MMEV (Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle)

[Kirkhill]

Both the Armour and the Artillery branches are themselves products of this very argument

Actually a pretty good case could be made for the position that the Tank was not an outgrowth of the Cavalry (who had to be forced to give up their horses) but actually of the Artillery.  The job that the Tanks first took over was moving batteries Machine Guns and Field Guns over broken terrain to support the advance of the Infantry.  Up until the advent of the tank the only other option was for gunners to drag Vickers guns on 100 lb sledges,  while their mates on the 13 and 18 pounder field guns tried to haul their pieces out of emplacements, across shell holes and mud in the face of enemy fire with no protection. 

The Brits fought an internal battle for years, up until the 1960's about Cavalry tanks and Infantry tanks.  The Cavalry wanted fast, light vehicles to skirt the battlefield.  The Infantry wanted slow, heavily armoured vehicles to support the assault.  This mirrored the differences between the Field Artillery with their 18 pounders and the Horse Artillery with their 13 pounders.

They eventually "compromised" on the Medium tank and the Gun-Howitzer.  All the Tanks were turned over to horse soldiers, and the distinction between Horse and Field artillery disappeared while the Infantry developed their own artillery in the form of the Mortar.  The Mortar, also called the Trench Mortar, also called (in German parlance) the Grenade thrower - which started out life as a home made wooden catapult with springs designed so that soldiers could lob their home-made hand bombs over the lip of the Trench without having to expose themselves.

All technology is developed from a need to fill a hole and to stay one-up on the enemy.

 

[a_majoor]

This is a reprise of the "arms make the man" argument.

I can forsee an era where mechanized units have identical TO&E's, and retain the cap badges and traditions as a means of molding their soldiers and maintaining esprit de corps. (This has the potential for some unintended humor: imagine the differences between the "Spit and Polish" 1 RCR manoeuvre battalion and the dashing "Cavalry" RCD manoeuvre battalion in 2 CMBG). This might not be a bad thing, since each manoeuvre battalion would have different "quiffs", which would make predicting their actions more difficult for the enemy, who (initially) would only see a Canadian manoeuvre battalion facing them. A less palatable alternative would be to wedge new capabilities into existing doctrinal structures ("These MMEV's belong in the AAP, and I don't want to hear any more about moveing them out of Combat Support Company. Do I make myself clear Mr Pook?")

On the other hand, if the different Regiments and Corps are too deeply dug in to buy into new doctrines to effectively use new kit, then perhaps we need to do what the Americans did in Gulf War One; drop a MOAB, then bulldozer the surviving bunkers. The Reserves are inherently flexible and willing to demonstrate the "can do" spirit, units would line up salivating just for the chance to try out new equipment and test new doctrines. You might think they are just as parochial as the Regs (and to some extent it is true), but as part timers they don't have "as" much institutional attachment as the Regs, as practical people who are students, business people and professionals outside the military they have a wider range of experience and more open viewpoints, and as soldiers starved for equipment, funds and, yes, recognition, they will jump through rings of fire for the chance to prove themselves.

 

[twohig]

All of these posts have some very good points, a lot of serious thought put into each point.   The problem is they are speculation, I do agree with most of your points, and being an air defender and being ADATS for the past 7 years, I do see the limitations and strengths of my system.   The big thing is again, we have no combat experience on the momodernattlefield, so all of our points that sound good on paper can easily be shredded on the battlefield.

The point I'm trying to make is we should look to who is using similar vehicles and tactics in actual combat and we can see what works and what will cost lives.   The Americans are learning this the hard way, why are we not trying to learn from their mistakes.  

I'm not saying that the points presented here are wrong, on the contrary they are mostly in line with lessons learned by the American army.   What I'm saying is that why don't our leaders seem to see these points and implement sop's accordingly.  

One good article on the benefits of armour, I mean tanks is this one.
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/04/11/talbot1104.asp?trk=nl

 

[12alfa]

ATT;

Your right on the money.

We don't have the $ to build or plan, r&d any wpn system. Best way for us is to see what others are using in the same role and buy off the shelf.

We have our past history in buying systems that are shall we say sub-performance with the LSVW,ADATS, SUBS,etc.

