Naval Capabilities Needed.

[Kirkhill]

So first question: What do we want this small boat to do?

My suggestion of the CB-90 was essentially an RHIB replacement that could operate from large vessels in littoral waters and operate in riverine environments environments both domestically and overseas.  In addition to working from the APV (when the ice is out) or any other large vessel it could also operate in harbours, on the St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, the West Coast Islands (which are ice-free) and be available for operation in any flood environment or inland waterway because of the shallow draft and waterjet propulsion.

Ex-Dragoon's selection looks like a solution for the West Coast, or the Great Lakes and Seaway, or foreign litorals (but might be a bit of a problem to transport to theatre).

Blackshirt moves up into the Corvette class. The Visby would be great on the West Coast and Georges Bank but would have to self deploy for expeditionary work in foreign littorals.

Boater seems to be thinking along the lines of a larger Offshore Patrol Vessel (A Frigate without the weapons or an APV without the ice capability)

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

I think we are focusing a little bit much on the inshore a bit

 

[NavyShooter]

I think the question being asked is which capabilities do we need to maintain, and how?

The individual platforms that would fill the roles that we choose to maintain will likely need to be made in Canada, or at least, licensed copies that can be built in Canadian Shipyards (if we have any left).

So.

Looking at our existing capabilities:

ASW:   Maintain the CPF's keep this role.  New platform not needed. 

ASuW:  Maintain CPF's, keep this role.  Improve it with newer versions of Harpoon, adding better land attack capability.

AAW (LR):  Retire the 280s, finish installing the ESSM's on CPF's, improve their point defence capabilities to a larger area defence capability, and get the 4 missile cells to increase loadout (from 16 single missile cells to 16x4 missile cells for 64 missiles per CPF) Not an ideal solution, but the 280's are well past their prime, and maintaining more than one class of major warship is damn expensive.

There's the 3 basic core capabilities of the Canadian Navy.  The CPF's can maintain most of them until we get a new class of ship.

Other capabilities and issues with them:

Command Ship.  CPF's have previously been configured as command ship.  This has been a jury-rig, but it's worked.  We can maintain a minimal level of this support on CPF's. 

Shipboard Helos:  The upgrade to the new Cyclones will be a welcomed change, but the size of the helo means that there is a significant amount of work to be done to a ship in order to fly them.

Naval Boarding Party:   No change.

Naval Gunner Support:  No ships currently well suited for this role, (though 280's are better off than CPF's due to larger gun) but no current ability (except Harpoon) to direct Precision Attacks.

Littoral Capability:  MCDV's are not a fast or capable platfrom for Littoral missions.  They lack firepower, speed and survivability.  CPF's are too large and valuable to be put inshore.  New platform needed.  If the platform is capable of performing NGS missions, and operating NBP's we gain a HUGE set of capabilities, and free the CPF's for offshore work.

So, whereto from here?

1.  Buy some mid-size corvettes and retire the MCDV's.  Simlar crew-size, greater capabilities.

2.  Retire the 280s, and get some small littoral ships such as the CB-90.  These ships have NGS ability with the 120mm AMOS turret.

3.  Get the JSS's on stream ASAP, but add the ability to have them carry two or more CB-90's, so that they can bring some extra hardware along when going into battle. 

Just my thoughts.  I was writing more, but it got confusing to me (up with the sick kids last night, zero sleep.)

NavyShooter

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Would you keep the Block1B or would you move to the RAM?

 

[NavyShooter]

Not being 100% in the know as to all the capability differences between the two, I'd say stick with the 1B, and maybe put the RAM onto the corvette sized ships. 

NS

 

[newfin]

I like the size of vessel that the Coast Guard is going to fill it's MSPV (mid-shore patrol vessel) role with.  I think the design is scheduled to be finalised this summer.  Here's presentation on the MSPV project.  Ignore the date on the first page - it automatically inserts today's date so I am not sure when this presentation dates from.

I think that all of the projects that are currently on the go should be completed.  An OPV is the most important big ticket capability that we need to add.  As for getting rid of the Kingston's, seems like they are widely unloved but what about their mine sweeping capability?  Shouldn't that be retained?  Side scan sonar?  I realise there have been recent problems with one.

