in the overall scheme of things.

I do not disagree - but if you look at large complex terrain issues, smaller squads and platoons end up requiring more Companies and Battalions, and even more quickly if they take casualties.

I recall my time with the Germans in Shilo - yes, there was a brief interlude of platoon and company training but all of that was directed to the battlegroup-level mission which operated fast, with much violence and roughly the way we did combat-team operations but with more resources and more granular command and control.

This is where I see the US Army CAB being advantageous in some situations.
The Armor CAB's (x2) have 29 M1A2 and 29 M2A4 (2 Tank Coy and 1 Mech Inf Coy each), and the Mech Inf CAB in the ABCT has 15 M1A2, and 43 M2A4 (1 Tank Coy, and 2 Mech Inf Coy each). Army 2030 planning saw the removal Cav Squadron from the ABCT and creation of a DivCav (a Scout Platoon of 6 Bradleys is all the ABCT's get now)

I'm wondering how much the CA wargames these concepts or do we simply amble onwards with a "same as yesterday" sense of satisfaction?

I'm more worried about the Wargaming with non issued kit, the Corps 86 Staff tables still give me shudders...