People here are dreaming on systems we will never use, and will cost money and people.

Seems you and I are the only ones that can see the trees through the forest.

 

[a_majoor]

All of these posts have some very good points, a lot of serious thought put into each point.  The problem is they are speculation, I do agree with most of your points, and being an air defender and being ADATS for the past 7 years, I do see the limitations and strengths of my system.  The big thing is again, we have no combat experience on the momodernattlefield, so all of our points that sound good on paper can easily be shredded on the battlefield.

The point I'm trying to make is we should look to who is using similar vehicles and tactics in actual combat and we can see what works and what will cost lives.  The Americans are learning this the hard way, why are we not trying to learn from their mistakes. 

I'm not saying that the points presented here are wrong, on the contrary they are mostly in line with lessons learned by the American army.  What I'm saying is that why don't our leaders seem to see these points and implement sop's accordingly. 

One good article on the benefits of armour, I mean tanks is this one.
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/04/11/talbot1104.asp?trk=nl

The biggest problem is that no other army in the world seems to be going in this direction. Even a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) only uses two of the fire support systems we are slated to get (MGS and LAV-TOW), uses them in a different context (integral support to Infantry companies) and within a much larger doctrinal horizon (currently as a component of AirLand Battle, and as a way to develop the "Objective Force" in the 2015-2020 timeframe).

Since the MMEV is currently slated to be part of a "troika" of DF weapons for our future battlefield, we need to decide NOW what is needed, so the technical development of the vehicle and the tafctical development of doctrine and organization can take place. It would be a very sad day when troops show up to "stables" parade and see the MMEV for the very first time without any clue as to how it is used.

I hope these discussions filter into the higher echelons where these plans are being made, so they at least have an idea how the people on the ground see things. This isn't the forest for the trees, we are blocking out where we want the forest to be planted in the first place.

 

[Kirkhill]

http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,65885,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_1

This was originally posted on the Stryker Robots thread but as a_majoor pointed out they are relevant to both the MMEV and the LAV threads as well and so are being reposted here.

More on robots.

The US are deploying armed versions of the little 6x6 bomb disposal crawlers to back up their Stryker equipped infantry units.  Also talking about robot ambulances.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/6_1_1.asp?id=318

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/6_5.asp?Offset=3&sKeywords=&sConjuction=&sRadioButton=&sFromDate=&sToDate=
Scientists work on new generation of armoured vehicles
VALCARTIER, Quebec - A group of scientists is working on what may become a new generation of Light Armoured Vehicles. (Video Story)
Friday, October 29, 2004

And these links to related work being done by DRES on the LAVs

 

[Wizard of OZ]

And if, as the pundits say, that Canada will never go to war, then why are we talking about the MMEV?

If we are going to equip and train for war, then lets do it right!

The problem those that go to war are never the ones who purchase the stuff.

 

[Kirkhill]

Here's the lead weapon for the Multi Mission Effects Vehicle - the Joint Common Missile

16km range from a presumably stationary platform like a helicopter

tri-mode seeker with imaging infrared, semi-active laser and millimeter wave radar capabilities for active and passive "fire-and-forget" and precision-strike targeting

In other words capable of being designated by the firer like TOW or Javelin, designated by an observer beyond the line-of-sight of the firer like Hellfire , launched blind into a designated target area and allowed to seek its own targets like Strix mortar rounds



Derivative of Hellfire it replaces TOW, Hellfire/Longbow/Brimstone as well as Maverick.  Designed for Helos and Aircraft but TOW and Hellfire/Longbow/Brimstone are all capable of ground-launch.


These plus Hydra-70/APKWS would give an amazing range of capabilities to a ground force.

One vehicle with 2.5 tonne payload can carry 6x19 round 70mm launchers for a total of 114 rounds or, presumably 6x4 Hellfire/Longbow/Brimstone/JCM carriers for a total of 24 rounds.

24 tank kills on one vehicle capable of launching beyond line of sight, 16 km from a grid reference target, and immediately moving.




Lockheed Martin Joint Common Missile Demonstrates Ability to Penetrate and Destroy Urban Targets
 
 
(Source: Lockheed Martin; issued March 15, 2005)
 
 
ORLANDO, FL. --- Lockheed Martin successfully tested its Joint Common Missile (JCM) multi-target warhead and fuze in a series of warhead penetration tests at the Redstone Technical Test Center, AL. 

