Preserving Army Fleets

[Kirkhill]

I was going to be flippant and remark that it is more difficult to get rid of stuff that it is to acquire new stuff, but I'll amend my thought and say that sometimes it may be "as difficult" to get rid of stuff as it is to acquire.

The purpose of that section in the NDA that you seemingly hold in great disdain because it talks about getting rid of stuff provides the department (and the CAF) with a loophole to accomplish defense (and diplomatic, humanitarian, etc) objectives that could be stymied by other legislation. Every department of government, just as it has to acquire stuff through PWGSC, also has to get rid off stuff through the same department. The Surplus Crown Assets Act is the governing legislation.

It's through that section of the act that Canada has been able on numerous occasions (for decades and decades) to sidestep the red tape that would entangle any transfer of military owned equipment to other countries and NGOs. I suppose the latest use of that section was the transfer of equipment to Ukraine.

I'm not disdainful of its inclusion. I can see its very real value. I just find it jarring that it precedes all other considerations of the Act.

 

[Kirkhill]

Money, money, money. As a reservist working out of the HQ building across from Jericho Park, I was aware that space was tight. Gee, I naively thought, perhaps we should move into the old BHosp building - stores and office space to spare, and a nice ramp for access to loading doors. No, that and everything else not used on the property were torn down as soon as not needed anymore in order to save money (costs of upkeep).

And that, in my uninformed opinion, isn't incongruent with Sect 11. It is as if the working assumption is that there is a whole bunch of surplus that the government can profit by its removal.

Written in the aftermath of WW2? Lots of bodies, real estate, trucks and guns to re-integrate into society?

 

[MilEME09]

And that, in my uninformed opinion, isn't incongruent with Sect 11. It is as if the working assumption is that there is a whole bunch of surplus that the government can profit by its removal.

Written in the aftermath of WW2? Lots of bodies, real estate, trucks and guns to re-integrate into society?

I mean if you raise your guns right, they don't become Assault guns right?

 

[FJAG]

I would separate the PRes.
The High School and University crowd will give you 6 ish years of Summer Employment - the HS Summer break being shorter - but you can do a lot with 6 summers of employment.

I only care about their summer employment "window" to the extent that it builds their knowledge and training. After that they can go semi active so long as they are there when you need to mobilize them for whatever. If I get two summers out of the majority of the reservists followed by four years sedentary standby with his unit at one weekend per month and two to three weeks summer exercise for four years I'd consider that a win.

If the army isn't the primary resource hog for the CAF, then there is no reason to preserve fleets. It would be far better to have GDLS constantly build/upgrade with new LAVs. Just keep replacing old LAV with new ones in the fleet and then divesting the older ones as necessary. I would rather the money that would go into inspection, care and feeding of a bunch of "classic cars" go into new/upgraded LAV's than hanging onto war stock like we are the US or Soviets.

I actually agree fully with this but essentially this is a manner of hanging on to "classic cars".

As you continuously build/upgrade you are essentially introducing improved models while still retaining older models. That will, in practical terms, create two fleets which vary in size during the build/upgrade process. The newer models will go to the priority units/missions and the older ones will move into secondary tasks and lower priority units and tasks. What is and what isn't a priority unit or task may very well vary over time based on how serviceable/useful older equipment is.

Gotta keep the money flowing into London. Swing ridings there.

Yeah but much more importantly, one of our few major equipment industrial centres.

 

[Underway]

I actually agree fully with this but essentially this is a manner of hanging on to "classic cars".

As you continuously build/upgrade you are essentially introducing improved models while still retaining older models. That will, in practical terms, create two fleets which vary in size during the build/upgrade process. The newer models will go to the priority units/missions and the older ones will move into secondary tasks and lower priority units and tasks. What is and what isn't a priority unit or task may very well vary over time based on how serviceable/useful older equipment is.

It depends on how you introduce the replacement. I think the LAV 6 upgrade is instructional here.

You do the replacement in batches, say there are 400 to fix up you take 40 at a time and each unit gets its new stuff in order (and of course a few vehicles to the schools for training). There is still a large commonality between the versions, and you are really only dealing with a single legacy system while you swap it out for the new one.

The difference is that you aren't just building 400 new LAV 6 and keeping 400 LAV 3. As the LAV 6 come online you reduce the LAV 3 stock (mainly because they are being upgraded but you get the point).

