Preserving Army Fleets

[Brad Sallows]

Sure, sorry. That second sentence is exactly the attitude that needs to stop. There is one Army. Full-Stop.

Is that also how the budgeting works now? One Army budget with no special containers for Res F acquisitions?

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Is that also how the budgeting works now? One Army budget with no special containers for Res F acquisitions?

God, I hope so.

 

[KevinB]

Is that also how the budgeting works now? One Army budget with no special containers for Res F acquisitions?

God, I hope so.

Until some good idea fairy in Parliament comes with an idea to buy something specific for the Reserves (usually from their riding).

 

[daftandbarmy]

Until some good idea fairy in Parliament comes with an idea to buy something specific for the Reserves (usually from their riding).

It's OK because the Reserves are usually used as an important part of the CAF's (personnel and equipment) recycling program

 

[SeaKingTacco]

I am not opposed to reserve forces getting hand-me downs. I am opposed to the two sides of the Army being treated as if they are foreign entities.

 

[KevinB]

I am not opposed to reserve forces getting hand-me downs. I am opposed to the two sides of the Army being treated as if they are foreign entities.

The issue is that the CA tends to hang on to stuff in the Reg Force so long that it has no life left by the time it is scheduled to be replaced. So there is nothing to hand me down.

A realistic equipment model for the CA currently would have capability X with a service life of 10 years, be replaced at the 5 year mark, send to refurb and then send to PRes, the PRes items in use would be then refurbished and put into long term war storage.

A better model would have hybrid units and a plan for mass mobilization, but that would require significant infrastructure upgrades and huge improvements to equipment acquisition.

 

[Kirkhill]

That's pure bullshit. Democratic society is governed by laws. Once a citizen joins the CAF he is subject to the provisions of the NDA. It is not conscription in that the individual has voluntarily placed himself subject to those laws until he is released.





I haven't seen an enrollment form for quite some time, but AFAIK, the fundamental provisions respecting the terms of service which govern the length of time that a regular or a reservist is engaged for are substantially the same.

Voluntary release is governed by regulations and policies. Note this NDA provision.


All RegF members are currently on Active Service due to an OiC. That also covers ResF members outside the country. An OiC can be issued by the government in a heart beat and has been for most operations. Note that the NDA technically keeps everyone subject to the NDA for their entire term of service. Voluntary releases prior to the expiration of that term are subject to regulations and policies. They too can be changed in a heart beat.

Your libertarian notions have little force unless a government, in times of crisis, can be easily cowed. If it can be it deserves to fall.

Did they have libertarians in Prussia? We never had Frederick the Great in Britain. The closest we got was a warty little farmer from Cambridge name of Cromwell.

Hobbes and Locke. Locke won. For a few centuries. Seems we may have to relearn some old lessons.

...

There is a reason why people are submitting annual budget authorizations for an army. It has been a requirement since 1689.

...

Canada's problem, one among many, is that Canada cheaped out as always.

Canada tried to create a Reserve force on the cheap from the Militia.

Reserves and the Militia have never been the same thing. The Militia was the precursor to the Army. The Reserves were the retired Army.
The Army, the Standing Army, which has to be authorized annually hired willing volunteers for the King's shilling. After termination of their active service those trained soldiers were held on standby, often with a stipend paid. The Reserves were cheaper than a Standing Force but still cost money. But they retained the value invested in them through training. It cost as much to produce a Reservist as it did an active soldier because the Reservist was an active soldier that was retained at notice to move.

The Militia was never that. The Militia was the citizenry. Some of the citizenry signed up as Volunteers, or Territorials or Home Guards or National Guards.

In the US the references are to the Army Reserve and National Guard. Two distinct bodies even if the National Guard has been co-opted by the Federal Army - still a point of tension with the States.

Canada decided that they were simply going to skip over the whole matter by declaring that its part-time volunteer Militia was its Primary Reserve. Hey presto and Canada has its own Reserve Force.

Indeed, it is a reserve force, in the sense that it a force held in reserve, but it is not a force of Reservists in the sense known to most NATO countries where Reservists are time expired trained troops. Those trained troops, in many cases, got their training involuntarily as conscripts.

....

There is a difference between a volunteer auxiliary of part timers and a body of recently released trained soldiers that can be recalled to the colours under the terms of the contract that they signed prior to receiving training.

The skills and motivations of the two bodies are entirely different. Expectations should not be the same. Both have their place. Both have their uses. But they are not the same.

 

[FJAG]

The historical development and varying structures as between reservists and militias are not relevant in any way shape or form to our current military structure. The Canadian military structure is statutory. It doesn't matter what Canada's military looked like under the Militia Act of 1855 or its various successors, nor does it matter if the Angolan reserve force is made up of retired regulars.

For Canada, there is only one statutory distinction between the regular force and the reserve force and it is that the former is made up of members enrolled for "continuing, full-time service" and the latter for "other than continuing, full-time" service. How those terms are interpreted and applied is a matter for lawful regulations and policies developed within DND including the creation of sub-categories of both regular force (if it wants to) and reserve force (which it has) service.

It's the current legal framework by the government and military leadership that matters and little else.

There are numerous models of how a person becomes a reservist; whether by merely being a citizen where everyone is subject to serve, or a voluntarily recruited individual, or a retired soldier subject to recall or many others. How a person becomes a reservist does not matter. What matters is how the country structures and utilizes its reserve force.

There are only two premier reserve force models.

The first is where a country places all of the operational equipment and resources with the standing army (regular force) and reservists (regardless of how they obtained that status) are called up to fill in vacancies, replace personnel loses and (perhaps) build into new units and formations as new equipment becomes available.

The second is where a country arms and organizes its regulars and reservists similarly so that reserve organizations can be called up directly. The only major difference between the two groups in peacetime is that one trains full-time and the other trains part-time.

Obviously there can be systems that employ both models to varying degrees. And obviously, either model can also have secondary tasks in service of the country other than war. It varies greatly.

With respect, your reaching into history, isn't relevant to how Canada defines, structures and utilizes the regular force and the reserve force. It might help explain how we might have gotten to the statutes, regulations and policies that are currently in effect but ultimately its not the history that governs, but the current legal structure and the current application of that structure.

 

[Kirkhill]

How we got here is dependent on the history of the rules that governed us.

If you want a notice to move ready reserve of trained soldiers you are going to have to pay for it.

And nobody, in government or uniform, has indicated by word or deed, over the last 40 years, any inclination to spend that money.

The government has been happy enough to pretend that its auxiliary corps of part time volunteers met the NATO requirements. Apparently the Generality has been willing to play along with that fiction.

It was better than taking money they didn't have from the proper soldiers of the real army.

....

Canada has never actually paid for a reserve. Its peak reserve was created from veterans of WW1 and WW2. Those people and their gear represented a sunk cost and a retained value. As they quit and died off they were never replaced.

The trickle of bodies coming through the peace time system couldn't sustain a useful reserve.

 

[Rifleman62]

Until some good idea fairy in Parliament comes with an idea to buy something specific for the Reserves (usually from their riding).

Even the manufactures advertising posters boosted the Bison was for the PRes.

The Bison is an armoured personnel carrier that has been in active service since 1990, built by Diesel Division General Motors Canada.

They were purchased and intended for operation by the Canadian Forces Primary Reserve, but were (very, very) rapidly appropriated by the Regular Force of Land Force Command, leaving the armoured Reserve units with unarmed Iltis jeeps

 

[daftandbarmy]

Even the manufactures advertising posters boosted the Bison was for the PRes.

The Bison is an armoured personnel carrier that has been in active service since 1990, built by Diesel Division General Motors Canada.

They were purchased and intended for operation by the Canadian Forces Primary Reserve, but were (very, very) rapidly appropriated by the Regular Force of Land Force Command, leaving the armoured Reserve units with unarmed Iltis jeeps

A wonderful example of our unofficial national defence motto: One CAF, two armies

 

[Brad Sallows]

They were purchased and intended for operation by the Canadian Forces Primary Reserve, but were (very, very) rapidly appropriated by the Regular Force of Land Force Command, leaving the armoured Reserve units with unarmed Iltis jeeps

Surely Bison was never intended for armoured units as a replacement for either Cougars or jeeps, but rather primarily to replace Grizzlies?

On the history of reserves/militia, there is a strongly relevant point: it still inflects what a lot of people think the reserve army ought to be.

 

[Kirkhill]

Surely Bison was never intended for armoured units as a replacement for either Cougars or jeeps, but rather primarily to replace Grizzlies?

On the history of reserves/militia, there is a strongly relevant point: it still inflects what a lot of people think the reserve army ought to be.

It should also be remembered that the Bison was only part of the "Reserve" fleet that was being proposed.

The other part was the Bv206 fleet, designated Northern Terrain Vehicles, that were to be built in Calgary by a Haegglunds Foremost JV.

BV-206 NTV PROJECT GETS PROD FROM ACTION-ORIENTED ALBERTA FIRM​

Lack of activity on Mobile Command's Northern Terrain Vehicle (NTV) acquisition programme has prompted Hagglunds Foremost Inc. of Calgary, Alberta to issue a discussion paper in the hope of generating political support for the project. In July 1988, DND approved an acquisition of 820 Swedish BV-206 northern terrain vehicles to be used for territorial defence tasks. The same fiberglass hulled, rubber tracked over-snow vehicles was successfully used by the Canadian Air Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade.

Hagglunds Foremost Inc. (HF) was formed in February 1989 as a joint venture between Hagglunds Vehicle AB of Sweden, manufacturer of the BV-206, and Canadian Foremost Ltd. of Calgary, Alberta to produce the vehicle in Canada. By early 1989, the firm had actually started converting Swedish technical drawings to Canadian standards and had sent out a number of information packages to potential subcontractors in expectation of a contract award by March 1990. Then came the April 1989 budget cuts. The NTV programme was reduced by half and delayed indefinitely. The company began to cut its staff. Since April the project has remained frozen. An increasingly uncertain HF is awaiting a contract to begin project definition and the NTV Project Management Office (PMO) is waiting for funding to proceed with a Canadianization study to determine which Canadian parts can be used with the BV-206. HF, on its own initiative, issued its paper.

