LAV III Mobile Gun System (MGS)

[Kirkhill]

I am now well OT I know but all of this discussion of the MGS and every other weapons system has to be put in the context of what we expect to be doing.  (I and tried to teach my Granny how to suck eggs as well  ).

I am going to suggest that Canada's Expeditionary Command needs to be:

Strategically Offensive
Operationally Defensive
Tactically Flexible

The taxpayer and the government seem to be in agreement that it is a good thing to send troops overseas to help people and governments in need.  Therefore we need to be able to move troops towards the threat globally - Strategically offensive.  Given that Governments don't seem to like to commit dollars until there is a crisis at hand then the force needs to be able to react quickly.  Quick reaction demands a light force. 

A light force can't stand long - but it can survive longer on the defence than it can on offence.  Therefore it can either be used for very short duration offensive missions (raids essentially) or it can be used as a barrier force which will either convince an enemy to stay home because it demonstrates the intent to act, or it will buy time until a heavier force with more staying power can be deployed.  A light force is also an effective internal security tool.

Once overseas we then come to the question of what do we expect those deployed troops to do.  Well, the taxpayer/voter doesn't seem inclined to support throwing the first punch and the Government doesn't seem inclined to press the case. The CF, politically, could be used to stand WITH a threatened Government against an external threat, or to support that Government in securing its territory against domestic threats.  That puts the CF onto the defence Operationally.  It isn't going to be launching 1000 km opposed thrusts across international borders.

A medium force, heavy in ISTAR and Fire Support assets (ground, rotary, fixed wing, direct or indirect), can perform this task.  The wheels and ISTAR allow it to patrol and control large areas with a small number of bodies.  The Fire Support allows enemy thrusts and probes along the borders or on internal lines of communication to be rapidly countered.  Long range assets mean that large protective umbrellas can be created under which the medium force can patrol and where fire can be rapidly switched from threat to threat.  The longer the range, and assuming equal effectiveness of the rounds employed, then the fewer the Fire Support assets required, the lest costly the price of maintaining the umbrella and the larger the area the force can secure, or the longer the time the taxpayer will continue to pay for it to stay in place.

A Heavy Force could do the same job, given adequate Fire Support and ISTAR assets but it could not patrol as large an area (due to the speed - 100 km/h on good going versus 60 km/h on good going).  It would also cost more in terms of the costs of the individual vehicles, the need for more operational vehicles because of the reduced patrol areas, the need for more support vehicles, the need for more spare parts and ultimately the need for more bodies to man all that extra kit and maintain it.

However, in the process of conducting an Operational defence it is necessary to be able to act/react flexibly.  It is necessary to be able to not just block enemy assaults but also to be able to launch our own local offenses (following Principle 3 - Offensive Action) and also to launch counter offenses to parry enemy offenses and to be able to threaten them and keep them off balance. There is a need to be able to launch local assaults in the face of enemy action.

There are no safe ways to conduct assaults - regardless of pace (deliberate or rapid), preparation (hasty or planned), or use of fire support (quiet or noisy approach).   Armour plate  is useful in reducing the risk to assaulting forces.  Heavy forces are useful in that regard and it is worthwhile having such a force on hand to allow assaults to be conducted.  However the logistical costs demand that the entire force can't be all heavy, all the time.  The heavy assets need to be husbanded and used in packages that are effective but that don't drain the system.  The problem with heavy forces, beyond their cost, is their lack of rapid response capability.  Generally speaking heavy forces are best employed concentrated but if they are concentrated then they can only cover a limited area or take a long time to get into position to counter a thrust or launch an assault.  To get speed of response they need to be dispersed, necessitating either large numbers or else penny packets.

It seems reasonable to me to suggest that heavy forces are at their most cost effective when held in reserve and employed in planned assaults.  Patrolling is better done by light and medium assets.  Countering thrusts is better considered a Fire Support problem due to its speed of response and flexibility.

The ultimate advantage of an armoured force is its ability to manoeuvre in the face of enemy fire.  From that I take it that the "ideal" armoured vehicle is one that can't be killed (mobility kill included) even when standing on top of an enemy position.   Even if it were totally unarmed then it could advance to the enemy and occupy the ground.

