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Sorry ref PAR, all PAR approaches are DND only no? So only an RCAF Irt would allow you to fly it legally?
Plane crash near Resolute Bay kills 12 - Aug 20, 2011
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YZT, without knowing the TC authorization for DND's Class-D control zone, it's not possible to know the upper limit of CYRB's temp CZ. Although standard DND Class-D CZs are normally 10NM radius from the surface to 6000' AAE (vice civilian 7NM radius to 3000' AAE), DND's temp CYRB CZ could have been different. A slight note to your earlier comment, Class A high level airspace near CYRB ends below FL270 (vice FL180), so the uncontrolled transition area (Class G) could be as great as 21,000' * (FL270 - 6,000')
From a pilot's point of view, a Class D control zone exists purely to control IFR traffic with appropriate separations, but we are mindful of the fact that VFR traffic is NOT RESTRICTED from entering a Class D CZ; the VFR pilot need only establish and maintain comms with ATC. The VFR flight can request traffic following services, but ATC is not required to do so for the VFR flight.
This also raises some interesting points, many related to YZT's post regarding the transition from high level controlled airspace to lower level airspace (both controlled an uncontrolled). An IFR flight is an IFR flight until/unless the aircraft captain cancels the IFR flight plan with an ATC unit -- from that point on, the flight is by default VFR. As well, the IFR flight is always flying on a "clearance" (may include altitudes, speeds, routings, etc...) and that clearance always has a "limit." That limit could be an aerodrome, a navaid or a fix (a defined point in space identifiable to the pilot given the functioning navigational equipment on board his/her aircraft) and defines a point to which both ATC and the pilot expect the aircraft to be flown to in the absence of any further clearance. If the limit is not the aerodrome itself, then the pilot is expected to either: a) conduct a hold at the limit upon arrival, and if an expected further clearance (EFC) time was given by ATC as part of the original clearance, to conduct an approach to the aerodrome; or b) if the EFC time has passed by the time the aircraft arrives at the clearance limit, to conduct an approach to the aerodrome using one of the public or TC-approved company instrument approaches. If the aerodrome is in controlled airspace (a Class C or D control zone, or a Class B, C or D terminal control area), then the IFR pilot must receive further clearance from ATC to conduct the approach. If the airspace is uncontrolled (like CYRB without the DND temp control zone), then the pilot would carry out one of the published approaches mindful of potential VFR traffic if the weather at the time was visual meteorological conditions (VMC).
The so what to this is whatever agency cleared the second Resolute Bay IFR aircraft out of controlled airspace (the Class A, FL270 and above [to FL600] high altitude airspace) would have had to ensure that that aircraft's IFR clearance limit was valid. In regular times, that clearance would likely be something like, "ATC clears C-GABC (fictitious name for the 2nd aircraft...I don't know what its call-sign was) to the Resolute Bay airport for an approach. You are cleared to descend [out of FL###] at pilot's discretion." ATC may keep C-GABC on their frequency if ABC states he/she has sufficient radios to also monitor 126.7 (general en-route freq), but once in uncontrolled airspace below FL270, ABC must maintain a listening watch on 126.7 (and then make appropriate calls on CYRB's mandatory frequency (MF) as I noted in an earlier post). With DND's temp Class D CZ in operation, however, what I think should happen is that when ATC cleared C-GABC out of Class A airspace, it should advise the pilot that there is a temporary Class D control zone in operation.
This is important, because as an IFR flight, the pilot of C-GABC cannot legally enter the Class D control zone without a clearance from the controlling agency (DND). YZT, I think this is what you were referring to? As an IFR flight, someone should have advised the second aircraft that there was now a control zone in effect at CYRB, and furthermore, should have ensured that the clearance reflected a limit that was also consistent with First Air 6560's presence in the area and conduct of the ILS 35T approach. I'm not certain what the MANOPs say on the issue, as far as controllers go, but if FAB6560 was in the process of conducting or was cleared by ATC to conduct its approach at the time that the second aircraft was cleared out of Class A airspace, then civilian ATC's clearance to the second aircraft should (could?) not have included the phrase "...to the Resolute Bay airport" as the limit, because there was already one aircraft (FAB6560) with a clearance limit of the CYRB airport.
So while the TSB admonishes DND for allowing there to be less than sufficient separation between FAB6560 and the second aircraft, did civilian ATC give the second aircraft a clearance limit that was not theirs to give? I.e. was DND set up for success to continue maintaining separation?
