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Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs)

Saab AMB (Sea Giraffe)? That would provide commonality with the JSS and frigates.
Yup. That's my vote if I had one.

I’m all for using material efficiently, but at this point I think the Bonnie’s Bofor’s can safely go to a museum.
They are there. I saw one in the National War Museum. But it was labeled that it was from an MCDV... lol
Honestly think the CRCN is playing way outside his swimlane all over the place, and way overestimating his actual authority.
Sounds like classic East Coast resistance to change. ;) He's already beat down CFRG and got his way there.

They are working in the capability office right now to get MCDV replacements planned. As they are for submarines. Coming in the new year will be a entirely different defence update. We'll likely get a sniff then.
 
So what we need is a utility truck of a ship which the MCDV has turned out to be. I already saw some concept art for the replacement and obviously they took into account the limitations of the Kingston Class. So we'll have a longer ship that has the capability of up to 25 knots, good range, a small gun most likely 25mm to 40mm, .50 Cals. Nothing else. The ship will have a full sized Rhib which we don't have now. The ship will have degaussing and a CBRN capability and the ability to operate drones. I believe the replacement will be a variant of the River Class. The replacement will be able to operate with NATO MCM.
Any replacement is at least 10 years away which is the ABS assessment of how long they'll last.
I think this is seriously short sighted. Anyone with half a brain can see that the risk of major power conflict (specifically maritime conflict) is growing. Never mind having better armed ships to fight a war if necessary, how about having better armed ships to potentially deter a war?

I 100% get the vital non-combat roles that a Navy plays in supporting a nation's vital interests, but it's at times like this that we need to be preparing for the worst. I'm with Mr. Campbell that the AOPS are extremely valuable assets but they are assets that are rightfully best suited for a constabulary role. The RCN can certainly (and has) fulfilled that role in times of low risk of conflict, but at times like these the RCN really needs to shift its focus to a potential wartime role. Other Government departments (CCG, DFO, RCMP, Etc.) will have to take up the constabulary slack (even if they have to be dragged into it kicking and screaming) while the Navy makes that pivot.
 
I have vague memories of hearing that at least one of Bonnie's Bofors had a manufacturing data plate that had the year 1943 on it.
They were extremely well traveled if nothing else.
After Bonaventure they provided Air Defense at Lahr and served aboard the AOR during the Persian excursion part one.. And finally aboard the MCDV s.
 
Two points here:

First, let's all get over the "Bonnie's Bofors" thing once and for all. The Bofors 40mm came from MAGNIFICENT. Bonnie had American twin 3 inch. 50 cal guns for AA - no Bofors.

Second:

1. The MCDVs were built for one purpose only: to save a shipyard. The Navy got 'em 'cause there was no one else. They have done yeoman service.

There was never the idea of saving a shipyard with the MCDV's. They were acquired to replace the extremely old and fast aging training vessels of the Regular and Reserve force on a one for one basis: 12 MCDV to replace 6 PB (Reg force), 5 Gate vessels and FORT STEELE ( Reserve force). All of these old vessels were built in the 1950's (with PORTE ST JEAN having the distinction of being the last RCN vessel commissioned under King Georges VI). The contracts for the MCDV constructions was a short listed contest between two Engineering consortiums - none of which had any specific yard attached to them. Ultimately, the Fenco team won and then (only then) hired Halifax shipyard - before the days of the Irvings - to build the vessels under their oversight. They could have retained any other yard they wanted.

Now, everyone knows that I am not a fan of Irving Ship Industries, but Fenco and HS were in the process of really screwing up the MCDV production and were already months behind schedule when the Irving's bought out HS. Yet, one of the first act of the Irving's was to stop all work for almost a month at the shipyard and turn everybody out to clean up and properly organize the yard before any work would resume - then get alongside Fenco and tell them how ships are to be built (they were then just finished with their experience with the HAL's). When they got back to building the MCDV's, they were able to get on a schedule that saw them deliver the MCDV's on time and nearly on budget. And for that, at least, they should be thanked and respected.
 