According to Shari Pusch of Canadian Foremost Ltd., the discussion paper was prepared to update HF's internal management staff, its Board of Directors and any concerned subcontractors. The company also seeks political support. The document reminds its readers that the NTV meets Mobile Command's requirement for a vehicle which can traverse difficult terrain and that the BV-206's low ground pressure minimizes risk of damage to the fragile northern ecology. The paper stresses western industrial diversity for the benefit of any politicians who need to be reminded of this well known political and regional development imperative of the current government.

While the company is conducting its private sector briefings, the NTV PMO is in a continual briefing process of its own, keeping senior DND decision makers informed. An Interdepartmental Senior Review Board (ISRB) is scheduled for today, November 29, at which representatives from DND, DSS and regional development departments will be briefed on project status. There are bright spots to the otherwise irritating situation which are keeping HF guardedly optimistic. DND is experimenting with an air droppable BV prototype which shows promise. Discussions between Hagglunds AB and Canadian Foremost Ltd. may result in HF producing BV-206s in Calgary for the U.S. Army. At present the U.S. buys its BV-206s directly from Hagglunds AB in Sweden. Lastly, the HF paper argues that when an NTV contract is finally awarded, there will be a high degree of Canadian content involved. Svante Andersson, Hagglund's representative in Ottawa, states that as much as 60 percent of the NTV may be made up of Canadian parts.

The Wednesday Report - Issue - TWR48V3

TWR48V3 - Issue 48, Volume 3 - The Wednesday Report - Canada's Aerospace and Defence Weekly - TWR - Editor: Micheal John O'Brien Editorial and news on Canadian aerospace and defence, The Wednesday Report, TWR, Canada's Aerospace and Defence Weekly, MPRM Group Limited, Micheal John O'Brien...

www.thewednesdayreport.com

PS "The Wednesday Report" is full of old news that is new again.

199 Bisons - light armoured vehicles, highway speed, cross country mobility, amphibious
820 NTV Bv206s - unarmoured vehicle, all terrain, amphibious for off-road mobility.

Both were supposedly "simple" enough to operate and maintain that they were compatible with "reserve" force operations.

Both would have been highly effective in humanitarian aid and disaster relief scenarios as well as having military benefits.

 

[Kirkhill]

PS - the rest of the story on the Bison was that the USMC contract for the 8x8 LAV-25s had been fulfilled between 1983 and 1987. When the Challenge and Commitment White Paper was being written London was looking for a way to keep the production lines open and proposed the LAV-Log variant from the USMC contract as a cheap and cheerful option that might come in handy some day.

 

[KevinB]

It should also be remembered that the Bison was only part of the "Reserve" fleet that was being proposed.

The other part was the Bv206 fleet, designated Northern Terrain Vehicles, that were to be built in Calgary by a Haegglunds Foremost JV.
.

The BV206 were not simply for the Reserve though.


Frankly the 199 Bison purchase was an odd one, as while it was allegedly intended for the PRes, if one looked at the state of the AVGP and M113 fleets in the Reg force at that time, one has to wonder who thought that ‘Total Force’ was going to be served.

When we look at the 90’s

3VP was in Victoria with AVGP (but effectively a Light unit)
1VP was a AVGP unit in Calgary
2VP had come back to Kapyong Barracks in Winnipeg from German with AVGP
LdSH (RC) was in Calgary with Leo

1 RCR was in London as an AVGP unit
2 RCR was in Gagetown attached to 5CMB with AVGP and Lynx
3 RCR was in 4 CMBG Germany with M113
RCD (minus C Squadron) was in Petawawa with Cougars a

1 22eR was in 4 CMBG Germany with M113
2 22eR was in Valcartier with AVGP and Lynx
3 22eR was in Valcartier with AVGP and Lynx
12RBC was in Valcartier with Cougar and Lynx

The CAR was in Petawawa with Iltis
8CH(PL) was in 4 CMBG with Leo’s and Lynx
C Sqn RCD was in Germany as part of 1 Cdn Div forward.

1 RCHA was in 4 CMBG with M109
2 RCHA was in Petawawa with L5 and C1
3 RCHA was in Shilo with C1
5 RALC was in Valcartier with C1



The PRes was to be expanded to 90,000 personnel based on the 1987 White Paper that sort of drove the idea of the Bison, but when that started to fizzle, and the creation of 10/90 units, when combined with the AVGP fleet were really long in the tooth at that point.
It should not have been a surprise when the Bison were reallocated to the Regs.

 

[Kirkhill]

Some historical reading from The Wednesday Report.

The year before the Beatty White Paper - 1986

1986 YEAR IN REVIEW​

The protection of Canada and Canadian interests, in both their military and quasi-military dimensions, attracted renewed attention during 1986. Particularly noteworthy--since it appeared likely to portend themes in the forthcoming white paper--was a 17 October speech by Defence Minister Perrin Beatty. The minister reminded his Toronto audience that 'membership in NATO does not relieve Canada, or any other country, of the responsibility, within the alliance framework, to enhance its [own] security and defence' and warned that Canada's 'airspace, the ocean areas off our east, west and Arctic coasts, and the waterways between our Arctic islands are gaining increased strategic importance.'

Mr. Beatty observed that Canada 'could leave it to the Americans to take care of Soviet activities in all or in most of these areas,' but wondered if we could emerge 'with our sovereignty unimpaired' if 'we were to ask the Americans to take care of our security because we were either unwilling or unable to do so.' Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, warned the minister, 'cannot be complete if we remain dependent on allies for knowledge of possible hostile activities in our waters, under our ice, and for preventing such activities.' In particular, 'we need to consider how to remedy our present military incapacity to operate and to maintain surveillance under the Arctic ice. The three conventionally-powered submarines we have today cannot do the job. The Soviets and the Americans have nuclear-powered submarines which can cope with Arctic conditions, but we do not and must consider how best to deal with this problem.'

The minister stressed two further points. First, that 'Canadians tend to believe the ideas of sovereignty and security are not related 2 to each other. We see them as different problems requiring different solutions. However, we are reaching the point where, at least in our defence policy, the two ideas must be brought together. Increasingly, we can expect to be judged sovereign to the degree which, in the context of alliance and collective defence, we can contribute to our own national security.' And second, that: We need to give real substance to the guiding principle, asserted but little honoured by previous governments, that military activities undertaken in Canada for purposes of collective defence will be carried out, as much as possible, by the Canadian Forces. By accepting the responsibilities of a sovereign state for national and collective defence and by making sure that the Canadian Forces can effectively meet those responsibilities both at home and abroad...the government can best assure both the security and sovereignty of Canada. The Arctic, and Canadian sovereignty and security in the Arctic, also figured prominently in Independence and Internationalism, the final report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations. A concern that 'under present circumstances' Canada 'would have to call on U.S. submarines' if it 'wanted to take action against [northern] intruders for any reason' prompted committee members 'to inquire of witnesses what would happen if Canada were to acquire submarines able to operate under the ice.' The witnesses, said the final report, indicated 'that not only would this [acquisition] strengthen Canada's assertion of sovereignty in the region, but it would also put the U.S. Navy in a position where it would have to share knowledge with Canada of the movement of U.S. submarines in Canadian waters. The result could be enhanced naval cooperation of the United States with Canada.'

The Special Joint Committee noted that the Senate Committee on 3 National Defence had in 1983 (Canadian Annual Review, 1983) advocated the acquisition of a fleet of 'modern diesel-electric submarines, pointing to their great effectiveness as weapons in anti-submarine warfare. While the [Senate] report focused mainly on ice-free waters, it expressed the opinion that "adequate surveillance of the Northwest Passage could be provided, for the time being, by conventionally powered submarines stationed at the entry and the exit of the passage." The [Special Joint] committee recommends that the possibility of equipping the Canadian navy with diesel-electric submarines be reviewed in the context of a general examination of the country's naval forces and, more generally, of Canada's defence policy.'

The final report of the Special Joint Committee added that 'a number of factors must be considered carefully before a decision can be reached that Canada should acquire modern submarines. The cost of standard nuclear-powered submarines is very high. The committee was informed of developments in conventional [i.e. hybrid] propulsion systems that could permit non-nuclear-powered submarines to undertake extensive under-ice operations. Although these systems are considerably cheaper, they have not yet been proven. The cost of even conventional modern submarines would have to be assessed carefully, because, apart from acquisition costs, there are servicing, training, shore establishment and other program costs, all of which are expensive. Finally, if a decision to acquire modern submarines were to involve a transfer of some resources from Canadian forces in Europe, the government would have to take into account the reaction of Canada's NATO allies.' 4 Canada's International Relations, the Mulroney government's 4 December response to the report of the Special Joint Committee, posited that 'the changing nature of military activity in the Arctic and the reemergence of that region's strategic importance make it vital for Canada to acquire the "eyes and ears" that will permit us effectively to monitor northern aerospace, land, surface and subsurface waters for military activity.'

It added, without elaboration, that 'the government will pay particular attention to problems of underwater defence in the Arctic' and that 'options for acquiring submarines capable of under-ice operations to replace Canada's aging Oberon-class vessels are now...being explored.' Two days before the tabling of these rather cryptic comments on 'submarines capable of under-ice operations,' Associate Defence Paul Dick informed the Standing Committee on National Defence that in addition to the project management team working on the Canadian Submarine Acquisition Project--which envisaged acquisition of a fleet of conventionally-powered submarines--'there is an entirely different committee working within the Department considering nuclear submarines and that option. When both [groups] have completed their research, then they will come together for a comparison, and at that time a decision will be made on whether we should go with the conventional or whether we should really look more seriously at the nuclear.