It's a bit of a catch-22. IF the second aircraft was cleared to the CYRB airport for an approach, then that ATC unit should have advised the DND controllers that it had cleared a second aircraft to the airport. Could the ATC unit actually have given such a clearance if they were not the controlling agency of the airspace within which the CYRB aerodrome was contained? What did the letter/MOU say on the issue? Would such a clearance overrule DND's control of the CZ? Could DND overrule such a clearance and provide a new clearance limit to the second aircraft that was not the CRYB aerodrome, but some other navaid or fix? We just don't know how that second aircraft (or theoretically any subsequent) aircraft was/would have been controlled, and whether there was appropriate handling of the IFR flight(s) all the way from earlier flight in controlled high level Class A airspace, all the way through Class G uncontrolled airspace, before entering the Class D control zone.
Further complicating the issue is that all the second aircraft would have to do is cancel its IFR flight plan to become VFR traffic and then only have to ADVISE, not ASK the DND controllers that it was entering the Class D control zone. Unlike Class C, where a controller can deny entry of VFR flight into a control zone, VFR flights cannot be restricted from entering Class D airspace. It would then be up to the DND controllers to maintain adequate separation for the IFR flights that they were controlling.
fireman1867: I reread through my AIP and YTZ is right in that civilians can conduct PAR approaches if the service is available (at a civilian aerodrome) or if authorized (at a military aerodrome with a PAR). I can see nothing about currency requirements for civilian pilots, and I know on the military side of the house, many fleets don't mandate that one of the semi-annual precision IF approaches for currency be a PAR. I am certain that the PAR controllers have a certain number of approaches they must conduct to maintain currency, but I don't know that detail. PARs definitely aren't as popular as they used to be, and not nearly as common either. I'll try and get a PAR in when I can, striving for the pilots' 'Holy Grail' of the PAR world: a controller's, "On course, on glide path. Excellent rate of decent." :nod: (Getting one of these during an IRT [instrument rating test] was particularly coveted.)
YTZ: You are definitely right that this is a specific situation, and there are no doubt many similar situations such as this, where clarity and understanding by all involved in the conduct of flight through mixed airspace, controllers and pilots alike, is clearly needed.
Aviation is a particularly unforgiving environment, and we are all living in a fairly large glass house when it comes to conducting flying operations. The prevailing attitudes should be biased towards inclusiveness and open information, and less on 'he said, she said' type notifications. I for one would be very interested, to say the least, in the outcome of the airspace issue in this situation.
Regards
G2G
* understanding that altimeter settings in low-level airspace and the standard pressure setting in high-level may result in a difference of 100s of feet from 21,000' if the two alt settings are notably different.
From a pilot's point of view, a Class D control zone exists purely to control IFR traffic with appropriate separations, but we are mindful of the fact that VFR traffic is NOT RESTRICTED from entering a Class D CZ; the VFR pilot need only establish and maintain comms with ATC. The VFR flight can request traffic following services, but ATC is not required to do so for the VFR flight.
This also raises some interesting points, many related to YZT's post regarding the transition from high level controlled airspace to lower level airspace (both controlled an uncontrolled). An IFR flight is an IFR flight until/unless the aircraft captain cancels the IFR flight plan with an ATC unit -- from that point on, the flight is by default VFR. As well, the IFR flight is always flying on a "clearance" (may include altitudes, speeds, routings, etc...) and that clearance always has a "limit." That limit could be an aerodrome, a navaid or a fix (a defined point in space identifiable to the pilot given the functioning navigational equipment on board his/her aircraft) and defines a point to which both ATC and the pilot expect the aircraft to be flown to in the absence of any further clearance. If the limit is not the aerodrome itself, then the pilot is expected to either: a) conduct a hold at the limit upon arrival, and if an expected further clearance (EFC) time was given by ATC as part of the original clearance, to conduct an approach to the aerodrome; or b) if the EFC time has passed by the time the aircraft arrives at the clearance limit, to conduct an approach to the aerodrome using one of the public or TC-approved company instrument approaches. If the aerodrome is in controlled airspace (a Class C or D control zone, or a Class B, C or D terminal control area), then the IFR pilot must receive further clearance from ATC to conduct the approach. If the airspace is uncontrolled (like CYRB without the DND temp control zone), then the pilot would carry out one of the published approaches mindful of potential VFR traffic if the weather at the time was visual meteorological conditions (VMC).
The so what to this is whatever agency cleared the second Resolute Bay IFR aircraft out of controlled airspace (the Class A, FL270 and above [to FL600] high altitude airspace) would have had to ensure that that aircraft's IFR clearance limit was valid. In regular times, that clearance would likely be something like, "ATC clears C-GABC (fictitious name for the 2nd aircraft...I don't know what its call-sign was) to the Resolute Bay airport for an approach. You are cleared to descend [out of FL###] at pilot's discretion." ATC may keep C-GABC on their frequency if ABC states he/she has sufficient radios to also monitor 126.7 (general en-route freq), but once in uncontrolled airspace below FL270, ABC must maintain a listening watch on 126.7 (and then make appropriate calls on CYRB's mandatory frequency (MF) as I noted in an earlier post). With DND's temp Class D CZ in operation, however, what I think should happen is that when ATC cleared C-GABC out of Class A airspace, it should advise the pilot that there is a temporary Class D control zone in operation.
