Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M

[jollyjacktar]

I may not have expressed myself correctly here, and for that I apologize.

My point is not that point of views like Dr. Dorn should not be expressed at various military advanced teaching institutions. They should, but in my view, as visiting lecturers in seminars within the course curriculum, and not as faculty.

The reason for not having them as faculty is the standard labour rule against conflict of interest. How can you be someone basically advocating the opposite to what the institution you work for stands for itself? An analogy would be: As a country, would you employ as one of your diplomats someone who is associated and an exponent of the concept that countries should be abolished and a single world dominion established? In training of your diplomats, exposing them to such a view so they know it and learn how to deal with it is appropriate, but not employment as one of your diplomats. That's all I was saying.

Well, we let the Bloc run as a party and sit in the HoC.  Not to mention their provincial counterparts that are working to undermine the country.

 

[ArmyRick]

Having read that article, I was kind of not sure the word, same reaction I had to seeing my five year old putting his tobbogan on top of the slide when it was covered in ice and getting ready to use it as a snow board. Not a good idea, not very well thought out or any real thought at all.

Kind of like Mr Dorn's thoughts on "peacekeeping". Or if he is CBCs latest comedian, than woops, I misunderstood the context of the article.

Progression not regression

I was also very disheartened by the comments attached to that article 

 

[CombatDoc]

"Over the past decade, Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have experienced a major decline in training and education for peacekeeping operations (PKOs), also known as peace support operations (PSOs) or simply peace operations. "

An interesting melange of terminology, whereby Prof. Dorn equates PKO = PSO = peace. Certainly in my mind these are three distinct items, and the third (peace) can result from winning at war-fighting.

 

[PuckChaser]

For a staff college professor, he seems to have never heard of the Three-Block-War concept that I was taught as a young Pte/Cpl in the early 2000s.

 

[dapaterson]

For a staff college professor, he seems to have never heard of the Three-Block-War concept that I was taught as a young Pte/Cpl in the early 2000s.

Google "Dorn Three Block War"

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol10/no1/07-dornvarey-eng.asp

 

[daftandbarmy]

Is it just me or does this report seem like a slap in the face to the OMLT, POMLT, etc folks who worked with, and trained, Afghan authorities during OPs ATHENA and ATTENTION?  I'm pretty sure we did some negotiation, conflict management and resolution there as well.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com//news/national/military-ill-prepared-for-peacekeeping-report/article28505963/?cmpid=rss1&click=sf_globefb

I would argue that this article is yet more proof that the G&M, like most Canadian media, is ill prepared to comment on anything related to Canada's military.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I will agree that the current generation might be ill-prepared to dealing with just how useless the UN bureaucracy is.

 

[Kirkhill]

Bump

An old take on what "modern" peace-keeping might look like - written ca 1968.  It's a long read.

No one was sure at first the concept would work--not in the summer of 1966. The village of Binh Nghia, in Quang Ngai province, was a battleground. The district chief at Binh Son was responsible to the province chief for the state of affairs at Binh Nghia and several other villages. He estimated that, during the past several years, 750 young men from that village had joined main-force VC units. Two independent VC companies and one full battalion were roaming the district. Of the 4,575 persons in the villages, 600 were known VC sympathizers. So the decision by the 7th Marines to establish a Combined Action Company in Binh Nghia was not made without an acknowledgement of the hazards involved.

Something had to be done. The morale of the local Popular Forces platoon was low and ebbing fast. They had been hit by the VC so often that their confidence was shattered. The enemy held the offensive and controlled the daily lives of the civilians. The guerrillas worked and lived at home, banding together at night for military excursions and political activities. Full-time regulars of the Viet Cong main force units entered Binh Nghia at will to seek supplies or hold meetings. Marine patrols and ambushes, operating from remote combat bases, made contact often, killing many soldiers and disrupting movements of large forces. But that alone was not enough. The villager scurried about with averted eyes, and the PFs clung to the shallow safety of their fort. It was obvious who controlled Binh Nghia.