It is premature [to speculate on the propulsion system]. They are just trying to get the information available and pulled together at this stage' (SCND, 2 December). In an 11 December appearance before the Standing Committee, Defence Minister Beatty acknowledged that "full" nuclear-powered submarines--as distinct from diesel-electric/nuclear 5 "hybrids"--were 'indeed expensive. There is no question about that. I guess, though, what we should be driven from is the question of our perception of the threat. What do we need adequately to protect Canada's security and Canada's sovereignty? We should work back from that.' Less spectacular initiatives related, in whole or in part, to the protection of Canadian sovereignty and security in the Arctic included an increase in the number of northern surveillance patrols conducted by CP-140 Aurora long-range patrol aircraft (from 16 in 1985 to 20 in 1986) and the navy's first venture into the far north in almost a decade, The epitome of multiple tasking, the northern surveillance patrols were designed to meet military, quasi-military, and even non-military (i.e. wildlife surveillance and ice reconnaissance) objectives. The enhanced naval presence involved the fleet diving support ship, HMCS Cormorant, and a naval research vessel, CFAV Quest.

During a mid-year deployment of approximately 60 days, the ships visited Clyde River, Nanisivik, Resolute Bay, and Pond Inlet and carried out acoustic research relevant to Arctic anti-submarine warfare. Both initiatives were foreshadowed by the government's 10 September 1985 declaration on sovereignty and security in the Arctic (Canadian Annual Review, 1985). The increased naval and air presence envisaged by the declaration of 10 September 1985, the forthcoming Canadianization of the northern radar network (see below, 'NORAD'), and the Mulroney government's obvious interest in nuclear-powered submarines did not, however, squelch complaints about the Arctic surveillance capabilities of the 6 Canadian Forces.

Two retired brigadier-generals, Clay Beattie and Keith Greenaway, for example, suggested that air defence and Canadian sovereignty would be better served by sitting the new North Warning System (NWS) farther north--around the periphery of the Arctic archipelago. Placing the NWS along the path of the existing DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line, they argued, would misuse modern technology, provide less warning time, and deprive Canada of indigenous surveillance coverage over disputed waters. A concomitant concern was the proposed use of American AWACS aircraft, with 'token' Canadian representation, in the Canadian high Arctic. This situation, said Beattie and Greenaway, 'is clearly prejudicial to Canada's claims to sovereignty' (Northern Perspectives, September-October 1986). Major-General R.W. Morton, however, argued that the NWS, as planned, would provide 'more than adequate time to carry out the attack warning and assessment function.' Moreover, 'while it can be argued that Canadian sovereignty would be better served by extending the coverage around the Arctic islands, the increased costs which would be incurred in an already expensive project designed first and foremost to do the attack warning mission could not be justified' (Canadian Defence Quarterly, Winter 1986-1987).

The heightened sensitivity to Arctic sovereignty and security was mirrored, albeit on a smaller scale, by increased attention to the sovereignty and security challenges off Canada's east and west coasts. At the root of the sovereignty problem, particularly on the east coast, was a rapid increase in the number of detected intrusions by unlicensed foreign fishing vessels. The Department of National Defence, in addition to its regularly scheduled support of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (i.e. 65 ship-days of surface surveillance and several thousand 7 hours of dedicated and multi-purpose air surveillance), provided special assistance to that department on two occasions during 1986. On 2 March, for example, the Tribal-class destroyer HMCS Algonquin assisted the fisheries patrol vessel, Cape Roger, in arresting the Panamanian-registered trawler, Peonia 7. In the most serious incident, in May, two Spanish trawlers--which had been stopped and boarded by personnel from the Cape Roger--fled for Spain via the Azores, with four fisheries protection officers still aboard. After a lengthy chase, the trawlers Amelia Meirama and Julio Molina were boarded in mid-Atlantic by an RCMP tactical squad operating from Canada's newest fisheries patrol vessel, the Leonard J. Cowley. Adding to the drama was a report from a Spanish marine radio station--which proved unfounded--that up to 50 Spanish trawlers 'planned to form a blockade just outside Canada's 200-mile economic zone to prevent the [Leonard J. Cowley] from escorting the two Spanish trawlers, arresting...for fishing violations, back to Canada for prosecution' (Globe and Mail, 27 May). Air surveillance during the incident was provided by CP-121 Tracker aircraft from Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Summerside, Prince Edward Island, and CP-140 Aurora aircraft from CFB Greenwood, Nova Scotia. Exasperated by the continuation of 'illegal foreign fishing within Canadian waters and over fishing by foreign fleets of "transboundary" stocks which straddle the 200-mile limit,' the secretary of state for external affairs, Joe Clark, and the minister of fisheries and oceans, Thomas Siddon, unveiled new fisheries protection measures on 13 June.

Among other changes, the ministers announced that Atlantic offshore patrol vessels would be armed--a project which ultimately saw the Canadian Forces provide both weapons (i.e. heavy machine guns) and 8 training for personnel from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)--and that DFO would 'explore' with the Department of National Defence and the Ministry of Transport 'means of increasing dedicated air and sea surveillance.' Somewhat paradoxically, given the proposed discussions with the Department of National Defence, the government also announced that civilian aircraft under contract to DFO would play an increased role in fisheries surveillance. Also apparent during 1986 was an increased naval sensitivity to maritime coastal defence (i.e. surface surveillance, shallow water anti-submarine warfare, and mine countermeasures). The renewed interest in maritime coastal defence--a role which had languished since the early to mid-1960s--was reflected in approval of a new role and mission statement for the Naval Reserve and in plans to create a new Maritime Coastal Defence Organization, which would be drawn largely from the Naval Reserve. Plans to re-equip the Naval Reserve with a new generation of minor war vessels, however, remained unfunded at the close of 1986. Also awaiting a decision was an update or replacement program for the venerable CP-121 Tracker, a medium-range patrol aircraft utilized for a wide variety of military, quasi-military, and non-military missions.

Equipment Programs​

The defence procurement agenda was dominated, as in 1985, by the Low Level Air Defence (LLAD) project, the Tribal-class Update and Modernization Project (TRUMP), the New Shipborne Aircraft (NSA) project, and the Canadian Submarine Acquisition Project (CASAP). The LLAD and TRUMP projects, together worth in excess of $2.2 billion, received final government approval and formal contract award during 1986, while the CASAP and NSA projects, together worth a minimum of $4 billion (and potentially much more) received approval to enter the project definition phase. A new and controversial player on the defence procurement stage during 1986 was the CF-18 Systems Engineering Support (SES) program. Also putting in an appearance, and temporarily running in parallel to the original Canadian Submarine Acquisition Project, was an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of acquiring a fleet of nuclear-propelled attack submarines (SSNs).

Initiated in 1982, the $1 billion LLAD project sought to provide a comprehensive, all-weather air defence system for the Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (4 CMBG) stationed in southern Germany, the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group stationed in Canada but earmarked for the defence of northern Norway, and the Lahr and Baden-Soellingen airfields of the Germany-based 1 Canadian Air Group. The missile, gun and radar systems making up the LLAD package would replace the geriatric Boffin anti-aircraft gun and the aging, shoulder-launched Blowpipe surface-to-air missile.

The LLAD project, which touched off a heated international competition, had drawn bids in 1984 from seven would-be suppliers, all of them European-based (Canadian Annual Review, 1985). Three of these firms, and their respective Canadian 2M partners, were in turn short listed by the Mulroney government on 8 May 1985: Bofors (Sweden) and Canadian Marconi Company (offering the Trinity gun system and the RBS 70 ARMAD missile system); Contraves (Switzerland) and Raytheon Canada Limited (bidding the GDF-005 anti-aircraft gun, the RIM-7M Sparrow missile system, and the ATAK 35 anti-aircraft tank); and Oerlikon-Buhrle (Switzerland) and Litton Systems Canada Limited (offering the ADATS missile system and the GDF-005 anti-aircraft gun). On 16 April 1986, the associate minister of national defence, Harvie Andre, announced that the team led by Oerlikon-Buhrle had won the LLAD competition. The main contract, finalized on 12 June, was valued at $650 million and covered the purchase of 36 M113A2-mounted ADATS 'fire units,' 20 GDF-005 35mm anti-aircraft guns, and 10 Skyguard fire control radars. An additional $350 million was allocated for ammunition, spare parts, trucks, training and maintenance facilities, and sundry other expenditures.

The associate minister and project officials indicated that the most significant factors in the selection of the Oerlikon Buhrle bid were the resistance to countermeasures and the degree of survivability bestowed by ADATS' passive electro-optical target tracking and laser beam-rider guidance. The Swiss firm's bid also included a highly rated industrial benefits package for Canadian industry. Initial deliveries of LLAD equipment, to the newly-established Air Defence Artillery School at CFB Chatham, New Brunswick, were scheduled to begin in 1988. The last of the four frontline LLAD units (one in Canada, three in Germany) was expected to be fully operational with the new equipment by the spring of 1991. 3M The recipient of final approval on 9 May, the Tribal-class Update and Modernization Project sought to convert the four existing Tribal-class destroyers (Algonquin, Athabaskan, Huron, and Iroquois) from a primary anti-submarine warfare (ASW) role to a primary anti-air warfare (AAW) role. In addition to providing the Canadian fleet with a much-needed area air defence capability--and a reduced dependence on allied navies--TRUMP would improve the Tribals' ability to support an embarked commander and update or replace systems which were no longer logistically supportable.

