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The latest issue of the US Army War College publication, Parameters, is dedicated to 'lessons learned' (possibly) from Afghanistan. LINK
It leads with an insightful overview by Sir Hew Strachan, who identifies two imperatives:
1. The first is that of the needs of coalition warfare. While having over 50 states contribute to the war is laudable, that achievement is overshadowed by the dysfunctionality of many of the contingents sent into theater -- by their token presence, by national caveats surrounding their employment, and by the part played by domestic politics in the timing of their withdrawals.
2. The second imperative follows from the first. This search for lessons must not just be in pursuit of commonalities. Such an exercise is in danger of looking at and recognizing the experience of others through the prism of the United States, and so ignoring differences, which may themselves be instructive. Just because the US Army may deem something not to have been “invented here” does not meant that it is therefore unworthy of consideration. After all, that too-ready dismissal of others’ experiences and of their possible applicability was a major source of exactly the problems the US Army confronted from 2002 to 2004.
The chapter specifically on Canada was written by Col. Howard Coombs, PhD. I think his views are summed nicely by a line in the penultimate paragraph, "Sadly, none of the lessons learned have been systemically operationalized in an enduring manner." In effect, lessons have been identified, but not actually 'learned.'
Mods: I couldn't find an Afghanistan topic where this seemed to fit. Feel free to move it (obviously)
It leads with an insightful overview by Sir Hew Strachan, who identifies two imperatives:
1. The first is that of the needs of coalition warfare. While having over 50 states contribute to the war is laudable, that achievement is overshadowed by the dysfunctionality of many of the contingents sent into theater -- by their token presence, by national caveats surrounding their employment, and by the part played by domestic politics in the timing of their withdrawals.
2. The second imperative follows from the first. This search for lessons must not just be in pursuit of commonalities. Such an exercise is in danger of looking at and recognizing the experience of others through the prism of the United States, and so ignoring differences, which may themselves be instructive. Just because the US Army may deem something not to have been “invented here” does not meant that it is therefore unworthy of consideration. After all, that too-ready dismissal of others’ experiences and of their possible applicability was a major source of exactly the problems the US Army confronted from 2002 to 2004.
The chapter specifically on Canada was written by Col. Howard Coombs, PhD. I think his views are summed nicely by a line in the penultimate paragraph, "Sadly, none of the lessons learned have been systemically operationalized in an enduring manner." In effect, lessons have been identified, but not actually 'learned.'
Mods: I couldn't find an Afghanistan topic where this seemed to fit. Feel free to move it (obviously)