During the first week in June, 12 Marines from Charlie Company were selected to go to the fort and work with the PFs. They were picked on the basis of a mature understanding of the Vietnamese problems as well as for sound tactical sense. The primary mission was to raise the fighting spirit and ability of the 28 PFs of Binh Nghia. The Marines were commanded by a corporal who took things slowly at first, allowing his men and the PFs time to become accustomed to shared watches and joint patrols. The individual friendships between the tall Americans and the Vietnamese militiamen were struck naturally. The language barrier was breached, not by formal language training, but by the basic desire to communicate. These Marines displayed a natural knack for making themselves understood because they wanted to communicate, even though they did not speak Vietnamese

By late June the presence of the Marines had been generally accepted ....

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/fast-rifles-0

 

[pbi]

Having worked at CFC when Walter was one of a very small crew of academics there, I can say that despite his endless UN cheerleading he is in the long run fairly harmless. The students there are at the rank of Maj/LCdr at least (higher in the senior courses) and one would hope capable of judging Dr, Dorn on his merits (or lack thereof). IMHO much of what he says is rubbish, but that is just me.

Since those days, the academics have overrun CFC and it can no longer even pretend to be a school for joint warfighters as opposed to NDHQ hall monitors. If you ever wonder  about military leadership in this  country, look at the place that produces them.

I was always glad that I was a graduate of Quantico and not Toronto. Ar least the Marines are not ashamed of being warfighters.

 

[Journeyman]

Since those days, the academics have overrun CFC and it can no longer even pretend to be a school for joint warfighters as opposed to NDHQ hall monitors.

Ah, but the academics were 'necessary' in order to create their pretend Master's degree -- the Master of Defence Studies -- (even though the fine print mentions that "this is not an accredited graduate degree;  it is a 'professional' degree.")

 

[Piece of Cake]

Ah, but the academics were 'necessary' in order to create their pretend Master's degree -- the Master of Defence Studies -- (even though the fine print mentions that "this is not an accredited graduate degree;  it is a 'professional' degree.")

Could you please show me this fine print.

In Canada, the Senate of an University has legal authority to grant degrees.  In the case of CFC / RMC it is federal authority from the Royal Military College of Canada Degrees Act, 1959. The Master of Defense Studies is an accredited degree, however it may be viewed as a professional degree - ie MBA, MPA, MD, LLB, JD ect - as opposed to an academic degree - ie BA, BSc, MA, MSc, PHD, ect -.


**** correction **** In the case of CFC / RMC it is provincial authority - the province of Ontario - from the Royal Military College of Canada Degrees Act, 1959

 

[Journeyman]

Could you please show me this fine print.

I see that it has been amended to read: "Defence Studies (DS) credits may  be acceptable toward other graduate programmes."  (Date modified: 2017-07-24)

Obviously there has been some academic stick-handling since the program was initiated.  I do know of two people who wanted to go on to earn a PhD (one applying at Carleton; one at Queen's), and neither was acceptable based on having only an MDS -- both having applied before this apparent July 2017 change.

I stand corrected.....

[edit] maybe.  Re-reading, it appears that they are only referring to the potential  acceptability of MDS credits to other RMC/CFC programs, and do not speak for civilian universities.

   

 

[Piece of Cake]

I see that it has been amended to read: "Defence Studies (DS) credits may  be acceptable toward other graduate programmes."  (Date modified: 2017-07-24)

Obviously there has been some academic stick-handling since the program was initiated.  I do know of two people who wanted to go on to earn a PhD (one applying at Carleton; one at Queen's), and neither was acceptable based on having only an MDS -- both having applied before this apparent July 2017 change.

I stand corrected.....

[edit] maybe.  Re-reading, it appears that they are only referring to the potential  acceptability of MDS credits to other RMC/CFC programs, and do not speak for civilian universities.