Serving as prime contractor on the $1.2 billion undertaking--the most ambitious Canadian warship conversion project in more than two decades--was Litton Systems Canada Limited of Toronto. At the core of the update package were two state-of-the-art, American-designed products--the General Dynamics Standard 2 surface-to-air missile and the Martin Marietta Mk 41 vertical launch system. The much-modified destroyers also were to receive new long-range, medium-range, and fire control radars; a Phalanx close-in weapon system, and an OTO-Melara 76mm Super Rapid gun. In addition to a new command, control, and communications system, the rejuvenated Tribal-class destroyers were also stated to receive strengthened hulls, a water-compensated fuel system, and habitability improvements. So-called 'stand-alone' improvements, which were to be funded separately but carried out concurrently, included new cruise engines and a new electronic support measures system. The Tribal conversions were to retain their 4 existing ASW sonars and their distinctively large flight decks and hangars. Work on the first ship, HMCS Algonquin, was expected to begin in November of 1987, with completion in the fall of 1989. The last of the four, HMCS Huron, was to begin conversion in November 1990, with completion in the summer of 1992. These dates represented a slippage of one year from the original TRUMP timetable (Canadian Annual Review, 1985). Also modified was the Trudeau government's 1983 decision to pre-designate Versatile Davie Inc., of Lauzon, Quebec, for the shiypard portion of the TRUMP program. Under the revised plan, Versatile Davie would convert the first two ships, with Litton Systems holding a separate competition to select the shipyard for the third and fourth conversions. The decision of the Mulroney government to proceed, simultaneously, with both the LLAD and TRUMP projects--at a time when the capital portion of the DND budget was under considerable pressure--evoked surprise in some quarters. Indeed, it appeared for a time in early 1986 that the LLAD project, in particular, might be deferred or even dropped. There was also concern in some quarters that TRUMP might have to be scaled back, possibly by converting less than four ships or by adopting a less expensive update package (i.e. the older Standard 1 missile and Mk 13 launcher) for all four ships (Aerospace Canada International, July-August 1986).

While there was ultimately some slippage in the TRUMP timetable (in part the result of squabbling over the shipyard portion of the contract) and, by comparison with Litton's 1985 'baseline' configuration, a very slight reduction in the scope of the TRUMP update (i.e. the decision to update the ships' existing torpedo handling equipment rather than install an entirely new system), the Mulroney government adopted the 'baseline' configuration essentially unchanged. Although, at $1.2 billion, considerably more expensive than the government's preliminary 1983 'design-to-cost' estimate of $650 million (in 1983-1984 dollars), the navy's need for an area air defence capability was judged sufficiently pressing to justify additional expenditures. In the case of LLAD, the decision to forego deferment or cancellation was rooted in the operational need for a new air defence capability in Europe, fear of an adverse reaction from NATO, and the prospect of substantial industrial benefits from the ADATS system. As the newest of the LLAD contenders, the ADATS system was felt to hold considerable export potential. The search for a successor to the venerable Sikorsky CH-124A Sea King ASW helicopter entered a new phase on 5 August with the announcement of government approval for the project definition phase of the New Shipborne Aircraft (NSA) project.

The NSA would be capable of performing two primary missions--anti-submarine warfare and anti-ship surveillance and targeting--and such secondary naval missions as search and rescue, vertical replenishment, and medical evacuation. At an estimated cost of $2 billion, the NSA promised, by a substantial margin, to be the largest and most complex helicopter procurement program in Canadian military history. Released on 12 September, the NSA 'request for proposals' asked would-be suppliers to provide bids on lots of 28, 40, and 51 aircraft, a request which reflected uncertainty over warship procurement beyond the first six City-class patrol frigates (Canadian Annual Review, 1985) and over the requirements of the Pacific fleet, the number of attrition replacements, and the reliability and 6 maintainability of the various contenders. The NSA schedule anticipated contract award by late 1989, first flight in 1992, and initial deliveries in 1994. The competition was expected to draw variants of the Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk (United States), the EH Industries EH 101 (United Kingdom/Italy), and the Aerospatiale Super Puma (France). All were expected to utilize a Canadian-designed mission avionics suite. Still more helicopters of the basic NSA-type would be required if the machine also proved suitable for battlefield airlift and 'primary' search and rescue requirements. Also moving forward, but facing something of an uncertain future, was the Canadian Submarine Acquisition Project (CASAP). Under this project, which received government approval for its project definition phase on 16 July, the Department of National Defence sought 'a minimum of four new conventional submarines to replace its current fleet and restore a minimum submarine capability on the West Coast.'

Although the existing fleet of three British-built Oberon-class submarines had been partially modernized under the Submarine Operational Update Project, they suffered from the performance limitations inherent to diesel-electric submarines of their generation, were increasingly difficult to maintain, and--given the need to recharge their batteries by surfacing or 'snorkeling'--unable to operate under ice. The 1986 CASAP schedule envisaged the selection of two finalists for funded project definition studies by early 1988, the selection of the winner by late 1989, and the formal contract award by early 1990. The first boat would enter Canadian service in 1995 (the 1985 schedule had anticipated service entry in 1992-1993), with the remainder following in 1997, 1998, and 1999. As the United States had long since eschewed the production of conventionally-powered submarines, CASAP was expected to draw a lengthy list of bidders from France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. In addition to the basic requirement for four submarines, would-be bidders on CASAP were being invited to quote price and availability on increments of two, four, and eight additional boats.

Moreover, as Defence Minister Beatty noted in an 11 December appearance before the Standing Committee on National Defence, 'we [have] invited potential suppliers to indicate to us whether or not the submarines they are offering would have under-ice capability.' The latter would necessitate adding some form of air-independent propulsion (AIP) system to the standard diesel-electric submarine, thereby producing an AIP/diesel-electric 'hybrid.' Among the potential options were the Swedish Stirling engine, the German fuel cell system, and two Canadian-designed systems--the Autonomous Marine Power Source-Nuclear (AMPS-N) from Ottawa-based Energy Conversion Systems Inc. and the so-called 'nuclear battery' from Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. The European systems required on-board storage of such difficult-to-handle fuels as liquid oxygen or liquid oxygen and hydrogen. Endurance, although a substantial improvement over that offered by 'standard' diesel-electric submarines, was consequently a function of the hybrid submarine's storage capacity. The AMPS-N, a relative of Atomic Energy of Canada's highly successful Slowpoke research reactor, and the nuclear battery, however, were expected to offer virtually unlimited endurance at low to moderate speeds. Naval opinion on the viability of the hybrid option appeared mixed. A serving naval officer, Commander E.J.M. Young, for example, wrote 8 that 'the cost of a production version [of an AMPS-N hybrid submarine] is estimated to be less than an additional 10% on the acquisition cost of a conventional submarine, or about 5 to 6% in terms of program costs of the vessel.' Moreover, 'because the design of the reactor system is relatively simple and safe, the required shore support facilities would be much less extensive and simpler than those required for the SSN type submarine. Costs of such support should be of the same order as the additional ones for the system itself.

Thus for a very reasonable additional expenditure Canada could obtain a viable under ice capability in addition to a marked tactical advance in other areas of interest. While such submarines could conceivably conduct polar operations, at the very least we would have the ability to operate in the seasonal ice-covered waters of our Arctic. If Canada took this step the potential for export sales would be very great; the "hybrid" could revolutionize conventional submarine concepts' (Canadian Defence Quarterly, Summer 1986). Later in the year, however, CASAP officials indicated to the Financial Post that 'none of the air-independent propulsion systems are available right now, and it is not clear whether they could be added on to existing submarine designs later. It would therefore be risky to run the submarine project on the assumption that such a system will become available, and DND is not interested in undertaking a high-risk development project' (Financial Post, 1 December). On a parallel track to CASAP was the study group established to examine the feasibility of acquiring up to twelve fully nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). Headed by the chief of maritime doctrine and operations, Rear-Admiral C.M. Thomas, the study group was investigating the cost, infrastructure requirements, and legal ramifications of a 9M Canadian SSN fleet (Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 December). Although running in parallel with the initial project definition phase of CASAP, it was apparent that any governmental decision to procure SSNs would mean the elimination of CASAP, at least in its diesel-electric or AIP/diesel-electric hybrid form. The first serious Canadian consideration of nuclear-powered attack submarines in almost three decades, the study was focusing on two designs: the French Rubis/Amethyste-class and the British Trafalgar-class. Both types were in full-scale production for their respective navies. American SSNs were deemed far too large and expensive to warrant serious Canadian consideration.

The decision to study the SSN option--which could apparently be traced to late 1985 and then-Defence Minister Erik Nielsen--was in part rooted in the government's concerns over sovereignty and security in the Arctic, but it also appeared to reflect the realization that nuclear-powered submarines could be relevant to national and Alliance commitments in the Atlantic and the Pacific and the discovery that the 'sail-away' cost of the British and, in particular, the French built SSNs compared favourably with the cost of modern patrol frigates and destroyers. An additional factor was concern over the unproven nature of the proffered AIP systems and the calculation that even the most advanced hybrid submarine could not match the speed or other operational attributes of the SSN. A powerful reminder of the intense emotions that can be fuelled by the awarding--or the failure to award--defence contracts surfaced in October with the Mulroney government's decision to award the potentially lucrative Systems Engineering Support (SES) contract for the McDonnell 10M Douglas CF-18 Hornet fighter aircraft to Montreal-based Canadair. Canadair prevailed over Bristol Aerospace of Winnipeg, even though the Bristol bid had been judged--by government experts--to be somewhat superior on cost and technical grounds. The Mulroney government declined this advice, however, on the basis that Canadair, unlike Bristol, was also an aircraft manufacturer, and thus in a position to better utilize the technology transfers which would accompany the CF-18 SES (i.e. maintenance) program. Late in the year there were indications that Bristol, which had long provided repair and overhaul services for Canadian fighter aircraft, would receive a less technically attractive, and shorter duration, contract to update 56 aging CF-5 fighter aircraft as fighter-trainers. The affair outraged Manitoba premier Howard Pawley, who described the pending CF-5 contract as 'a consolation prize' that would not satisfy Manitoba residents who believed that Bristol deserved the CF-18 SES contract (Globe and Mail, 23 December). Adding insult to injury for Manitobans was the fact that the CF-5s had been manufactured by Canadair. The federal government's practice of pursuing industrial benefits (i.e. the production of components, regional distribution of procurement, small business participation, technology transfer, and new investment in Canada) was the subject of a lengthy examination by the Nielsen Task Force on Program Review.

