Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs)

[Navy_Pete]

So right now now at sea in one of the Kingston Class on Op Reassurance. Ships have reached or are reaching its design life of 25 years. ABS did their survey and found the ships fit for 15 more years as they are in pretty good shape. All Kingston class will he extended for the first 5 years, after which it's expected to start paying them off 2 at a time. So you more than likely see the Kingston Class around for further 15 years. That could of course change as the ships provide incredible value in operational savings and in crewing with low maintenance costs.

No official replacement yet however plenty of concept artwork the replacements. Expected requirements similar to the Kingston class with 25 knot speed, longer and with a gun. So basically a MCDV with some of the biggest deficiencies corrected.

I don't disagree that the MCDVs are incredibly useful and a great asset, but I just don't see how we'll receive the new AOPs without retiring the MCDVs and maybe some CPFs early. We just don't have the crew, and the MARTECH trade is broken with a 10+ year recovery time (at least; there isn't really an actual plan to improve retention, recruitment or training). If they get rid of the HCRFF from the Martechs, that will probably be the final straw for a lot of the legacy HTs and the juniour Martech that are really into the firefighting side of things.

Lots of things are technically and financially possible but without people to do it it doesn't really matter. If we can't figure out how to crew our existing fleet then new replacement projects shouldn't really be considered. Just worried that the RCN will continue to roll the dice on sailing with minimal crews/beaten up ships until we actually lose a ship or kill people, as there was absolutely zero uptake that we dodged a major bullet with the FRE fire.

 

[TacticalTea]

It was a part time job, akin to current reserve command.

At the time, we had no asset as we were just resuscitating the capability. We started (in good Canadian fashion) by setting up HQ to define the requirements, prepare/update the plan and then build up from there. There were three areas (to be brought up to four when Arctic stood up) corresponding to the Coast Guard ones: Pacific, Atlantic and Laurentian, which corresponded to the Coast Guard Central region. For Laurentian, we had our HQ in the Montreal Harbour administration building.

Each area was under the command of a Captain, with a Commander as deputy commander, then the various sectors had a Lcdr in command. My sector, within Laurentian, was designated "St-Lawrence", with my counterpart in Toronto commanding sector "Great Lakes". We ran at least two CPX, that I can recall.

While no pre-MCDV vessels were assigned to the tasks, the whole of the Naval Reserve was re-organized around coastal defense and Shipping Control at that time. Prior to that, N.R.U.'s were basically dedicated to individual training. In a single summer, they were redirected to become providers of operational crews, a bit like the US Naval Reserves, and concentrated on team training under the CFCD102 to fill the needs of coastal defense/NCS. So, for instance, a given NRU would be "tasked" with providing two CSV crew, 2 ISV crew and one HSV crew, together with one diving team and one NCS watch. Etc. Etc.

Then, the wall fell, the submarine program was bandonned and cuts in defense occured. The Navy barelly managed to hang on to the MCDV project - now using the need for reserve training ships as the rationale, and the whole coastal defense thing was shelved yet again, replaced by more modest harbour defense teams and general trades training. I suppose the timing was good, as until a permanent solution was found after 9/11, the reserves harbour defense teams played a major role in protecting the fleet's main harbours.

I suppose that now that the Naval Reserve is seen as an "augmentation" force again, they went back to individual training only.

So, reading up on our history a bit - and realizing I am woefully ignorant (just now getting what your username is about) - it seems the MCDVs were in some way a return to NavRes' post-war commitment to MW? Which had existed in the form of the Bay class MCMs.

And this is the SSN project you were talking about?

Canada-class submarine - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Now, looking forward. The AOPVs already replace the MCDVs in some regards, although they are about ten times as massive, and presumably much more expensive to operate. In parallel, the Orca patrol and training vessels are also nearing the end of their usefulness. They're about a decade younger than the MCDVs, but have been taxed heavily, being in almost continuous operation since their service began, and generally crewed by more junior, accident-prone personnel. Plus, as discussed, navies and governments can be expected to move MW away from crewed ships and onto the unmanned vessels.