This should be the same with the ACSV's. When the Ambulances are built you don't keep the Bison Ambs around. You divest them.

When the ACSV's are done being built then there should be a SHORAD LAV 6 built or 120mm mortar version or whatever.

Then you go back and build LAV 7 and do the full replacement run again. Or keep building LAV 6 and sell/donate the old ones off to someone else.

There will always be minor differences as the line goes on but I don't think that's necessarily a bad thing as long as the majority of the systems are the same.

 

[KevinB]

US pledges $391 million for Euro allies to buy American to backfill weapons donations to Ukraine

Fifteen European allies will get nearly $400 million in new U.S. grants to buy American military hardware to backfill weapons they’ve donated to Ukraine from their own stockpiles, the State Department announced Monday.

www.defensenews.com

Just saying

 

[Kirkhill]

It depends on how you introduce the replacement. I think the LAV 6 upgrade is instructional here.

You do the replacement in batches, say there are 400 to fix up you take 40 at a time and each unit gets its new stuff in order (and of course a few vehicles to the schools for training). There is still a large commonality between the versions, and you are really only dealing with a single legacy system while you swap it out for the new one.

The difference is that you aren't just building 400 new LAV 6 and keeping 400 LAV 3. As the LAV 6 come online you reduce the LAV 3 stock (mainly because they are being upgraded but you get the point).

This should be the same with the ACSV's. When the Ambulances are built you don't keep the Bison Ambs around. You divest them.

When the ACSV's are done being built then there should be a SHORAD LAV 6 built or 120mm mortar version or whatever.

Then you go back and build LAV 7 and do the full replacement run again. Or keep building LAV 6 and sell/donate the old ones off to someone else.

There will always be minor differences as the line goes on but I don't think that's necessarily a bad thing as long as the majority of the systems are the same.

I think the difference is that you are talking about sustaining a fleet of 400 in service. That is enough for a small number of regular force battlegroups.

The alternative being discussed is building a fleet of 1200 with three blocks of 400 units. One in service and two older generations in storage.

And that relates to the whole question of do we want a mobilization base, do we want to utilize the reserves, what do we want the reserves to do, what do the regs want the reserves to do, what do the reserves want to do, what does command want the reserves to do.

Do we want reserves at all?

I think if the government were willing to fund the reserves with top of the line kit to serve alongside the regs when the balloon went up then none of the Class A types would object. I suspicion the objections would come from the regs and the treasury.

The reason we are discussing keeping second hand kit at all is that the reserves are begging for crumbs - they are asking for a real job and they are asking for real kit to do that job. They are willing to accept ancient kit because ancient kit is better than no kit. They can still learn basic soldiering and respond to rudimentary tasks, and they will be better prepared so that the training time to convert them to top of the line gear will be reduced.

What they are not asking for is a full time career in the army. They are asking for the opportunity to help when they can. And each individual has different definitions of what they can offer.

Other countries manage those voluntary hours much better than we do.

And not a lot of regs seem to see the volunteers as anything but a useless competitor for salaries and equipment.

 

[FJAG]

And that relates to the whole question of do we want a mobilization base, do we want to utilize the reserves, what do we want the reserves to do, what do the regs want the reserves to do, what do the reserves want to do, what does command want the reserves to do.

Do we want reserves at all?

IMHO the answer is a resounding yes.

The issue is what roles each fills. The key is you need to define the force structure you want for the missions that you intend to participate in.

If all you want is light battalion to send on UN missions then by all means have a full-time force of three light battalions to rotate through. You really do not need much of a headquarters above the battalions and few enablers beyond the ones in the battalions.

If on the other hand you want to keep a rifle battalion in Latvia and preposition a brigade there in case of a war then you'll need a brigade at home which has maybe four full-time rifle battalions but its artillery air defence and armour primarily reservists together with at least one more reserve brigade.

You pay full dollar for the people you need every day and a heavily discounted dollar for the people you only need when necessary. Equipment, on the other hand, needs to be paid for up front whether used every day or kept in reserve.

Sometimes I get the feeling that in Canada the government says "we'll give you, DND, a pay envelope for 100,000 military and civilian PYs and 20,000 reservists - go figure out what to do with it and then let us know."

 

[Kirkhill]

IMHO the answer is a resounding yes.