This is important, because as an IFR flight, the pilot of C-GABC cannot legally enter the Class D control zone without a clearance from the controlling agency (DND). YZT, I think this is what you were referring to? As an IFR flight, someone should have advised the second aircraft that there was now a control zone in effect at CYRB, and furthermore, should have ensured that the clearance reflected a limit that was also consistent with First Air 6560's presence in the area and conduct of the ILS 35T approach. I'm not certain what the MANOPs say on the issue, as far as controllers go, but if FAB6560 was in the process of conducting or was cleared by ATC to conduct its approach at the time that the second aircraft was cleared out of Class A airspace, then civilian ATC's clearance to the second aircraft should (could?) not have included the phrase "...to the Resolute Bay airport" as the limit, because there was already one aircraft (FAB6560) with a clearance limit of the CYRB airport.
So while the TSB admonishes DND for allowing there to be less than sufficient separation between FAB6560 and the second aircraft, did civilian ATC give the second aircraft a clearance limit that was not theirs to give? I.e. was DND set up for success to continue maintaining separation?
It's a bit of a catch-22. IF the second aircraft was cleared to the CYRB airport for an approach, then that ATC unit should have advised the DND controllers that it had cleared a second aircraft to the airport. Could the ATC unit actually have given such a clearance if they were not the controlling agency of the airspace within which the CYRB aerodrome was contained? What did the letter/MOU say on the issue? Would such a clearance overrule DND's control of the CZ? Could DND overrule such a clearance and provide a new clearance limit to the second aircraft that was not the CRYB aerodrome, but some other navaid or fix? We just don't know how that second aircraft (or theoretically any subsequent) aircraft was/would have been controlled, and whether there was appropriate handling of the IFR flight(s) all the way from earlier flight in controlled high level Class A airspace, all the way through Class G uncontrolled airspace, before entering the Class D control zone.
Further complicating the issue is that all the second aircraft would have to do is cancel its IFR flight plan to become VFR traffic and then only have to ADVISE, not ASK the DND controllers that it was entering the Class D control zone. Unlike Class C, where a controller can deny entry of VFR flight into a control zone, VFR flights cannot be restricted from entering Class D airspace. It would then be up to the DND controllers to maintain adequate separation for the IFR flights that they were controlling.
fireman1867: I reread through my AIP and YTZ is right in that civilians can conduct PAR approaches if the service is available (at a civilian aerodrome) or if authorized (at a military aerodrome with a PAR). I can see nothing about currency requirements for civilian pilots, and I know on the military side of the house, many fleets don't mandate that one of the semi-annual precision IF approaches for currency be a PAR. I am certain that the PAR controllers have a certain number of approaches they must conduct to maintain currency, but I don't know that detail. PARs definitely aren't as popular as they used to be, and not nearly as common either. I'll try and get a PAR in when I can, striving for the pilots' 'Holy Grail' of the PAR world: a controller's, "On course, on glide path. Excellent rate of decent." :nod: (Getting one of these during an IRT [instrument rating test] was particularly coveted.)
YTZ: You are definitely right that this is a specific situation, and there are no doubt many similar situations such as this, where clarity and understanding by all involved in the conduct of flight through mixed airspace, controllers and pilots alike, is clearly needed.
Aviation is a particularly unforgiving environment, and we are all living in a fairly large glass house when it comes to conducting flying operations. The prevailing attitudes should be biased towards inclusiveness and open information, and less on 'he said, she said' type notifications. I for one would be very interested, to say the least, in the outcome of the airspace issue in this situation.
Regards
G2G
* understanding that altimeter settings in low-level airspace and the standard pressure setting in high-level may result in a difference of 100s of feet from 21,000' if the two alt settings are notably different.
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g2g-
An excellent post, although you left several hanging paragraphs. ;D
An excellent post, although you left several hanging paragraphs. ;D
I'm not certain what the MANOPs say on the issue, as far as controllers go, but if FAB6560 was in the process of conducting or was cleared by ATC to conduct its approach at the time that the second aircraft was cleared out of Class A airspace, then civilian ATC's clearance to the second aircraft should (could?) not have included the phrase "...to the Resolute Bay airport" as the limit, because there was already one aircraft (FAB6560) with a clearance limit of the CYRB airport.