As such, would it be reasonable to expect a replacement that stays away from MCM and morphs closer to some kind of a midway point between an Orca and an MCDV? Perhaps, as you mentioned previously, some sort of ISV with heavier armament or a flight deck that would focus on coastal patrol duties, fishpats, american diplomacy, and training? Seems like it would also fit the theme of Force Protection revival the RCN has been going with (NST, NTOG).

 

[FJAG]

but I just don't see how we'll receive the new AOPs without retiring the MCDVs and maybe some CPFs early. We just don't have the crew, and the MARTECH trade is broken with a 10+ year recovery time (at least; there isn't really an actual plan to improve retention, recruitment or training)

I know this is my usual rant, but, try to make much better use of the 5,000 plus naval reservists that the Navy has now. I know that its totally anathema to the CAF to plan an asset around part-time service. The MCDVs have a life left (which might even extend with the right kind of program) but if the bulk of them really became a training vessel with a mobilization role, then maintenance and use of them could be spread out further than the somewhat scarce RegF ratings. The Navy is a bit like the Army - RegF equipment it can't man and ResF personnel without equipment. For me, one problem solves the other.

 

[dapaterson]

The RCN has nowhere near 5K primary reservists and has not in several decades.

 

[FJAG]

The RCN has nowhere near 5K primary reservists and has not in several decades.

I'm shocked. Wikipedia lied?

I stand corrected. Navy website says 4,100 as to 8,400 RegF.

My point, however, stands. MCDV crew of 47 max with 12 in service for a total of a maximum 564 all ranks which works out to seven ResF members per position on each ship. Even with our slow system of training and career progression, one ought to be able to keep up that staffing level. The ratio gets even better if not all the ships are allocated to the ResF or some RegF members are required to fill specific command jobs.

 

[dapaterson]

I'd take the Navy website with a grain of salt as well (your choice of three oceans for the source of the salt).

Unfortunately, the DRR does not give a breakdown of P Res strength by CAF level 1. (https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/reports/2021/drr-2020-21.pdf)

 

[Edward Campbell]

What I think I'm reading here is that we, Canada (with the military for which we are willing pay), cannot crew a proper fleet. Proper means one sized and equipped for a country with three oceans and the world's longest coastline.

We are going to have:

1. Several (thin/summer) ice-capable but very, very lightly armed patrol vessels;

2. Several well armed, globally deployable combat vessels;

3. Two or three or four support ships - some 100% military, some leased, perhaps;

4. A few submarines, maybe;

5. A dozen small, middle aged, lightly armed, civilian-standard patrol vessels; and

6. Some auxiliary vessels.

We cannot crew them all, especially not if we replace the small patrol vessels and it will take a decade or so to address the staffing issues IF we get serious, quickly.

There are also some difficult cost/capability issues. The big, well armed combat vessels can do almost anything in ice-free waters but they have fairly large crews and are expensive to run and many of the tasks that our Navy has can be performed, adequately, by smaller, cheaper (and cheaper to operate) but less capable ships.

IF the above is correct - and please tell me if it isn't - then:

1. We need a mix of major combatants, small combatants/minor war vessels and lightly armed, constabulary, patrol vessels and oilers and submarines on full time service. The fleet should be fairly large (say 20-30 surface combatants, including the a few of the lightly armed, ice-capable patrol vessels) surface fleet, including oilers, and some under-ice capable submarines and some training vessels;

2. But we can't crew them all at the same time;

3. Maybe we needn't crew them all at the same time - perhaps some of each can be in some sort of "limited storage" (I'm not sure I know what the is or how it might work), waiting for a time when they are either needed or affordable.

 

[Stoker]

I don't disagree that the MCDVs are incredibly useful and a great asset, but I just don't see how we'll receive the new AOPs without retiring the MCDVs and maybe some CPFs early. We just don't have the crew, and the MARTECH trade is broken with a 10+ year recovery time (at least; there isn't really an actual plan to improve retention, recruitment or training). If they get rid of the HCRFF from the Martechs, that will probably be the final straw for a lot of the legacy HTs and the juniour Martech that are really into the firefighting side of things.