The issue is what roles each fills. The key is you need to define the force structure you want for the missions that you intend to participate in.

If all you want is light battalion to send on UN missions then by all means have a full-time force of three light battalions to rotate through. You really do not need much of a headquarters above the battalions and few enablers beyond the ones in the battalions.

If on the other hand you want to keep a rifle battalion in Latvia and preposition a brigade there in case of a war then you'll need a brigade at home which has maybe four full-time rifle battalions but its artillery air defence and armour primarily reservists together with at least one more reserve brigade.

You pay full dollar for the people you need every day and a heavily discounted dollar for the people you only need when necessary. Equipment, on the other hand, needs to be paid for up front whether used every day or kept in reserve.

Sometimes I get the feeling that in Canada the government says "we'll give you, DND, a pay envelope for 100,000 military and civilian PYs and 20,000 reservists - go figure out what to do with it and then let us know."

I know your answer FJAG. And I am in complete agreement with you. We disagree on how those reserves would be organized, trained and tasked and how their taskings would be weighted but we agree on the value of a reserve.

Our mutual problem is that our DND/CAF community does not, in my opinion, demonstrate through its words and deeds, as similar sense of the need or value.

And 40 years of drum banging doesn't seem to have changed much.

 

[FJAG]

I know your answer FJAG. And I am in complete agreement with you. We disagree on how those reserves would be organized, trained and tasked and how their taskings would be weighted but we agree on the value of a reserve.

Our mutual problem is that our DND/CAF community does not, in my opinion, demonstrate through its words and deeds, as similar sense of the need or value.

And 40 years of drum banging doesn't seem to have changed much.

It's really strange isn't it. The concept is viable and a clear money saver. One can honestly debate the quantities and ratios and roles; but the concept? It's like the Army got itself stuck in the 1960s model of 'forces in being' when the cash was good and can't figure out how to get itself out of that rut. It's only solution is 'give us more cash for more forces in being'.

 

[GR66]

Personally I'm of the opinion that in a potential peer conflict between NATO and Russia or China we will not require a mass mobilization of additional Canadian Brigade Groups for the conflict. NATO's European members plus the US have enough forces/reserves/population to overmatch Russia and any Pacific conflict against China will be more of an air/sea conflict than something requiring Canadian Brigade Groups.

So I'd say that the key role for the Army Reserve would be to a) provide those capabilities/enablers that are required in wartime that are not typically required in peacetime (e.g. Mission Task roles like Mortar/Direct Fire/Pioneer Platoons, additional IDF platforms, AD, etc.) and b) provide the "depth" to sustain our Reg Force Brigades when they are deployed.

The problem that's been identified is that under the current system the Reserves don't have the capability of maintaining the vehicles used by our Mech Battalions and training burden to be proficient in the Mech forces is difficult even for the Reg Force due to limited training time, never mind for a part-time Reservist.

So could something like this possibly work?

• The LAV Battalions are concentrated in 1 & 5 Brigades with 2 Brigade becoming the Light Brigade.
• Instead of completely disbanding the 3rd Mech Battalions in 1/5 Brigades you instead keep the maintainers and post one additional LAV Company with each of the Regiments 1st and 2nd Battalions.
• This additional Company would focus on training troops in the vehicle operation elements of the Mechanized Infantry role (vehicle commanders/drivers/gunners only...no "guys in back"). Troops could rotate through the vehicle Company to master their skills then rotate back into one of the three line companies of the Battalion.
• The Vehicle Company could then also host dismounted infantry Platoons mission tasked from Reserve Infantry units to provide "guys in back" to give them experience in operating from the same vehicles that the Reg Force is using.
• Individual Reservists who have the time available could (after completing their regular vehicle driver/turret/commander qualification courses) could have short-term postings to the Vehicle Company to maintain their currency in the vehicle skills.

What would this system give us?

• 2 x Battalions of vehicle spares available as replacements for losses in a conflict (maintained centrally with the Reg Force Battalions by Reg Force maintainers).
• Increased training opportunities within the Battalion concentrating on vehicle skills.
• A pool of Reserve Infantry that are familiar with mounted operations making it easier for them to augment Reg Force Mechanized units.
• A smaller pool of Reservists trained as vehicle drivers/gunners/commanders to augment the Reg Force.
• A clear employment role for Reserve units as each would be Mission Tasked (either for a specific CS role or to generate dismounted troops to augment a Reg Force Battalion).
• Free up Reg Force Infantry PYs for schools, filling out the Reg Force, etc. (only 2 Companies worth of vehicle crews and maintainers retained from the 3rd Battalions of the Mech Regiments...the rest of the PYs fed back into the system).
• Reduction in the Command overhead of the Reserve units as each of the Mission Tasked units (CS or GIB augmentee Platoons) would fall under the command of their parent Reg Force Battalion.