Separation services are only provided whilst the a/c is in controlled airspace. Thus a civilian controller is quite justified under normal circumstances in clearing a second a/c to the CYRB airport. Although they do, they should never use the expression for an approach as the approach is normally in uncontrolled airspace. The a/c clearance should include a statement such as "cleared to descend to FL270. Descent below FL270 at your discretion,report leaving FL270. ATC services terminated (except alerting services) leaving FL270." Once the report is received, a second a/c in a non-radar environment can legally be cleared in exactly the same manner. The controller should advise the second a/c of the preceding traffic but that is the limits of his obligation. He does not have to wait until the first a/c reports on the ground. Consider the case of a single flight. Once out of 270 the aircraft can shoot the approach do a miss, shoot a second approach or whatever else he wishes to do. He only needs to call ATC to cancel his flightplan or to request clearance back into controlled airspace if proceeding to his alternate.
G2G your post was an excellent summary and said everything that I tried to imply and more in a totally transparent fashion. I believe, given the information available that DND was set up to fail. Nowhere in the note was any coordination mentioned and with a valid ATC unit on site, NavCanada was obligated to provide an estimate and the second a/c was obliged to call for clearance to enter controlled airspace with the transition from FL270 to the top of the Class D being uncontrolled despite probably being on instruments. Does that leave any discrepancies?
Separation services are only provided whilst the a/c is in controlled airspace. Thus a civilian controller is quite justified under normal circumstances in clearing a second a/c to the CYRB airport. Although they do, they should never use the expression for an approach as the approach is normally in uncontrolled airspace. The a/c clearance should include a statement such as "cleared to descend to FL270. Descent below FL270 at your discretion,report leaving FL270. ATC services terminated (except alerting services) leaving FL270." Once the report is received, a second a/c in a non-radar environment can legally be cleared in exactly the same manner. The controller should advise the second a/c of the preceding traffic but that is the limits of his obligation. He does not have to wait until the first a/c reports on the ground. Consider the case of a single flight. Once out of 270 the aircraft can shoot the approach do a miss, shoot a second approach or whatever else he wishes to do. He only needs to call ATC to cancel his flightplan or to request clearance back into controlled airspace if proceeding to his alternate.
G2G your post was an excellent summary and said everything that I tried to imply and more in a totally transparent fashion. I believe, given the information available that DND was set up to fail. Nowhere in the note was any coordination mentioned and with a valid ATC unit on site, NavCanada was obligated to provide an estimate and the second a/c was obliged to call for clearance to enter controlled airspace with the transition from FL270 to the top of the Class D being uncontrolled despite probably being on instruments. Does that leave any discrepancies?
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Interesting info ref the PAR. My young FO was so happy to get an 'excellent' a few months back while flying the autopilot, I flew the next one and hand flew it and managed to get the turkey aka three 'excellent' calls on one approach. I guess we're still competitive folks by nature. ;D Not sure if having someone fly a PAR in anger with out at least some familiarity is a good idea? Not many places were it would matter - ZX is one of the few I think.
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YZT, not havimg made either a long-range or high level IFR flight in a while, what could/mught the original clearance have been for the second aircraft, say it was departing CYOW? Specifically, I'm wondering what would the clearance limit be? I'm thinking something along the lines: "ATC clears C-GABC to the Resolute Bay Airport, via flight flight planned route. Depart via the Ottawa SID 1. Squawk 0652."
I don't have my LO chart with me at the moment, so I can't recall if there is a Class E low-level airway that intercepts either the YRB or the RU NDBs, but if so, would not the clearance be, say, the YRB? Following that, would the original clearance include the YRB as the clearance limit, vice the Resolute Bay Airport? Repeatedly, if the was a Class E airway leading to the vicinity of CYRB, could not the high-level controller vector the IFR flight on top of the Victor airway so that the flight would technically still remain under ATC control throughout the descent to commence the approach?
If no Class E airway to YRB or near CYRB, then a flight descending trough FL270 truly would be in uncontrolled airspace. Part of me thinks that the clearance limit would have to consider RNAV to an appropapriate navaid as a limit.
I'll definitely be discussing this with the other ICPs when I get back to the squdron next week...this discussion has made me recognize that there was a bit of dust on the IF grey cells. It is important to make sure we, military and civilian aviators, get IFR right.
Regards
G2G
I don't have my LO chart with me at the moment, so I can't recall if there is a Class E low-level airway that intercepts either the YRB or the RU NDBs, but if so, would not the clearance be, say, the YRB? Following that, would the original clearance include the YRB as the clearance limit, vice the Resolute Bay Airport? Repeatedly, if the was a Class E airway leading to the vicinity of CYRB, could not the high-level controller vector the IFR flight on top of the Victor airway so that the flight would technically still remain under ATC control throughout the descent to commence the approach?
If no Class E airway to YRB or near CYRB, then a flight descending trough FL270 truly would be in uncontrolled airspace. Part of me thinks that the clearance limit would have to consider RNAV to an appropapriate navaid as a limit.
I'll definitely be discussing this with the other ICPs when I get back to the squdron next week...this discussion has made me recognize that there was a bit of dust on the IF grey cells. It is important to make sure we, military and civilian aviators, get IFR right.
