No Silent Night- Claim by US Historian about US Artillery in World War 2

[Cloud Cover]

I question the claim made by the author of this book, so I will repeat it at length and request that our artillery historians comment in the claim.

Content reproduced under the Fair Dealings Provisions of the Copyright Act, RSC 1985.

Book Title: No Silent Night: the Christmas Battle of Bastogne
Authors: Leo Barron and Don Cygan
Publisher: NAL Caliber (2012)

Afternoon to evening, 19 December 1944
463 Parachute Field Artillery Battalion gun line
Hemroulle, west of Bastogne, Belgium


Colonel Cooper's "******* Battalion" arrived at Bastogne on the morning of nineteenth. Between 1400 and 1500 hours, Cooper direct his cannon-cockers to set up their gun line near the village of Hemroulle, behind the 327th GIR and the 502 PIR. As instructed, the 463rd would fire in direct support of the 327th.

Surveying the area around Hemroulle, Cooper set up his command post in a nearby farmhouse with the Fire Direction Centre (FDC). In the U.S. Army during World War II, an FDC was the brain of an artillery battalion. There, radio operators and artillerymen plotted and directed the various artillery strikes on the enemy. The Americans had learned during World War I that to accurately plot, destroy and assess the success of massed gunfire, communication was the key.  The FDC was one of the chief reasons the Americans had such an overwhelming advantage in artillery in World War II. No one could match the U.S. Army's accuracy and ability to mass fires on a single point on the battlefield at the same time. A lot of this advantage lay in the fact that the Americans could supply communications equipment all the way down to the platoon level. Therefore, a mere platoon leader- -lieutenant or sergeant- could relay information back to a battalion FDC and bring dozens of shells on a single target in practically no time. No other army of its time could do that. 

OK, there are obviously some very strong claims here about the prowess, precision and uniqueness of American artillery during the war especially in comparison to others. I do not believe this to be true, in fact I believe the British and Canadian army's both had very similar thoughts and capabilities in regards to communicating, coordinating and delivering effective gunfire from batteries all the way to regimental sized fires. I am in large part basing this on Brian Read's Reids book No Holding Back: Operation Totalize, wherein it seemed apparent to me that the coordination of artillery fire was something the British and Canadians were very, very good at, especially from about the time of El Alamein and possibly before that.

Second, the US Army artillery doctrine of World War I was, I believe that of either the French or British (or both) and in no way did the US develop their own system during that war, although they certainly studied such tactics and refined them continuously to this day, as all professional armies will.

In short, i do not believe there was anything unique in the US Army FDC, that it was simply a variation on a theme, possessed no unique abilities or features that were not in some way shape or form available to most other Allies, (esp Canadian and British) and probably even that of the Germans and to a lesser extent Russians.  Am I way off base here? Were they really that unique and therefore so much more potent of an artillery force because of it???

Cheers

 

[Chispa]

I would question Barron, Cygan; sounds like APM WWII revisionist history with more holes then my mother's deluxe cheese grader, as for no one could match, is utter embellished nonsense.

While B. Read's Totalize, "Totalise," seemed apparent to coordination of artillery fire was something the British and Canadians were very, very good at, especially from about the time of El Alamein and possibly before that.

Read's narrative is certainly not factual, countless of British & Canadian casualties inflicted by their own artillery during the SWW, per-say in Op Atlantic, Spring, etc, etc.

The American Air Force was infamously known for FFC, there's two sayings concerning their accuracy.

What did the Americans learn in their version of WWI, "World War," aaa yes they only entered the war in late 1917 never seeing any serous action, until 1918. AEF: "By June 1917, only 14,000 U.S. soldiers had arrived in France and the AEF had only a minor participation at the front in late October 1917"

Allied or Axis powers artillery accuracy during the war, was close enough at best, nor any held the upper hand, indeed.

As for Doctrine; Canadians during FWW & SWW were using British Doctrine, noted the French during la Grande Guerre were using com's too direct artillery fire quite effectively, then adopted by the British I believe.

C.U.