Lots of things are technically and financially possible but without people to do it it doesn't really matter. If we can't figure out how to crew our existing fleet then new replacement projects shouldn't really be considered. Just worried that the RCN will continue to roll the dice on sailing with minimal crews/beaten up ships until we actually lose a ship or kill people, as there was absolutely zero uptake that we dodged a major bullet with the FRE fire.

If you see what I wrote they will be paying them off eventually and that was from the Commodore a few weeks ago. The Kingston Class being on Op Reassurance is going to be a steady state thing and really you'll probably see some CPFs in extended readiness at some point. AOPS will more than likely be used as a mothership for the Kingston Class on these missions before long.

 

[Stoker]

I'm shocked. Wikipedia lied?

I stand corrected. Navy website says 4,100 as to 8,400 RegF.

My point, however, stands. MCDV crew of 47 max with 12 in service for a total of a maximum 564 all ranks which works out to seven ResF members per position on each ship. Even with our slow system of training and career progression, one ought to be able to keep up that staffing level. The ratio gets even better if not all the ships are allocated to the ResF or some RegF members are required to fill specific command jobs.

The effective bunking for the class is 45 and for some time now at least 3 MCDVs are zero crewed. Res Force gave up crewing them and now only a token amount on them. There is no appetite to take a greater role

 

[Underway]

I know this is my usual rant, but, try to make much better use of the 5,000 plus naval reservists that the Navy has now. I know that its totally anathema to the CAF to plan an asset around part-time service. The MCDVs have a life left (which might even extend with the right kind of program) but if the bulk of them really became a training vessel with a mobilization role, then maintenance and use of them could be spread out further than the somewhat scarce RegF ratings. The Navy is a bit like the Army - RegF equipment it can't man and ResF personnel without equipment. For me, one problem solves the other.

It was tried. The RCN was the envy of the Militia for years as they "had a mission", to crew and operate the MCDV's. But that mission was going to fail eventually because of two things.

1. The majority of the crew were Reg F in all but name. Class C reservists who sailed the ships all the time, with no postings ashore as a break. Constantly at sea or on the ship. The amount of time the crews were at sea was ridiculous.
2. The PRes couldn't keep up the OP tempo and keep the ships crewed. There just were not enough people who could sail enough, and give over their time to earn the qualifications needed (particularly C ticket MESO's).

This of course led to unbalanced promotions, where the Class C got all the promotions and the Class A got less. How does a Class A PER compete with a Class C PER? Answer... it doesn't. Some trades at the reserve units were destitute of anyone higher than LS (Kingston Class were not reserve units but Fleet units crewed mainly by reservists). This also mean that the Class C pers were holding positions at their home units which were essentially vacated by the perma Class C.

So you had Class A vs Class C vs Reg F separation (back to wavey navy crap from WW2) all of which who disliked each other and of course, stovepiped into different levels of expertise.

The current situation of 10% of positions on all ships for PRes is much better. All PRes quals are equivalent to Reg F except for PRes only trades (Port Inspection Diver as an example). When a PRes sailor has time they take a position on a ship for up to a year and have the exact same qual as a Reg F pers of the same trade. This means that they can augment properly if called up. Most of the former Class C PRes have switched over to Reg F.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Problem when you read to much naval history and then hear "Coastal Defense Vessel" and you think of this

 

[Underway]

What I think I'm reading here is that we, Canada (with the military for which we are willing pay), cannot crew a proper fleet. Proper means one sized and equipped for a country with three oceans and the world's longest coastline.

We are going to have:

1. Several (thin/summer) ice-capable but very, very lightly armed patrol vessels;

2. Several well armed, globally deployable combat vessels;

3. Two or three or four support ships - some 100% military, some leased, perhaps;

4. A few submarines, maybe;

5. A dozen small, middle aged, lightly armed, civilian-standard patrol vessels; and

6. Some auxiliary vessels.

We cannot crew them all, especially not if we replace the small patrol vessels and it will take a decade or so to address the staffing issues IF we get serious, quickly.

There are also some difficult cost/capability issues. The big, well armed combat vessels can do almost anything in ice-free waters but they have fairly large crews and are expensive to run and many of the tasks that our Navy has can be performed, adequately, by smaller, cheaper (and cheaper to operate) but less capable ships.