Having said that, putting a block of steel in the midst of the enemy is not likely to make them give up ground.  Unless they sense that they are about to die and there is nothing they can do about it then they can cheerfully ignore the block of steel coming their way.  That block of steel has to have some effect on them.  It has to be able to blow them up, or shoot them, or deposit troops on their position or perhaps, ideally again, all three.  If all three capabilities can be put into one package, such as the Merkava 4, then that has advantages but at very least the assault force needs to be able to deliver all three threats when assets are combined on the objective.

But first and foremost the assault force has to be able to reach the objective - even if it doesn't fire a shot.  This is the only logically absurd conclusion that I can draw given that a) we can't accept casualties and b) no matter how much fire support and preparation available some enemy forces with intact weapons systems will survive on the objective.  Therefore any armoured force must be able to survive point blank hits from all weapons.  Given that then the issue of whether or not the armoured force requires a large calibre long range gun becomes moot,  especially if it slow in response and has a slow rate of fire (6-10 rounds per minute is not rapid).

What is required in armament, for a vehicle that fights on the objective, is speed of response and accuracy as at close range the enemy is capable of operating while only presenting fleeting targets and those need to be countered quickly. The weapon system also has to be able to deliver large packages of potential (or residual kinetic) energy to targets - the larger the better because it allows for larger, better protected targets to be dealt with.  However it does not need to be long ranged.  The energy expended in sending a projectile a long distance is better expended against the skin of a target.  As well, if the own force heavy vehicle is well armoured, and can take hits, then it doesn't have to worry as much about getting the first shot in. 

Based on this calculus my suggestion for a heavy force would be a vehicle with as much armour as the roads can bear, mounted on tracks to carry that load anywhere but armed with a mix of rapid fire small/medium calibre weapons and a short range, large calibre weapon, and preferably able to transport troops.  This minus the ability to transport troops virtually defines the original tanks of World War I vintage.

Today it is something like a cross between the Merkava, the Achzarit and Matt Fisher's Urban Combat Tank.

It would not be affordable, reasonable or useful to have an entire force of such vehicles, but to put such a steel core (10% of the assets for example) into a Medium/Light force would keep the initiative in the hands of the defending force commander.

And by the way,  Granny was just as impressed after I finished her lesson.  ;D

Cheers.


Final thought, just to tie this back to the MGS - the MGS with its gun would be most suitable in dealing with light vehicles and fixed positions at long ranges.  A useful tool for a Cavalry force, not so useful in the face of an armoured force, of limited use in an assault except for supplying stand-off fire support from hull down positions.

 

[DG-41]

I agree with almost everything you've said here, with one or two minor quibbles:

Given that then the issue of whether or not the armoured force requires a large calibre long range gun becomes moot,  especially if it slow in response and has a slow rate of fire (6-10 rounds per minute is not rapid).

What is required in armament, for a vehicle that fights on the objective, is speed of response and accuracy as at close range the enemy is capable of operating while only presenting fleeting targets and those need to be countered quickly. The weapon system also has to be able to deliver large packages of potential (or residual kinetic) energy to targets - the larger the better because it allows for larger, better protected targets to be dealt with.  However it does not need to be long ranged.  The energy expended in sending a projectile a long distance is better expended against the skin of a target.  As well, if the own force heavy vehicle is well armoured, and can take hits, then it doesn't have to worry as much about getting the first shot in.

The nice thing about gun systems, at least when you are talking KE penetrators, is that "long range" becomes almost a side effect.

KE works by accelerating hard, dense projectiles to super-high velocities. The ability to penetrate a given chunk of armour is a function of the hardness, toughness, and density of the projectile, and its velocity at impact.

Given that the material we make the penetrator out of (given some major technical development) is going to be either tungsten or DU, which have known properties, the penetration power of the gun is pretty well a function of muzzle velocity. And all that muzzle velocity, given that the penetrators don't slow down all that quickly, gives you range "for free".