 

[FJAG]

In short, i do not believe there was anything unique in the US Army FDC, that it was simply a variation on a theme, possessed no unique abilities or features that were not in some way shape or form available to most other Allies, (esp Canadian and British) and probably even that of the Germans and to a lesser extent Russians.  Am I way off base here? Were they really that unique and therefore so much more potent of an artillery force because of it???

Cheers

I'll leave it to Old Sweat to cover this because he's the expert in this field but I'll take an opportunity to add my  :2c: and call bulls**t on the article. In my view when it comes to fire direction and control I'd rate the Brit/Cdn system slightly superior to the US with both being slightly superior to the German and considerably superior to the Russian.

To give the Russians their due, they were the experts at brute force deploying over a 100,000 artillery weapon systems during the war where the Germans had thousands and the US/Brits/Cda a few tens of thousands. The Russians system depended on meticulously prepared massed fireplans with front line flexibility provided by assault guns moving with the advancing forces.

Back to the FDC (called Command Posts or CPs by the Brits and Canadians) issue. All systems generally worked very similarly.

A battalion (US) or field regiment (UK/Cda) generally had three batteries and supported a brigade. Brits/Cdns generally had 8 gun batteries with 25 pounders while the US battery had six 105 mm howitzers (33 pound projectile). Each battery has one or more FDC/CPs where calls for fire are received and firing data was calculated. Each battalion or regiment has a further FDC/CP which coordinated fire amongst the batteries and/or sent requests for fire onward where additional supporting artillery resources (divisional or corps) were available. Further FDC/CP modules existed at Division, Corps and Army HQs to fulfil a multitude of tasks including fire support coordination, fire planning, resource allocation etc. Fire calculation tools such as artillery plotting boards, meteorological conditions measurement systems, firing tables, artillery survey, communications systems, target registration etc were very similar.

Both systems deployed artillery officers as forward observers to accompany the infantry or armour. Both had radios available to connect observers with the FDCs/CPs although most tried to lay wire lines whenever possible. The most significant difference (leaving aside weapon systems, ammunition resupply systems and basic numbers) was that US forward observers were generally second lieutenants with only fundamental experience in calling and adjusting fire while Brit/Cdn observers were generally captains who had already served as gun position/command post officers before becoming FOOs. As a result Brit/Cdn observers were more experienced and expected to evaluate each target and select and order the appropriate treatment for it. US observers generally sent back a description of target to the FDC which would then select the appropriate ammunition and rate of fire for effect or even whether  to engage it at all.

Key to the Brit/Cdn system was the degree of authority each FOO had to call for fire. An ordinary FOO had the authority to engage a target with his battery. In certain circumstances an FOO deployed to a particularly active sector might be specifically "authorized" to order in the fire of the entire regiment or even the entire divisional artillery on a target. In short, decisions re target engagement were made further forward in the Brit/Cdn system than in the US one.

The statement made by the authors that "no other army of it's time" had the ability for a platoon leader to "bring dozens of shells on a single target in practically no time" is sheer sophistry. Platoon radios at the time did not have access to artillery nets (either frequency or range) and in every case a platoon's request for fire would have taken time to run through the various radio network levels until it finally reached someone who could relay it to a FDC (probably, but not necessarily the company's FO) it would have been no different within a Brit/Cdn organization and, more importantly, any company in contact would generally have an FOO who would most probably have been able to identify and engage the target themselves (company frontages of the time were not that large).

As I said: my  :2c:

:cheers:

 

[Cloud Cover]

My apologies to the author of Totalize: that should read No Holding Back: Operation Totalize by Brian Reid (not Read).

Cispa: I respectfully disagree with your assessment re: Totalize/Totalise.  This particular book was written by a very meticulous author who, for many professional reasons, made every reasonable effort (and probably beyond) to ensure the accuracy since the work itself appears to challenge many common assumptions and conceptions-misconceptions regarding the performance of specific Canadian, British and German formations in Normandy during the course of that particular offensive.

I agree with your comments re: friendly fire (whether from aircraft or artillery) which if I understand the history of World War II, was an event to some degree more probable to occur than merely possible to occur in anything but the most advanced planned engagements between opposing forces. 