IF the above is correct - and please tell me if it isn't - then:

1. We need a mix of major combatants, small combatants/minor war vessels and lightly armed, constabulary, patrol vessels and oilers and submarines on full time service. The fleet should be fairly large (say 20-30 surface combatants, including the a few of the lightly armed, ice-capable patrol vessels) surface fleet, including oilers, and some under-ice capable submarines and some training vessels;

2. But we can't crew them all at the same time;

3. Maybe we needn't crew them all at the same time - perhaps some of each can be in some sort of "limited storage" (I'm not sure I know what the is or how it might work), waiting for a time when they are either needed or affordable.

The future fleet composition plan:
15 CSC/CPF (replacing as new capabilities come online)
2 AOR (+1 leased perhaps)
4 Submarines (gov't has leaned into life extension)
6 AOPS

Kingston class replacement and numbers are not known for sure. I doubt it will be a one for one as AOPS do the OPV mission as well. 6-9 replacements is what I'm thinking.

The RCN Task Group concept is to have one high readiness task group available at all times. That's 4 CSC/CPF and 1 AOR (with airdets, but that might be a critical pinch of pers as well. 6 airdets available seems a massive stretch). That's in combination from both coasts (2 CSC one coast 2 another coast). The rest of the ships are working up to high readiness, coming off of it or in a maintenance period. They might be available for sailing but not task group operations without some time.

 

[FJAG]

It was tried. The RCN was the envy of the Militia for years as they "had a mission", to crew and operate the MCDV's. But that mission was going to fail eventually because of two things.

1. The majority of the crew were Reg F in all but name. Class C reservists who sailed the ships all the time, with no postings ashore as a break. Constantly at sea or on the ship. The amount of time the crews were at sea was ridiculous.
2. The PRes couldn't keep up the OP tempo and keep the ships crewed. There just were not enough people who could sail enough, and give over their time to earn the qualifications needed (particularly C ticket MESO's).

This of course led to unbalanced promotions, where the Class C got all the promotions and the Class A got less. How does a Class A PER compete with a Class C PER? Answer... it doesn't. Some trades at the reserve units were destitute of anyone higher than LS (Kingston Class were not reserve units but Fleet units crewed mainly by reservists). This also mean that the Class C pers were holding positions at their home units which were essentially vacated by the perma Class C.

So you had Class A vs Class C vs Reg F separation (back to wavey navy crap from WW2) all of which who disliked each other and of course, stovepiped into different levels of expertise.

The current situation of 10% of positions on all ships for PRes is much better. All PRes quals are equivalent to Reg F except for PRes only trades (Port Inspection Diver as an example). When a PRes sailor has time they take a position on a ship for up to a year and have the exact same qual as a Reg F pers of the same trade. This means that they can augment properly if called up. Most of the former Class C PRes have switched over to Reg F.

Just before I respond to this let me add a thing about RCN manpower. As I see the Halifax class in basic terms is we have 12 with a crew of around 225 for a total of 2,700. Even when you consider ships down for maintenance and so on that would be very hard to maintain at full complement with a RegF of 8,400 especially when you need to add in the support ships, AOps, subs (and MCDVs) and all the training craft and essential headquarters and shore facilities.

Back to your points @Underway - I watched all of that unfold in 2000 to 2009 while I was on Chief of Reserves Council and the ResF Employment Project. Much of the pressure for change came from the RCN because they were trying at the time to make a go of the ResF/MCFV thing. A ResF friend of mine, a civilian lawyer from Edmonton of all things, got his ticket to run an MCDV but it took a lot of full-time commitment to jump through all the command hoops and then followed that up by a full-time tour as master. I could see that the Navy's desired course of action was to keep the bulk of the MCDVs operating full-time with ResF crews. But basically at Class B and C (and that was an issue as to which they would be then) crews operating full-time, even if rotational, is just a way of expanding the full-time force above PY levels (and usually at the expense of other activities such as Class A pay, and other O&M budget items)

The lesson that I took away from that is that the RCN (and the Army and RCAF) see the ResF as little MiniMes who, if they aren't serving full-time on Class B or C just aren't worth the bother. The concept of Class A ResF soldiers and sailors with ResF equipment - all kept in reserve and just used part-time until there was an emergency - was and is generally not a desired form of service. Class As were just a pool to draw Class Bs and Cs from on a continuous basis.

