First of all, let me say that Pat is right on with his last post just above here, and that it is sad to say that it is the reason none of us will see the positive results of the government Shipbuilding Strategy, if such results ever happen.
Engineering is the heart and soul of modern ships, and warships in particular. Their existence and continued operation can only occur with the assistance of master craftsmen. And this is where we failed in the last 30 years: The dockyards were pressed to save on costs and as a result failed to hire sufficient numbers of apprentices and give them time to learn their trade from the retiring masters; our shipyards could not find enough work and let their craftsmen go, never to be replaced or without passing the knowledge base; in the Navy, the engineers became more and more operators first and maintainers/repairers second, again losing the discipline of the apprentice/craftsman. Such situation cannot be remedied quickly - it takes generations (plural) of master/apprentice to recover it. The European and Asian's have this tradition. We in North-America don't have it, at least not anymore. (And no, a "master" welder from Fort McMurray cannot just come in and become a "master" welder in a shipyard. There are too many differences).
So this said, and before we condemn the Navy brass as simply following the old cold war strategy, let us look at the strategy and the consequences of the engineering dilemma above.
Many moon ago, when preparing to release "Leadmark", the RCN looked at the whole spectrum of naval operations, analysed what each one required and would cost, looked at the resources available to the Navy and at the type of operations going on in the world from a Canadian experience and point of view. They rejected instantly carrier operations and ballistic submarines for obvious reasons, took a good look at mine warfare and realized we had never had such an attack in Canada in either world war or even during the cold war - so the limited capability of the MCDV's was enough. They seriously looked at amphibious operation (though one must understand that at that time, even the idea of the Special Op Regiment had not been conceived yet) and concluded that, considering the speed of their deployment "from home base in Canada" and "from scratch" with usefully trained soldiers onboard would require such lead time as to make them not useful to Canada. The alternative amphibious ops capability was forward deployment in contingency area - USMC style, which turned out to be too expensive for Canada. So it was shelved.
Leadmark's conclusion (and one I agree with) was that the best bang for our very limited Naval money was concentrating on General purpose forces deployable under the concept of the Canadian Task Force (One command/AAW ship deployed with one or two GP frigates and one support ship) deployed from each coast. This, by the way, is NOT the continuation of our cold war mentality. During the cold war, we concentrated completely and uniquely on ASW close escort of convoys. Everything else was left to our allies. The CTF concept led to development of new capabilities for the Navy and in particular in the command area, which is why, for instance, during the Gulf War, with only a three ships contribution, Canada was assigned the command of all forces in the gulf rear area (the largest command at sea by a Canadian since the retirement of BONAVENTURE), the only country other than the US given an operational command.
Going back to Leadmark and engineering: the reason to concentrate on the CSC's as a "single" class arises from the tremendous savings in training, supply/support and development of the ship particular knowledge base. Contrary to many European countries, Canada as a country has limited tradition of civilian support for its Navy and its operations. Thus, the Navy must always keep in mind the cost of its operations. We simply cannot afford the complexity of supporting a large number of different type of ships. This may change if the Navy is given new strategic direction from the Government (but "Canada First" is not a new strategic guidance - just a shopping list) and the resources to put it in effect.
And by the way, AirDet: the Navy/USMC team in the US is not a "multi-role" force. It is a single role: Amphibious ops - nothing else.
This said I would favour limited Amphibious capability at this stage for two reasons: (1) We now have a permanent special operations regiment that could incorporate and maintain the required knowledge base for amphibious ops and therefore be available quickly and (2) with the North opening but without good support base for the army and the Caribbean's becoming a new focus area of operations for the Navy, a small amphibious capability would be useful and deployable in a timely fashion from Halifax or Esquimalt.