Put another way, if you determine the maximum thickness of armour that your penetrator must be able to defeat at a certain range - 1km? 2km? - that will determine the muzzle velocity you need. But with that, you get the ability to penetrate thinner targets to longer ranges without adding any complexity to the weapons system, save perhaps a higher magnification on the sight to be able to make effective use of the longer range should the opportunity present itself (and that's cheap and easy)

If that maximum thickness is of MBT scale, then your gun is a killer to anything less than an MBT effectively out to the limits of vision. And if your spec distance is greater than about 1000m (I once got a very stern lecture from a WW2 vet that no tank engagement was ever longer than 400m) then you have a weapon system that is de facto undefeatable.

All of which sounds to me a lot like NATO 120mm - so in other words, I guess I'm arguing that a NATO 120mm main gun ought to be big enough for anybody.

What might be interesting is the ability to increase the *rate* of fire out of a standard 120mm gun. I have a vision of something like the 5-round clip on a 40mm Oerlikon AA gun. What if there were a 3-round hopper on the top of the breach of a 120mm gun, and the loader filled the hopper instead of stuffing the breach directly?

Also, I think this is an argument *against* missile systems, which have long ranges with high hit&kill probabilities, but have slow flight times, slow reload times, and often, minimum ranges.

Based on this calculus my suggestion for a heavy force would be a vehicle with as much armour as the roads can bear, mounted on tracks to carry that load anywhere but armed with a mix of rapid fire small/medium calibre weapons and a short range, large calibre weapon, and preferably able to transport troops.  This minus the ability to transport troops virtually defines the original tanks of World War I vintage.

It also sounds a lot like an M1, or a Challenger.

I don't think you can mix "all the armour the roads can bear", "big gun", "troop transport", and one you overlooked "keep a reasonable size such that it will fit in transport". Pic any three.

DG

 

[Kirkhill]

It also sounds a lot like an M1, or a Challenger.

In the absence of anything better.

And PS - I agree with you on missiles.  From where I sit missiles work better as Cavalry and Fire Support assets.  Not assault assets.  Therefore Arty Missiles and LAV Missiles but not MBT Missiles.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Kirkhill,

I am not a fan of multiple weapon stations.  They were in vogue for some inter-war tank designs and they did not seem to do very well.  I am a fan, however, of having lots of machineguns.  Staying with main armament, having the ability to destroy enemy tanks is still important.  Long cannons are a pain in urban terrain but it can be managed.  What cannot be managed is the inability to destroy enemy armour.  I am also not sold on having the capability to transport infantry.

I guess I am arguing that if you are going to have "heavy" forces then get M1s and some form of APC/IFV for the accompanying infantry (LAV III, Stryker, M2, Warrior, BMP etc).  With the right ammo loads the M1 can deliver significant destruction during the run-in to the position.

Looking at the strategic realm (well above my grade), recent experience seems to indicate that the crisis (such as an invasion) will already have happened before our troops are mobilized.  That is not to say that we could not be in a stabilty operation that goes wrong when a neighbour intervenes, but I'm not sure about the "operationally defensive" bit.

The LAV task force (including Coyotes and maybe MGS etc) does have an appeal for the types of missions that we have conducted over the past ten years.  It is an outstanding force for stability/counter-insurgency operations.  We should, however, be realistic about how quickly these forces can deploy.  Think weeks and months, not days.

 

[Kirkhill]

2B:

If you see the platform slashing through enemy lines disrupting their cohesion, but fundamentally leaving them intact to reform behind you, a la Patton,  then I can see the benefits of an all MBT force.

If you want to secure the ground behind then you need those infantry guys.  Speaking as an ex-infanteer, even if only militia-rat, and one that suffered from claustrophobia and at the same time didn't relish catching more than my fair share of incoming rounds, I was not too impressed by the thought of following along behind you with your 120mm - 400mm  armour plate in a vehicle with 8 mm to 30 mm of armour plate.  As good as you guys are with your guns delivering significant destruction I am willing to bet you might miss the occasional target.    If you want the infantry to keep up then they need the same armour that you carry.  Now whether they come along in the same vehicle, like this Merkava seems to be proposing or they come along in a separate, equally heavily armoured vehicle, like the Achzarit is open for debate. 