And why can't we find three suitable, available vessels to fill in the role of the 280's while we are waiting for SCSC.  By available I mean previously loved.  Used.  We only need 10 years of life out of them.  The AAW and C&C functions of the 280's are requirements that the Navy finds useful and do not want to give up on.  I don't think we should either but it does not matter much what I think.

...and the role of the Sea King/Cyclone is/will be so important to the function of the ship that it has to be included.  These a/c exist only because of what they offer the ship.  Their ownership does not matter.  If they were flown by Navy pilots and owned by the Navy the capabilities that they bring to the ship would not change.

 

[newfin]

link:
http://www.uscg.mil/d9/wwm/marinesafety/blomshield/MSPV.ppt

 

[cameron]

Just getting to check replies, the usual problem of accessing the site.  Thanks for the info CDN Aviator, too bad SCTF has been put on hold.  While I support the mission in Astan 200%, and realize that we need to commit a lot of resources including financial there, I fear the powers that be may be getting tunnel vision.  We need to prepare our military to face not only current but future contingencies.  The next threat may very well not come from a landlocked nation.  Yes the army certainly needs extra resources at this time, let's just make sure we don't sacrifice the Navy too much in the process

 

[Good2Golf]

What happened to CADRE?  Did it get rolled into SCSC or FELIX?

 

[IN HOC SIGNO]

Just getting to check replies, the usual problem of accessing the site.  Thanks for the info CDN Aviator, too bad SCTF has been put on hold.  While I support the mission in Astan 200%, and realize that we need to commit a lot of resources including financial there, I fear the powers that be may be getting tunnel vision.  We need to prepare our military to face not only current but future contingencies.  The next threat may very well not come from a landlocked nation.  Yes the army certainly needs extra resources at this time, let's just make sure we don't sacrifice the Navy too much in the process

I agree Cameron. I have no doubt that there is a lot of tunnel vision right now on the needs of the mission and the Army at the expense of the capability of the other two services. I too support the mission unequivocally and believe the purchases we are making to support (C17s, Chinooks, Tanks etc)are worthy and will serve for other theatres at a later date also. I do wonder though if we are going to have as capable a Navy and Air Force...not just for things that help the troops get to where they need to go. We need to be capable in ASW....there are lots of subs in the world (check out China and Russia)...and AAW. We need a fast air capability and adequate maritime patrol....etc etc
I think that a country as rich as ours should never have to wonder if we can afford to do long range planning and investing for our defence needs. If we can waste billions in scandals in the HRDC and the adscam and the gun registry (to mention only a few places we have squandered billions) we have billions to invest in proper equipment for our protection.

 

[cameron]

+1 IN HOC SIGNO, there was a recent article in a publication by that naval studies think tank at Dalhousie University.  Unfortunately I can't remember the name of the publication or the think tank, that's why I didn't mention it in my previous post.  However, the gist of the article, which I agree with, is that Britain, a small country with a small population, became a military giant due to its naval power, which it used to secure and consolidate its empire against countries like France which have always (up to today) had bigger armies.  While I have great respect for the RAF (I think its probably the world's most incredible air force), many people forget how mortally afraid Hitler was of the Royal Navy, remember how the Tirpitz was kept hidden in a Scandinavian fjord for much of its service life?  And one of the reasons why Sweden was the only Scandinavian country not attacked by Hitler was his healthy respect for the Swedish Navy.

I am overjoyed to see the Canadian Army getting long overdue respect as warfighters, respect it hasn't gotten since WWII and Korea.  A country with a small population like Canada's however, needs to realize that a flexible navy that is always kept at the cutting edge in terms of ships and equipment, is not only indispensable for defending the world's largest coastline, but also for defending Canada's interests abroad and projecting Canadian military might, both as a credible deterrent and a credible response.  Like the above mentioned article stated Canada can learn a lot from the historical lessons of British naval power.  I'll try to find the article and provide a link as soon as possible.

 

[cameron]

Ok guys i've found it, the journal is the Canadian Naval Review published by Dalhousie University.  We all know of my previous miserable attempts to post links so i'll not try it  this time ;D.  But if you go to Dalhousie U's website in the search bar type the name 'canadian naval review', open the link and click on archive, some back issues will be displayed.  The article which is entitled "Sinking the Navy in Afghanistan" is in the Winter 2007 article, pp 25-27.  Excellent article, check it out.