FJAG: for my own information, can you clarify did you mean the Red Army could bring to bear hundreds of thousands of tubes in an offensive, battle or other encounter or did you mean an entire front or the order of battle for the entire Red Army? I am assuming it is the latter, but....?

 

[Lightguns]

My understanding is that the Yanks were the first to develop full firing tables taking into account dozens of atmospheric scenarios.  I believe the MAPS system I used when I first commissioned was developed by them.  I also read somewhere that the US FDC had huge binders of these tables sorted by gun and charge that gave them the data for each scenario, this allowed them to be quicker on target as there was no calculation.  They also had a more access to more guns firing more ammo at a lower level fire control for more rapid responses.  Certainly, the POW German Generals who wrote for the US Army histories felt so.   

 

[tomahawk6]

Here is an interesting analysis of US and German artillery in the Battle of the Bulge.

http://99div.com/olddirect/american_and_german_field_artillery_in_the_battle_of_the_bulge+cb01biggio+416d65726963616e20616e64204765726d616e206669656c6420617274696c6c65727920696e2074686520426174746c65206f66207468652042756c6765

. Communications:

To perform its shooting (gunnery) function the field artillery must be able to communicate with higher, lower, and supported units. When the FDC system was being developed it became evident that in order to exercise the control necessary to mass fires the FDC would have to be provided with an elaborate, redundant, and reliable communication network involving the forward observers, FDC, and the gun batteries. Moreover, it should be an independent artillery system which did not rely on the infantry for wire links.

In WWII the primary means of communications was by phones — field wire in the infantry divisions. Radio was considered a "back up" means. During the Bulge, the American communication system generally performed well. During the first few days, there were some disruptions to wire lines cut by shell fire — but these were usually repaired with dispatch.

Regarding German artillery communications during the Bulge not much information is available at the division level. We do know that the senior artillery officer of 6th Panzer Army did not have independent artillery wire/radio links to his subordinate units — such as the system available to his counterpart in U.S. V Corps, Brig. Gen. Helmick.

 

[Lightguns]

This is a excellent source written by a retired US Army Artillery officer.  Very graphical, although written from war game perspective.

http://www.fireandfury.com/artillerytutorial/artyus.shtml 

 

[Old Sweat]

This should be considered a preliminary response, as I have not read the book.

First point, I am the author of No Holding Back and an Instructor-in-Gunnery including a tour as the Chief Instructor at the school in Gagetown 1974-1977.

From my understanding of organizations at the time, the field artillery battalion in question had three batteries, each of four 75mm pack howitzers. That really did not change the basics of its operation. The US system was built on forward observers sending requests for fire to a FDC. Depending upon the assessment of the responsible officer in the FDC, the request could be denied, approved or approved and forwarded up the artillery fire direction chain in an effort to get further resources. Note that battalion and battery commanders stayed with their units and relatively junior liaison officers acted as artillery advisers at battalion and regimental (brigade) level.

This was in contrast to our system, but both worked. Key to the success of both the British and American systems were the the communications networks, which were comprehensive and cut out unnecessary steps. Both systems developed in ways that perhaps demonstrate national characteristics. The American system was based to a certain extent built on the First World War French system, but was refined and developed in line with what one would expect from the major industrial power of the time. The British organization used in the Great War was changed virtually on the eve of war by a civilian adviser to the Minister of Defence. When the divisional artillery proved to be largely ineffective in the 1940 campaign in France, the divisional artillery organization used for the rest of the war, and still remains to this day, emerged. One should note that the regimental organization imposed by the civilian adviser left battery and regimental commanders with little to nothing to do, so they gravitated to battalion and brigade advisers, where they soon became "our gunner."

By 1943 the British fire control system had evolved by trial and error as well as a lot of thought into what we understand today, and, to steal a phrase from Sir Brian Horrocks, his gunner had every gun in range no farther away than the tip of his radio antenna. So did every FOO in the army, and they were not reluctant to call for them. Indeed certain FOOs could be authorized to order the fire of a regiment, division or more and could do so with a short radio transmission or two. It appears that the 1st Canadian Division in Italy was the first formation to fire a W Target, that is all the guns within range in the (8th) Army.