Regards
G2G
Most initial clearances are to destination airport unless it is a short flight within the same FIR. The exception is normally to resolve an off-the-ground potential conflict i.e. transiting traffic in a non-radar environment. In this case the short clearance provides the departure with loss of comm. security to enable climb to cruise in the event the radios fail. ATC assured separation in the case you gave is to the top of the SID. Again, in the hypothetical radio failure ATC would progressively clear the track in front of you with the separation gradually increasing to procedural. But you are cleared to destination as a geographical place. You are not cleared to destination for an approach and that is an important distinction because there are a number of airport destinations without a certified approach and a chap in WG has no knowledge of an approach availability in QM or overseas. ATC responsibilities are to provide alerting services, traffic information (when known) in appropriate airspace and separation between qualified flights depending again on the appropriate airspace. It is the pilot's responsibility to pick a route that provides separation from terrain and suitable nav facilities to get him to destination. Thus we have air routes that are flight checked for reception and terrain but are in uncontrolled airspace. In northern domestic airspace there is no control ainywhere below FL230 excepting into airports that provide ATC services.Good2Golf said:
Now I will throw a small wrench into the works. If a single flight into RB reports leaving controlled airspace in descent there are no provisions given to provide separation between him and other flights even if known that are operating in uncontrolled airspace HOWEVER separation must be assured between that flight and the climb back up into controlled airspace in the event of a missed approach or between that flight and a departure off FB that is climbing up into controlled airspace. In both cases the loss of separation would occur at FL270 which sounds strange considering the two flights might conflict at 2 or 3000 feet but that is the first point of responsibility. Your hypotheticals are both more or less correct excepting there is no radar service up there. It is the responsibility of the flight crew to do the transitions. Clearance to a beacon or navaid does not get the flight to his destination because it precludes flight beyond that navaid. Thus clearance to YRB or RU NDB requires the flight to stop at that point and hold until he figures out something else to do whilst ATC provides separation only at that point for the hold. If the beacon is on site then it is a mute point but in the case where a navaid is located many miles from the runway, it means that you are kind of stuck. As I see it, DND was responsible to the top of the temporary airspace. NavCanada should have included a restriction on the second inbound via a short clearance i.e. to the NDB not below 6000 feet (assuming protect airspace at 6000 and below). An ETA should have been passed to DND. DND should have had a missed approach on FAB to climb not above 5000 feet. In this manner all would have been well but one or more of those simple clearances was omitted.
With regards to an airport with a certified approach, a controller can clear the flight to destination airport to descend to the floor of the controlled airspace and to report leaving controlled airspace. The aircraft remains on the boards for possible missed approach and traffic information but no separation is provided except in the case I mentioned above. The aircraft is IFR and separation must be provided between him and a subsequent flight until he cancels which puts me in error on an earlier post. However, the existence of a low level approach facility ie. the military PAR would permit the civilian sector controller to clear a second aircraft for descent, to report leaving and to contact PAR. He is no longer responsible for providing missed approach separation.
But I am babbling. It is a complicated issue and one that probably should be resolved as I suspect that more and more northern operations will come up in the long term. Pleasure discussing with you, it is indeed good to wake up some long dead brain cells.
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Zoomie said:
You're right ... I don't understand; but I am mightily encouraged that some smart people - you guys - understand that there are problems and that you are talking about ways to mitigate the risks that are inherent in flying. And I agree: this is a GREAT way for these fora to contribute.
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YZT, I concur with Zoomie and Mr. Campbell, there is no babbling going on in your posts whatsoever. I appreciate greatly your perspective from the other side of the radio/scope! :nod:
Doing some more reading over the holidays I have found more info related to crash, including the identity of the second aircraft (one of Ken Borek's Twin Otters, Borek Flight 99, which conducted a LOC(BC) RWY 17T approach shortly after FAB6560's crash, but had to conduct a missed approach due to weather and then landed shortly afterwards, visually to RWY 35, I believe).
From a subject thread from the AvCanada forum ( Resolute Bay Accident - Pilots Discussion Thread ) I found the text of two Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) related to the control zone (CZ) and, as I just learned, a military terminal control area (MTCA), as well. The CZ reflected the std mil extent of 10NM and a 6000' ASL cap. The MTCA was pretty large, 80NM radius (civilian TCAs are normally out to 45NM) and a vertical extent from 700' AGL/AAE all the way up to FL200.
The important thing to note in relation to these NOTAMs is:
1) that the Class D CZ was technically in place as of 1300Z, 10 Aug 2011 (1108101300 eff date code = 2011, Aug, 10th, 1300Z). Since there was no manned tower, however, the CZ would revert to Class E airspace -- inbound traffic makes advisory calls only, no clearance to enter the zone or to land is required, and the weather minima are increased slightly from regular uncontrolled Class G airspace); and
2) The MTCA airspace and the tower/radar/terminal frequencies were not active at the time of the crash, but rather was to take effect two days later (per the "1108221200 TIL 1108280100" code at the end of the second NOTAM).