Two points here:

First, let's all get over the "Bonnie's Bofors" thing once and for all. The Bofors 40mm came from MAGNIFICENT. Bonnie had American twin 3 inch. 50 cal guns for AA - no Bofors.

Second:



There was never the idea of saving a shipyard with the MCDV's. They were acquired to replace the extremely old and fast aging training vessels of the Regular and Reserve force on a one for one basis: 12 MCDV to replace 6 PB (Reg force), 5 Gate vessels and FORT STEELE ( Reserve force). All of these old vessels were built in the 1950's (with PORTE ST JEAN having the distinction of being the last RCN vessel commissioned under King Georges VI). The contracts for the MCDV constructions was a short listed contest between two Engineering consortiums - none of which had any specific yard attached to them. Ultimately, the Fenco team won and then (only then) hired Halifax shipyard - before the days of the Irvings - to build the vessels under their oversight. They could have retained any other yard they wanted.

Now, everyone knows that I am not a fan of Irving Ship Industries, but Fenco and HS were in the process of really screwing up the MCDV production and were already months behind schedule when the Irving's bought out HS. Yet, one of the first act of the Irving's was to stop all work for almost a month at the shipyard and turn everybody out to clean up and properly organize the yard before any work would resume - then get alongside Fenco and tell them how ships are to be built (they were then just finished with their experience with the HAL's). When they got back to building the MCDV's, they were able to get on a schedule that saw them deliver the MCDV's on time and nearly on budget. And for that, at least, they should be thanked and respected.
I beg to differ ... I was in the room, I was a senior staff officer to RAdm Ed Healy, then Chief of Engineering and Maintenance - responsible for all military equipment, when we were told to buy the MCDVs. They became reserve training vessels AFTER the decision was taken.
 
Perhaps a bit of history here, Edward (can I call you Edward ?).

I joined the Naval Reserve in 1976. In the summer of 1977, I went on my first tour on a Gate Vessel as a Diesel Mechanic ... and we were told they would be replaced within five years. That, of course never happened.

But, on and off, there were always talks of replacing them, and the old PB's, and of various attempts at replacing them.

Then, Ronald Reagan and his 600 ships Navy came along, together with Brian Mulroney's first governement in Canada, and defence became more important. The naval Reserve was given a task: coastal defense of Canada. We identified (I was an officer by then, and involved in some of the tiger teams) the various types of vessels we needed for the task and came up with a requirement for three types: 8 offshore patrol vessels (1200 to 1500 tons), 12 inshore patrol vessels (500 to 900 tons) and 50 harbour defense vessels (30-50 tons).

The original building decision was to go for the 12 inshore vessels, as their operation would amply qualify personnel to operate the harbour vessels while they would be a good steping stone to develop the skills required for to the offshore vessels.

Then, the MND steped in the submarine replacement program and, with the help of the white paper on defence, directed it towards nuclear attack boats. As a result, the Maritime command staff, almost overnight, modified the inshore patrol vessel requirements into a mine warfare vessel capable of EDATS (Extreme Depth Armed Team Sweep) to ensure the safe transit of the nuclear submarines from Halifax and Esquimalt.

And then (again) Glastnost broke out and the wall came tumbling down ( in Berlin, that is). Suddenly, peace broke out and you had to show a "peace dividend". Simultaneously, the Mulroney governement was dealing with balooning deficits and inflation and had to show some restraint on the fiscal side. The nuclear submarine program was canned. And many voices wanted the "associated" mine warfare vessels program also canned as "not needed" anymore.

That is when the narative of the "need for reserve training" of the vessels resurfaced as the RCN way of holding on to the ships.

But they were always needed for replacement of the training vessels. It was just a political narative to deal with a political situation at the time.
 
I quite frankly find all this fascinating. Between the two of you. You could probably write a book on the MCDV
God knows I'd buy it.
 
It boggles my mind that we're not seeing ads running like crazy in the media highlighting the RCN since we're so short of personnel. Not just the RCN specifically, but everything Maritime related (fisheries, oceanographic research, maritime trade, etc.) to raise general awareness of the population about our maritime domain and the importance of protecting it.