   

It is difficult to get into a PhD program at any university with a professional Master degree.  This is partly due to most professional Master are course based and not thesis based.  While there is a directed research option with the MDS, most universities would not consider this option as meeting 'independent thinking' that comes from a thesis based Master. With this being said, it is possible if one's undergrad GPA was high and in the same course of study of the PhD one was looking to pursue. 

 

[daftandbarmy]

Bump

An old take on what "modern" peace-keeping might look like - written ca 1968.  It's a long read.


http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/fast-rifles-0

Yeah, and that worked out really well in the end for them, right?

Peacekeeping is an oxymoron these days. In realpolitik world, we'd be better off thinking about how to implement a more effective 'Metternich Peace' process.

 

[Kirkhill]

Yeah, and that worked out really well in the end for them, right?

Peacekeeping is an oxymoron these days. In realpolitik world, we'd be better off thinking about how to implement a more effective 'Metternich Peace' process.

My read on that article is that the strategy was not widely dissimilar from the strategy adopted in Malaya in the 50s, Borneo, Dhofar and the Radfan in the same era as the article (early 1960's) with 3 out of 4 wins (Aden's Radfan being the loss).

That the situation on the ground was changed by the loss of nerve on the part of American politicians after the Tet Offensive in January 1968 doesn't obviate, in my opinion, the merits of the strategy.

Training locals to defend themselves, while influencing them to play by our rules, is never, again in my opinion, a bad plan.  It worked with the Jordanians, the Indians, Omani and Malaysians - among many others.

 

[pbi]

I bitterly resist the school of thought that tries to depict peacekeeping as some kind of military black art requiring that the initiates partake of the grail of "Specialist Peacekeeping Training", or something.

IMHO (and after three UN PK Ops in the Good Old Days) this is just rubbish. But, of course, quite useful rubbish if you are touting for a course or a training establishment built around that idea.

Granted there may be a few TMST skills that need to be trained up, but I am firm in believing that well disciplined, combat trained professional soldiers who know their business (and LOOK like they know it...) are your best bet for any PKO.  The experience and common sense that a long-service Army brings to these ops is what, in my opinion, makes all the difference.

And, I think, many of the skills needed for successful COIN translate quite nicely to PKO as well.

What I would invest my training time in (other than good soldier skills) is making sure that all ranks have a solid understanding of the situation in the AO, who the players are, and how things got the way they are. That knowledge is, in my opinion, worth the time spent on it.

Let's avoid "niche-ism" at all costs.

 

[OldSolduer]

pbi I will agree.

The reason we were successful at peacekeeping is that we trained for war. If I remember correctly we ran some drivers courses etc prior to Cyprus then mission specific training which lasted five days.

We didn’t train like a Roto 0 nor did we need to.

 

[pbi]

pbi I will agree.

The reason we were successful at peacekeeping is that we trained for war. If I remember correctly we ran some drivers courses etc prior to Cyprus then mission specific training which lasted five days.

We didn’t train like a Roto 0 nor did we need to.

Roger all. And when we trained for Croatia in 1994, we went down to USMC Pendleton and Twentynine Palms and trained for combat, live fire, right up to having Marine Air dropping 500lbers in support. Thankfully our mission didn't get us in a fight, but if it had done, our chances of getting through a fight were 100% better than the other UN contingents around us.

 

[daftandbarmy]

My read on that article is that the strategy was not widely dissimilar from the strategy adopted in Malaya in the 50s, Borneo, Dhofar and the Radfan in the same era as the article (early 1960's) with 3 out of 4 wins (Aden's Radfan being the loss).

That the situation on the ground was changed by the loss of nerve on the part of American politicians after the Tet Offensive in January 1968 doesn't obviate, in my opinion, the merits of the strategy.

Training locals to defend themselves, while influencing them to play by our rules, is never, again in my opinion, a bad plan.  It worked with the Jordanians, the Indians, Omani and Malaysians - among many others.

One of my COs had been in the Malayan job with the Royal Marines. His secret of success?

It went along the lines of: "We starved them out then hunted them down."