There are numerous positions in the Army (and I expect even more so in the Navy) that a ResF guy can never get the training or experience to do well, if at all. There are clearly positions in a unit (or ship) which absolutely need to be filled by a full-timer. To me a full-timer is a RegF guy. Class Bs and Cs to me should be short term "other than full-time, continuing" jobs (such as an operational tour or replacing a RegF guy or gal on family leave or some such absence) and not a "RegF Lite" add-on component that either fills positions for years on end or who allow the organization to exceed PY limits.

I think the CAF has lost the bubble when it comes to understanding that there is a certain force level that you need in peacetime for training and limited operations and another whole different force that you need when things turn sour.

To me it makes sense that a portion of the Army's vehicle fleet and Navy ships and even RCAF helicopters, being "kept in reserve" for limited annual training which will not only extend the life of that equipment, allow it to be rotated out for maintenance and upgrades, and still provide a purpose for a ResF crew to train with and man in an emergency. In all cases they need to be staffed by enough RegF people in the key jobs that absolutely need full-timers with the requisite training and experience. I really have no idea for who or how many that needs to be for a ship's complement but it strikes me that with the numbers of ships and personnel that the Navy has that a program of "active" ships and "reserve" ships could be instituted based on designated hybrid crews and specific "mobilization" roles for the "reserve" ships. I know that when I was a seventeen year old gunner, I was happiest and most motivated when I had a howitzer or a truck that I could touch and say "this is mine". When I was just in a mob of people with no defined purpose I watched people leave in droves. (I was always too thick to quit).

I can't think of anything better than four or five ResF ships' companies, consolidated under one RegF Captain, than to have a CFP parked somewhere and be told, for the next year that's your ship for training. We will do a couple of confirmation sails for two weeks each in August.

 

[TacticalTea]

I doubt it will be a one for one as AOPS do the OPV mission as well.

My take as well. So what do you figure they'd look like?

 

[Underway]

My take as well. So what do you figure they'd look like?

Similar to a River-class but with the flight deck used as a work deck instead.

 

[daftandbarmy]

There are numerous positions in the Army (and I expect even more so in the Navy) that a ResF guy can never get the training or experience to do well, if at all. There are clearly positions in a unit (or ship) which absolutely need to be filled by a full-timer. To me a full-timer is a RegF guy. Class Bs and Cs to me should be short term "other than full-time, continuing" jobs (such as an operational tour or replacing a RegF guy or gal on family leave or some such absence) and not a "RegF Lite" add-on component that either fills positions for years on end or who allow the organization to exceed PY limits.

It seems that the RCN has had success with a 90/10 model, as opposed to 10/90. That's a great idea.

Assuming that you don't post junk/bottom of the barrel Reg F dudes to the mo', and that they actually train people as opposed to just sitting in their offices pushing paper like most of them do now, the mo' could reasonably be expected to train people up to Maj/MWO level.

IMHO right now, with a few exceptions, it's a hit and miss approach to pushing inadequate people upwards into positions well above their levels of competence to fulfill a thinly veiled political agenda.

 

[TacticalTea]

It seems that the RCN has had success with a 90/10 model, as opposed to 10/90. That's a great idea.

Assuming that you don't post junk/bottom of the barrel Reg F dudes to the mo', and that they actually train people as opposed to just sitting in their offices pushing paper like most of them do now, the mo' could reasonably be expected to train people up to Maj/MWO level.

IMHO right now, with a few exceptions, it's a hit and miss approach to pushing inadequate people upwards into positions well above their levels of competence to fulfill a thinly veiled political agenda.

Hard for me to make sense of what you're saying here. Sorry to say.

What's ''the mo'''? What's 10/90 vs 90/10? What's the political agenda you're talking about?

 

[Rainbow1910]

Similar to a River-class but with the flight deck used as a work deck instead.