As a virtual island the Navy (and Air Force) are our first lines of defence. Nothing against the Army, but if recruiting and Basic need to change to better suit Navy and Air Force recruits then do it and do it quickly. We know what the personnel needs are going to be so we should be doing everything we can to get ahead of that curve and bring in the people we need and at the same time start taking the pressure off the people we already have.
CCG and the RCN advertize on FB quite a bit.
 
Some interesting info about the project.

🔔What Bob Mustard says rings lots of bells.🔔 In 1986/87 I was, rather too frequently, in hospital and under medical care and I returned to work, full time in 1988 - RAdm Denny Boyle had replaced RAdm Heally as Chief Engineering - and one of th first files I dealt with was a memo from the COS to the MND telling us that the government wanted, urgently, to support the right Canadian shipbuilders and a coastal patrol vessel was the route we were to take.

As OGBD says, the RCN (I don't think we called it the, then, although we already had "Coats of Many Colours" as we called th then DEU in honour of former MND Bob Coates who's idea it was) had an unfunded requirement for minesweepers. The MND added funding and some political direction. Adms Boyle and Heally (who was now ADM(Mat)) kicked the thing into gear - money, which the MND has or can get, is the answer to all problems in NDHQ.

Shortly afterwards I moved to take charge of DND's radio frequency business and my involvement with the MCDV project was marginal because the comms/radar suite was minimal.

But, I stand by my contention that the MCDV, like the HDW class, was a political choice, made by politicians for political reasons, and executed by DND (and PWGSC, as it was then) with as much military rationale as could be mustered.
 
I have vague memories of hearing that at least one of Bonnie's Bofors had a manufacturing data plate that had the year 1943 on it.
They were extremely well traveled if nothing else.
After Bonaventure they provided Air Defense at Lahr and served aboard the AOR during the Persian excursion part one.. And finally aboard the MCDV s.
There's a Bofors 40 at the Connaught Ranges in Kanata (Ottawa) where my daughter's Air Cadet squadron parades. I haven't looked at it too closely, but I believe there is a plaque of some sorts affixed. I'm now curious to see what it reads...
 
But, I stand by my contention that the MCDV, like the HDW class, was a political choice, made by politicians for political reasons, and executed by DND (and PWGSC, as it was then) with as much military rationale as could be mustered.
I think that probably is true for any capability worth more than a Timmies large double-double… 😉
 
The support/crewing model for AJISS depended on MCDVs being retired, and that assumption is also built into other common equipment plans to get those to eke out to end of life.

Aside from raw crew numbers, you need the right mix; right now martechs are down to the 50-60% range and falling. So doesn't really matter if they recruit 500 new sailors if they are bosuns and operators.

I honestly think the RCN ambition to do everything all the time will kill people sooner or later due to asking them to do too much with not enough too many times. We don't have enough people to crew the new ships coming down the pipes, but sure lets add in a new class that isn't in the strategic plan or the NSS.

"Mission first, F*ck people always, reality last".
 
But, I stand by my contention that the MCDV, like the HDW class, was a political choice, made by politicians for political reasons, and executed by DND (and PWGSC, as it was then) with as much military rationale as could be mustered.
To pull the thread on this sweater a bit, are not all military procurement choices political in the end? The government sets the priorities and we fall in step. AOPS was a priority for the Harper government for a some domestic political reasons but also because we were essentially blind in the ground (ocean? lol) truth up there.

My understanding is the proper way to do this is the government sets the priorities, military does some work and says this is what we need to do that job, and then there is some haggling and a process starts for the particular capability that needs to be provided (either by training, reallocation of resources we already have, procurement of new equipment etc...).

The Harper government wanted arctic operations for the security/soveriegnty. Whatever that motivation sprung from, and whatever it turned into that was the direction given to the RCN (well actually no Royal at that time!). Their election promise was armed icebreakers. The RCN needed patrol boats (its in Leadmark 2020) and so the haggling began. RCN came back to the gov't and said true icebreakers were a no go but we have this requirement, matched up to army requirements for arctic deployability/sustainability and AOPS was born.

