Op PRESENCE/Mali (Cdn mission/s, sitreps, etc. - merged)

[observor 69]

I guess that's why they could go to Italy, but not Afghanistan where the rest of the CF was fighting a war.  Thankfully we could rely on the USAF and the RAF, which have fully-deployable air forces.

Now from Matthew Fisher of Postmedia News:

It was not for want of trying that Canada’s fighter pilots have been the only ones from a major NATO country to have not had a chance to fly in Afghanistan. Fact-finding visits to the big airfield at Kandahar were conducted as far back as 2006 to verify that Canada’s refurbished 30-year old Hornets were suitably equipped to be based there. But Ottawa never came close to sending them.


In explaining why they were not sent, the Harper government has repeatedly stated that NATO had never asked for them. This explanation was disingenuous in the extreme. NATO never formally asked Ottawa for such a contribution because every time the alliance put out feelers, as it always does before making “official” requests, it was loudly told to forget it.


According to government and military sources, Ottawa’s skittishness over committing “fast air” assets to the UN-sanctioned mission in Afghanistan, while sending thousands of ground troops into harm’s way there, was largely based on the Harper government’s reluctance to face the political fallout from “collateral damage,” if Canadian jets killed Afghan civilians.

A second consideration was that operating a squadron of fighter jets in Kandahar would have cost nearly as much again as the billions of dollars that Canada was spending on ground forces there [that seems rather excessive].

The reservations that the Harper government had regarding sending fighter jets to Afghanistan, apparently do not apply in Libya, where Prime Minister Stephen Harper said on Friday that the situation had become “intolerable.”

However, having decided to only send a few aircraft, Canada’s role in what will be a politically and militarily complex Anglo-French-led operation in North Africa will, perforce, be peripheral.


http://www.cdfai.org/the3dsblog/?p=148

 

[GAP]

Al-Qaida tipsheet on avoiding drones found in Mali
By RUKMINI CALLIMACHI Associated Press, Feb 21
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AF_THE_AL_QAIDA_PAPERS_DRONES?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2013-02-21-13-03-46

TIMBUKTU, Mali (AP) -- One of the last things the bearded fighters did before leaving this city was to drive to the market where traders lay their carpets out in the sand.

The al-Qaida extremists bypassed the brightly colored, high-end synthetic floor coverings and stopped their pickup truck in front of a man selling more modest mats woven from desert grass, priced at $1.40 apiece. There they bought two bales of 25 mats each, and asked him to bundle them on top of the car, along with a stack of sticks.

"It's the first time someone has bought such a large amount," said the mat seller, Leitny Cisse al-Djoumat. "They didn't explain why they wanted so many."

Military officials can tell why: The fighters are stretching the mats across the tops of their cars on poles to form natural carports, so that drones cannot detect them from the air.

The instruction to camouflage cars is one of 22 tips on how to avoid drones, listed on a document left behind by the Islamic extremists as they fled northern Mali from a French military intervention last month. A Xeroxed copy of the document, which was first published on a jihadist forum two years ago, was found by The Associated Press in a manila envelope on the floor of a building here occupied by al-Qaida of the Islamic Maghreb.

The tipsheet reflects how al-Qaida's chapter in North Africa anticipated a military intervention that would make use of drones, as the battleground in the war on terror worldwide is shifting from boots on the ground to unmanned planes in the air. The presence of the document in Mali, first authored by a Yemeni, also shows the coordination between al-Qaida chapters, which security experts have called a source of increasing concern.

"This new document... shows we are no longer dealing with an isolated local problem, but with an enemy which is reaching across continents to share advice," said Bruce Riedel, a 30-year veteran of the CIA, now the director of the Intelligence Project at the Brookings Institution.

The tips in the document range from the broad (No. 7, hide from being directly or indirectly spotted, especially at night) to the specific (No 18, formation of fake gatherings, for example by using dolls and statues placed outside false ditches to mislead the enemy.) The use of the mats appears to be a West African twist on No. 3, which advises camouflaging the tops of cars and the roofs of buildings, possibly by spreading reflective glass.

