Medium Cavalry: Critical Capability or Poor Man’s MBT?

[KevinB]

"Six Nations Plot $13 Million Tank Shopping Spree": BAE Systems Prepares Massive CV90 Combat Vehicle Order While Ramping Production to 250 Units Annually

In a landmark move within the defense industry, BAE Systems is poised to secure a substantial order for its CV90 tracked combat vehicles. According to Peter

visegradpost.com

Finland
Sweden
Norway

Estonia
Lithuania

The Netherlands

Looking open a production line for hundreds of CV90s a year.

Heavy, Medium or Light.

...

13 million refers to the high end unit cost.

It isn't a tank, and it isn't designed as a tank.
It is a Medium Tracked Combat vehicle in various optional configurations - none of which are a tank. I think the CV-90 is a good system, even a great system - but I don't see the point of putting a tank gun on it.
It isn't a heavy and definitely isn't a Light.

My biggest point of concern is that BAE thinks that 250 year is a reasonable production volume, yes it is up from 50, but 250 frankly is only around a Bde worth of vehicles. I would think BAE would be looking at wanting to make 1,000 a year.

 

[Kirkhill]

It isn't a tank, and it isn't designed as a tank.
It is a Medium Tracked Combat vehicle in various optional configurations - none of which are a tank. I think the CV-90 is a good system, even a great system - but I don't see the point of putting a tank gun on it.
It isn't a heavy and definitely isn't a Light.

My biggest point of concern is that BAE thinks that 250 year is a reasonable production volume, yes it is up from 50, but 250 frankly is only around a Bde worth of vehicles. I would think BAE would be looking at wanting to make 1,000 a year.

Are investors going to jump from 50 units to 1000 units? Isn"t there a considerable risk of that being a bubble with the market saturated in a short time and the line mothballed and slills lost?

Looking at Rheinmetall, Thyssen, Vickers and GD here.

Meanwhile Hagglunds has a business model that has successfully operated in hot and cold wars as well as peace.

If I am reading these tealeaves right Hagglunds is proposing to open 5 lines. If they are built on the existing model then they can survive at a 50 unit per year pace. Survival is important. Dispersal is also important.

Also scaling one plant up by a factor of 20 (1000÷50) is a lot more daunting than building 5 new plants that can survive producing 50 units a year on one shift but can jump up to 24/7 production and produce 250 units per year per plant.

....

As to "not a tank"....

By your definitions the first tank was not a tank. Nor was the M48, M64 or Leopard 1.

Slainte.

 

[KevinB]

Are investors going to jump from 50 units to 1000 units? Isn"t there a considerable risk of that being a bubble with the market saturated in a short time and the line mothballed and slills lost?

Looking at Rheinmetall, Thyssen, Vickers and GD here.

Meanwhile Hagglunds has a business model that has successfully operated in hot and cold wars as well as peace.

Hagglunds doesn't exist anymore, it is a wholly owned subsidiary of BAE Systems.

If I am reading these tealeaves right Hagglunds is proposing to open 5 lines. If they are built on the existing model then they can survive at a 50 unit per year pace. Survival is important. Dispersal is also important.

Also scaling one plant up by a factor of 20 (1000÷50) is a lot more daunting than building 5 new plants that can survive producing 50 units a year on one shift but can jump up to 24/7 production and produce 250 units per year per plant.

Nowhere did I suggest building one plant. I think you will find that the AFV plants cannot do a 3 shift setup due to maintenance - so while you may be able to get a second shift going - I don't think that any of those production numbers will scale linearly.

I suggested have more throughput, and I am all about more facilities - ideally one in Canada...

....

As to "not a tank"....

By your definitions the first tank was not a tank. Nor was the M48, M64 or Leopard 1.

Slainte.

What is or is not is subject to the lens of time.

 

[Underway]

You mean the doctrine that defines light and medium with the same words?

There is still a definition. I didn't say it was a good one. But the heavy definition is very clear, and the tasks required by medium and light cavalry in the rest of the doctrine clearly indicate that dismounts will be required to do their jobs properly. Something that a dedicated light tank force cannot do.