The study team charged with an examination of defence and other high-technology procurement by the federal government found that: --the government's expectations of securing 100 per cent offsets of equal technology to the equipment being procured have been unrealistic. Benefits acquired have been much lower than expected and have mostly been of short-term value to Canada. Costs of achieving industrial benefits have not been easily ascertained and have been substantial; 11 --while some benefits of lasting value to Canada have resulted, these have not been as significant to Canadian industrial development as had been anticipated; --the growing deficit in U.S.-Canadian defence trade is a major concern and will persist with the increase in the number of planned [Major Crown Projects]. A relative decline in the technology base of Canadian industry is a key factor in the increasing deficit; --the emphasis on offsets in Canada's industrial benefits programming has become a trade irritant with the United States and Europe while producing marginal long-term benefits to Canada; and that --there are linkages among these factors which point the way to changes which will produce greater net benefits to Canada, while reducing irritants and costs.

The study team came to the conclusion that a need 'exists for a much clearer purpose in the direction given by Ministers for industrial benefit strategies for major Crown projects'; that 'the procurement lever has not effected the anticipated broad range of industrial benefits'; and that 'a new strategy is needed if Canada is to be successful in using procurement as a lever to generate long-term benefits.' That strategy 'must be sharply focused on improving the competitiveness of Canadian-based industry in world markets. It must result in the advancement of technology, greater investment in Canadian industry, and improved access to domestic and foreign markets. A major element of the strategy should be to preposition Canadian industry for procurement to the maximum when domestic and associated export opportunities are attractive.' The study team recommended to the Task Force that the government consider developing an industrial benefits policy for federal procurement that would 'enhance the international competitiveness of Canadian industry, by establishing long-term industrial and regional development as the primary national objective for major procurements' and 'take into account the potential for Canadian industry to participate in the servicing of major equipment purchases during their operational life.' end equipment section

MILITARY AND SECURITY ISSUES​

Unlike 1985, which had seen major controversies erupt over the North American Air Defence Modernization (NAADM) agreement, the American invitation to participate in the SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) research program, and the voyage of the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea through the Northwest Passage, 1986 was a relatively quiescent--and therefore more typical--year on the Canadian defence policy front. The year was not devoid of controversy, however.

NOTICED IN 1986​

Also serving to draw attention to defence or defence-related matters during 1986 were the findings of the Nielsen Task Force on Program Review, a number of reports and studies generated by the 1982 sinking, off Newfoundland, of the semi-submersible drilling rig OCEAN RANGER, and the Mulroney government's decision to assign responsibility for Canada's anti-terrorist Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) rather than the Canadian Armed Forces.

The year also witnessed the deployment of the Canadian contingent assigned to the MFO (Multinational Force and Observers) peacekeeping operation in the Sinai. Established in September 1984 under the chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister Erik Nielsen, the Task Force on Program Review had two major objectives: better service to the public and improved management of government programs. Charged with the onerous task of reviewing 989 federal programs and services, the Nielsen Task Force consisted of 19 study teams comprised of public service and private sector executives.

On March 11, 1986, the Task Force--which had in fact completed most of its work during the course of 1985--released its 2 21-volume final report grouped under four major themes: management of government; services to the public; improved program delivery; and economic growth. Mr. Nielsen emphasized that the options and proposals outlined in the reports would be studied by the federal government and Parliamentarians, and would not necessarily become government policy (Hansard, 11 March). Several of the volumes touched on defence or defence-related matters. The study team charged with an examination of real property, for example, concluded that the Department of National Defence (DND) 'has too much infrastructure, and this oversupply is causing wasteful expenditure and manpower utilization.' The study team noted that 'if military requirements were the only criterion, DND internal documents indicate that the number of [military] bases in Canada could be reduced by at least seven from the 33 which currently exist.' The report attributed the oversupply to changing military requirements, 'slow adjustment by DND to changing urban/community conditions,' 'lack of a powerful challenge function outside DND in central agencies,' and, in particular, to 'powerful local socio-economic pressures, which hitherto have led government to direct that installation which DND wishes to close should remain in operation.'

The study team added that 'mobilization contingencies' were also used 'to justify the retention by DND of redundant infrastructure.' In the view of the study team, 'prolonging indefinitely the life of defence installations with no essential military function is not the way to encourage the social and economic evolution of host communities; the costs to all outweigh the benefits.' Its report also asserted that 'an alternative approach to accommodation for mobilization which would entail a combination of prefabricated building, canvas and designated 3 civilian buildings would appear to offer a much more cost effective yet practical solution than maintaining redundant facilities.' The study team therefore recommended to the task force that 'the government should consider asking DND to develop medium (one to five years) and long range (five to ten years) infrastructure proposals. The rationalization plan should include provision for cooperative planning with provinces and local communities for the socio-economic adjustments which would have to be made.'

PROCUREMENT​

Insofar as search and rescue (SAR) was concerned, the Nielsen study team concluded that 'the assignment of responsibilities for SAR to [the Canadian Coast Guard] in the marine mode and to [the Department of National Defence] in the air mode and in coordination of search activities causes some problems. It is not clear, however, that any other assignment of responsibilities would be superior or decrease the number or severity of problems.

Segregation of the SAR budgets in the two main departments would lead to a better understanding of the costs involved but operationally the [search and rescue] program works.' The study team did not, however, that: Rescue Coordination Centres can make better use of non Coast Guard resources (e.g. municipal or provincial police forces). In addition, it might prove effective to utilize private helicopters and vessels in marine search if not in rescue. This may necessitate the federal government providing SAR kits for helicopters and ships, and entering into contracts on a contingency basis. Moreover, in reequipping [the Coast Guard's] helicopter fleet, the Department [of Transport] should consider the merits of taking into consideration SAR as a secondary mission for establishing the operational requirements of the aircraft. Search and rescue--the largest, most expensive and most important of the myriad 'national development' roles performed by Canada's armed forces--also figured in a report on military air transport prepared by the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence. Tabled in February, the Senate report recommended that the long-serving de Havilland CC-115 Buffalo search and rescue aircraft employed by the Halifax, Trenton and Victoria SAR regions by phased out by 1992 and their tasks assigned to an augmented fleet of Lockheed CC-130 Hercules aircraft.

The Senate committee also recommended that the de Havilland CC-138 Twin Otters utilized by the Edmonton SAR region be replaced by six de Havilland Dash 8s by 1992, and that the Boeing-Vertol CH-113/CH-113A Labradors (Canadian Annual Review, 1985) be succeeded by 20 new helicopters by the mid-1990s. The committee did not endorse a specific type of helicopter, but it did take note of the advantages inherent in commonality with other military procurement programs (for example, the eventual successor to the Sikorsky CH-124A Sea King anti-submarine warfare helicopter). next--ocean ranger and responses 5 On 10 March, Perrin Beatty, then the solicitor general, announced that responsibility for Canada's long-mooted Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) would be vested in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. An integral part of Canada's counter-terrorism program, the team would be employed 'in those rare cases where all efforts to negotiate a peaceful end to a hostage seizure have failed and where the hostages are in immediate danger, [and] the authorities have no choice but rescue by armed assault.' The 49-person team, unlike existing RCMP response units, would be held 'in a constant state of readiness and training.'

The Special Emergency Response Team would be based in the Ottawa area and make use, as required, of military air transport. Although the rise in international terrorism ensured a generally positive response to the creation of such a unit, Ottawa's decision to make it part of the RCMP, rather than the armed forces, drew criticism from John Starnes, a former head of the RCMP's security and intelligence section, Professor Leslie Green, a University of Alberta specialist on terrorism, Jean-Jacques Blais, a former solicitor general and minister of national defence, and Robert Kaplan, also a former solicitor general. In Mr. Starnes' view, 'the raison d'etre of a soldier, his experience and training seem naturally to fit the anti-terrorist role. The idea of assigning to a law enforcement officer a task which is essentially military in nature leaves me a bit uneasy' (Toronto Star, 11 March).

In response to such criticism, the deputy solicitor general, Fred E. Gibson, told an April 1986 conference of the Toronto-based Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS) that he should make clear the government's position that terrorist acts, however political in their ultimate objective, inevitably involve criminal offences which in our system of government fall within the purview of the civil law enforcement authority. On this basis, we view this [counter terrorism] role as a logical and legitimate expression of the RCMP's law enforcement responsibility, consistent with the force's national obligations for the investigation of security offences as set out in the [Canadian Security Intelligence Service] Act. Furthermore, this arrangement ensures that those required to carry out counter-terrorist assaults will be subject in all respects to the authorities, and to the ACCOUNTABILITY, imposed on peace officers, by virtue of the Criminal Code of Canada.

PEACEKEEPING​

The major development on the peacekeeping front involved the dispatch of the Canadian contingent--136 military personnel and nine CH-135 Twin Huey helicopters--assigned to the MFO (Multinational Force and Observers) peacekeeping operation in the Middle East. Deployed to El Gorah in the northern Sinai Peninsula during March, the Canadians assumed responsibility for the MFO's Rotary Wing Aviation Unit (RWAU). Previously provided by Australia and New Zealand, the RWAU was responsible for the transportation of MFO observers on their verification tasks, the insertion and extraction of temporary observation posts, logistical support, medical evacuation, and MFO-related search and rescue.