In the online discussion, there are questions regarding queries made to First Air 6560 pilots by what was believed to be a military controller, regarding 6560's inbound direction and distance from the airport. The terminology of the question to the First Air crew was discussed as "radial and DME" -- for those unfamiliar with the terms, radial being a compass-like spoke on a horizontal wheel centred about a directional navigation aid, and DME being an acronym for 'distance measuring equipment', but that usually refers not to the equipment itself, but to the distance between a navigational aid and the aircraft in question. While DME is a separate component that can be associated with numerous types of en-route and approach naiads, 'Radial' would in my mind imply the VOR
I also found a more recent copy (2011) of the specific approach (ILS/DME RWY 35T) that 6560 was flying. Of note, the Cape Martyr NDB (RU - 391) was decommissioned prior to the accident and no longer fits into the equation. The 'POKAN' final approach fix is purely DME based now, and notably further away from the RWY 35T threshold (twice as far at 4.2NM) than the 2.1NM of the Cape Martyr NDB FAF.
There is also an interesting video of an ILS/DME RWY 35T approach on YouTube, taken from a Lockheed L-188 Electra (civilian airliner/transporter based on the P-3 Orion/CP-140 Aurora airframe). The large lake directly ahead of the landing aircraft before the runway is Resolute Lake. You can see in the first few moments as the aircraft breaks out of the overcast, the site of the decommissioned Cape Martyr NDB (base of the screen, slightly left of centre, at 0:21). Over to the right at about the 1:00 o'clock position is the higher terrain that 6560 crashed into.
Regards
G2G
Doing some more reading over the holidays I have found more info related to crash, including the identity of the second aircraft (one of Ken Borek's Twin Otters, Borek Flight 99, which conducted a LOC(BC) RWY 17T approach shortly after FAB6560's crash, but had to conduct a missed approach due to weather and then landed shortly afterwards, visually to RWY 35, I believe).
From a subject thread from the AvCanada forum ( Resolute Bay Accident - Pilots Discussion Thread ) I found the text of two Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) related to the control zone (CZ) and, as I just learned, a military terminal control area (MTCA), as well. The CZ reflected the std mil extent of 10NM and a 6000' ASL cap. The MTCA was pretty large, 80NM radius (civilian TCAs are normally out to 45NM) and a vertical extent from 700' AGL/AAE all the way up to FL200.
The important thing to note in relation to these NOTAMs is:
1) that the Class D CZ was technically in place as of 1300Z, 10 Aug 2011 (1108101300 eff date code = 2011, Aug, 10th, 1300Z). Since there was no manned tower, however, the CZ would revert to Class E airspace -- inbound traffic makes advisory calls only, no clearance to enter the zone or to land is required, and the weather minima are increased slightly from regular uncontrolled Class G airspace); and
2) The MTCA airspace and the tower/radar/terminal frequencies were not active at the time of the crash, but rather was to take effect two days later (per the "1108221200 TIL 1108280100" code at the end of the second NOTAM).
In the online discussion, there are questions regarding queries made to First Air 6560 pilots by what was believed to be a military controller, regarding 6560's inbound direction and distance from the airport. The terminology of the question to the First Air crew was discussed as "radial and DME" -- for those unfamiliar with the terms, radial being a compass-like spoke on a horizontal wheel centred about a directional navigation aid, and DME being an acronym for 'distance measuring equipment', but that usually refers not to the equipment itself, but to the distance between a navigational aid and the aircraft in question. While DME is a separate component that can be associated with numerous types of en-route and approach naiads, 'Radial' would in my mind imply the VOR
I also found a more recent copy (2011) of the specific approach (ILS/DME RWY 35T) that 6560 was flying. Of note, the Cape Martyr NDB (RU - 391) was decommissioned prior to the accident and no longer fits into the equation. The 'POKAN' final approach fix is purely DME based now, and notably further away from the RWY 35T threshold (twice as far at 4.2NM) than the 2.1NM of the Cape Martyr NDB FAF.
There is also an interesting video of an ILS/DME RWY 35T approach on YouTube, taken from a Lockheed L-188 Electra (civilian airliner/transporter based on the P-3 Orion/CP-140 Aurora airframe). The large lake directly ahead of the landing aircraft before the runway is Resolute Lake. You can see in the first few moments as the aircraft breaks out of the overcast, the site of the decommissioned Cape Martyr NDB (base of the screen, slightly left of centre, at 0:21). Over to the right at about the 1:00 o'clock position is the higher terrain that 6560 crashed into.