The doctrine that was written to justify TAPV as a medium cavalry platform?

According to your feelings.

 

[daftandbarmy]

FWIW... a good description of what cavalry does, as part of Congreve's obituary. Light, mobile, flexible and fast are all images that come to mind. I believe they used 'Honey' tanks in both the desert and Burma:



The 7th was then despatched to Burma, where the scanty British force had begun a 1,300-mile fighting withdrawal in the face of a determined and well-equipped Japanese army.

In spite of the difficult, unfamiliar terrain, the 7th performed the classic cavalry role of protecting the flanks, harassing the attackers and rescuing units which were on the verge of being cut off or overwhelmed. They destroyed roadblocks that the Japanese had set up behind the retreating forces, and preserved bridges which would otherwise have been destroyed.

Congreve was in his element in this mobile battle, in which speed of thought and shrewd judgment were vital. He also maintained high morale among his men, which was of great importance since the Japanese had carefully infiltrated the region and it was difficult to tell friend from foe.

Obituary: Lt Col J. Congreve, O.B.E., D.S.O. | QRH Museum

In Memoriam

www.qrhmuseum.com

 

[KevinB]

There is still a definition. I didn't say it was a good one. But the heavy definition is very clear, and the tasks required by medium and light cavalry in the rest of the doctrine clearly indicate that dismounts will be required to do their jobs properly. Something that a dedicated light tank force cannot do.

So like Mechanized Infantry…

According to your feelings.

He isn’t wrong. It’s garbage, that was used to situate an estimate.

 

[McG]

According to your feelings.

I have received first hand accounts from inside the room (or inside the tent as it was a few times) as this was developed. A foundational premise that a TAPV squadron can do any task that might be done by a tank squadron (and vice versa) is axiomatically incorrect.

 

[Brad Sallows]

It should have been the field artillery that inherited DFS, but somehow it fell to the cavalry (slowly approaching demise of relevance of horses, although not clearly foreseen by all at the time), and here we are.

If we had a doctrine for cavalry, how many units would a division likely need? One? Assuming that to be the case, a hunt for a purpose for two units is essentially depriving some other much needed capability of a unit.

 

[markppcli]

It should have been the field artillery that inherited DFS, but somehow it fell to the cavalry (slowly approaching demise of relevance of horses, although not clearly foreseen by all at the time), and here we are.

Why? By the advent of the tank - or mechanization depending on how you define it, the artillery was already the arm of indirect fire. That’s why they were the technical trade going to technical schools, and why they began devising things like acoustic sensors inWW1. The direct fire MGs were operated the infantry. The Cavalry by contrast was always the arm of mobility and striking power - tanks do what cuiraseurs and lancers did a century before. Further what benefit would have been gained from this ? We had RCA tank destroyers but once that concept died so too do that job.

If we had a doctrine for cavalry, how many units would a division likely need? One? Assuming that to be the case, a hunt for a purpose for two units is essentially depriving some other much needed capability of a unit.

We situated the estimate with equipment and are now show horning units into roles to make it work. Frankly, to my outside observer eyes, it seems like we have some doctrine being written by people more concerned about proving how clever they are in the intellectual battle then they are with effectiveness on the battle field.

 

[FJAG]

It should have been the field artillery that inherited DFS, but somehow it fell to the cavalry (slowly approaching demise of relevance of horses, although not clearly foreseen by all at the time), and here we are.

When there are limits to pers structures, I'm not so sure arty would be interested in DFS. It's already a burden in an army of Canada's size to manage the proper training and career structure for field guns, field rockets, heavier loitering munitions, STA, AD, CUAS and all the C2 that accompanies that.

If we had a doctrine for cavalry, how many units would a division likely need? One? Assuming that to be the case, a hunt for a purpose for two units is essentially depriving some other much needed capability of a unit.

Since no one asked I'll give you my thumbnail sketch.

