New MBT(Leo 2, M1A2, or Challenger 2), new light tank (Stingray), or new DFSV (M8 or MGS)?

[ChopperHead]

I wrote that essay someone told me to write and there is alittle bit moe then 500 words 

Slim if you want to give me your email adress i'll send it to you.

 

[Infanteer]

The Americans successfully trialled a M1A1 with the Leo's diesel engine.  That it was not part of the M1's A2 upgrade was simply because the diesel is not American. 

Perhaps the best trade off for Canada, assuming a MBT buy, would be buying surplus M1A1, rebuilt with the MTU power pack?

Like the Aussies, we could maintain a small MBT capability in case we need to pull an Thunder Run.  The Aussies realize that they are most likely going to be fighting a bush war in the jungle, but they are smart enough to realize that this doesn't mean that you throw out the baby with the bathwater - we need to do the same.

Seeing how our fleet is mostly diesel now (is the G-Wagon?), I think that just makes a refurbished M1C1 even more appealing.

Lance Wiebe for MND! 

 

[Michael Dorosh]

ya but we already know how to use the Leo's and are familiar with them.

We may be familiar with how to "operate" the Leopard, but as to "knowing how to use" them, I'd say we will never know whether or not we ever knew how to use them.  We never had to use them, and theoretical doctrine is just that...theoretical.  You can test your theories in exercises, but real combat is better.  Even so, when was the last time Canadian tanks exercised at a formation level?

 

[TCBF]

Fallex 91, maybe.  But Fallex 88 was best, over 100,000 people on it.  V Corps versus VII Corps freeplay ex.  That was one crazy manouevre box.

Tom

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Fallex 91, maybe.  But Fallex 88 was best, over 100,000 people on it.  V Corps versus VII Corps freeplay ex.  That was one crazy manouevre box.

Tom

That's a long time; we were fighting against Soviet doctrine in that one I take it?  How did the Leopards do? 

 

[George Wallace]

We may be familiar with how to "operate" the Leopard, but as to "knowing how to use" them, I'd say we will never know whether or not we ever knew how to use them.  We never had to use them, and theoretical doctrine is just that...theoretical.  You can test your theories in exercises, but real combat is better.  Even so, when was the last time Canadian tanks exercised at a formation level?

A bit of a Highjack, and a bit outside your lanes.

The Armour Corps is very familiar with how to operate the Leopard and they do know how to use them.  Your comments on theoretical doctrine is elitist gobblie goop.  If you used some real life experience or decent research, you wouldn't have these questions. 

Where do you ask have we used the Leo C1 and Leo C2 recently?  We have used them in Bosnia and Kosovo.  In fact they were of great use in Kosovo, being able to go places the the larger M1, Leo 2 and Challengers, as well as the Italian Centaro, could not go.  They really proved their worth there, but many of our Senior Staff and Politicians fail to acknowledge that. 

The Canadians are still using Leo C2 in Wainwright today, as witnessed daily by TCBF.  On BTE 2003 we employed two Sqns of Leo C2 in the RCD with 2 CMBG. 

Testing on Exercise with Miles Equipment is far cheaper than testing in battle.  More lessons learned, without death, to hopefully prevent death when the time comes.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

A bit of a Highjack, and a bit outside your lanes.

The Armour Corps is very familiar with how to operate the Leopard and they do know how to use them.  Your comments on theoretical doctrine is elitist gobblie goop.  If you used some real life experience or decent research, you wouldn't have these questions. 

Where do you ask have we used the Leo C1 and Leo C2 recently?  We have used them in Bosnia and Kosovo.  In fact they were of great use in Kosovo, being able to go places the the larger M1, Leo 2 and Challengers, as well as the Italian Centaro, could not go.  They really proved their worth there, but many of our Senior Staff and Politicians fail to acknowledge that. 

The Canadians are still using Leo C2 in Wainwright today, as witnessed daily by TCBF.  On BTE 2003 we employed two Sqns of Leo C2 in the RCD with 2 CMBG. 

Testing on Exercise with Miles Equipment is far cheaper than testing in battle.  More lessons learned, without death, to hopefully prevent death when the time comes.

How many MBTs did Leopards engage in Kosovo?

They haven't been proven in a major battle, which is what they were designed for, right?  Canadians fighting other Canadians with laser simulators is great; how do we know how they would have fared vs. Soviet all-arms teams?  Or for that matter, how they would do against a Chinese battlegroup in, say, Korea?

Everyone thought the Sherman would be the cat's ass, too, until they actually had to use them against the Germans.