As for Operation Spring, I recall attending a 3 CIBG officers' study group on it in Gagetown when I was a subaltern. Suffice to say, the commander of the 2nd Canadian Division was lucky to have kept his job. The operation was a primer on how not to plan and conduct an attack; the only successful attack was by the RHLI commanded by LCol John Rockingham. He also listened to his gunner, but that's outside the scope of the discussion.

The comment that the US was the only one that could mass fire quickly is incorrect. Whether it is based on ignorance, nationalism, artistic licence or what does not change the facts of the matter.

 

[Old Sweat]

Further to my last post, it is time for a very brief discussion of the four different countries approach to gunnery.

The Soviets believed in lots of guns, mortars and rockets, but their organization and procedures seemed roughly similar to those of the British army in early 1917.

The German system was designed to facilitate operations at the regiment (brigade) level and below. Higher formation operations could be supported, but the procedures were clumsy. Frankly the Germans also suffered from a lack of ammunition compared to the western allies.

Despite the differences in approach, both the British and American systems were very effective, flexible and responsive to the needs of the supported arm. I would not want to make an objective assessment of which was better, because I have been schooled in the good points of the Brit system since I was an 18-year-old student on a Group 1 Technical Assistant (Field) course in 4 RCHA in Petawawa. Both were better than anything the Soviets or any of the Axis power could produce, including being able to get bullets to the guns on time and in numbers the others could only dream of. "The Guns, Thank God, The Guns" was and is more than a corny slogan.

The Second World War proved that, but the Korean War example is probably easier to discuss as it is in numbers one can get one's mind around. The British Commonwealth Divisional Artillery and the US Army and Marine Corps routinely supported each other easily and seamlessly with remarkably few glitches. The RCHA history has several examples that support this thesis.

 

[exspy]

As for Operation Spring, I recall attending a 3 CIBG officers' study group on it in Gagetown when I was a subaltern. Suffice to say, the commander of the 2nd Canadian Division was lucky to have kept his job. The operation was a primer on how not to plan and conduct an attack.

It doesn't seem to have done the chap any harm.  He went on to a Corps command before the war ended, was appointed the first post-war Chief of the General Staff, and was the only 4-Star General in the Canadian Army prior to Unification.  Someone must have had faith in him during the war, although I don't know who.  Being British-born he may have been another of Montgomery's favoured Canadians.

Cheers,
Dan.

 

[Old Sweat]

He had a well-developed ability to get ahead of the crap storm by blaming one or more of his subordinates. For example, in Operation Tractable the DCO of the Divisional Recce Regiment drove into the German lines with a copy of notes explaining the corps plan. CF blamed his GSO I for issuing explanatory notes to verbal orders, a procedure that was accepted doctrine.

In my opinion, he survived because he was the only alternative to Guy Simonds in Crerar's mind. Crerar actually had concerns about Simonds' sanity, but that is another story. Charles Foulkes also was the best of a not so good lot. Kellar in the 3rd Division was shaky at best, and Kitching, a protege of Simonds, was an outright disaster. In my opinion Kitching got his job because he had done well working for Simonds as his GSO I and then less so as a brigade commander for a very brief period of time in Italy. He was an upper class Brit who had moved to Canada in 1938, which enhanced his standing in the eyes of the Anglophilic Simonds.

 

[FJAG]

FJAG: for my own information, can you clarify did you mean the Red Army could bring to bear hundreds of thousands of tubes in an offensive, battle or other encounter or did you mean an entire front or the order of battle for the entire Red Army? I am assuming it is the latter, but....?

You assume correctly. My understanding is that the Red Army had somewhere in the neighbourhood of 100,000 to 114,000 guns and mortars at any given time to support their army of roughly 6 million men. A much larger proportion of their army was in the artillery than any other force (some figures indicate thirty percent). Some estimates put the Soviets losses in guns and mortars during the course of the war in excess of 200,000 most of which were being continuously replaced by their factories because of the general simplicity of weapon systems design and manufacture.