WRT multiple weapons stations: you have multiple weapons stations - main gun, coax, commander's RWS and loader's station (possible RWS as well), not to mention grenade launchers which can be used for rounds other than smoke.

WRT the long gun - both you and DG make good points.  The gun also has the advantage, like the M1 and Challenger, of being available now and useful.  It, along with a heavy APC, would be entirely useful in forming the steel core I was alluding to.

I was not arguing agains the tank per se.  I was just pointing out that the design criteria that the CF might desire might not be the same criteria that the US might desire.  Having said that the vehicles that are available and can meet 80 to 90% or requirement are better than something that  might be 100% capable but exists only on a drawing board somewhere.

I have long stipulated that heavy forces should be part of the force mix.  At the same time I feel that what gets lost in the discussion is what the capabilities are that are left on the table with the kit available.

I agree with your point about the deployability of a medium force.  That is why I talked about the value of a light force to hold ground until other forces can be brought in.  Medium weight forces CAN be brought in faster in small packets than Heavy forces and every increase in weight equates to an increase in capability making it that much harder to dislodge the early entry force which in turn buys time to bring in more forces, both Medium and Heavy.  For long stay operations the relative proportions of Light, Medium and Heavy seem likely to be driven by environment and operational necessity moreso than deployability.

I disagree to an extent about the suggestion that all crises start with an invasion.  All crises start with with an increase in tensions.  Even the first Gulf War was telegraphed.  What would the effect on Saddam have been if Canada had deployed a light battle group with an ongoing thickening of forces in support of the Emir of Kuwait.  The Brits and the Yanks couldn't have done it.  That would be seen as a possible precursor to invasion.  But suppose Canada had deployed just to stand with the Kuwaitis.  Would Saddam have been as ready to push?  Militarily it  might not be a major problem, even if his nose got bloodied in the process, although with allied naval and air support it might not be as easy as he might hope, but diplomatically I have to believe that he would have a  significant problem to deal with.  Perhaps enough to make him rethink about driving over the border in the first place.

"Better a Battalion in time, than a Division too late."

Cheers. 

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Machineguns are one thing.  The rapid-fire light to medium calibre guns you mention are another.  The now-classic MBT layout with one main gun backed up by a coax and one or two roof mounted machineguns has proven to be manageable.  Those roof-mounted machineguns are now capable of reliably being remote-fired, an added bonus in the close fight.

As for the infantry, their vehicles can be uparmoured to a point (the M2 has gone through a series of improvements in this regard).  The tanks should be taking the hits, that's why they are up front.  A series of compromise MBT/APC hybrids might end up being able to do neither job.  The tank/APC team has been somewhat validated in combat.

As for Canada deploying a medium task force to "deter" an aggressor I can think quickly of Hong Kong in 1941 or any number of UN forces that have been bypassed/overrun.  Deterring a big, conventional threat had better come with a coalition (US) presence.

 

[a_majoor]

Hypervelocity KE rounds do have long range as a byproduct of their kinetic energy, but this is somewhat analogous to the situation with the ADATS: extreme range requires an unobstructed sight line. I would guess this is getting to the point of diminishing returns, the curvature of the Earth is the limiting factor for direct engagements.

I believe we need a bag of tricks approach to our direct fire support, using various natures of ammunition to defeat different target sets, and smart rounds to defeat difficult targets. For a modern tank, I would be satisfied with a 44 calibre barrel and a hockey sock of ammunition, rather than a 55 calibre barrel even with its superior performance against hard targets. The shorter barrel provides a bit more mobility in confined areas, and if I was taking the fight to the enemy in complex terrain, Multi Purpose Anti Tank and HE would probably be the nature of ammunition needed anyway. Long range engagements were to be dealt with by projects like Tank Extended Range Munitions (TERM) and Sensor Target Acquisition Fire and Forget (STAFF); designed around a 44 cal barrel, and current through tube missiles also provide alternative means of destroying difficult targets.