Given a hypothetical major war against a first world enemy, you can plan all you like and maybe have an idea how the first weeks or months of hostilities go, but if the war lasts long enough your enemy is going to find he has lots of money to burn on new weapons projects he couldn't afford in peacetime and I think all bets are off.

Did the Stryker have those birdcage contraptions on them before the Iraq War started, or was that a level of protection they found they needed after hostilities started?

Why did Fireflies carry German tank tread and sandbag armour in 1945?

Do we really have cause to believe the Leopard was the perfect weapon to stand up to Soviet T-80s?

These are the kinds of issues I'm referring to.  American units modified their doctrine/role after engaging in real combat in Iraq, are you suggesting we wouldn't have had to after going into an actual combat situation where tanks were fighting?

 

[Infanteer]

We may be familiar with how to "operate" the Leopard, but as to "knowing how to use" them, I'd say we will never know whether or not we ever knew how to use them.  We never had to use them, and theoretical doctrine is just that...theoretical.

Nice try, but if you read the posts, the argument for a Leo2 based on familiarity is in crewmanship; you don't need to be in a warfighting situation to learn how to drive a vehicle or run a targetting system.  This crew proficiency, which would be maintained with a familiar vehicle, is what the thread was looking at, so drop the hijack of commanding armoured sub-units, units and formations.

Methinks someone else may need a 500 page homework project too....

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Nice try, but if you read the posts, the argument for a Leo2 based on familiarity is in crewmanship; you don't need to be in a warfighting situation to learn how to drive a vehicle or run a targetting system.  This crew proficiency, which would be maintained with a familiar vehicle, is what the thread was looking at, so drop the hijack of commanding armoured sub-units, units and formations.

Methinks someone else may need a 500 page homework project too....

No hijack intended, I haven't read the whole thread, I just noticed Slim singled out that one sentence for a response, and so I did the same as I thought the point was salient and an angle Slim had overlooked.

Feel free to split it off if George wants his wisdom to remain on the board, otherwise feel free to delete this if you really feel it ungermaine.

I will be happy to do a 500 page homework project on how doctrine and equipment go hand in hand, however, and relate how the deficiencies of the Sherman in 1944 and the Stryker in 2004 caused ad hoc changes in armour protection and long term changes in weapons design...

But, if this thread is "only" about crew training, I have nothing to say on that matter.  I would be interested, though, in another thread if necessary, to know if George really feels that fighting pretend battles in Wainwright is really going to be proof that the Leopard can stand up in actual combat conditions.  I won't argue that they were used well in exercises in Germany, Wainwright, Shilo, or on peace/stability/whatever the buzzword is now missions in the Balkans.  Are we really arguing that we need to keep the Leopard/replace the Leopard with the MGS because of what it can do in the Balkans?

I thought the argument was that we need to keep a tracked MBT capability, and for that I would presume we need it for warfighting.  And if that is the case, I still say the Leopard hasn't been "proven" in that arena beyond the theoretical.  I'm not saying it wouldn't stand up, I'm not saying it would, I'm saying it would be foolhardy to think we have all the answers we need. And I say that based on the changes we've seen to US doctrine and equipment in Iraq. 

 

[George Wallace]

In its dying days, the Mulroney government had the chance to get 300 M1's (armed with 105's) plus parts and spares for a song. If they had gone ahead with the purchase, rebuilding and diesel-izing the fleet and even up-gunning them could have been done very cheaply.

I don't think you have your facts correct.  In 1989-90 there was an opportunity to pick up 300 US tanks, in exchange for our 128 Leo C1s.  The deal was not for M1s, but for M60s, an older tank than what we already had.

The Liberals passed up a better deal, when the Germans were pulling out of Shilo and due to the disarmanent Treaty, they were going to leave all their Leo 2s that were in Shilo to the CF.  Cretin nixed it.

 

[Eland]

I don't think you have your facts correct.  In 1989-90 there was an opportunity to pick up 300 US tanks, in exchange for our 128 Leo C1s.  The deal was not for M1s, but for M60s, an older tank than what we already had.

The Liberals passed up a better deal, when the Germans were pulling out of Shilo and due to the disarmanent Treaty, they were going to leave all their Leo 2s that were in Shilo to the CF.  Cretin nixed it.

OK, I stand corrected. My information came from news reports I remember reading many years ago. I'm curious as to why the US would have wanted to take our Leopard 1's in exchange. What use would they have had for them? The M60 wouldn't have been too bad, provided it was the A3 version. The Israelis still have uparmoured versions of these still in service - admittedly in reserve roles. But then again, given this country's outright negligence in defending itself, even three hundred third-line tanks would be a step up.