Regards
G2G
Took a quick look through the dialogue on the AVCanada link. Apart from the most interesting series of speculations it is enlightening to note how many of the flight crews proposed deviations from the published approach/arrival procedure. If TC safety are having difficulty determining exactly what happened and why I suspect that those comments would prove most interesting although definitely not conclusive. There was an AA B757 that hit a mountain top in South America I believe with just such a proposed deviation from SOP using GPS to smooth a turn. There is a specific reason for all those designated headings and turns on approach plates with most of those being the presence of very solid objects in the off-course. The land may look flat but even a 200 foot elevation can ruin your day.
With no tower in operation and the radar not due to open for another couple of days there is no reason for DND to get their knuckles rapped. The controller was fully within his rights to broadcast on mandatory provided he did not issue clearances or attempt to control. Even passing traffic advisories would have been within his authority provided the phraseology was something like "FAB traffic information only, reports of a DH6 inbound from the north eta? position unknown". Actually, anyone with a VHF radio-telephony license could pass the same information. The queries regarding position alluded to could have been nothing more than confirming radar alignment with an actual target.
Being a DH6, the Borek flight was always uncontrolled and with no active class D was not required to do anything other than broadcast his position. Sounds like someone in headquarters doesn't know his air regs.
With no tower in operation and the radar not due to open for another couple of days there is no reason for DND to get their knuckles rapped. The controller was fully within his rights to broadcast on mandatory provided he did not issue clearances or attempt to control. Even passing traffic advisories would have been within his authority provided the phraseology was something like "FAB traffic information only, reports of a DH6 inbound from the north eta? position unknown". Actually, anyone with a VHF radio-telephony license could pass the same information. The queries regarding position alluded to could have been nothing more than confirming radar alignment with an actual target.
Being a DH6, the Borek flight was always uncontrolled and with no active class D was not required to do anything other than broadcast his position. Sounds like someone in headquarters doesn't know his air regs.
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Good2Golf said:
G2G,
I may have missed something, but where do you see there was no manned tower?
SSM
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Good2Golf said:
I think this is where lies the problem. IF NavCan cleared the flight for "an approach", as they would normally do for a CZ "E" that lies within their AOR, then the went beyond their authority, since DND was the controlling agency of the CZ (unless prior coordination was done prior to issuing the clearance).
The issue is that there was no TCA established around the CZ, so who would clear a flight for an approach?
It seems like it is a coordination/communication issue between controlling agencies (the "loss of separation" part, not the flying into the ground part).
YZT: Are there any Class D CZ lying within class G airspace with no TCA around? If so, how does NavCan deal with approach clearances?
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SSM, my understanding of publicly available information is the 8 ACCS crew was in location and their tower (and PSR and PAR) was physically placed, but not 'manned', i.e. they were not operating as a controlling agency on a TWR freq at the time. The CZ controlling portion was to have commenced on the 22nd, once the MTCA was activated, per the second NOTAM (110124 YRB). The UHF TWR freq of 236.5 would have been dual-band transmitted along with two on the regular VHF MF (122.1). I can find no references that state that 8 ACCS was positively controlling the CZ as Class D airspace prior to the intended 22 Aug 11 date. The fact that the Borek 99 crew described conducting their LOC(BC) 17T using regular R/T (regular CAR-reqd transmissions at an uncontrolled aerodrome) would tend to support this configuration at the time.
Regards
G2G
Regards
G2G
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SupersonicMax said:
Max, this exact question is what reinforces to me that the Mil ATC team was not yet acting as CZ controllers, even if the CZ airspace was designated as of 10 Aug. Had they been, then I believe Arctic Ctr would (should) have contacted the MTCA controllers advising them that it had cleared FAB6560 out of Class A airspace for the approach.
Regards
G2G
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G2G,
The first NOTAM is the one describing CZ "D". I see it active on the 10 Aug 2011 until 28 Aug 2011. While there is no frequency, once could easily assume the normal "MF" frequency would be used (which it is, 122.1 MHz) for control.
The second NOTAM details the MTCA, adding frequencies for different controlling agencies.
Why have different dates to the set up of the CZ and MTCA if, practically speaking, they were really stood up at the same time?
To me, a Class D CZ means it will have somebody issuing clearances and instructions at the other end. I do not see any provision for the CZ "D" to revert to a CZ "E" when the tower is not manned (I know it is a common practice, however it is always described in the GPH205 or approach plates. I could not find a reference indicating that anytime a CZ "D" is not manned, it reverts to a CZ "E").
Either the CZ was manned by a controller from 10 Aug or the NOTAMs are very confusing wrt airspace structure around Res Bay.
The first NOTAM is the one describing CZ "D". I see it active on the 10 Aug 2011 until 28 Aug 2011. While there is no frequency, once could easily assume the normal "MF" frequency would be used (which it is, 122.1 MHz) for control.
The second NOTAM details the MTCA, adding frequencies for different controlling agencies.
Why have different dates to the set up of the CZ and MTCA if, practically speaking, they were really stood up at the same time?