I tend to follow the concept of lighter more agile armoured/mech divisions. Such a division can generally adequately control around six to eight manoeuvre battle groups. I also tend to follow the idea that the ratio should be roughly 1:1 of armoured sub units and infantry subunits (or slightly more infantry) in order to build combined arms combat teams. (Note US ABCTs used to have three CABs with two tank and two inf coys each (6 tank and 6 inf coys total). The current structure has gone to three coys each (5 tank 4 infantry coys total) (not counting the ABCT's cav squadron)) showing the Yanks preference for tanks. (albeit the US armored divisions are going to 2 ABCTs and one SBCT)

Canada's two WW2 armoured divisions had two brigades each - an armoured brigade (3 tank regiments, 1 motorized infantry battalion) and an infantry brigade (3 infantry battalions) as well as a divisional reconnaissance regiment.

So, I tend to see a modern Canadian armd/mech div having two brigades

• 1 x armoured brigade (2 x tank regiments, 1 x mech inf bn);
• 1 x mech inf brigade (1 x tank regiment, 2 x mech inf bns); and
• 1 x divisional light/medium cavalry regiment

I also see the need to retain a full RegF light inf bde (3 x light inf bns)

That leaves 3 x RegF armd regts and 6 x RegF mech inf bns to form the foundation of however many armd/mech divs Canada wants to form. Without forming hybrid units with the ARes you can probably only form 1 and therefore will probably need to convert one mech inf battalion to light/med cavalry. But more probably, because the army is infantry centric, we'll make just one division of:

• 2 x mech brigades (1 x tank regt, 3 x mech inf bns); and
• 1 x divisional light/medium cavalry regiment

Just as an aside. If it comes to making hybrid armoured units I would go for a larger RegF presence in the divisional cavalry regiment than the tank regiments. Tankers are much easier to train.

 

[markppcli]

I suppose if we look at the concept of “dfs” we really see that organic or close to organic fire support as being the infantry of WW2 vintage getting their AT guns. Which were always operated by infantrymen.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Why?

Just a whimsical observation; going back a little further - not too far before the tank - the field artillery were DFS. In that frame, the tank is the successor to horse artillery and mechanized infantry are the successor to cavalry. Many/most of the cavalry tasks still viable and useful, whether by land or air (aviation), require mounted infantry. One of the common characteristics that emerges on most napkins is that cavalry units often end up blended (infantry/tank) while infantry and tank units tend to remain "pure" (CABs being an exception). Maybe only to me, but it suggests something usefully distinct about cavalry and its purposes compared to the other two (all being manoeuvre arms, of course).

 

[daftandbarmy]

I suppose if we look at the concept of “dfs” we really see that organic or close to organic fire support as being the infantry of WW2 vintage getting their AT guns. Which were always operated by infantrymen.

My guess is the whole 'DFS thing' arose from the AFG experience. Anything direct fire is largely the realm of the Infantry/Armoured 'bread and butter' and therefore fairly short range. Which is relatively cheap and simple.

As a higher priority we probably need to get serious about, and properly equipped for, the Indirect FS capacity we need to support large scale armoured formations. Which is expensive and complex.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Canada's two WW2 armoured divisions had two brigades each - an armoured brigade (3 tank regiments, 1 motorized infantry battalion) and an infantry brigade (3 infantry battalions) as well as a divisional reconnaissance regiment.

Notably, British organization.

The Brits frigged around a bit in the desert with different armoured formation designs before coming up with that (and still didn't shed their fondness for independent armoured brigades). This discussion always reminds me of something posted long ago on another forum by a guy who claimed to have been involved in OR : that appropriate ratios tank:infantry (whether unit or sub-unit or platoon) are 3:1 in open (desert), 1:1 in mixed, 1:3 in close (urban) terrains. The British design with a motor battalion in the armoured brigade was - I'm just guessing, now - a result of optimization for the North African desert. Everyone started WWII tank-heavy and found they needed more infantry, ending up close to 1:1 (or lower on the tank side, if anything).