Trust Cretin (or any Liberal) to nix a deal like the one the Germans offered us. Good tanks, practically for free (although I do realize that in return, the Germans might have wanted a rebate of the fees they paid to use Shilo  > ).

 

[TCBF]

"That's a long time; we were fighting against Soviet doctrine in that one I take it?  How did the Leopards do?"

- Excellent.  At the end of day 1, having withstood - from a superbly sited battle position - the piecemeal attacks of 6 to 9 opposing armoured bns, the 8 CH BG had only five tanks left.  "4 Cdn Mech Speed Bump Bde."

What else did anyone expect?

Tom

 

[Michael Dorosh]

"That's a long time; we were fighting against Soviet doctrine in that one I take it?  How did the Leopards do?"

- Excellent.  At the end of day 1, having withstood - from a superbly sited battle position - the piecemeal attacks of 6 to 9 opposing armoured bns, the 8 CH BG had only five tanks left.  "4 Cdn Mech Speed Bump Bde."

What else did anyone expect?

Tom

Well, that depends.  How were kills assessed?  Computer simulation of actual ballistics, extrapolated from tests of Russian tank guns on actual Leopard hulls?  Was angle of penetration taken into account, glancing blows on external stowage, hits on vision ports, gun sights, etc. modelled?

Was it one hit=one kill?

Did an umpire simply decide what felt right? 

Did a staff officer look up data on ballistics tables back at brigade HQ and then roll a zocchihedron onto a musty copy of SPI's TANK or RED STAR/WHITE STAR?

In short, how much could ANYONE have expected?  And even if the weapons were simulated down to a T, would those simulations hold true after a couple of weeks of soldiers in the field - on both sides - improving their kit with field expedients, or their tactics, or the unlikely event a European war stretched out long enough for weapons developers to come up with new kit?

George wants me to stay in my lane.  So I'll ask Infanteer - in your years in the reserves, how much time did you spend pepperpotting and how directly relevant was that to a) the work you actually did on your peacekeeping tour and b) what you've been watching the Canadians and Americans doing on TV in SE Asia and the middleeast?

Slim was the one who singled out a particular sentence for a reply, I chose to reply to the same sentence, and I think it is relevant to the whole MGS debate.  We don't know what we need to field because we don't know who our next enemy will be.  Those who feel that the Leopard should have not been phased out may be right, but I don't think they can safely assert that they were "proven" to be more or less effective than the MGS, since they were never fought against other armour (at least not by us).  Short of the sublime and the ridiculous (if our next war is against ray-gun toting aliens from the Confederation of Martian States, all bets truly are off), I don't doubt that weapons procurement and testing proceeds along very scientific lines, and that soldiers in the field are very diligent about testing that stuff to the best of their abilities.  I don't happen to believe that - based on historical experience - that kind of testing will ever really approximate the necessary conditions to give an accurate read.  Have we ever, in our history, guessed correctly what the next war would be like?

Incidentally, see General Eisenhower's response to General Bradley when the latter reported, sometime around COBRA, that the US 76mm gun was incapable of penetrating frontal armour on German PzKpfw V and VI tanks. 

Don't read too much into this; these aren't failings on the part of Canadian scientists and soldiers, I just look at Sam Hughes, who would assert that the Ross was the finest battlefield rifle in the world, which it was - on the range at Valcartier - and wonder if perhaps the Leopard isn't the finest battetank in the world - when deployed against other Leopards on the computer range at Wainwright...

 

[TCBF]

"SPI's TANK or RED STAR/WHITE STAR?"

- Wow.  Those are almost as old as my Avalon Hill "Blitzkrieg" game.  Do you have "Wurzburg" and "Chinese Farm" as well?

The assessment solution lies with niether the technology or good judgement, but both.  The stuff we are getting at CMTC has flaws that have to be mitigated by intelligent Observer/Controller play, but even then it is difficult to predict exactly how a piece of kit will do under ALL circumstances.  Look how well the superior French tanks did in 1940.

Tom

 

[Michael Dorosh]

"SPI's TANK or RED STAR/WHITE STAR?"

- Wow.  Those are almost as old as my Avalon Hill "Blitzkrieg" game.  Do you have "Wurzburg" and "Chinese Farm" as well?

The assessment solution lies with niether the technology or good judgement, but both.  The stuff we are getting at CMTC has flaws that have to be mitigated by intelligent Observer/Controller play, but even then it is difficult to predict exactly how a piece of kit will do under ALL circumstances.  Look how well the superior French tanks did in 1940.