 

[NavyShooter]

http://naval.review.cfps.dal.ca/archive/public/vol2num4art6.pdf

 

[Good2Golf]

http://naval.review.cfps.dal.ca/archive/public/vol2num4art6.pdf

That's a good piece.  Since many of the world's hot spots are within reach of the littoral, I'd say it would be wise not to forsake the Navy which, pardon the metaphor (not meant as a slight to a subordinate service), is the maritime version of "boots on the ground".

G2G

 

[NavyShooter]

Some 90% of the world's population lives within Harpoon missile range of a shoreline.

Foresaking the ability to influence these areas?  What a loss for our country, with how many thousands of km's of shoreline ourselves?

Don't forget the GTS Katie....who had to save the army's kit from being "hijacked" for more money?  (Kidnapped?) 

NS

 

[NavyShooter]

Or is that....tank-napped?

 

[George Wallace]

Don't forget the GTS Katie....who had to save the army's kit from being "hijacked" for more money?  (Kidnapped?) 

Or is that....tank-napped?

So does this put you "FOR" or "Against"?

 

[CrazyCanuck]

At this point in time the only way the Canadian Navy is going to be rejuvenated is if a) major public opinion supports it or b) sadly if people start dying which in turn will lead to public opinion demanding it.

 

[a_majoor]

Canada has a particular problem with naval capabilities.

We have the longest shoreline in the world, and 1/3 is icebound for most of the year. We should have platforms capable of patroling and controlling these areas.

If we are doing force projection, we need to cross oceans, which means large, capable ships which can commence operations once they reach the AoR.

On the other hand, inside the AoR, the trend seems to be for smaller ships that can operate in Littorals, and conduct small boat operations such as landing SOF teams.

We also have a relatively small industrial base and disinterested population when it comes to getting resources to address these problems.

You will live in interesting times........

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

No offence to the Navy personnel here, but I totally disagree with the author on a number of his statements, the most glaring being:

"Most particularly, it is important for the Canadian Government to recognize the cost-effectiveness of a modern and capable navy, and how a flexible, multi-role fleet gives Canada the most effective and nationally-acceptable means to meet is alliance responsibilites and the many other challenges that will arise."

Specifically:
1)  I find the above statement re: "national acceptability" to be somewhat cowardly and very much reminiscent of the Liberals intentional rust out of armed forces so that foreign policy options were limited by intentional reduction in physical capability.  We may have a large number of anti-war advocates as citizens who would claim non-intervention in places like Afghanistan, however that in no way means they are right.  To pander a procurement model based on the idealistic naivete of our population is disgraceful.
2)  I think the above statement regarding cost-effectiveness is misleading as it makes it sound as if naval procurement is relatively inexpensive.  My recollection is the latest costing for the new Australian AAD's is pushing $2 billion per ship, excluding Life Cycle Costs.  That means for a fleet of (4) replacement AAD's the cost would be close to $8 billion excluding the helicopters.  To say there are a lot of alternative ways to spend that $8 billion, would be an understatement and I think his absolute aversion to presenting a tangible procurement plan necessitates the fact he knows those numbers will undermine his own argument.
3)  I think the author is somewhat too attached to the British Navy as a model.  He forgets that the nostalgic British Navy he describes existed in an era of nation-states where destroying another nation's harbours, merchant navy, and as such its ability to trade, in essence destroyed the circulation system of that state at which point the leadership bowed and succumbed to British dominance.  As we transition into the 21st century, killing civilians, even when caught in a crossfire, is no longer deemed acceptable, much less launching a battleship barrage onto a town or city to assert national dominance.  In short, the model he cites in support of his statements ceased to exist long ago.

In a world in which failed state insurgencies are going to be the greatest demand (Taliban in Afghanistan, Janjaweed in Darfur, Hezbollah or Al Qaeda in Lebanon), we have to measure the prudency of procuring redundant naval assets that our allies already own that we know will be on-station because it is politically expedient as described above especially for our European allies (frigates and destroyers), versus investing primarily in Land Forces (with requisite air support like C-17 and naval support like JSS) that our allies are politically unwilling to deploy and whether those contributed forces are the tipping point between action and inaction in a theatre such as the former Rwanda.

Candidly, I think the CDS is on exactly the right track in terms of balance and only hope he continues along the path he has started to walk....


Matthew.