The series of four tests was designed to assess the missile's ability to penetrate and destroy Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) targets. The tests included detonation of the precursor warhead, penetration of a brick-over-block wall, and emergence of the intact warhead in an interior space, where in a tactical scenario the warhead would be detonated. 

"These tests are part of our ongoing effort to thoroughly demonstrate and validate the entire Joint Common Missile system, which will give our troops capabilities that simply do not exist today," said Steve Barnoske, JCM program director at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control. "Our rigorous testing program is intended to reduce cost and schedule risk for the military services and operational risk for the end-user," he added, noting that Lockheed Martin's aggressive risk reduction efforts were among the factors behind its selection as winner of the JCM competition. 

Air-gun test firings propelled four missile simulant test articles at tactical brick-over-block targets at velocities ranging from 574 to 902 feet-per-second (391 to 615 miles-per-hour) and at obliquity angles of 30 and 45 degrees. The main warhead case and the firing module both came through the wall intact. 

The tests evaluated multiple performance parameters and system capabilities, particularly the ability of the main warhead and the time-delay fuze that detonates it to penetrate the wall intact. The results of the live tests were also calibrated with the predictions of earlier simulations. All test objectives were achieved. The fuze was successfully tested earlier at Eglin Air Force Base, FL, via howitzer shots that blasted it through concrete walls. 

These tests demonstrate the successful penetration of a MOUT structure and the successful survival of the warhead structure and embedded firing module on the opposite side of the wall. It is part of an extensive risk reduction program under Phase 1 of the System Design and Development (SDD) contract. 

The SDD program builds on a firm foundation of extensive pre-contract risk reduction tests that Lockheed Martin performed in 2003 and 2004 including two successful warhead test series at Redstone in January 2004 and howitzer fuze tests in December 2003. 

The multi-target warhead and fuze, developed with General Dynamics-Ordnance and Tactical Systems (warhead) and PerkinElmer (fuze), applies cutting-edge technology to provide diverse-mission, multi-target capability. The JCM warhead and fuze provide both shaped-charge capability, to defeat armored targets; and blast fragmentation capability, for use against buildings, bunkers, small boats, lightly armored vehicles and other soft targets. 

The JCM program is on schedule and on budget in Phase 1, the risk mitigation segment of the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) contract. JCM was the first program to be approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) under the new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process. 

The JCM is the next-generation, multi-purpose, air-to-ground precision missile that will replace Hellfire, Longbow, Maverick and airborne TOW missiles in the U.S. arsenal. The long-term U.S. production run for the Army, Navy and Marine Corps is estimated at 54,000 missiles. In addition, the United Kingdom has also expressed interest in the new weapon and has been part of the development process. 

To deliver the multi-purpose warhead to its target, the Lockheed Martin JCM includes a tri-mode seeker with imaging infrared, semi-active laser and millimeter wave radar capabilities for active and passive "fire-and-forget" and precision-strike targeting. This increases crew survivability and minimizes collateral damage. To further enhance crew and aircraft survivability JCM has extended range capability for standoff engagements--16 kilometers (10 miles) for rotary-wing and 28 kilometers (17.5 miles) for fixed-wing aircraft. JCM's design also provides maximum modularity for growth. 

JCM builds on the heritage of the Hellfire missile family, which includes semi-active laser Hellfire/Longbow millimeter wave missiles, and the Javelin imaging infrared missile, all of which have been combat-proven in Afghanistan and Iraq, with a total of more than two thousand rounds expended. 

Headquartered in Bethesda, Md., Lockheed Martin employs about 130,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture and integration of advanced technology systems, products and services. The corporation reported 2004 sales of $35.5 billion. 


http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.4308111.1089903978.QPadasOa9dUAAESlMZk&modele=jdc_34

 

[MrWhyt]

Here's the lead weapon for the Multi Mission Effects Vehicle - the Joint Common Missile

Sadly the JCM has been cancelled. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=667305&C=landwar. It looked like a pretty useful weapon.

 

[Kirkhill]

I am confused.