These solutions are independent of the firing vehicle (except for the calibre of the round, obviously smaller lighter vehicles would use smaller cannons with less recoil impulse), so in theory at least, we could have all of Kirkhill's Light, Medium and Heavy forces covered through the clever application of fire support ammunition. Picture, for example, a light force equipped with a 105mm on a traditional anti-tank wheeled mount (similar to a PaK 75). They could jump in with the guns and have a means to fend off enemy forces of greater "weight". Mobility could be by towing behind a light utility vehicle, or slung by helicopter. Medium Fire Support Vehicles are simply a means of carrying the same gun and ammunition combination with more mobility and protection, while heavy forces would be able to use tanks armed with 120mm cannons using the same natures of ammunition, but in a bigger package. Tanks armed with 105mm ammunition are not to be sneered at, the gun can destroy all target sets below MBT, and ring the bell on any enemy MBT hard enough to put it out of action (mobility kill, broken FCS and shaken or injured crews). The 50+ round carrying capacity of a Leopard C2 or Merkava Mk 1 also counts for a lot, especially when the other guy is running low on rounds and you are not.

I have no doubt that a properly designed autoloader could provide very high and sustained rates of fire for cannons, although I think there are other ways to get the same effect; parallel engagements like with the LOSAT demonstrator, "loitering" precision munitions like Kirkhill's favorite Netfires system (launch a round and let it look for the bad guys on its own...), or even artillery and mortar cluster munitions like DPCIM (the trick is to be able to acquire and fire the round fast enough before the target can flee).

There are lots of possible solutions out there for fire support, the MGS is simply not a good example of how to do this, but the idea of a complimentary fire support vehicle for the LAV III is sound.

 

[TCBF]

"Hong Kong in 1941 or any number of UN forces that have been bypassed/overrun.  Deterring a big, conventional threat had better come with a coalition (US) presence."

- Good point, and even they had a Corps over run in Korea ( read "The River and The Gauntlet" by S.L.A. Marshall).

Tom

 

[mainerjohnthomas]

One of the big problems I have with the LAV III/MGS/TUA/MMEV or ADATS "system of systems" is that I have never seen us deployed in such depth outside of Wainwright or Gagetown.  Relying on a doctrine that requires four vehicles to provide a survivable force, when we do not deploy all of them together routinely is asking for defeat in detail, or defeat of the detail as deployed anyway.  The MGS can be a nifty direct fire infantry support weapon, the TUA is a proven if mediocre tank killer, and the MMEV(whenever it comes to life) or ADATS provides the long range punch that a 120mm would have given us.
      I would rather see LAVIII with Spike or even TOW missiles included at the troop level, so that bunker busting and real antitank capacity was available to the troops we deploy.  The low numbers of MGS suggested, the lack of doctrine for deployment, and the purely "offensive" role of the direct fire system lead me to believe that they are more likely to be left at home when the troops deploy.  If it cannot replace a tank, and is not included in numbers enough to make it a regular part of our mechanized infantry tool kit, it's just going to become another expensive white elephant like the upgrades to the Leo's that we never get to deploy.

 

[Mountie]

Exactly.  Therefore, significantly increase the number of LAV-III TUA systems and give them back to the mechanized infantry battalion either in an ant-armour platoon at battalion level or right down to the rifle company level like the US Stryker units do.  If they really insist on the MGS then do the same with it.  Give the support to the troops that are deploying.  Scrap the ADATS/MMEV all together.  When's the last time ADATS actually deployed?  A few systems concentrated in one regiment just doesn't seem to make sense.

 

[Eland]

One of the big problems I have with the LAV III/MGS/TUA/MMEV or ADATS "system of systems" is that I have never seen us deployed in such depth outside of Wainwright or Gagetown.  Relying on a doctrine that requires four vehicles to provide a survivable force, when we do not deploy all of them together routinely is asking for defeat in detail, or defeat of the detail as deployed anyway.  The MGS can be a nifty direct fire infantry support weapon, the TUA is a proven if mediocre tank killer, and the MMEV(whenever it comes to life) or ADATS provides the long range punch that a 120mm would have given us.
      I would rather see LAVIII with Spike or even TOW missiles included at the troop level, so that bunker busting and real antitank capacity was available to the troops we deploy.  The low numbers of MGS suggested, the lack of doctrine for deployment, and the purely "offensive" role of the direct fire system lead me to believe that they are more likely to be left at home when the troops deploy.  If it cannot replace a tank, and is not included in numbers enough to make it a regular part of our mechanized infantry tool kit, it's just going to become another expensive white elephant like the upgrades to the Leo's that we never get to deploy.