The decision to join the MFO followed requests from the governments of Egypt and Israel (Canadian Annual Review, 1985). Canada's first venture into non-UN peacekeeping in the region, the MFO commitment required approximately 25 per cent of the country's tactical transport helicopter assets. Although few of the submissions to the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations dealt specifically with peacekeeping, the committee found most witnesses of the opinion that peacekeeping was 'an appropriate and constructive way for Canada to contribute to maintaining peace in the world.'

The committee advanced four peacekeeping-related conclusions and recommendations: that a continuing Canadian contribution to the United Nations Force in Cyrpus (UNFICYP) helps to prevent fighting on the island and maintain stability on NATO's southern flank; that Ottawa 'consider making significantly greater use of the reserve forces for peacekeeping'; that Canada 'continue to make its peacekeeping expertise available to the armed forces of other countries'; and that the 'best approach to invitations to become involved in peacekeeping operations is for Canada to apply its criteria on a case-by-case basis, while maintaining its preference for operations under United Nations auspices.' The government's December 1986 response indicated that it would 'remain alert to possibilities to act constructively in [the peacekeeping] role, wherever they may arise in the world and whenever resources allow if Canadian interests would thus be served, and a Canadian presence would be acceptable.'

The response also expressed support for the recommendations of the Special Joint Committee. of one [issue] should be conditional upon the resolution of the other." In his September 27 address to the General Assembly, the Secretary of State for External Affairs added that "South Africa's precondition to implementation, the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, cannot legitimize its illegal occupation of Namibia. The question of principle is clear. Namibia should have its independence regardless of what happens or does not happen in Angola." In June, both the Secretary of State for External Affairs and Canada's ambassador to the United Nations expressed frustration over the seemingly irreconcilable situation in Cyprus. Mr. MacEachen reportedly warned the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, that Canada might withdraw its troops from the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus (International Canada, June-July 1983). Mr. Pelletier told the Security Council on 15 June that "the two communities of Cyprus and others involved in the dispute have displayed a regrettable lack of will to make the necessary difficult compromises required for a successful political solution" (International Canada, June-July 1983). In general, however, Canadian support for peacekeeping remained firm.

The December Speech from the Throne indicated that "renewed attention" would be given "to the contribution Canada can make to peace and stability through peacekeeping operations under the control of the United Nations." On December 28, the United States officially informed the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) that it would be withdrawing from the agency effective January 1985. The United States would, however, retain the right to rejoin at a future date should UNESCO correct a number of highly objectionable ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT Canadian arms control policy was studied, explored and promoted in an unusually diverse range of for a in 1983.

The new-found prominence was not surprising for, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs noted in his September 27 address to the General Assembly, "questions of disarmament and arms limitation have become the central preoccupation of our time." In his address Mr. MacEachen expressed "regret that a working group on arms control and outer space was not established this year by the Committee on Disarmament." He reiterated Prime Minister Trudeau's warning to the UN Second Special Session on Disarmament that "we cannot wait much longer if we are to be successful in foreclosing the prospect of space wars."

The Secretary of State stressed the urgency of the issue and pressed for the timely creation of a working group. Canada was "prepared to cooperate fully in the detailed examination of the issues" and continue "its research program on both the legal and technical issues." Mr. MacEachen also stressed the "absolute necessity of verification if we are going to make real progress in international disarmament and arms control negotiations." He noted that Canada had "attached special importance to the development of international verification mechanisms" and [had] "assigned a high priority to research in this area." Canada hoped to "make a real contribution to the Committee's effectiveness" through increased research into the technical and practical aspects of verification.
Complete Issue

Canadian Foreign Affairs History - 1986 TWR

The Wednesday Report - Canada's Aerospace and Defence Weekly - TWR - Editor: Micheal John O'Brien History, The Wednesday Report, TWR, Canada's Aerospace & Defence Weekly, Defense History, MPRM Group Limited, Micheal John O'Brien, Maclean Hunter, TWR1V9.

thewednesdayreport.com

 

[Kirkhill]

1987 - The Year of the Beatty paper

1 Heavy Division for Germany (4 CMBG reinforced by 5 CMBG with 1 CMBG held in reserve in Canada) - Prepositioned kit and 200 to 300 new tanks

1 Continental Task Force (1 Abn Battle Group (Regimental) and 1 Light, Air-Transportable Brigade Group supplemented by a much expanded Militia)

1 Vital Point Guard Force found from the Militia - lightly armed.

Militia to expand from 21,000 to 65,000 (IIRC that was exclusive of the Vital Point Guards but I could be wrong on that)

Germany would also benefit from 5 CF-18 squadrons formed as an Air Division, 3 based in Germany, 2 based in Bagotville and Cold Lake.

Navy looking at 6 CPFs, the Kingstons, 6 or so SURTASS ships and 12 SSNs (or SSns if equipped with the Canadian Slowpoke Reactors).

1987 Year In Review​

It was a remarkable year. On the domestic front, 1987 brought a relatively new white paper on defence (the first in nearly a generation), a lively debate on the perceived advantages and disadvantages of nuclear-powered attack submarines, a long-awaited order for six follow-on frigates (all from the same shipyard!), a significant upgrading of Canada's Pacific fleet (the first in nearly two decades), a significant upgrading of the northern radar network (the first in nearly three decades), and a host of smaller procurement and re-organization initiatives The year also brought renewed attention to the long-dormant subject of defence industrial preparedness.

For Canada's defence industry, 1987 was dominated by on-going activity on a host of pre-white paper procurement programs (covering everything from small arms to patrol frigates), by initial examination of the short and long-term opportunities (challenges?) offered by the white paper, and by a series of pivotal export contracts. Numbered among the latter were the French and West German orders for $410-million-worth of CL-289 unmanned airborne surveillance systems from Canadair, a British order for 242 Advanced Integrated MAD (Magnetic Anomaly Detection) systems from CAE Electronics, and last, but certainly not least, the Canadian share of the U.S. Army's potentially massive order for the Oerlikon-Buhrle/Martin Marietta ADATS air defence system. Among the Canadian beneficiaries of ADATS' victory in the hard-fought FAAD LOS-F-H competition were Oerlikon Aerospace, Litton Systems Canada Limited, and Spar Aerospace.

On the international front, the gradual warming trend in East-West relations was reflected in the December summit between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. A media event enveloped in an air of near-euphoria, the Washington summit's almost immediate claim to fame was the signing of the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) agreement, but it also appeared to pave the way for a possible START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) treaty in the first half of 1988. the START talks hold the key to a potential 50 percent reduction in strategic missile inventories.

Itself a significant and encouraging -- but no means risk-free -- development in arms control diplomacy, the INF treaty would eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons, including the American Pershing 2 ballistic missile and the BGM-109G ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), and the Soviet SS-20 ballistic missile. Virtually certain of ratification by the U.S. Senate, the INF treaty will require rigorous -- indeed, unparalleled -- verification procedures. It would also seem to necessitate, as former NATO commander-in-chief Bernard W. Rogers has warned, increased attention to NATO's conventional deterrent.

Rendered even more timely by the INF treaty, the June 5 white paper re-affirmed the Mulroney government's staunch support of collective defence, and unveiled a 15-year game plan for bridging the gap between Canada's declared defence commitments and actual military capabilities. Integral to its vision of a more credible Canadian defence posture were the re-alignment and consolidation of existing NATO commitments, a renewed interest in home defence, a 'vigorous' naval modernization program and a sweeping re-organization of the Canadian army. The new policy document also outlined a long-term plan to increase the strength of the Primary Reserve from 21,000 to 65,000. The revitalization of the reserves would include the introduction of a genuine Total Force concept and a reduced distinction between the Regular and Reserve forces.

Dominating much of the white paper -- and most of the discussion and debate it stirred up -- were the government's proposals for the reshaping of the Canadian navy. In place of the existing fleet, which could charitably be described as geriatric, unbalanced and virtually irrelevant to sovereignty and security in the far north, the white paper envisaged a balanced, multi-role fleet capable of operating on all three coasts. In addition to the six City-class patrol frigates and four Tribal-class destroyers already under construction or conversion, the white paper announced plans for 10 to 12 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN's), six follow-on patrol frigates, several sonar array towing vessels (similar in concept to the U.S. Navy's SURTASS operation), and 30 or more minor war vessels. Intended primarily for a revitalized and retasked Naval Reserve, the war vessels would be utilized for mine counter-measures, coastal patrol, training, and other sundry tasks. The white paper also proposed a fixed, under-ice surveillance system for the Arctic. Cancelled to make way for this ambitious shopping list were the eight (rather ill-defined) frigates originally projected under phase three of the Ship Replacement Program (SRP III) and the four to twelve, conventionally-powered submarines (SSK's) that made up the original Canadian Submarine Acquisition Project (CASAP).

Far les spectacular in the eyes of the media and the public, but in many ways more complex, were the plans for the restructuring and expansion of Canada's land forces. Pivotal to these plans was the government's decision to shift the focus of the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group from northern Norway to southern Germany. Although the CAST Brigade Group (i.e. 5e Groupe-brigade du Canada) would continue to be based in Canada, it would deploy, in time of crisis, to the Central Front. The result would be a two-brigade Division built around 4 Canadian Mechanized Group (4CMBG) -- the formation stationed year-round in Germany -- and 5e Groupe-brigade du Canada (5 GBC). Concomitant steps outlined by the white paper included the pre-positioning in Germany "of a large part" of the CAST Brigade Group's equipment, and the permanent deployment in Germany of selected Divisional elements (i.e. part of the headquarters) and larger logistics and medical support cadres. In addition, the relatively 'light' 5 GBC would be re-equipped with main battle tanks and other equipment as was necessary for the Central Front. Another Canada-based brigade group, the even more lightly equipped 1 CBG, would be upgraded with main battle tanks and other equipment (i.e. LLAD) in order to provide trained augmentation and reinforcement personnel for the division in Germany. The combined needs of the three brigade groups -- and the Combat Training Centre -- were expected to generate a requirement for 200-300 new main battle tanks.