Clearly while their fire control systems lagged that of the Germans and the other allies, their ability to field and supply such a force was something to be reckoned with.

:cheers:

 

[cavalryman]

Clearly while their fire control systems lagged that of the Germans and the other allies, their ability to field and supply such a force was something to be reckoned with.

:cheers:

Quantity has a quality all of its own.
-Joseph Stalin

 

[Colin Parkinson]

With Lend-lease supplying critical components for their ammuntion

 

[Chispa]

My apologies to the author of Totalize: that should read No Holding Back: Operation Totalize by Brian Reid (not Read).

Cispa: I respectfully disagree with your assessment re: Totalize/Totalise.  This particular book was written by a very meticulous author who, for many professional reasons, made every reasonable effort (and probably beyond) to ensure the accuracy since the work itself appears to challenge many common assumptions and conceptions-misconceptions regarding the performance of specific Canadian, British and German formations in Normandy during the course of that particular offensive.

FJAG: for my own information, can you clarify did you mean the Red Army could bring to bear hundreds of thousands of tubes in an offensive, battle or other encounter or did you mean an entire front or the order of battle for the entire Red Army? I am assuming it is the latter, but....?

Clearly while their fire control systems lagged that of the Germans and the other allies, their ability to field and supply such a force was something to be reckoned with.

Concerning the Russian comments made, sounds about right.


Hi, PBA I’m only allotted 11/2hrs a day, hit by Bell’s P., I have a patch over one eye, while the other gets hazy after sometime looking at my LTS.

I quickly Googled this Read on Op Totalise/ze, found nothing, by your wording what U stated, I was only replying concerning, Op. T & “artillery accuracy,” in the Normandy Campaign or throughout World War Part Two. Later off line figured it could be No Holding Back: Operation Totalize by Brian Reid.

Cdn artillery accuracy during Op., Totalise/ze; down Route Nationale 158 to Falaise, was Brit/Cdn prime objective however VR shelved those plans.

Some notes I have: With 8 Pz Div on July 26th, Fritz by the 30th July- 7th August still held VR with 1st SS LAH, & 9th SS H; 4 Div went west, on the 1st Hohenstauffen left and by the 3rd 1 SS LAH redeployed, the 21 Pz, 9 SS Pz and 10 SS Pz took part in Bluecoat. By 7th Aug 44, Fritz launched a counteroffensive, Op. Lüttich; mainstream historians/authors narrative, “in halting the allied momentum.” The Ridge Of Verrières, etc., etc., part of Op Spring was still held by the Germans, 2nd  Cdn Corps., was pushed back in the counteroffensive to ca., pre Op Atlantic objectives, some held a defensive position near the outskirts of Caen. Dempsey west of the Orne was facing 101 SS sPzAbt, while Schack’s 272nd Division left Verrières Ridge in secret. Pockets of German resistance left behind, entrenched playing the Hit and Run game, delaying the advance.

RG24 Vol. 10,811 2 Cdn Corps Gen G. O. Simonds “Planning Operation Totalize, A, Appreciation by the Corps Commander” 1 Aug 44, 9.

ULTRA & Grandville’s own Intel staff reported; “on 7 August news was received that large amounts of 1 SS and at least a battlegroup of 12 SS were fighting further West at VASSY and the FORET DE GRIMBOSQ respectively.”

Op. Totalize/se Cdn Artillery was in support or if needed, in the rear on reserve traveling with Grandville’s Circus armoured columns, as Simonds halted his advance waiting for the artillery to catch up. Simmonds columns packed so tight, it was officially recorded; one of the men, “walked from one end two the other without touching the ground.” Noted the RCA participated in two main bombardments during the Op.,