While some of the tips are outdated or far-fetched, taken together, they suggest the Islamists in Mali are responding to the threat of drones with sound, common-sense advice that may help them to melt into the desert in between attacks, leaving barely a trace.

more in article

 

[tomahawk6]

The US has deployed 100 armed troops next door in Niger along with drones to support French operations in Mali.

 

[daftandbarmy]

An interesting article by a (smart) USMC vet  ;D:

The Role of Ideology in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution During the Tuareg Rebellions
by Raymond Miller

Abstract: From the earliest recorded battles to the most recent armed conflicts within the Middle East and North Africa, ideology has played a major role in both the negotiation process and how the states or parties involved and the supranational bodies deal with conflict resolution. This paper traces the history of conflict resolution and negotiation during the four Tuareg rebellions in Mali, the negotiation process and actions within each conflict and unlike most research on the Tuareg rebellions, focuses primarily on the role that ideology played and is playing within each of the Tuareg rebellions.     
   
It recommends the continued understanding of how underlying ideologies play a significant role in negotiation and conflict resolution within the Tuareg Rebellions and more specifically the North African Sahel region while keeping in mind the effect of these ideologies on the negotiation process between the affected states as well as the supranational bodies who attempt to mediate the conflict.  While there are other variables that play a part in these armed conflicts as well as other ideologies, the focus for this research will be on the role that primary ideologies play in the conflict resolution and negotiation process.  It outlines suggestions on how a negotiation or armed conflict should be approached to ascertain the ideologies present and to further understand conflicts between the ideologies based on past historical evidence.  Finally, it suggests the continuing focus of educating people who operate in these regions with ideologically-based negotiation and conflict resolution training provided through various organizations including the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS) as well as the U.S. Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL) and even the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

The most significant findings in this research were: First and foremost, there has been very little research done on the role of ideology in negotiation and conflict resolution with a focus on the Tuareg rebellions; Second, there is a current misconception regarding the role that ECOWAS and other Supranational organizations should play within negotiations and armed conflicts in the region; and finally, due to the Arab Spring causing tensions to rise in the Middle East and North Africa resulting in armed conflicts, there is going to be a very real impact on the rest of the countries within the African region involving a clash of ideologies resulting in the shift of rule from a more secular ideology to the more restrictive ideologies like those of the Muslim Brotherhood or vice versa.  With this paradigm shift, there will be an increased need for understanding the role of ideology within the negotiation process as well as when resolving armed conflicts in the region.  If we are to successfully navigate these conflicts and support the sides financially or logistically that are most likely to provide security and stability in the region, we may be able to partner with and successfully create a strategic advantage with them against threats in their region.


http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-role-of-ideology-in-negotiation-and-conflict-resolution-during-the-tuareg-rebellions

 

[The Bread Guy]

Two weeks ago, the CDS had two days of meetings with French counterpart Admiral Édouard Guillaud. 

Tomorrow morning, just before 10am Eastern, PM Harper "will participate in a joint statement with Jean-Marc Ayrault, Prime Minister of the French Republic" following a five-minute "Hall of Honour walk".

One more month of Canadian heavy airlift goodness maybe?

 

[tomahawk6]

More bling for the Air Force.

 

[PuckChaser]

More bling for the Air Force.

They'll make a special hanger to wear it on their fleece jacket.  :stirpot:

 

[The Bread Guy]

Postmedia News and CBC are tweeting that the PM says "C17 transport plane will remain in Mali as long as it's needed," with "Future role still TBD".