Also unveiled in the white paper was Ottawa's decision to create a new task force for territorial defence/CANUS (Canada-United States) missions. The task force was to include an airborne battle group of approximately regimental size and a light, air-transportable brigade group. These formations would be created by re-organizing and re-equipping the existing Special Service Force (SSF). The white paper also reported that the revitalized and much expanded Militia would "contribute to defence operations in Canada and elsewhere in North America, and will train replacements for land forces deployed overseas. The Militia will also establish a relatively large force of lightly armed guards to protect military vital points, and make a major contribution to the logistic and medical organizations required to support our consolidated European commitments."

By comparison with the navy (which now faces the daunting task of assimilating everything from austere MCM vessels to state-of-the-art SSN's) and the army (which now faces massive re-organization and militia expansion programs), the air force's future course of development was not radically altered by the 1987 white paper. This state of affairs reflected both the priority attached to salvaging the navy and reorganizing the army, and the fact that a significant number of air force procurement programs are already well underway (i.e. North American Air Defence Modernization) or nearing completion (i.e. initial procurement of the CF-18). Still, the white paper was by no means devoid of air force or air force-related programs.

In the area of procurement, the white paper unveiled plans to: acquire "at least" six additional long-range patrol aircraft (which should take some of the burden off the 18 existing CP-140 Auroras); modernize and re-engine the venerable CP-121 Tracker medium-range patrol aircraft; acquire additional strategic air-lift capacity (which should generate a hefty order for additional CC-130's); acquire CF-18 attrition replacements (probably in the form of 13 ex-American F/A-18's); acquire advanced munitions for the CF-18; and proceed with the coastal extensions of the North Warning System. The white paper also confirmed the requirement for New Shipborne Aircraft (NSA) to replace the aging (and, of late, somewhat cantankerous) CH-124A Sea King. The document made no reference to new tankers, but a pre-white paper requirement for four KC-130's -- primarily to support home-based CF-18's apparently still stands.

The white paper also announced that the commitment of the two Canada-based CF-18 Rapid Reinforcement squadrons (the yet-to-be-formed No. 416 at Cold Lake, Alberta, and No. 433 at Bagotville, Quebec) would be shifted from Northern Norway -- the originally intended deployment area -- to southern Germany. With the commitment of the two CF-18 Rapid Reinforcement squadrons to the Central Front, the three-squadron (Nos. 409, 421, and 439) Air Group currently stationed in Germany would be elevated to Air Division status.

Apart from the fact that it would be expanded and more closely linked with the regular force, the white paper had relatively little to say about the Air Reserve. A useful glimpse of its future evolution has, however, been provided by the commander of Air Command, Lt-Gen. L.A. Ashley, in a recent interview with TWR's sister publication, Aerospace and Defence Technology. Ashley reported that "the air reserves will be postured to complement those areas where we have critical operations, such as air lift." The "kind of thing that will emerge is illustrated in Edmonton, where 418 Air Reserve Squadron will be twinned with the regular force 435 Squadron" and "share a common pool of C-130 aircraft." Another approach would be taken in Winnipeg, where No. 402 Air Reserve Squadron would be "equipped with the Dash 8 and be twinned with the Air Navigation School to provide the airlift for air nav training."

 

[Kirkhill]

Assessing The 1987 White Paper​

Reaction to Canada's first defence white paper since 1971 was predictably varied. Indeed, the casual observer may have concluded that there are as many opinions on the white paper as there are editorial writers, politicians, peace researchers, academics, defence industrialists, and members of the armed forces. A perusal of the most recent assessments of the white paper -- as found in media commentaries, scholarly journals, defence and business publications, and testimony before the Commons and Senate defence committees -- quickly establishes a number of recurring themes. There is, for example, relief that a new white paper has finally appeared, and well-deserved praise of defence minister Perrin Beatty for his determination to provide a successor to the moribund Defence in the Seventies -- a document which in some major respects was obsolete within three years of its appearance. For the most part, the Mulroney government has garnered high marks for so explicitly acknowledging the commitment-capability gap, for proceeding with commitment rationalization (when it would have been very easy, politically and diplomatically, to acquiesce with the status quo) and for offering a long-term approach to the modernization and restructuring of Canada's armed forces. Although a 15-year plan is necessarily hostage to the vagaries of future elections and changes in the international environment, it offers at least a modicum of continuity and a useful benchmark or baseline for Canadian defence planners.

Also generally well-received has been the white paper's explicit recognition that Canadian security does not start and end on the Central Front or in the mid-Atlantic -- that legitimate security concerns also exist in our territorial waters, in the Arctic, on the North American continent, and in the north east Pacific. The result -- for the first time in many years -- should be a better balance between our NATO commitments in Europe and our NATO, NORAD 'defence of Canada' concerns on this side of the North Atlantic.

In terms of the specific strategies or policies outlined by the white paper, the decision to shift the CAST commitment to the Central Front has naturally drawn disappointment from those who argued -- in some cases quite eloquently -- for a 'northern' approach to Canadian defence policy. In the face of Norway's (understandable) reluctance to sanction the permanent deployment on its soil of foreign troops, most observers have expressed support for the Canadian government's choice of land force consolidation options. Although one could in theory have earmarked a significant Canada-based contingent for north flank reinforcement (i.e. a two-brigade division, replete with additional airlift support and maximum pre-positioning), its 'out-of-sight, out-of-mind' existence, and doubts over whether Canada would really deploy it in time of crisis, could have fostered the impression in Europe that Canada had opted for 'fortress North America' -- with all that might imply in terms of Canadian linkages with the United States or weakened cohesion within the North Atlantic Alliance.

Also drawing support from most observers were the decisions to create a balanced Canadian navy (although support for more submarines did not necessarily mean support for SSN's), to expand the reserves and implement a true Total Force strategy, and to place renewed emphasis on Defence Industrial Preparedness and defence-related research and development. The decision to create a balanced fleet (i.e. one that has more to offer than ASW frigates) reflects the belated recognition that a single-role, single-type-of-ship navy cannot possibly be responsive to all of Canada's maritime sovereignty and security concerns.

Shortcomings?

On the down side, one fairly common complaint was that the white paper spent too little time articulating an identifiably Canadian perspective on some of the major issues of Western security. Consider, for example, the assessment of John Halsted -- a former Canadian ambassador to NATO -- in the July-August issue of Aerospace Canada International (the predecessor to Aerospace and Defence Technology): "It is true that [the white paper] deals briefly with the international environment in terms of East-West rivalry, and with the military threat to Canadian security in North America and Europe. But it does not really come to grips with such important questions as the compatibility between NATO strategy and arms control objectives, the impact on NATO doctrine of the U.S. shift from reliance on MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) to a countervailing nuclear strategy, and the implications of SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) for Canada's defence posture and priorities."

Another frequently-heard observation is that the white paper's rhetoric is, in some cases, too harsh and too 'Cold War'-like, that its 'military threat' section too closely resembles a Canadian version of the Pentagon's Soviet Military Power. Some may reject such assessments as the misguided musings of the peace movement, but it should be noted that similar concerns have been voiced by more moderate, highly-respected Canadian defence commentators. In a collection of white paper reviews published by the non-partisan Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), for example, Professor R.B. Byers suggests that "while the 1971 defence white paper presented too benign an assessment of East-West relations, it may well be that that the 1987 white paper has erred in the opposite direction. This could have the effect of unnecessarily calling into question subsequent sections [of the 1987 white paper] which address changes in defence commitments and future requirements."

A thought-provoking critique of the white paper has also been provided by Brigadier-General (Ret'd) George C. Bell -- the president of the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies (CISS) -- in a recent appearance before the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence. Although Dr. Bell commended the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence for providing Canadians with "a reasonably comprehensive framework of defence policy," he expressed concern over a "number of specific deficiencies in the areas of naval forces, air forces and military space policy." The white paper's "most serious omissions," however, were to be found "in the areas of Regular Force manpower, military modernization for periods beyond 30 days and the scope of emergency legislation." Bell noted that: "Nowhere in the white paper is the size of the Regular Force mentioned. Although informal soundings indicate that the Regular Force might grow from its present ceiling of approximately 84,700 to 90,000 within the 15-year planning period, informed commentators must be concerned about the apparent insufficiency of the Regular Force. Even if it reaches 90,000, it is likely to be unable to provide the training and support infrastructure and integrated personnel in Reserve units which are essential to achieve major growth in the Reserves from current levels of 90,000 (65,000 Primary Reserve and 25,000 Supplementary Reserve)." Bell suggested that "if the increase in the Regular Force is not increased well beyond the 90,000 indicated, the net benefit in increased overall force capabilities is likely to be far less than a surface look at the white paper would suggest."

Another recurring theme, inevitably, has been the white paper's adoption of a two percent-plus funding formula (i.e. "a base rate of annual real growth in the defence budget of two percent per year after inflation," plus occasional extra infusions as major capital programs are introduced). Although this approach could be made to work -- assuming that the two percent figure is a floor and not a ceiling, and that the extra infusions beyond the two percent will amount to more than $1.98 -- it was not as generous as the Department of National Defence had hoped. In the current fiscal environment, however, it is difficult to see how the Department could have done any better.

The major controversy unleashed by the white paper has, of course, centred on the proposed acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines. This is potentially the most significant procurement decision in the history of Canadian defence policy -- and one which should be rightly subjected to the most rigorous and penetrating analysis. One barrier to meaningful discussion of the SSN option, however, is the mistaken impression in some editorial, foreign policy analysis, and U.S. Navy circles that the raison d'etre of a Canadian SSN fleet would the checking of passports at the entrance of the Northwest Passage.