To me, a Class D CZ means it will have somebody issuing clearances and instructions at the other end. I do not see any provision for the CZ "D" to revert to a CZ "E" when the tower is not manned (I know it is a common practice, however it is always described in the GPH205 or approach plates. I could not find a reference indicating that anytime a CZ "D" is not manned, it reverts to a CZ "E").
Either the CZ was manned by a controller from 10 Aug or the NOTAMs are very confusing wrt airspace structure around Res Bay.
The plot thickens! Here is the reference for Class D to E from RAC 2.8.4 Class D Airspace
Class D airspace is a controlled airspace within which both IFR and VFR flights are permitted, but VFR flights must establish two-way communication with the appropriate ATC agency prior to entering the airspace. ATC separation is provided only to IFR aircraft. Aircraft will be provided with traffic information. Equipment and workload permitting, conflict resolution will be provided between VFR and IFR aircraft, and upon request between VFR aircraft.
Airspace classified as Class D becomes Class E airspace when the appropriate ATC unit is not in operation.
That I know of there is no class D that does not lie on an airway thus controlled airspace begins at 2200 agl as all controlled airports lie in the southern control area. The very fact that there is a tower indicates sufficient traffic to justify controlled airways.
With a valid class E Borek99 required an IFR clearance for the approach. His normal contact would, I suspect be Arctic Radio in YYB and Arctic Radio would be responsible for informing him that there was a valid control zone and that he needed a clearance. The clearance itself would be issued through radio by the responsible sector in UL I believe. It would have definitely been a shock to Borek. I doubt if he had had a clearance issued since arriving in the north. He would be used to finding his own way around.
Class D airspace is a controlled airspace within which both IFR and VFR flights are permitted, but VFR flights must establish two-way communication with the appropriate ATC agency prior to entering the airspace. ATC separation is provided only to IFR aircraft. Aircraft will be provided with traffic information. Equipment and workload permitting, conflict resolution will be provided between VFR and IFR aircraft, and upon request between VFR aircraft.
Airspace classified as Class D becomes Class E airspace when the appropriate ATC unit is not in operation.
That I know of there is no class D that does not lie on an airway thus controlled airspace begins at 2200 agl as all controlled airports lie in the southern control area. The very fact that there is a tower indicates sufficient traffic to justify controlled airways.
With a valid class E Borek99 required an IFR clearance for the approach. His normal contact would, I suspect be Arctic Radio in YYB and Arctic Radio would be responsible for informing him that there was a valid control zone and that he needed a clearance. The clearance itself would be issued through radio by the responsible sector in UL I believe. It would have definitely been a shock to Borek. I doubt if he had had a clearance issued since arriving in the north. He would be used to finding his own way around.
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Max, YZT beat me to the RAC 2 reference. Yes, I'm tracking the difference between the two NOTAMs, and while I can't explain why the Class D was set up 12 days before the MTCA, I think my read was correct that the CZ was not actively being controlled at the time of the crash, thus Class E. I do note, however, YZT's further clarification that Borek 99 would still have had to get a clearance for their approach on the LOC(BC) 17T. The 8 ACCS team would have been the only ones capable of controlling the CZ if my understanding is correct, as the CARS guys are not at all qualified to provide any element of control.
Regards
G2G
Regards
G2G
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From the posts on Avcanada, it seems like the tower was active at the time (issuing take-off & landing clearances anyways). To me that's active, hence the CZ would have been class D.
Thanks for the reference.
The transition from uncontrolled IFR directly to a CZ is the source of the problem IMO, as there is no real deconfliction between IFR aircraft in uncontrolled airspace (other than what was agreed by both aircraft on 126.7, if they did so). The presence of an MTCA would have mitigated this problem as terminal control would have been taken from further out.
I still have one outstanding question: who clears aircraft for an approach in this case (active class D CZ)?
As far as te CFIT goes, some people are suggesting they were flying the LOC approach with the VOR tuned (which would make sense that they called the GS U/S, if they did not notice the mistake). Their track was parallel to the LOC track, but tracking towards the VOR station.
There are some very valuable lessons to be learnt from this accident..
Thanks for the reference.
The transition from uncontrolled IFR directly to a CZ is the source of the problem IMO, as there is no real deconfliction between IFR aircraft in uncontrolled airspace (other than what was agreed by both aircraft on 126.7, if they did so). The presence of an MTCA would have mitigated this problem as terminal control would have been taken from further out.
I still have one outstanding question: who clears aircraft for an approach in this case (active class D CZ)?
As far as te CFIT goes, some people are suggesting they were flying the LOC approach with the VOR tuned (which would make sense that they called the GS U/S, if they did not notice the mistake). Their track was parallel to the LOC track, but tracking towards the VOR station.
There are some very valuable lessons to be learnt from this accident..
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