The defencenews item of 18 Feb says the budget team has recommended cancellation of the programme.

The Lockheed Martin press release of 15 Mar says the programme is on schedule and proceeding.

Is a recommendation a cancellation?  Or is LM working ahead on its own?

 

[T.S.Rea]

I would predict that the MMEV will be cancelled, since due to its excessive weight it will never be able to get to the conflict quickly enough to be relevant.  Leopards too heavy, Leopards left to rust.  M109's too heavy, M109's left to oxidize.  ADATS MMEV too heavy, ...  LAV's too heavy, ...  The high cost of developing a whole series of uniquely engineered components to tailor a vehicle to engage the high value targets that are not relevant to a post-battle environment will cause it to be cancelled once the development budgets start generating large overruns and its effectiveness and reliability flaws start becoming public.  The only reason it exists in the first place is because its the product of a Quebec based company with strong ties to NDHQ (which is certainly not an indictment of Quebecers to be clear).  Remember when ADATS was selected, and half the NDHQ project team went to work for them?

The point most of you appear to miss is that if it is not light enough to get to the conflict with the smallest possible logistical footprint, then it will be inevitable be cut.  How do you propose to move a 3600 ton LAV battalion group quickly to fix/rearguard the OPFOR prior to the sealift of 150,000+ tons of brigade equipment and supplies?  With at most 600 tons of airlift and 10,000 tons of sealift?  Fighting along roads, immobilized by simple automatic weapons fire, annihilated by virtually every weapon type in use, the ground slick with your blood?  How keen do you think the taxpayers will be when they are told of the tens of biilions of dollars all this is going to cost for a conflict that is only indirectly a strategic threat to Canada that could never justify that many casualties?  Trust the Americans to supply to all our defiiciencies, just like we trusted the British for air support at Dieppe?  Or continue along the present path to irrelevence, fanning the flames to yet another world war?

Light - Mobile - Effective - Relevant = Airborne Armoured Cavalry And Non-Lethal Warfare Units / Canadian Mobile Brigade Groups

But perhaps a little beyond the mathematically challenged people at NDHQ, who seem to have priorities all their own?

 

[Kirkhill]

T.S. Rea

I agree with your point entirely but I think that you miss one relevant point.  I am not convinced that the ADATS or even the LAV-ADATS is necessarily the MMEV.  ADATS has some of the attributes that the MMEV requires, long-range, direct AND indirect fire (due to networking one vehicle can designate while another launches), networked, multiple missions (air and armoured now but other weapons could be mounted).

I saw once an old M101 howitzer carriage that had been converted to hold 6 of those 19 round launch dispensers used by CF188s and helicopters to carry 70mm rockets.  Those rounds, with their direct and indirect firing options, precision kill variants or area suppression modes, various warheads are multi-mission effects systems themselves.

Now if those mounts to which those dispensers were attached were configured the same way that they are on aircraft then they could carry the same ordinance as the aircraft.  In the case of the helos that would mean that each mount could carry up to 4 ATGMs like TOW/Hellfire-Longbow-Brimstone or it could carry Anti-Air missiles like Stinger or Starstreak (can't remember the hard-point loading).

That would make M101 carriage fully configurable to meet the threat, light and transportable.  It would make it a Multi-Mission Effects System.

The same six hardpoints could be carried on any 2.5 tonne load carrying vehicle - soft-skinned or armoured.  Either and MLVW or a LAV-flatbed (an 8x8 pick-up with and armoured cab for a 2-3 man crew.

By the way the M101 carriage elevation and traverse was handled by electric motors and it was possible to wire a battery onto one network so that one gunner and a computer could select individual shots from 8x6x19=912 ready rounds or ripple them one after the other or fire them all off in one blast.

The LAV-ADATS may not be the required product for the MMEV role but there is nothing wrong with the MMEV concept.

Cheers.

 

[T.S.Rea]

The ADATS MMEV will probably weigh 40,000+lbs and cost hundreds of millions to properly develop, and billions more to purchase and support.  The excessive height and weight of it will restrict it to only the largest strategic airlifters which we will never have in any numbers if at all, and even strategic sealift will be complicated by height and weight.

