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Why is it that there were no canadian ground troops in the north african campaign. I believe we had a couple divisions ready in 1942, why werent they used?
North Africa
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Prime Minister Mackenzie King was a very political animal and was concerned about a potential public outcry if the army which had been sent to the UK to defend the British Isles was used in North Africa. Belatedly he came to sense that this caused him some political grief when the Canadian army and public began to question our part in the war. Again, as a typical Canadian politician and especially a Liberal, he viewed everything through the prism of scoring political points.
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It's a bit more complicated than that. The Canadian leadership, both civil and military, wanted the Canadian Army to go into action as a whole, rather than in small units split between various British commands. (There was already some conflict over the Brit policy of posting members of the RCAF anywhere instead of just to Canadian squadrons and wings). There was never a need for a whole Canadian corps or field army (even if one could have been deployed) in North Africa in 1941-42, there were many Commonwealth troops there from India (four divisions in all, though not all at the same time), Australia (a whole corps of three divs at one stage), South Africa (two divs plus numerous corps and army troops) and New Zealand (one division)- the British were in the minority in the 8th Army, at least amongst the fighting divisions. Later as Old Sweat wrote the Canadian govt realised it had to get troops into action somehow. First came the disastrous Dieppe raid in August 1942. The following year 1st Cdn Div took the place of the British 3rd Div in the assault on Sicily, again mainly for political reasons. The Brits were happy to have the division and later 5th Cdn Armd Div in Italy, but complained when 1 Cdn Corps HQ was sent out to command those two divisions. Some of their generals reckoned another corps HQ was not needed in 8th Army. But the Canadians insisted that their divisions fight under a Candian corps HQ (although once or twice elements were moved to other corps).
A small number of Canadian soldiers (IIRC about 150-200) did fight in North Africa, as part of the 1st Army in Tunisia in 1943. They were officers and NCOs from Canadian units in the UK who were seconded to British units for periods of 2-3 months, to gain combat experience. Most returned to their units (a few were killed) and fought in other campaigns. This project was not directly related to the later CANLOAN scheme.
Of course members of the RCAF served in North Africa, for Canadian flyers did not only serve with RCAF units, many were assigned to RAF squadrons all over the world.
A small number of Canadian soldiers (IIRC about 150-200) did fight in North Africa, as part of the 1st Army in Tunisia in 1943. They were officers and NCOs from Canadian units in the UK who were seconded to British units for periods of 2-3 months, to gain combat experience. Most returned to their units (a few were killed) and fought in other campaigns. This project was not directly related to the later CANLOAN scheme.
Of course members of the RCAF served in North Africa, for Canadian flyers did not only serve with RCAF units, many were assigned to RAF squadrons all over the world.
Good information, thanks. My only quibble is that while the Australians formed a headquarters in the Middle East, it did not command the three divisions in action. The 6th Division fought in Greece and Crete as well as North Africa in 1940-1941, with mixed results. (If a Canadian division would have fought at that time, the results probably would have been the same.) The 7th Division served in the invasion of Syria, I believe, while the 9th fought in the desert in 1942. Note that these divisions were kept in the Middle East after the start of the Pacific War despite pleas from the Australian government. (The 8th Division was in Singapore and went into the bag, except for its commander, who decided he was too valuable to become a POW, and fled.)
Some source material I have read claims that the relationship between Chruchill and the Australian government was icy at best. There were a series of minority governments, characterized by confused and half-hearted support of the war effort. One of the PMs even conspired with Churchill's enemies in the UK with an aim of replacing him as the British leader, so Churchill's disgust with the Australians got personal. By the way, unlike Canada and South Africa, Australia had not invoked the 1931 Statutes of Westminster and therefore had its foreign affairs managed by Whitehall, so its negotiating position was weakened. Anyway, during the Japanese rampage across SE Asia and Oceania, the Brits retained the Australian army and ships of the RAN in the Mediterranean theatre. When they did return troops, at least one Australian brigade was sent to Ceylon. And, there were no modern fighter aircraft in Australia and the British dragged their heels about providing any or returning experienced RAAF pilots.
Sorry if this got off the thread, but the Australian experience at the time helps to explain their unstinting support of the Americans, who came to their rescue.
Some source material I have read claims that the relationship between Chruchill and the Australian government was icy at best. There were a series of minority governments, characterized by confused and half-hearted support of the war effort. One of the PMs even conspired with Churchill's enemies in the UK with an aim of replacing him as the British leader, so Churchill's disgust with the Australians got personal. By the way, unlike Canada and South Africa, Australia had not invoked the 1931 Statutes of Westminster and therefore had its foreign affairs managed by Whitehall, so its negotiating position was weakened. Anyway, during the Japanese rampage across SE Asia and Oceania, the Brits retained the Australian army and ships of the RAN in the Mediterranean theatre. When they did return troops, at least one Australian brigade was sent to Ceylon. And, there were no modern fighter aircraft in Australia and the British dragged their heels about providing any or returning experienced RAAF pilots.
Sorry if this got off the thread, but the Australian experience at the time helps to explain their unstinting support of the Americans, who came to their rescue.
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Yes, I should have mentioned that while HQ 1st Australian Corps saw action in Greece, Syria and the Western Desert, it never commanded more than one Australian division in action at a time; it did however command various British, Indian and New Zealand formations. The Australian government was not happy about this situation and eventually, during the siege of Tobruk in 1941, insisted that 9th Aus Div be withdrawn both for rest and so the division could join the other two and corps HQ in Palestine.
Later on, when 1st Australian Corps (minus 9th Div) was allowed to leave the Middle East in early 1942, the British wanted to divert one or both of the divisions (I can't remember which) to Burma instead of returning it to Australia. For the Australians, who had just lost their 8th Div at Singapore and had hardly any trained units at home, this was madness and the corps returned to Australia and subsequently fought in New Guinea and other campaigns.
Later on, when 1st Australian Corps (minus 9th Div) was allowed to leave the Middle East in early 1942, the British wanted to divert one or both of the divisions (I can't remember which) to Burma instead of returning it to Australia. For the Australians, who had just lost their 8th Div at Singapore and had hardly any trained units at home, this was madness and the corps returned to Australia and subsequently fought in New Guinea and other campaigns.
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