- Reaction score
- 7,885
- Points
- 1,360
From the (reasonably) non-partisan Congressional Research Service - highlights mine....
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf
Summary:
The mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan
is seen as a test of the alliance’s political will and military capabilities. The allies are
seeking to create a “new” NATO, able to go beyond the European theater and combat
new threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Afghanistan is NATO’s first “out-of-area” mission beyond Europe. The purpose of
the mission is the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The mission is a
difficult one because it must take place while combat operations against Taliban
insurgents continue.
U.N. Security Council resolutions govern NATO’s responsibilities. The NATOled
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) faces formidable obstacles:
shoring up a weak government in Kabul; using military capabilities in a distant
country with rugged terrain; and rebuilding a country devastated by war and troubled
by a resilient narcotics trade. NATO’s mission statement lays out the essential
elements of the task of stabilizing and rebuilding the country: train the Afghan army,
police, and judiciary; support the government in counter-narcotics efforts; develop
a market infrastructure; and suppress the Taliban.
Although the allies agree on ISAF’s mission, they differ on how to accomplish
it. Some allies do not want their forces to engage in combat operations. None wants
to engage directly in destruction of poppy fields in countering the drug trade; how to
support the Afghan government in this task — largely through training the police —
is proving to be a difficult undertaking. In the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal and
criticism of U.S. practices at Guantanamo, the allies are insisting on close
observation of international law in dealing with prisoners taken in Afghanistan.
ISAF has proceeded in stages to stabilize the country. In Stage One, ISAF took
control of Kabul and northern Afghanistan. In Stage Two, ISAF moved into western
Afghanistan. Stage Three, in the still restive south, began in July 2006. ISAF’s
principal mechanism for rebuilding Afghanistan is the Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT). PRTs, composed of military and civilian officials, are charged with
extending the reach of the Afghan government by improving governance and
rebuilding the economy. There are significant differences in how individual NATO
governments run their PRTs. Some U.S. officials believe that several allies do not
commit sufficient resources to make their PRTs effective.
Most observers predict that ISAF’s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan will require
five years or more. An exit strategy has multiple components: suppressing the
Taliban; rebuilding the economy; and cajoling Afghan leaders to put aside tribal and
regional disputes and improve governance. U.S. leadership of the alliance as well as
NATO credibility are at issue. The allies are sharply critical of aspects of the Bush
Administration’s foreign policy, and sometimes specifically its NATO policy. U.S.
leadership in Afghanistan may well affect NATO’s cohesiveness and its future. This
report will be updated as needed.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf
Summary:
The mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan
is seen as a test of the alliance’s political will and military capabilities. The allies are
seeking to create a “new” NATO, able to go beyond the European theater and combat
new threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Afghanistan is NATO’s first “out-of-area” mission beyond Europe. The purpose of
the mission is the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The mission is a
difficult one because it must take place while combat operations against Taliban
insurgents continue.
U.N. Security Council resolutions govern NATO’s responsibilities. The NATOled
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) faces formidable obstacles:
shoring up a weak government in Kabul; using military capabilities in a distant
country with rugged terrain; and rebuilding a country devastated by war and troubled
by a resilient narcotics trade. NATO’s mission statement lays out the essential
elements of the task of stabilizing and rebuilding the country: train the Afghan army,
police, and judiciary; support the government in counter-narcotics efforts; develop
a market infrastructure; and suppress the Taliban.
Although the allies agree on ISAF’s mission, they differ on how to accomplish
it. Some allies do not want their forces to engage in combat operations. None wants
to engage directly in destruction of poppy fields in countering the drug trade; how to
support the Afghan government in this task — largely through training the police —
is proving to be a difficult undertaking. In the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal and
criticism of U.S. practices at Guantanamo, the allies are insisting on close
observation of international law in dealing with prisoners taken in Afghanistan.
ISAF has proceeded in stages to stabilize the country. In Stage One, ISAF took
control of Kabul and northern Afghanistan. In Stage Two, ISAF moved into western
Afghanistan. Stage Three, in the still restive south, began in July 2006. ISAF’s
principal mechanism for rebuilding Afghanistan is the Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT). PRTs, composed of military and civilian officials, are charged with
extending the reach of the Afghan government by improving governance and
rebuilding the economy. There are significant differences in how individual NATO
governments run their PRTs. Some U.S. officials believe that several allies do not
commit sufficient resources to make their PRTs effective.
Most observers predict that ISAF’s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan will require
five years or more. An exit strategy has multiple components: suppressing the
Taliban; rebuilding the economy; and cajoling Afghan leaders to put aside tribal and
regional disputes and improve governance. U.S. leadership of the alliance as well as
NATO credibility are at issue. The allies are sharply critical of aspects of the Bush
Administration’s foreign policy, and sometimes specifically its NATO policy. U.S.
leadership in Afghanistan may well affect NATO’s cohesiveness and its future. This
report will be updated as needed.