So how is that any different then the CSC? A political choice, made by politicians for political reasons (the missions they have assigned to the RCN through Strong Secure Engaged, and before that the Canada First Defence Strategy) lead to the CSC being built. The only difference I can see is one of the missions is one the RCN traditionally held and actually wants, while the other it rolls its eyes at and doesn't really want.*

*Caveat that with there are A LOT of sailors who want to sail on AOPS. Small crews mean more responsibility at a Jr rank and some people just thrive with that.
 
To pull the thread on this sweater a bit, are not all military procurement choices political in the end? The government sets the priorities and we fall in step. AOPS was a priority for the Harper government for a some domestic political reasons but also because we were essentially blind in the ground (ocean? lol) truth up there.

My understanding is the proper way to do this is the government sets the priorities, military does some work and says this is what we need to do that job, and then there is some haggling and a process starts for the particular capability that needs to be provided (either by training, reallocation of resources we already have, procurement of new equipment etc...).

The Harper government wanted arctic operations for the security/soveriegnty. Whatever that motivation sprung from, and whatever it turned into that was the direction given to the RCN (well actually no Royal at that time!). Their election promise was armed icebreakers. The RCN needed patrol boats (its in Leadmark 2020) and so the haggling began. RCN came back to the gov't and said true icebreakers were a no go but we have this requirement, matched up to army requirements for arctic deployability/sustainability and AOPS was born.

So how is that any different then the CSC? A political choice, made by politicians for political reasons (the missions they have assigned to the RCN through Strong Secure Engaged, and before that the Canada First Defence Strategy) lead to the CSC being built. The only difference I can see is one of the missions is one the RCN traditionally held and actually wants, while the other it rolls its eyes at and doesn't really want.*

*Caveat that with there are A LOT of sailors who want to sail on AOPS. Small crews mean more responsibility at a Jr rank and some people just thrive with that.
Why/how was true icebreaker a no go, again?
 
It boggles my mind that we're not seeing ads running like crazy in the media highlighting the RCN since we're so short of personnel. Not just the RCN specifically, but everything Maritime related (fisheries, oceanographic research, maritime trade, etc.) to raise general awareness of the population about our maritime domain and the importance of protecting it.

As a virtual island the Navy (and Air Force) are our first lines of defence. Nothing against the Army, but if recruiting and Basic need to change to better suit Navy and Air Force recruits then do it and do it quickly. We know what the personnel needs are going to be so we should be doing everything we can to get ahead of that curve and bring in the people we need and at the same time start taking the pressure off the people we already have.
Listen we'd all like the Navy and Air Force to be larger than the Army but let me ask you a couple of questions:

1. Who is going to fill sandbags and act as Canada's largest pool of GDs?

Certainly not the Navy, they are too fat and our decrepit healthcare system can't handle anymore cardiac arrests from poor health choices.

2. Who is going to go to Long Term Care homes and wipe old people's asses during the next pandemic?

Not the Air Force, they only deal with 5-star accommodations, well the fighter pilots anyways and we all know they run the show at RCAF HQ.

Thus the Army will continue to hold primacy in the Halls of Power!
 
Thus the Army will continue to hold primacy in the Halls of Power!
Well when you promote to Major a full three years ahead of their equivalent counterparts in the RCN and RCAF that's what happens. It's the Russian strategy, swamp them with numbers and you'll win the day!

Seriously though, this NATO pivot to the Pacific is going to make the army primary for Europe and the RCN Primary for the Pacific. I would not be surprised if we started seeing east coast frigates doing OP PROJECTION deployments or at the very least port visits from India to Singapore/Australia.
 
Well when you promote to Major a full three years ahead of their equivalent counterparts in the RCN and RCAF that's what happens. It's the Russian strategy, swamp them with numbers and you'll win the day!

Seriously though, this NATO pivot to the Pacific is going to make the army primary for Europe and the RCN Primary for the Pacific. I would not be surprised if we started seeing east coast frigates doing OP PROJECTION deployments or at the very least port visits from India to Singapore/Australia.
Oh I know, I'm just being a smartass 😁
 
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