I'd guess with the lack of Cyclones to go around or an alternate medium/light helicopter, a large hanger and full flight deck could be something that could cause a ballooning of size and tonnage? Would it be worthwhile to futureproof the vessels with the ability to carry larger unmanned drones/helicopters and other similar systems to increase their surveillance and patrol capabilities? I think the RCN adopted the Skeldar V-200 recently but I haven't heard much about if it will be procured in any meaningful numbers. Seems like a worthwhile capability if they are going for more of an OPV focus. The ability to carry seacans would help this somewhat but a dedicated landing area might be required for larger vehicles.

 

[FJAG]

It seems that the RCN has had success with a 90/10 model, as opposed to 10/90. That's a great idea.

Assuming that you don't post junk/bottom of the barrel Reg F dudes to the mo', and that they actually train people as opposed to just sitting in their offices pushing paper like most of them do now, the mo' could reasonably be expected to train people up to Maj/MWO level.

IMHO right now, with a few exceptions, it's a hit and miss approach to pushing inadequate people upwards into positions well above their levels of competence to fulfill a thinly veiled political agenda.

I'm convinced 10/90 doesn't work. It leads to what you're accustomed to - a small staff that looks after administration and has little to do during the time between Class A parades. That leads to having too many low performers sent to RSS. (Although I have to tell you that I was RSSO for two years and never considered myself a low performer - same same for many of my peers both officers and NCOs - admittedly I took over from a guy who was pretty much a none entity)

Anyway that's why I tend to the 30/70 system that basically forms a solid full-time bn headquarters staff, a full company and a substantial CSS company. In that type of system, the battalion has something to do besides train the weekend warriors and is also capable of developing full-time elements to lead or be a part of peacetime operational deployments. The CO for that unit would be responsible and accountable for leading his full-time components while also training and developing the reserve elements that round out his unit.

I know that there is great reluctance to do something like this but I know it can work. Two of the four years that I spent in 2 RCHA in Petawawa, we were a 1 battery regiment with D Bty while E Bty was permanently hived off to Gagetown so support the artillery school. As a regiment we did everything and trained in all the functions of a full regiment including cobbling together a second battery - F Bty - and heavily training and exercising five ResF regiments (each of which in those days able to generate a battery for weekend exercises and two full batteries for the summer. No one can tell me that our CO - Howie Wheatly - was a slouch or that he and his senior officers suffered in their career development.

4 AD was also a hybrid RegF and ResF regiment with sufficient full-time strength to conduct the essential regimental and sub-unit training for both its full-time and part-time people.

The key is that the battalion leadership is RegF and that there is enough mass of full-time people to function at all levels of training and that they have authority and responsibility for their ResF elements. I don't think that you can reach that with less than a 30% RegF core. In my book I see the majority of Army units as either 70/30 or 30/70 with no difference in criteria for the COs and senior staff and no difference in value to their command time.

I think ResF leadership should generally stop at the senior captain and WO level although I'm prepared to accept ResF majors and even LCols and MWOs so long as they have taken the requisite RegF courses and have had some experience on lengthier Class B or C positions (let's say one year, or have prior RegF time)

So just for the fun of it here's two examples:

48th Highlanders, Toronto 30/70 bn
Bn HQ - 48th Highlanders, Toronto 90/10
A Coy - 48th Highlanders, Toronto 100/0
B Coy - 48th Highlanders, Toronto 10/90
C Coy - Argyle and Southerland Highlanders, Hamilton 10/90
D Coy CS - Toronto Scottish, Toronto 30/70
E Coy CSS - Elements from 32 Svc Bn, Toronto 30/70

7th Toronto Regt RCA, Toronto 30/70 regt
RHQ - 7th Toronto RCA, Toronto 90/10
9 Fd Bty - Toronto 100/0
10 Fd Bty - Brantford, St Catharines, 10/90
11 Fd Bty - Guelph, 10/90
15 STA Bty - Toronto, 30/70
CSS Bty - Elements from 32 Svc Bn, Toronto 30/70

To put this back into an RCN context, one could amalgamate several ResF Naval divisions into a single Divisional Group centred on one particular division. Each group would have a RegF Captain and sufficient qualified RegF staff to fill the key positions to man a single CFP or a three to four MCDV flotilla depending on strength and which ships are assigned to the Divisional Group.