Tom

I don't have Wurzburg or Chinese Farm, but I have Mechwar 77 and Patrol.  I know as much about playing wargames as I do about running a Leopard tank; but its a bit irrelevant because mostly I just collect old titles for historical value.  Having said that,  if you're up for a game of Sniper! via VASSAL sometime and don't mind winning all the time....

I think you see my point; the problem of predicting how enemy kit will do is exacerbated by the secrecy with which governments tend to treat their stuff (but from the 60s onwards with the two major superpowers selling their stuff to anyone in the world that wanted it, it got a lot easier to acquire samples for testing, I think).

Add to that not knowing what conditions you will be using it in.  The idea of an MBT is great if you know you're going to use it in suitable terrain.  And if you know what suitable terrain is.  Were the Americans not surprised at the performance of the M1 tank in urban terrain in Iraq, and was that experience borne out of necessity rather than a desire to try the concept out?  We may have to fight our next "big" war in places wheels can go and tracks can't.  Or maybe we will get to fight with tracked vehicles on the North German Plain, who knows.  But I'd be loathe to think that we have 100 percent certainty that any weapon or vehicle system we have will perform exactly as we anticipate, given all these unquantifiable facets of the equation.

Anyway, if I've well and truly dragged this off topic or simply repeated what's been discussed in the other MGS threads, my apologies, I don't really keep up on the several hundred active threads running every day.  Just saw something I wanted to respond to, and so did.

In any event, I was at a briefing for the CMTC (at the PPCLI reunion, actually) and it looks like a ton of stuff that was never simulated in exercises before will be part of the new generation of sims.  I think that's terrific.  But in the end, one has to ensure that the simulations are sound, reasonable facsimiles of the real thing.  Pepperpotting over open ground in 1917-style assaults on Soviet trench systems without artillery, armour or air power even remotely considered seem to be a thing of the past.  Good.  But if the ability to understand how modern weapons and vehicles really interact on the battlefield with potential threats is as good as George seems to think, why so many "lessons learned" coming out of a shooting war like Iraq?

 

[TCBF]

Because "lessons learned" always come out of shooting wars.  Generally speaking, the kit is a lot more predictable than the people using it. 

Tom

 

[George Wallace]

A couple of things for you Michael D.  First off, there is that statement of fighting the next war in places where wheels will go and tracks will not.  You have been around long enough to know better than that.  You got it completely backwards, so it really caught me by surprise to see it come from you.  In the event, you honestly believe what you posted, I would like to correct you on it; Tracks are more maneuverable and capable than wheeled vehicles in all terrains. 

I really don't think you are being fair in your half look at simulations.  You go on and question the scientific aspects of Tank or wpns fire on Armour Vehicles and call them suspect.  I am sure that you probably hold the same suspicions on the effectiveness of simulated small arms fire on the infanteer.  I suppose you would like us to use live ammunitions to actually test the effectiveness of fire on our Armour vehicles in the same light as you would like us to actually use live ammunitions to shoot at our dismounted troops. 

Michael.....get real.

Simunitions and Simulators will do just fine for me.  As for Lessons Learned; we are continually learning.  Although we sometimes have the habit of 'reinventing the wheel', we are hopefully avoiding that practice by using the Lessons Learned systems that have been developed.

 

[Infanteer]

George wants me to stay in my lane.  So I'll ask Infanteer - in your years in the reserves, how much time did you spend pepperpotting and how directly relevant was that to a) the work you actually did on your peacekeeping tour and b) what you've been watching the Canadians and Americans doing on TV in SE Asia and the middleeast?

Slim was the one who singled out a particular sentence for a reply, I chose to reply to the same sentence, and I think it is relevant to the whole MGS debate.

We were not talking about tank tactics or tank command, so your point on "pepperpotting" is irrelevant.  However, I was taught how to properly use and maintain a C7 and operate a PLGR.  This is individual proficiency and skill with equipment, which is what Slim was talking about with his mention of "knowing" the Leo2.  Using the C7 family of rifles is a certain skill, one where practicing on the parade square always helps you down the road.  If I was to have an AK dumped into my hands, a rifle but from a different family, I'd have to spend some time familiarizing myself with a new operating system.  Apply the same principle to a tank and the individual and team skills required to operate one and you'll understand what Slim was referring to.

You're mention of tactics for tanks is fine and relevent (infact, there is another thread on the Armoured forum dealing with it at the moment) but it has nothing to do with what Slim or anyone else was talking about.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I'm coming in to this one late, but here goes.