Edited to add excerpt from the joint Canada-France statement:

.... We reaffirm our strong commitment to defend international security and fight terrorism. In response to a request from the Malian authorities, France intervened to restore the territorial integrity of Mali and counter the offensive launched by AQIM and its allies. France thanks Canada for the significant logistical support it has provided and for its contribution to joint actions aimed at strengthening security in the region. A long-lasting solution in Mali requires a political process, including the organization of democratic elections and dialogue on national reconciliation. France and Canada intend to continue to contribute as leading partners to Mali’s long-term development ....

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I am assuming they rotate aircraft and crews to spread the hours around?

 

[Armymedic]

A RIP at 31 days to spread the wealth amongst airframes, would be my guess. Crew hours can't be too bad....France to Bamako is about a 4 hr flight.

I am sure the French hotels, serving wine and other finery, is a real drain on thier morale too.

 

[tomahawk6]

Some images from Mali.

http://www.flickr.com/photos/theatrum-belli/sets/72157632507552964/

 

[The Bread Guy]

I couldn't make this one up ....

Malian authorities will give French President Francois Hollande another camel after the one they gave him in thanks for helping repel Islamist rebels was killed and eaten by the family he left it with in Timbuktu, an official in Mali said.

A local government official in northern Mali said on Tuesday a replacement would be sent to France.

"As soon as we heard of this, we quickly replaced it with a bigger and better-looking camel," said the official, who asked not to be named because he was not authorized to speak to the media.

"The new camel will be sent to Paris. We are ashamed of what happened to the camel. It was a present that did not deserve this fate."

Hollande was presented with the camel when he visited Mali in February several weeks after dispatching French troops to the former colony to help combat al Qaeda-linked fighters moving south from a base in the north of the country.

The president joked at the time about using the camel to get around traffic-jammed Paris. But he chose in the end to leave it with a family in the town on the edge of the Sahara desert.

Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian was tasked with giving Hollande regular updates on the camel's status and had to inform him of its death last week, French media said ....

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I hope they let it wander through the halls of power, then he can say "sorry the Camel ate the budget....."

 

[tomahawk6]

Green transportation a socialist could love.

 

[The Bread Guy]

Mali's government has signed a peace deal with Tuareg rebels to help pave the way for elections next month.

The accord calls for an immediate ceasefire and for government troops to return to the rebel-held northern town of Kidal, officials said.

The rebels captured Kidal after a French-led offensive forced militant Islamists out of the town in February.

The Tuaregs have been fighting for autonomy in the north since Mali gained independence from France in 1960.

They say they are marginalised by the government in the capital, Bamako.

French President Francois Hollande, announcing the deal after the G8 summit in Northern Ireland, said the agreement paved the way for a presidential election across Mali, including in Kidal.

'Secular state'

The main rebel group which signed the accord, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), had formed an alliance with al-Qaeda-linked militants to seize the north in 2012.

But the alliance quickly crumbled, and the Islamists took control of the MNLA's strongholds.

Government and MNLA negotiators reached the deal after nearly two weeks of talks brokered by Burkina Faso's President Blaise Compaore in the Burkina capital, Ouagadougou.

The army had threatened to seize Kidal if no agreement was reached.

Malian government representative Tiebile Drame said the two sides had overcome their greatest differences.

"I think we can say that the biggest task is finished. We have agreed on the essentials," AP news agency quoted him as saying ....

BBC, 18 Jun 13

From the attached analysis:

.... This is not an overall peace deal putting an end to a rebellion that started a year-and-a-half ago. This is an agreement that is meant to allow a presidential election to go ahead next month everywhere in Mali, including Kidal, which is still controlled by Tuareg fighters.

But then, what happens after the election? Tuareg rebels insist this deal will allow them to keep their weapons while they are being garrisoned. Disarmament will only be discussed after a new president is elected, allowing much broader peace talks to take place to address the rebels' grievances.

Tuareg rebels have agreed to be committed to peace; they aren't laying down their weapons yet.

Still, small steps - we'll see how it goes.