The US could never separate the guerilla from access to resources in the same way they could in Malaya.

 

[Kirkhill]

By October, the action had slackened. The unrelenting pressure on the guerrillas was telling. Consistency is a primary ingredient for a successful pacification, and every single night the Marines and PFs would set out a least three ambushes in Binh Nghia. Their full attack of Fort Page did not bring the enemy the respite they had anticipated. In fact, it had precisely the opposite effect. Not only did the enemy continue to encounter pressure form the CACO unit within the village, but, in addition, his sanctuary to the south across the river became the favorite hunting ground for two Marine rifle companies.

Acceptance

There were few VC-initiated incidents in November in the village of Binh Ngnia. As a result, the combat actions slowed considerably, and, although in December there were several shoot-outs against targets on the river, the CACOs have struck at the enemy on land only rarely since the battles in September. By 1967, Binh Nghia was no longer a battleground. From a variety of sources and reports, the district chief and his sub-sector advisor have estimated that there are less than 12 active guerrillas left in the six hamlets. The village is now secure; but it is not self-protecting. The main basis for stability and security in Binh Nghia is still slung loosely over a Marine's shoulder.

The rapport between the people of Binh Nghia and the CACO Marines has been building slowly and steadily. Each Marine has three of four close friends among the families of the villagers, and many meals are taken within the hamlets at the insistence of the villagers. On many occasions, Marines on night patrols passing by certain houses have received information about VC activities whispered through windows in broken English. The PFs and village leaders provide additional intelligence.

The CACO acts as a clearing-house for all military movements within the village complex. The Marines and Vietnamese plan their patrols and plot their on-call night illumination missions together. No Marine force enters the area without checking with the CACO first. Medical evacuation by helicopter and fire support are available. The Marines are convinced that these are very important factors contributing to the high morale of the PFs. Furthermore, any villager requiring swift aid may also be transported by helicopter. During the fall of 1966, 59-man Revolutionary Development Care (RDC) teams moved into two of the villages six hamlets. Their arrival in no way impeded the work of the CACO. The Cadre leaders took to checking in with the CACO Commander to settle military matters as if it were the most natural procedure to follow. For certain checks and visits, the village Police Chief got into the habit of requesting a combined PF/Marine escort, where before he would only take national police.

The extent to which the CACO at Fort Page in Binh Nghia had become solidly established was graphically demonstrated at the village fair held during the last week in December, 1966. The Village Chief and Police Chief planned the fair in order to draw the villagers together; their attention was held by games and songs, and the hope was to inspire a solidarity of feeling against the Viet Cong. The Village Chief invited the CACO Marines to come, not as guests, but as participants.

In the market place of the hamlet of Binh Yen Noi, a wooden stage had been erected for the fair. There were two benches set in front of the stage. Behind them sat thousands of villagers, packed in tight to watch the entertainment. After a number of villagers had sung songs or acted out skits before a most appreciative audience, two Marines and a PF mounted the stage to moan and mimic some of the latest rock-and-roll records, to the accompaniment of much hooting and laughter. When the fair quieted down toward midnight, those Marines in attendance gathered some PFs and RDC militia and faded into the darkness to relieve others on watch or patrol. One patrol checked the fishing hamlet of My Hue. There were six men--three Marines and three PFS--in the patrol. There was no contact that night, which was Christmas Day in the United States.

The Future

There is no real concussion to this story, not yet anyway. The Marines and the PFs and the RDT militia will be going on patrol in Binh Nghia village tonight, and tomorrow night, and the night after that. The task is not finished, but it is well started and gaining momentum.

The article I quoted seems to address the need for, and the means to achieving, separation of the community from the guerillas.  It also addresses the notion of a quick-fix.  There isn't one.  It requires a long term commitment by all participants - and it requires soldiers, not social workers.  But the soldiers need to be extraordinary in their abilities - self-disciplined, motivated, capable and willing to work with the locals.

By the way - re concussion - I assume that that infers no Marine had yet been hit over the head with a two by four.