It would offer little that any number of combinations of TOW, FOG-type, and a large array of available, developed, and future tactical missiles will offer in terms of range and performance, and most of these could be acquired off the shelf in a highly competitive environment.  Short-range air defence can be accomplished through the same systems; I see no distinction between a helicopter hovering at tree top level or the armoured vehicle fifty feet below it; there are no technical obstacles to create a showstopper situation, although the mix of missiles need to take these considerations into account and minor modifications made where practical and relevant.

Effective range is the direct effect of terrain (LOS), weapons range (LOS/NLOS), and communications networking (NLOS).  Terrain influence varies widely, from a few dozen metres up to as far as 10-15km (at which point delivery and targeting performance becomes prohibitive); the weapons must be available at platoon in order to react quickly enough.  ADATS MMEV would be masked by terrain much of the time, unable to respond quickly enough, likely not able to respond at all, and for a battalion group on the other side of the world not likely even present.  Economy of forces would necessitate some restriction to minimum effective availability at platoon, with rapid reinforcement available at company/battalion/brigade in both LOS and NLOS modes as relevant.

These tactical missiles can be mounted on large jeep/small truck sized vehicles, as like they are on Humvee's and similar vehicles.  They lack proper armour, but this is the result of them being merely bolted to the vehicles, rather than being optimized as armoured vehicles in their own right.  Reasonably inexpensive grades of aluminum/aluminum oxide matrix armours with sparing quantities of fibres, titanium, tungsten and other materials could provide protection up to Level III+.  Little would prevent the inclusion of the 25mm chain gun or the 40mm derivative into this vehicle as a very useful infantry support weapon, nor a mix of vehicle configurations based on cost, ammunition capacity, armour, C4ISR systems, and weight.  The major contributor of weight would be armour, but arranged in a boxed/girder type pattern, armour levels could be adjusted over wide ranges with large internal inserts and offer adequate structural strength within vehicle gross weights ranging from 6000-12000 lbs., allowing short-range transport by CH-148/CH-149, or CH-147's if any are actually bought.  Powered by a Volkswagen V10 diesel or similar engine with hybrid components taken from some of the Toyota or Honda types, and allied with suspension that can accept tracks and other traction/protection aids, the vehicle can be moved by tactical airlift in numbers, can be moved by helicopter over water or terrain obstacles, and fight in any environment with an abundance of horsepower, torque, and traction against any OPFOR.

The distinction between LOS/NLOS/BLOS is driven by terrain more than any other factor, and certainly not by arbitrarily set distances, and this should also dictate the command and control structure.  In this division, you achieve a workable and flexible means to divide the overlapping spheres of influence between platoon/company/battalion/brigade.  The Clausewitz work remains relevant today in as far as subdivision of units and allocation of LOS/BLOS firepower is concerned, and could provide the framework for pushing firepower taskings up and down the command structure projected on to the 3D battlespace.  Careful restriction of communications assets to ensure the free flow of essential minimums of pure numerical data in preference to pretty .jpegs and other bandwidth wasteful material will go a long way towards providing a well networked communications structure.  Most 3D materials required can and should be transferred prior to operations by hard wire or similar low-detectable direct wireless.  Powerpoint Rangers to be shot on sight.

A rotating sensor masthead with multiple apertures/phased polar filters feeding an IR sensor element would provide 360 degree detection with basic tracking range data.  On or off target laser rangefinding would provide final LOS fire solutions.  The physical arrangement would be somewhat resistant to bullet and fragment damage as well.  Correlation of tracks between vehicles (hard numbers only) would supplement situational awareness at platoon through to brigade, and could well be capable of providing tracks on any type of OPFOR NLOS firepower.  This description is a gross simplification that ignores several things (air control, IFF, etc.), but underlines the basic working principle involved.

A heavy support weapon would be required at battalion or in regiments.  Tactical missiles will increasingly fall prey to close-in defence weapons and an assortment of deception and screening tactics and technologies, and it would be foolish to abandon the big gun and high-speed armour piercing projectiles and heavy explosive types.  This type would form the complement to the lighter vehicles, and is described in my CASR article in moderately greater detail that some references have been made to in this posting.  Not every heavy support vehicle needs to assume the fully evolved form described there, and much greater numbers of vehicles could be afforded within a greatly reduced time-scale if it were developed as a series of progressive evolutions of the type.  It too would be transportable/moveable by C-130 or CH-147, although for the purposes of an airdrop/landing/movement they would have to be restricted to essential minimums.  Although moving anything by air is expensive, problematically weight critical, and subject to a number or perils, the tactical and strategic value of 500-600 tons of airborne armour lift would be a decisive edge in the form and pattern of fixing and flanking actions available.