On the issue of whether we'd be better off with M1A2s vs Leopard 2s, I'd pick the M1A2s.  The M1 is "combat proven" and used by our friends down south.  That being said, the Leopard 2 (any mark) is an excellent tank and if Santa had left a regiment worth in the vehicle park (including parts and ammo) I wouldn't have been upset.

Whether Canada needs an MBT is a tricky issue.  If we do not have one (current generation), then Canada needs to manage its expectations as to what our Army can do on operations.  The Australians have opted for M1s based on their study of modern combat (their own in Vietnam included).  For us, I venture that it is not about the money.

On both these issues (M1s vs Leos and does Canada need an MBT) I've spilled many electrons and killed bandwidth on this and other sites and the point is rather moot.

Regarding the issue of whether we knew how to employ our Leopards, we certainly trained hard and studied our doctrine and TTPs.

Much of our doctrine was based on searing WW II experience, but there was also influence from the study of Arab-Israeli fights (especially 1973) and sharing information with allies.  In this we were not far off from most other nations in the Cold War.  We also maintained links with allied armoured corps to benefit from their experience.  Our doctrine and TTPs were never really "validated", in that we did not see how they fared on the two way range.  That being said, our low-level TTPs are quite similar to US ones that did well in both Gulf Wars (there are differences, the biggest one to me being an acceptance on the US part of travelling overwatch).

Our training was certainly rigorous.  Our individual gunnery courses were top-notch and invested time, ammo and seasoned instructors.  Our crew commanding courses (junior officers and NCMs) were field oriented and very challenging.  Failure to observe basic principles would lead to failure on the course.  Our collective training was also high quality, although MILES gear would have helped.  The last tank squadron that I was in (02 to 03) had a very full training year and was good to go from my perspective, which was admittedly biased.  In my estimation we could have converted to M1A2s in about six weeks of hard training (both individual and collective).  More time would be better to truly master the little things, but as a Squadron we did know our tanking business and we could have transferred it to other tanks.

As to our equipment, the Leopard (C1 and C2) both had good firepower and mobility but had made compromises in protection.  The base design had been made in the days when it was figured that ATGMs could kill anything so evasion was the best bet.  If 4 CMBG had gone to war they probably would have killed a lot of Soviet tanks but would have also suffered heavy losses (perhaps like the Israelis in 73 on the Golan).  If we'd gone to either Gulf War I figure that we would have suffered higher losses than an M1 equipped unit (stating the obvious, I know).  Its all guesswork, but we can try to make informed guesses. 

I'm currently in the "Lessons Learned Community", and it is somewhat difficult to learn lessons in peacetime.  Individuals and units can certainly "learn" lessons with regards to mastering existing doctrine, but new doctrine and TTPs are little trickier.  Even instrumented exercises do not show the whole picture and I am a little skeptical of new doctrine developed out of peacetime exercises.  Instrumented exercises have biases built into them by the designers, although observer/controllers can help mitigate this (although they have their own biases as well).  I figure that instrumented exercises are excellent at "confirming" if a given unit has learned and applied current doctrine.  They are somewhat less capable, in my mind, of "validating" training and doctrine.  That is best done on operations.  That being said, you go with what you have.  If you don't have a war going on then you make the best replica you can and keep practicing.  Stay flexible, in the meantime, and expect some suprises (both good and bad) if you do go to war. 

CMTC will, I believe, improve the quality of our training and allow us to have our "first battles" without losing people.

"You, staring at your sword to find it brittle,
Suprised at the suprise that was your plan,
Who, shaking and breaking barriers not a little,
Find never more the death door of Sedan"  G.K. Chesterton regarding the French in 1870

Cheers,

2B

 

[Michael Dorosh]

I'm currently in the "Lessons Learned Community", and it is somewhat difficult to learn lessons in peacetime.  Individuals and units can certainly "learn" lessons with regards to mastering existing doctrine, but new doctrine and TTPs are little trickier.  Even instrumented exercises do not show the whole picture andI am a little skeptical of new doctrine developed out of peacetime exercises.  Instrumented exercises have biases built into them by the designers, although observer/controllers can help mitigate this (although they have their own biases as well).  I figure that instrumented exercises are excellent at "confirming" if a given unit has learned and applied current doctrine.  They are somewhat less capable, in my mind, of "validating" training and doctrine.  That is best done on operations.  That being said, you go with what you have.  If you don't have a war going on then you make the best replica you can and keep practicing.  Stay flexible, in the meantime, and expect some suprises (both good and bad) if you do go to war. 

Your entire post is well stated 2Bravo, so thanks for that.  I especially agree with this, obviously.  Perhaps I was stating it in ways George wasn't able to understand.  Hopefully this clears it up for him.