In Op. Totalise Phase I & II, the R.C.A. participation, not even mentioned by mainstream, only the Brit/US coordinated aerial bombardments, some state the roots of large-scale carpet-bombing. The Field Regiments of the RCA issued 25pdr, while the 23rd FR (S-P) RCA 25pdr Sex-Equip., 15 FR towed 25pdr Equip. Phase II 4th Armd Div RCA supporting 10th Inf Bde, on the right; 15th FR RCA, on the left, 23rd FR (Self-Propelled) RCA covering 4th Armd Bde on the Caen-Falaise road. The 19th Army FR RCA with M7 ‘Priest’ 105mm How’s were on speed dial if needed, in support of 4th Armd Bde or 10th Inf Bde. The 19th not involved in both counter-battery bombardments at H + 100 mins. and H + 7 hrs. In support of the attack Div 25pdr issued 400 rpg HE ammo, CB- 50 rpg, On Call- 200 rpg. The Div., 105pdr same amount, noted the Polish were allotted half of that amount however “on call” 400rpg.

Royal Canadian Artillery, 2nd Canadian Corps, Counter Battery Policy, Operation Totalize, Appendix L, Addendum A to RCA, Operation Instruction No. 5, 7 August 1944.


Op Totalise/ze, “Simmonds Plan” when you get down too all the nuts and bolts, was a failure IMO.

C3= Command, Control, Communications, like Atlantic, Spring, Totalise, etc., etc., all knowing chin wagging, Grandville Simonds lacked all 3, trying too bite on more then he could chew: Reckless with the lives of the men he commanded. The FOO’s, Bde commanders constantly plagued by unreliable Com’s, the wireless radio was a serous issue, just like it unfolded in Op., Market Garden, aka A Bridge Too Far, 17-25 Sept., 1944. Simmonds used precise Hrs, Artillery, timings, etc., etc., with no elbow or even wiggle room for unforeseeable situations, time delay, etc., “Lets Get Cracking.” True many immediate artillery fire requests were turn down by command, the wrong transmitted coordinates, infantry being in the wrong place at the wrong time, etc., all contributed too RCA friendly fire casualties throughout the Normandy Campaign, also known as the Battle of Attrition, my response, many Op’s etc during the war were.


Just some of my notes I have & thoughts,

C.U.   

.

 

[daftandbarmy]

FWIW, a good lecture by Terry Copp:

The 2015 Eaton Lecture, "Cinderella Army: The Canadians, October 1944," by Prof. Terry Copp

The Eaton Lectures are presented by the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society at the University of New Brunswick. Visit https://www.unb.ca/eatonlecture for more information

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4BVTfDRZ7Hc

 

[Old Sweat]

Chispa

Have you read No Holding Back. If not, I suggest you see if your local library has a copy, or can get you one on loan. I discussed the fire plan and the air plan in detail in it. I also reached the following conclusions:

a. the Phase One advance broke the German hold on Verrieres Ridge feature and essentially doomed the German hold on Normandy;

b. 2nd Canadian Corps had achieved a break through and there was nothing capable of mounting a formed defence between it and Falaise. (The Phase Two objective was the ground where the Caen-Falaise road overlooked Falaise from the north

c. Simonds' adherence to his original plan did allow the Germans to put a block in effect, but Kurt Meyer et al bungled in counter-attacking instead of blocking; Edit to aid: He expected to be counter-attacked by 1 SS Panzer Division on the Phase One objectives and, as Ultra had not included 1st Canadian Army on the intrep, did not know it had been located in the American sector, would not have been inclined to change his plan.

d. the Phase Two advance, while flawed, forced 12 SS Panzer Division out of its blocking position by outflanking it;

While Totalize did not achieve all its objectives, it was not a failure. Not only did it doom the German hold on Normandy, but it also destroyed most of 89 Infantry Division and reduced 12 SS Panzer Division to perhaps two or three battle groups.

I fear the Anglo/Canadian command and control system could not react quickly enough to take advantage of the situation until the 14th.

Thoughts? I feel for you. My wife had Bell's Palsy at one time and it ain't fun.

 

[Brad Sallows]

The Soviets used large numbers of tubes to compensate for less flexible communications and control.  Basically, when you lack the capability to move the fires of one battery around quickly, you can compensate by having more batteries.

 

[Cloud Cover]

I finished the book the other day. It was worse than I could have imagined.

 

[Red 6]

How much assistance did the US Army field artillery receive on the Western Front by BEF gunners sharing information, techniques, and tactics?