The operative sentence in your post is, "... the MMEV (whenever it comes to life) or ADATS provides the long range punch that a 120mm
would have given us." For what it's costing us to develop the MMEV (and I think this has been pointed out by someone else in the army.ca site), we could have a significant number of up to date tanks. Those tanks would give us the long-range punch that is desired *and* a survivable platform. Better still, the tanks would offer another important item: simplicity. The MMEV is unproven. Yet there are lots of proven 120mm guns and fire control systems out there. The simplicity comes in the form of a 120mm round, good optics and a computer system not much more powerful than the 286 or 386 home computer systems of yore.

If you really want the ability to smack your enemy from a decent stand-off distance, you'd be better off acquiring the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) which offers the ability to bust bunkers, tanks, provide counter-battery fire, kill infantry in open-topped trenches - all for a fraction of the price. Since it's based on the M113 platform, you have a well-established stream of parts and support resources to boot. If you need more force de frappe than that, just call in an air strike for God's sake.

To my way of thinking, the MMEV is a solution looking for a problem. Given how top-heavy the creature is, I think it will be as mediocre as you predict the LAV-TUA system will be. In fairness to the MMEV system, I could see a number of limited scenarios where it could be employed successfully. Most of those scenarios entail well-concealed defilades for launch points, and a low risk of retaliatory strikes from the enemy -if, and only if the enemy in question is relatively unsophisticated, with no real means of detecting the position of a MMEV before or just after it launches its payload. Unfortunately real-world combat situations rarely offer ideal launch positions and defilades, and underestimating one's enemy is always dangerous.

The comment I make about an unsophisticated enemy also holds true for the MGS. If your enemy has lots of ATGM posts and the training and skill needed to use them, watch out. Tanks are vulnerable to such a threat profile, and the MGS even more so. You say the MGS makes for a 'nifty direct-fire infantry support weapon'. However, a tank also makes a good support weapon too, and is capable of dealing with enemy tanks if they pop up. By comparison, the MGS can deal with dug-in infantry, but not enemy tanks because of its weak armour and de-powered main gun.

The MGS/MMEV systems are already obsolete. They were born at the time US Army General Eric Shinseki conceived of a way to make military forces faster and lighter, and in an era when it was believed that the future conflict would involve only low-intensity scenarios. I say 'obsolete' because there appears to be a real risk that the US will be going to war with Iran soon, possibly causing the outbreak of a general war in the Middle East, and, God forbid, another world war. You do not want to be sending your troops into the middle of a 'hot war' with vehicles like the MGS and the MMEV.

I agree with you that the MGS and MMEV are likely to get left behind. Simply because their too-sophisticated electromechanical systems and lack of survivability make them a millstone around the necks of soldiers who can do their jobs far better with lower-tech, more traditional weapons.

 

[mainerjohnthomas]

Actually, I have always favoured LeoII(A5-A6?) over the MGS.  We don't have the ability to air deploy the MGS, so that issue is a non-issue for us.  The Americans can use the MGS because they have the M1 to do the tank destroying for them, and they have heavy tactical air helicopter and fighter-bomber assets to do the same.  I don't see us having the ability to use the MGS in its niche role, I see us using the MGS as a tank-destroyer as well as direct infantry fire support, and it lacks the armour and hitting power for the job.  Our doctrine requires MGS, TUA, and ADATS (or MMEV) to do the job that the LeoII could do solo.  If we are stuck using a LAVIII hull, then I prefer the LAV III with sidecar ATGM or NLOS systems for tank-killing and bunker busting, because the MGS brings no more armour, and less tank-killing power to the table, with a similar burden to the logistics train.  The problem with niche weapon systems, is that too often we are stuck with only the one tool in the box, and several jobs to do with it.  That situation can get us killed using an MGS to do the job of the dedicated tank destroyers we did not deploy.  I remember Jean Chretien telling the press that we did not need the Cadillac (referring to Sea King replacement), that we could get by with a Chevy. The problem is that we do need the Cadillac, as we will not have a dozen vehicles to do a dozen jobs, we will have one or two vehicles to do the same dozen jobs, and if its not the Cadillac, we (not the politicians) are up the creek.