A small number of artillery guns, based on the M777 technology mounted on a modified heavy support type, could be allocated to support deployed battalions or brigades from individual guns up to a single reinforced regiment.  In addition to fortifying the volume of fire of field formations, the guns would be capable of providing support to the Tier 1 and Tier 2 units of JTF and airborne armour movements over ranges of 100-250km, depending on the cost and availability of projectiles that could be developed or purchased off the shelf from allies.  Although the projectiles would take several minutes to reach targets, they would remain far more responsive and just as quick as airpower or naval missiles.  Anything farther or heavier really should be a responsibility for the air force or navy, just as long range air defence otherwise would.  Artillery rockets would present a large logistical and cost burden, are not as flexible or point-accurate as tube artillery, do not necessarily provide any real increase in the rate/volume of fire, would require a separate set of loading and resupply equipment, and could encounter political resistance given that most are indiscriminate saturation weapons.

Logistics vehicles and heavily reworked M113's based on the single pattern of drivetrain components would provide the core of general transport.  This is rambling on too long, so I do not want to get into more detail on this.  I made a comparison of a theoretical detailed TO&E of a fully loaded Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group equipped with the LAVIII; mechanized infantry battalions weighed about 3600 tons, the Leopard regiment over 6000.  Direct substitution to a light formation with real actual armour resulted in weights of 1500 tons for mechanized infantry, 1700 tons for an intermediate cavalry, and 2000 tons for armoured gun system, and these are pessimistic and non-optimized estimates.  For the purposes of airdrop, 60-80% of these battalions with supplies could be airdropped or landed in a single 600 ton sortie, and there would be a wealth of flexibility in terms of tailoring the force to the particular operation.  By no stretch of the imagination am I advocating recklessly dropping armoured units into every crisis in the world that comes along, but primarily that there are instances every five or ten years where this capability would be warranted to a greater or lesser extent.

Security and stability operations will continue to be norm, and would be rendered far more safely with the integral core element of the airborne armoured battalions and regiments of the three Mobile Brigade Groups.  Non-lethal warfare units and capabilities will be needed to provide a full range of options to the SASO force across a broader spectrum of potential SASO types, especially since the tactics and doctrine are very much in their infancy, and dedicated units are needed to cautiously advance the methodology beyond a scattered collection of novel technologies and gadgets.

But I digress too much into detail.  I would agree with the core need for the capabilities of something described as an MMEV, but not with it as a distinct vehicle type, which I find rigid, linear, two-dimensional, and focused too much on firepower at the expense of the dynamic interactions of a unit in combat.

 

[Kirkhill]

http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2005/050319-jcm.htm

JCM project under the gun

In-Depth Coverage 
By Ken Rogers, The Messenger

The Joint Common Missile, a program targeted for termination in the Department of Defense budget, proceeds ahead of schedule, under budget - and under the gun.

Canceling the JCM contract, awarded last May to Lockheed Martin, would save the DOD more than $2.3 billion over six years. However, the range, versatility and accuracy of the missile has led some in the Pentagon - not to mention Lockheed officials and Alabama's Congressional delegation - to call for a closer look at the project.

A closer look may be all it takes to restore funding for the JCM, which would be built in Troy and central Florida.

"I won't say that I agree with them," said Gen. Peter Schoomaker, Army chief of staff, "but I'm Å  looking at the decision."

Edwards disagreed with the assessment that JCM's capabilities can be met by existing programs.

"There are capability gaps that this system is specifically designed to fill," he said.

A recent test in front of Pentagon officials demonstrated JCM's ability to penetrate brick over block while keeping a warhead intact.

An upcoming test will demonstrated the range of the JCM, which is designed for 16 kilometers (10 miles) in helicopters. It is scheduled at White Sands (N.M.) in early May, Smith said.