I find no fault in a division of three manoeuvre brigades unless the brigade HQs are just baggage OR actual experimentation and experience (the latter preferably at someone else's expense) reveals that there has to be a distinct shift away from the post-WWII balance (ie. give up one brigade to "buy" three units plus HQ and admin of fires, comms, engineering, etc).

 

[FJAG]

Notably, British organization

Also looking at others.

The Americans went through a number of different structures but their WW2 armored division basically had 6 x tank battalions (4 x medium and 2 x light) and 3 x mechanized infantry bns. They were generally divided into two Combat Commands (A and B - albeit that a third Combat Command R[eserve] could also be formed.

The German WW2 Panzer division settled into a structure with a panzer brigade (2 x tank regiments of 3 x tank coys each) and a motorized infantry brigade (2 x motorized infantry regiments of 3 x rifle and 1 x MG coy each).

I find no fault in a division of three manoeuvre brigades

It's not so much a question of fault as practical employment.

The later Bundeswehr army's structure varied but under Army Structure 4 (1980s) a panzer brigade had 3 x panzer and 1 x panzergrenadier bns while a panzergrenadier brigade has 3 x panzergrenadier bns and 1 x panzer bn.

Generally (but not always) a panzer division had 2 x panzer brigades and 1 x panzergreandier brigade and a panzergrenadier division had 2 x panzergrenadier brigade and 1 x panzer brigade. So a division totalled 12 manoeuvre bns of varying ratios.

It seems that wartime structures defaulted to lighter more agile armoured division while post war they grew quite a bit. If one considers the division the tactical "unit of action" then handling around 12 battalions/battle groups becomes unwieldly. It's very much a question of how much road space a division takes up and how long moves are and how easily they can move on multiple axes and how easily they can manoeuvre thereafter and what ratio of the force becomes left out of battle as reserves/depth at different echelons.

IMHO, there is much greater flexibility if one reorganizes the 24 battalions contained in two divisions of 12 each into 3 divisions of 8 battalions each (or possibly even 4 divisions of 6 battalions each). The same combat power is there but more of it can be brought to bear and more quickly as well.

 

[markppcli]

Just a whimsical observation; going back a little further - not too far before the tank - the field artillery were DFS. In that frame, the tank is the successor to horse artillery and mechanized infantry are the successor to cavalry. Many/most of the cavalry tasks still viable and useful, whether by land or air (aviation), require mounted infantry. One of the common characteristics that emerges on most napkins is that cavalry units often end up blended (infantry/tank) while infantry and tank units tend to remain "pure" (CABs being an exception). Maybe only to me, but it suggests something usefully distinct about cavalry and its purposes compared to the other two (all being manoeuvre arms, of course).

I disagree. Horse artillery didn’t ever provide decisive shock action, which is what tanks are for. Maybe that’s where we are diverging.

 

[Kirkhill]

I disagree. Horse artillery didn’t ever provide decisive shock action, which is what tanks are for. Maybe that’s where we are diverging.

Shock action was provided by the horse (cavalry with sword and lance). Horse artillery (13 pounders) supplied intimate support to the horse.

In the same way field artillery (18 pounders) supplied intimate support for the infantry. Those were backed by 4.5" howitzers. 1907 reorg and purchases.

In both instances the guns came up on line with the supported arm and engaged the enemy within rifle shot range with direct, line of sight fire.

Infantry knew what they wanted tanks to do. They wanted them to bring bunker busters and machine guns to support their assaults.

Cavalry was still digesting the rifle and the machine gun that forced them out of the saddle when the tank debuted. WW1 was largely the result of any side to generate shock action because of the neutralization of the horse.

How are we doing with shock action in Ukraine? Either side.

 

[Infanteer]

Define shock action.

 

[Underway]

Define shock action.

I posted something vulgar here that I thought was funny but then thought better of it. Apologies

 

[Underway]

I have received first hand accounts from inside the room (or inside the tent as it was a few times) as this was developed. A foundational premise that a TAPV squadron can do any task that might be done by a tank squadron (and vice versa) is axiomatically incorrect.

Ok that's awesome. Now we are getting somewhere. I was just chirping you to get more info. I withdraw my chirp.