I'm looking at some old documentation but what I have shows each division already has roughly 5 RegF positions and between 66 to 180 Class A positions for a total of 2,491 Class A positions. (There are thousands more in various headquarters installations and the MCDVs). That means groups of divisions should be able to muster roughly 20 to 30 RegF and 405 to 641 Class A ResF as currently authorized.

The distribution could go something like this with the command element for each group located at the more central division as follows:

HMCS Scotian (East) - Brunswicker; Cabot; Scotian; Queen Charlotte (20 + 405)
HMCS Montcalm (Quebec) - Champlain; d'Iberville; Donnacona; Jolliet; Radisson, Montcalm (30 + 584)
HMCS York (Lake Ontario) - Carlton; Cataraqui; York; Prevost; Star (25 + 641)
HMCS Griffon (Lakehead) - Hunter; Griffon; Chippewa; Queen; Unicorn (25 + 419)
HMCS Malahat (West) - Malahat; Discovery; Tecumseh; Nonsuch (20 + 442)

It strikes me that if we designated say three CFPs and 6 MCDVs each year to the "reserve fleet" (possibly CFPs to each of Scotian, Montcalm and Malahat and MCDVs to York and Griffon) then these would be under the command of a Reg F captain with an adequate number of Reg F key appointments. My guess is that we would need to augment that RegF staff for each group a bit. I'm not sure if that would need to be year round or during "sails". The concept is different from the Army one and here 10% of the ships companies tend to be RegF. It depends on what you want or need the core full-time groups to accomplish during the time that the Class As are not training. However, regardless of the ratio, it would give each of the divisions something specific to focus on while giving those ships a rest and allowing for programmed maintenance and rotation.

Just a thought.

 

[Underway]

What's 10/90 vs 90/10?

Ship/shore ratio.

The book "ideal" ship-to-shore ratio is 40/60, as even part of that 40% is posted to a ship during a work period or trials. It allows for regenerative training and filling the shore billets, while not running your staff ragged. However, that has to be across all trades not just pan navy with one really good trade bringing up the average.

I'd guess with the lack of Cyclones to go around or an alternate medium/light helicopter, a large hanger and full flight deck could be something that could cause a ballooning of size and tonnage? Would it be worthwhile to futureproof the vessels with the ability to carry larger unmanned drones/helicopters and other similar systems to increase their surveillance and patrol capabilities? I think the RCN adopted the Skeldar V-200 recently but I haven't heard much about if it will be procured in any meaningful numbers. Seems like a worthwhile capability if they are going for more of an OPV focus. The ability to carry seacans would help this somewhat but a dedicated landing area might be required for larger vehicles.

If you take a look at the Arafura class and River class they have flight decks with no hangars. This means you could in theory land a helicopter on them. Ships that small would be very restricted in the sea states they could land (not embark) a helo.

This is why a work deck that can be used as a flight deck is likely the best way to go.

The Skeldar was for trials and testing, and there is a new procurement out for the final solution. RCN want's a common control station for UAV, UUV and USV, and as such that's what they are driving towards.

What I think the requirements should be:

• min 25knots
• 30mm main gun with independent EOIR sighting, 50 cal positions
• ~40 crew
• ability to take multiple sea can mission packages
• mast high EOIR capability (similar to AOPS or JSS)
• half decent range (~5000nm)
• standard 9m multirole boat launch
• extra space for 20 pers (dive team, UXV team, boarding team etc...)
• Link 16 / IFF capability integral (not a FFNW situation)
• flexible OPS space
• improved radar so that it can detect some air targets (SCANTER 6002 as an example)
• edit: Degaussing system...

On the nice to have part:

• quiet ASW levels of noise to allow for TRAPS and mine warfare gear to better do their job
• dynamic station keeping (may be mutually exclusive from quiet...)
• flight deck for landing (not embarking ) Cyclone, operation of UAVs