 

[Zipper]

Wow. Good discussion.

Light - Mobile - Effective - Relevant = Airborne Armoured Cavalry And Non-Lethal Warfare Units / Canadian Mobile Brigade Groups

I would like to know more about what you mean by this? Isn't the idea of non-lethal and warfare a little opposed? Or is this some kind of Canadianism?

As for the Airborne part. As we all know, the powers that be have said quite clearly that we are not going that route again. As you said, their own agenda.

Otherwise, I agree completely with the ADAT's assessment.

Kirk - Do you think the costs of development of a MMEV will be to much for us considering the US is not going this route as well?

Thanks

 

[T.S.Rea]

I am not specifically advocating 'Airborne' in the sense of any sort of elite formation like the previous Airborne Regiment, much of this national force capability would be available in the considerable different structuring, training, and roles of the units of the JTF.  Perhaps the phrasing I should have used was Rapidly Air Portable at Global Ranges With Appropriate Mobility and Armour Protection and Efficiently Disposed Allocations of Flexible and Effective Firepower, but thats a little wordy.  The role is the same one that the is intended for the U.S. Army's Stryker brigades, a strong force capable of being deployed rapidly to deter escalation of a conflict, which by extension must have a real combat capability to be effective.  As could be the case due to insufficient intelligence and the absence of perfect foresight, low and medium intensity conflicts could rapidly become hot, real fighting capacity would be necessary to minimize casualties or even just for survival.

Canadianism?  As a third-fourth generation Canadian of predominantly conservative stock, I take exception to the implied use of it as some sort of dirty word.  I have relatives who have died for this country in military service.  If the purpose of the OPFOR's in using military force is to achieve their political ends by force, and the purpose of the deployed Canadian force is to undermine that conflict's military objectives, it serves no purpose to go in and start shooting at everything in sight and merely become a part of some other countrys' war.  In order to increase the effectiveness of the deterence value of the deployed force, it is essential to possess a full spectrum of options in order to serve the objective of undermining the conflict, and issuing a few sponge grenades will no more serve that end than would allocating a few medium mortars and calling it artillery support.  I would accept any argument concerning the effectiveness of non-lethal doctrine in specific case examples, but not with underlying value of developed capabilities to serve this end, the on-going function of which is to apply lessons learned and become more effective.

Although the majority of Canadians are generally ignorant of the facts of military power, I would not for a moment second guess the intangible instincts of the people of this country on these matters.  I prefer to look behind the motives for the words of the overwhelming majority, and not get lost in the specific articulations of them or the rantings of a very small minority who offer superficially similar sentiments.  The military should reflect that will of the people, and not just serve the over-rationalized whims of its participants in isolation.

ADATS MMEV is stuck in the massed battles type of thinking of the Cold War, suited only for engaging tanks and aircraft on a linear battlespace, heavy, expensive, immobile, and irrelevant.

 

[Kirkhill]

Zipper:

I believe we may be missing the point on MMEV by focusing on the ADATS system as the final configuration.  I contend that an argument can be made that all successful weapons systems are effective at multiple missions.  A C3 howitzer is an effective Multiple Mission Effect System in the it can be fired in direct mode as an anti-tank and anti-personnel weapon or it can be fired indirectly launching various rounds, precision and dumb, obscuring and revealing the battlefield or supplying various lethal effects against a variety of targets.

Vehicles have missiles of various types bolted on to them, both with fire direction on board the vehicle and with the vehicle just being a travelling arsenal.  Midrange Missiles of the Hellfire, 70mm rocket, Stinger/Starstreak/Adats types have all been fought from ground vehicles.  Mixed stores hardpoints are the norm for the airforce.  I believe that Canada could integrate such a system.

The Coyote essentially gave the CF a ground mounted version of the capabilities of the Kiowa helicopter with its mast mounted surveillance device.  That was a successful Canadian integration.

T.S.Rea:

The old planning was indeed based on the linear battle and you are right that that is the environment in which the ADATS was created.  However the other characteristic of the old battlefield was a willingness to trade space for time.  In other words it was acceptable to give ground.  As long as you kept your front to the enemy it wasn't important how many German towns were abandoned.