 

[TCBF]

"Exactly.  Therefore, significantly increase the number of LAV-III TUA systems and give them back to the mechanized infantry battalion either in an ant-armour platoon at battalion level or right down to the rifle company level like the US Stryker units do.  If they really insist on the MGS then do the same with it.  Give the support to the troops that are deploying.  Scrap the ADATS/MMEV all together.  When's the last time ADATS actually deployed?  A few systems concentrated in one regiment just doesn't seem to make sense."

Good points.  History lesson?  Tanks supporting Recce.  As a Recce soldier, I always said that the only tanks I could count on accompanying me on the battlfield would be enemy ones.

If you don't have it now, you won't see it then.

Tom

 

[Retired AF Guy]

A couple of days ago there was a post in several papers about the MGS, and no it is not cancelled! According to the paper the first MGS is to come off the line in 2008. 

 

[Armymatters]

If you really want the ability to smack your enemy from a decent stand-off distance, you'd be better off acquiring the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) which offers the ability to bust bunkers, tanks, provide counter-battery fire, kill infantry in open-topped trenches - all for a fraction of the price. Since it's based on the M113 platform, you have a well-established stream of parts and support resources to boot.

Just to correct you, the American MLRS launch system is based on a a stretched M2 Bradley chassis, not a M113. Please do not confuse the two. Thanks.

 

[Kirkhill]

Please do not confuse the two. Thanks.

Yes Sir. Three bags full Sir. ;D

 

[George Wallace]

....... Please do not confuse the two. Thanks.

;D

 

[GK .Dundas]

Just to correct you, the American MLRS launch system is based on a a stretched M2 Bradley chassis, not a M113. Please do not confuse the two. Thanks.

SIR! YES SIR!  :

 

[GK .Dundas]

Help me here perhaps  I'm a little slow but everytime I gaze upon Transformation (Tm.) I feel like I'm being sold a bill of goods.
As I understand it we are replacing tanks which we wont (note the use of the word)deploy overseas. They are each being replaced with four separate vehicles. Which we are unable to deploy overseas using current national assets. Futhermore they vehicle have difficulty in extreme terrain found on some  battlefields.As well they 're is that matter of weak armour.
And finally we have to rely on enemies competence or rather lack of it to achieve victory.

 

[Eland]

Help me here perhaps  I'm a little slow but everytime I gaze upon Transformation (Tm.) I feel like I'm being sold a bill of goods.
As I understand it we are replacing tanks which we wont (note the use of the word)deploy overseas. They are each being replaced with four separate vehicles. Which we are unable to deploy overseas using current national assets. Futhermore they vehicle have difficulty in extreme terrain found on some  battlefields.As well they 're is that matter of weak armour.
And finally we have to rely on enemies competence or rather lack of it to achieve victory.

You're not slow. You and all other Canadians have been sold a bill of goods. The previous government bought the MGS and went whole hog on the current Army Transformation deal, on the assumption that the Canadian Army would never again participate in major combat operations. As was just demonstrated in Afghanistan early this week, significant combat ops are in store for Canadian troops deployed there. If the United States attacks Iran, there is a risk that we could see a general war erupt in the Middle East, which in turn would see Canada and other US alllies drawn in.

The idea behind the MGS is to provide a measure of fire support and 'intimidation factor' for infantry and other combat arms engaged in "operations other than war". OOW covers a pretty broad spectrum, all the way from humanitarian aid ops and anything else up to, but just short of a full-bore advance to contact. In most OOW situations, there's little need to deploy very quickly, so a lack of air-portability is generally not a concern.

I suspect the government which bought the MGS figured it could be deployed on leased RO-RO ships, and by the time the ships arrived, whatever crisis was brewing would already have been dealt with. By America, Britain, or some other country, take your pick of a number of possible choices.