I'm sure that like any change there would be challenges and trade-offs, but on the surface at least it would appear to check a number of boxes.

 

[Kirkhill]

It's really strange isn't it. The concept is viable and a clear money saver. One can honestly debate the quantities and ratios and roles; but the concept? It's like the Army got itself stuck in the 1960s model of 'forces in being' when the cash was good and can't figure out how to get itself out of that rut. It's only solution is 'give us more cash for more forces in being'.

As a kid back in Britain I watched with my parents a TV show on ancient history. It was called All Our Yesterday's. It was about The Second World War. 20 years previous. Ancient history to a kid. But the last of that generation, my parents' generation, is just dying off now.

The Canadian Army really only found purpose and stability with the Cold War and Louis St-Laurent. Prior to Korea and the Berlin Crisis it was raised from the Militia on an as needed basis. 1950 is only 72 years ago. Some folks around here remember that year.

The Institution is young. It is less than one lifetime old. I suggest the Institution feels insecure and fragile and feels the need to fight to justify its existence.

And the worst thing that could happen to the Institution is that the Militia revives and becomes a viable component of National Defence-Public Safety-Emergency Preparedness. Any success in any of those fields would cut into the Institution's rationale for existing.

That, in my opinion, would be consistent with a tendency to respond to any question with "You don't need to do that. We can do that if needed. But it is never needed."

Sorry if I offend anybody on this site. It's not personal. It's my considered opinion after 40 years of observation.

Institutions have personalities all their own.

 

[quadrapiper]

It's only solution is 'give us more cash for more forces in being'.

"...by which we mean headquarters staff in division strength."

 

[KevinB]

As a kid back in Britain I watched with my parents a TV show on ancient history. It was called All Our Yesterday's. It was about The Second World War. 20 years previous. Ancient history to a kid. But the last of that generation, my parents' generation, is just dying off now.

The Canadian Army really only found purpose and stability with the Cold War and Louis St-Laurent. Prior to Korea and the Berlin Crisis it was raised from the Militia on an as needed basis. 1950 is only 72 years ago. Some folks around here remember that year.

The Institution is young. It is less than one lifetime old. I suggest the Institution feels insecure and fragile and feels the need to fight to justify its existence.

And the worst thing that could happen to the Institution is that the Militia revives and becomes a viable component of National Defence-Public Safety-Emergency Preparedness. Any success in any of those fields would cut into the Institution's rationale for existing.

That, in my opinion, would be consistent with a tendency to respond to any question with "You don't need to do that. We can do that if needed. But it is never needed."

Sorry if I offend anybody on this site. It's not personal. It's my considered opinion after 40 years of observation.

Institutions have personalities all their own.

Frankly the PRes has given the Regular Army good reason to discount it for a lot of things.
Vehicle VOR rates are generally insanely high in reserve units, and those aren't even A vehicles.
Utterly erratic attendance, questionable skill levels of senior personnel etc.
That isn't even digging into the fact there militia is nearly an inside down pyramid for rank structure - does it really take a LCol to manage a platoon Minus?

Then factor in the fact that the equipment one needs to be proficient with has increased exponentially in the past 50 years.

Honestly I think the Militia is it's biggest enemy -- if it wants to be a real part of the Army - it needs to do a lot of soul searching and figure out how it can restructure to make a reasonable contribution.

 

[FJAG]

Frankly the PRes has given the Regular Army good reason to discount it for a lot of things.
Vehicle VOR rates are generally insanely high in reserve units, and those aren't even A vehicles.
Utterly erratic attendance, questionable skill levels of senior personnel etc.
That isn't even digging into the fact there militia is nearly an inside down pyramid for rank structure - does it really take a LCol to manage a platoon Minus?

Then factor in the fact that the equipment one needs to be proficient with has increased exponentially in the past 50 years.