The current reality allows for that but Medak and Srebrenica come to mind.  "Responsibilty to Protect" missions demand holding ground.  With 500,000 refugees clustered around the only water hole within a week's walk you have to go firm.  At that point locking the ADATs down to fixed positions, or at least limited areas of movement, and using them as anchorpoints in a defensive scheme doesn't seem ludicrous to me.

I don't know how well they would work in the manoeuvre battle but I suspect a system that doesn't require as much time to lock in and unlock would work better and a lighter system that doesn't guzzle as much gas or show up so hot on TI sight might also work better.  Right now we have the ADATS, the missiles are not getting any younger.  It seems not unreasonable to use the system, especially in the relatively benign environment of Wainwright, and figure out what if any capabilities it brings and what new avenues for consideration it opens up.

MHO.

Cheers.

 

[T.S.Rea]

Agreed.  The future battlespace and OPFOR's will become more vastly more variable and complex in nature, and I do not accept the notion that modern communications and sensors dedicated to long-range engagements against high-value targets only would be justified.  IMHO the requirement is for flexible systems that are functionally useful down to platoon level, but capable of effective integration as larger brigade formations for their strategic force in being deterrence value in addition to the distant prospect of actual deployment as such.

ADATS MMEV does not fit this requirement, nor could it be flexibly modified to do so.  An armoured gun system still would possess utility in non-lethal scenarios with its heavy  mass of Level III to full armoured protection, the capacity to deliver non-lethal agents such as ground lubricants or chemical irritants over very short ranges (vertical launch at very low velocity from the autoloader) or longer ranges through the tube, while still being capable of direct fire with APFSDS and guided types for anti-armour and anti-air use, indirect fire with guided rounds (Sadarm, Excalibur, Bonus, and various other munitions), or even well-directed fire with conventional 'dumb' rounds.  A gun tube is a flexible and efficient projector of munitions, especially when optimized as such.  Control of fires is a command function, driven by operational taskings and terrain influence.

 

[a_majoor]

This sounds a lot like many of the arguments in other threads (i.e. Canadian Armoured Cavalry, CV90 fan page, Should Canada retain MBTs, Combat Team of Tomorrow etc.)

There are several interrelated arguments here, and by picking one in isolation, you can advocate almost any position that you like. MBT's with modern electronics and through tube missiles make great MMEV's for example, because they can carry a large amount of ammunition, are well protected for DF engagements and so on. By this argument, we should start picking up all those retired American M-60 A3s and have them rebuilt to Israeli Magalch 7 standard and arm them with a mix of cannon ammunition and LAHAT missiles.

What we need to wrap our heads around is the fact that we have an existing fleet of AVGP and LAV varients, a big "sunk cost" in the LAV III (everything from logistics to training), the LAV series has certain advantages in terms of operational and strategic mobility when compared to other competing systems, and it in fact works (as the US Stryker brigades are showing in OIF). These factors strongly exclude other candidates, no matter how worthy they may appear to be in isolation.

As readers of this post know, I am no fan of LAV-ADATS, and would preffer to upgrade the LAV-TOW system to include data-links and a long range "Fire and Forget" missile battery to take on the MMEV role. I also like the idea of upgrading the LAV-TOW since (in my mind anyway) it is a battalion asset, which can be attached right down to the platoon level if need be, allowing for the fast response time T.S.Rea correctly points to. (LAV-TOW with a mixed battery of FOG-M and LOSAT in a platoon setting; FOG-M to shoot over those annoying buildings and terrain features, LOSAT to deal with the sudden appearence of hard targets.)

 

[pbi]

The Americans are learning this the hard way, why are we not trying to learn from their mistakes

What makes you guys think we aren't doing that now? This is why we have Cdn LOs and Instructors at all the major US and British Army schools and development centres(and some in Australia), why we take part in things like ABCA, and why our Lessons Learned shop keeps in touch with the US Army CALL and the USMC equivalent. We have been doing this for years. It isn't that the Army doesn't try to keep up on what our Allies are doing: we do. It is that all of our recommendations, advice, etc don't cut much ice against the CF-internal struggles, the pork politics and the money issues that have traditionally driven our major defence purchases.

Cheers.