 

[Old Sweat]

This is not going to end well.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The Tuareg are the key to this area, in the end I suspect it will be semi-autonomous anyways. The Tuareg should be taking lessons from the Kurd s. Mali has enough problem without trying to forcefully control this area. 

 

[The Bread Guy]

The United Nations is beginning its military mission in Mali by bringing the 6,000 West African troops already in the country under its command.

By December it will reach full strength with 12,640 uniformed personnel.

The UN will take over security duties from the French forces which led an operation to oust Islamist militants from the north in January.

Its first mission will be to secure the north so that Mali can hold a presidential election on 28 July.

Taking advantage of a coup in March 2012, an al-Qaeda group and its allies took control of the north of Mali, including major cities such as Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu where they imposed a strict form of Islamic law.

France decided to intervene after the militants threatened to march on the capital, Bamako.

Since January, about 4,000 French troops, with the help of Malian and West African soldiers, have gained control of the vast desert region's main towns and cities, but some Islamist militants have been leading guerrilla-style attacks ....

BBC, 1 Jul 13

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Thought I would include a bit more:

From French MND http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/mali/actualite/serval-rearticulation-du-dispositif

Mise à jour : 22/05/2013 21:39
Le 20 mai 2013 à Gao, a eu lieu le transfert d’autorité entre le Groupement tactique interarmes numéro 2 (GTIA 2) et le GTIA Désert. Le colonel Eric Ozanne, chef de corps du 2e régiment étranger d’infanterie (2e REI) a ainsi succédé au colonel Bruno Bert, chef de corps du 92e régiment d’infanterie (92e RI).


Au cours de la cérémonie, le général Laurent KOLODZIEJ, commandant la brigade Serval a félicité les « Gaulois » du 92eRI ainsi que toutes ses unités subordonnées pour l’excellent travail accompli dès les premières heures de l’opération.

Initialement, la brigade Serval comptait 3 GTIA. Avec la réarticulation du dispositif, un unique GTIA arme désormais la brigade Serval. Ce dernier est désormais baptisé « Désert ».

Le GTIA Désert est composé d’unités provenant principalement de la 6e Brigade légère blindée (6e BLB) : un état-major tactique et une compagnie d’infanterie sur VAB du 2eREI, une compagnie VBCI du 1er Tirailleurs (1erRTIR), une compagnie de combat du génie, un détachement de Fouille Opérationnelle Spécialisée (FOS) et une Equipe Opérationnelle de Déminage (EOD) du 1er Régiment étranger de génie, d’un escadron blindé monté sur AMX 10-RC du 1er Régiment étranger de cavalerie et d’un groupement artillerie composé CAESAR de 155mm et de mortiers de 120mm.

L’ensemble de ces unités opéreront, en vue de faciliter le déploiement sur le terrain de la MISMA, puis de la MINUSMA, ainsi que les forces armées maliennes accompagnées par la mission de l’Union européenne EUTM.

Sources : EMA
Droits : Ministère de la Défense

France will leave a group of forces in Mali called the Groupe Tactique Interarmes Desert consisting of the following:

Headquarters and Command of the 2e Régiment Étranger d'Infanterie (2e REI)
1er Régiment Étranger de Cavalerie (1er REC), one troop with AMX 10 RC
1er Régiment de Tirailleurs (1er RTIR), one company with VBCI
2e Régiment Étranger d'Infanterie (2e REI), one company with VAB
3e Régiment d'Artillerie de Marine (3e RAMa), a mixed unit armed with CAESAR self-propelled 155mm howitzers and 120mm mortars deployed
1er Régiment Étranger de Génie (1er REG), one sapper company, one EOD squad

They will remain in the area to conduct further combat operations and provide support to MISMA, MINUSMA and EUTM Mali missions as well as the Malian Army.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

That's still a substantial QRF, I can see as the Islamist start to focus in an area, the QRF will go there, pound them for a bit and withdraw. The local forces and UN will provide a base level of security. The key to this working is good intel.