Honestly I think the Militia is it's biggest enemy -- if it wants to be a real part of the Army - it needs to do a lot of soul searching and figure out how it can restructure to make a reasonable contribution.

Kevin, Kevin, Kevin.

The PRes is what the CAF leadership makes it or let's it be.

Everything that is wrong with the PRes is fixable - IF - the CAF wants to fix it - and there is a lot that needs fixing. However, the PRes is exactly what the CAF wants, a cheap manpower pool to fluff out the Class B cubicles in Ottawa and, much to the Army's surprise, a worthwhile pool of augmentation manpower in times when rotations get heavy like in Afghanistan. It doesn't want more because to get more would take an effort and require transferring more resources from the day-to-day activities to the in-case-of-emergency-break-glass capabilities.

It was made abundantly clear to me when I provided advice to the Reserve Force Employment Project back in the early '00s that the CAF was then looking for a reserve employment structure that brought more reservists into the day-to-day activities of the CAF. (You might recall the 'limited liability reservist' v 'unlimited liability reservist' class fiasco)

The Navy was particulalry hot on this as the expected manning levels of the then fairly new MCDVs wasn't being met. In the halls of Ottawa, the Class B was becoming the darling reservist; Class A were tolerated as a source of Class Bs but otherwise considered useless; and the operational Class C hadn't quite become a major thing at that time. The headshed was aiming for a multipurpose reservist that would serve full-time, be posted, deployed etc as the CAF considered necessary during their contract term.

It's still a 'what have you done for me today?' relationship and not a 'what can you do for the country tomorrow?' one.

 

[Infanteer]

I love how this thread has turned from "Preserving Army Fleets" into "Preserving PRes"

 

[MilEME09]

I love how this thread has turned from "Preserving Army Fleets" into "Preserving PRes"

Yeah at this point it could be merged with the Pres thread. It started as what to do with vehicles, and while a logical progression, we all know the army isn't going to fix the PRes.

 

[FJAG]

I love how this thread has turned from "Preserving Army Fleets" into "Preserving PRes"

In fairness, it really started with a theme of Sharing Army Equipment with the Reserves which was then countered with Hoarding Preserving Army Fleets.

I'm not sure how you can separate the two topics. In any modern army, soldiers and their equipment (or lack of it) are interconnected.

But you're right; this thread may have run its course unless someone can come up with a viable way that we can equip and properly train both the RegF and the ResF from the limited stocks that we have.

 

[Kirkhill]

Nah! It's time to put a bow on it!

Monkeys and weasels still running.

 

[Underway]

I love how this thread has turned from "Preserving Army Fleets" into "Preserving PRes"

They always do. Wait out for the Army Organization discussion to rear its head.

I think that we to discuss Preserving Fleets in the current context of how the Army actually works not in a fantasy land of how it will never work.

The PRes as currently constructed can't use "Preserved Fleets" effectively. The question is can we mobilize industry as fast or faster than we can mobilize people. Because the only time we would ever need a preserved fleet is in case of mobilization. Given it takes 6 months to train a soldier will GDLS or the various other companies in Canada be able to build vehicles to equip the mobilized formations?

Or better yet will we be able to buy equipment from elsewhere and train upon them in time. The US has more equipment than it will ever use. Canada could easily just buy what it needs from US reserve stocks and quickly digest it into newly mobilized units.

In my mind, a Preserved Fleet is an exercise in keeping up with the Jones' instead of properly analyzing the Canadian Army reality and applying our own situation and circumstances.

---

The other argument against preserved fleets for PRes is this question. How many vehicles do we have surplus already in the CA? TAPV's, LAV's, G Wagons, MILCOTS etc... I suspect that there is some surplus. Can the PRes when mobilized just jump into those vehicles? I mean they aren't that big, their current role is to provide for specialized skill sets (mortar, heavy weapons, CIMIC,) in platoons or to fill out Ref F formations.

We might already have enough active vehicles to equip the extra pers the PRes would provide for their assigned tasks. How many PRes formations will be doing stuff that doesn't require more than a Milcot or GWagon? Base security? Light Infantry? LOC policing? Rear echelon engineering tasks like fixing bridges or removing UXO's, POW guards, and the plethora of other things that are required.

If the ball really goes up then there are a million civilian vehicles you can get that will be able to take a green paint job and a maple leaf on the side to do many of those tasks just fine.