While SSN's would indeed bring an important new dimension to Arctic sovereignty, they cannot and should not be assessed on that basis alone. Rather, the SSN proposal must be evaluated in the context of what it would bring to the entire spectrum of Canadian (and Alliance) maritime missions. This means looking at both sovereignty and security, and the Pacific Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Arctic Ocean. It also means looking at the other equipment options for a late 20th-early 21st century navy. One must also give the utmost consideration to the possible arms control and other implications of an SSN acquisition program. Although some of the arms control and other criticisms (such as fear of linkage, however indirect, with the U.S. Navy's controversial Maritime Strategy) which have been directed at the proposed SSN program may appear exaggerated to some SSN proponents, they must be clearly and satisfactorily addressed if the program is to garner the support of Canadians.

That still leaves, of course, the question of cost -- or, more accurately, cost-effectiveness. Given the military attributes of SSN's (i.e. speed, endurance and the unparalleled ability to shift Canadian naval resources around the three coasts without using the Panama Canal) and the costs of possible alternatives, an SSN fleet for $8 billion or so would be very cost-effective. It would still be cost effective at a cost in excess of $8 billion. If, however, an SSN program threatens to approach the truly frightening worst case scenarios postulated by some observers, it would be difficult to support. It is conceivable that the currently projected overall defence budget might still be able to cope, but the risk would be a seriously distorted defence establishment (i.e. one with too little money for the other branches of the navy, not to mention the army and the air force). In 1988, consequently, one can expect SSN cost-estimating to be a continuing national pastime.

Also at issue, although something of a 'sleeper' at this point, is the continuing tasking of both of the CF-18 Rapid Reinforcement squadrons in the flyover role (albeit to Germany rather than to Norway). More than a few observers had hoped that the government would use at least one of the CF-18 Rapid Reinforcement squadrons to bolster the modest, two-squadron force dedicated to home defence (plus, in crisis, the CF-18 operational training squadron). The rationale for an increase in the dedicated home defence fleet was not predicated on a desire to recreate the massive RAF interceptor force of the 1950's. It did, however, rest on four basic assumptions: (a) that the peacetime interceptor mission of providing "unambiguous confirmation" of radar data was becoming more important in an age of cruise missiles; (b) that two dedicated squadrons seemed a rather modest force for a country the size of Canada; (c) that additional CF-18's could be multi-tasked to perform such missions as sea denial (i.e., with Harpoon) and reconnaissance; and (d) that using additional Canada- (and Iceland-?) based CF-18's to help extend land-based air cover out over the North Atlantic could conceivably be of more use to NATO than two more fighter squadrons in southern Germany. Another irony of the continued tasking of both CF-18 squadrons in the flyover role was that it would mean sending Canadian fighter reinforcements to Europe at the very time -- during a crisis -- when the United States would be seeking to deploy USAF fighter reinforcements in Canada.

The NDP Position Paper​

On 30 July, the New Democratic Party unveiled its conception of a viable Canadian defence policy. Entitled Canadian Sovereignty, Security and Defence: A New Democratic Response to the White Paper, it reaffirmed the long-standing NDP desire to withdraw Canada from NORAD and NATO but, ironically, it outlined a force structure which could conceivably be very useful in a NORAD or NATO context. Thus, although it would repatriate the Canadian contingents in Germany, it offered an impressive shopping list. For the navy, it would provide up to 18 patrol frigates, up to 12 conventionally-powered submarines, an unstated number of mine counter-measures and coastal patrol vessels, and an under-ice surveillance system in the Arctic. For the air force, the NDP position paper envisaged the acquisition of a New Shipboard Aircraft, additional airlift capacity, an expanded fleet of patrol aircraft and 'Canadian-controlled' AWACS aircraft. At the close of 1987, there were indications that the New Democratic Party was reassessing -- although not necessarily changing -- its position on withdrawal from NORAD and NATO. If it does modify its stance on this issue -- and if it retains the shopping list outlined in its position paper -- the New Democratic Party's defence policy would be eminently more marketable to mainstream Canadian public opinion.

Life Beyond the White Paper​

Although Perrin Beatty's white paper and the issues it raised almost completely dominated the defence agenda during 1987, there were a host of lesser -- but still significant -- developments. For Canada's air force, the year was marked by the handover of the first CC-142 Dash 8 by de Havilland Canada, by the award of the CF-5 update contract to Bristol Aerospace (although it was no doubt a bittersweet experience to the latter), by the selection -- in principle -- of the EH Industries EH 101 for the crucial New Shipborne Aircraft (NSA) requirement, and by a well-publicized CF-18 engine problem (i.e., uncontained engine compressor failures with a potential for engine or engine compartment fires). The difficulty resulted in a temporary suspension of CF-18 deliveries in early November. CF-18 deliveries were resumed on 17 November following discussions between the Canadian government, McDonnell Douglas and General Electric, and the identification of an acceptable modification package. In other equipment developments during 1987, Innotech Aviation was awarded a contract for the modification of three Canadair CE-144 Challengers to an interim electronic warfare standard, and Kelowna Flight Group Limited was awarded a $10.9-million contract for the CC-109 Cosmopolitan avionics update.

For Canada's air force, 1987 also saw the activation of two more CF-18 squadrons (No. 441 at Cold Lake and No. 433 at Bagotville), the awarding of the operations and maintenance contract for the North Warning System (to Frontec Logistics Corporation of Edmonton), the activation of the North Warning System's first AN/FPS-117 long-range radars, the closure of the bulk of the remaining CADIN-Pinetree Line radar stations in the interior of Canada, and the selection of the five CF-18 Forward Operating Locations (i.e., Inuvik, Yellowknife, Rankin Inlet, Iqualuit [Frobisher Bay] and Kuujjuag [Fort Chimo]). Not co-incidentally, Canadian and American fighter squadrons also did land office business intercepting an inordinate number of Soviet Bear aircraft.

For the navy, 1987 saw the handover to MIL Davie of HMCS Algonquin, the first of the four DDH-280 Tribal-class destroyers to undergo conversion to the ambitious TRUMP (Tribal-class Update and Modernization Project) configuration. Although the destroyers modified under TRUMP would retain a secondary ASW (anti-submarine) capability, their primary role would become anti-air warfare (AAW). Also noteworthy were the official 'placing in dock' ceremony (i.e., the modular equivalent of 'laying the keel') for the first of the City-class patrol frigates (HMCS Halifax) and, of course, the decision to award the contract for all six of the follow-on batch (HMC Ships Montreal, Fredericton, Winnipeg, Charlottetown, St. John's and Ottawa) to Saint John Shipbuilding Limited. In organizational terms, 1987 brought the commissioning of two more Naval Reserve units in Quebec (HMCS Radisson in Trois Riviere and HMCS D'Iberville in Rimouski), the formal activation of the new Maritime Coastal Defence Organization in Halifax (although it was an organization with something less than an abundance of physical assets) and, most important, the first substantial augmentation of Canada's Pacific fleet in almost two decades. The upgrading of the Pacific fleet -- which unlike its east coast counterpart did not have any helicopters or air-capable frigates or destroyers -- reflected the decision to transfer HMCS Huron, a Tribal-class destroyer, to Esquimalt in return for the transfer to Halifax of the Improved Restigouche-class frigate HMCS Gatineau. Also transferred to the west coast were four Sea King helicopters from HS 443 Squadron. The Sea Kings would operate from HMCS Huron and from HMCS Provider, the Pacific fleet's veteran operational support ship.

A year of less obvious change for Canada's land forces, 1987 was marked by the award of a $19.2-million contract to Invar Manufacturing to produce TOW turrets (for the M113) under license from Thune-Eureka of Norway, and by on-going negotiations with France for the co-production of the advanced Eryx anti-armor weapon. Both moves promised to fill major gaps in Canada's anti-armor inventory. In organizational moves, the Royal Canadian Dragoons -- the armored regiment attached to 4CMBG in Germany -- returned to Canada for the first time in 17 years. Taking its place in Germany -- and its Leopard C1 main battle tanks -- were the 8th Canadian Hussars from CFB Petawawa. Also announced was the decision to increase the size of the Canadian contingent serving with the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus. Reservists, the 60 additional soldiers would help to compensate for the withdrawal of the Swedish contingent. The increase would bring the number of Canadian military personnel on active peacekeeping duty -- in Cyprus and elsewhere in the Middle East -- to almost 1,000.

 

[McG]

Canada tried to create a Reserve force on the cheap from the Militia.

Reserves and the Militia have never been the same thing. The Militia was the precursor to the Army. The Reserves were the retired Army.

I mean, I don’t think it matters how someone might have interpreted “Militia” and “Reserve” during the Reformation or Industrial Revolution. I am pretty sure nobody was thinking from that perspective when the modern Army Reserve was crafted through the last half century.

 

[FJAG]

1 RCHA was in 4 CMBG with M109
2 RCHA was in Petawawa with L5 and C1
3 RCHA was in Shilo with M109
5 RALC was in Valcartier with C1

Small correction. 3 RCHA already had a flyover role to provide a fourth M109 gun battery to 1 RCHA and had two M109 batteries to train for that when I was posted back to the regiment in 1978. 2 RCHA and 5 RALC got there's when 1 RCHA was repatriated in the 1990s. They stayed there until the great M109 slaughter of 2004/5.

One point on the BV 206. There were some of those in Petawawa when I was there from 1972 to 1976. We had the AMF(L) role for Norway then and while there were some BVs, most of our vehicles were from the M113 family which were brilliant in snow. D Battery was fully tracked with M548s as portee gun tractors for our L5s - which again is a great over-snow solution and better even then towing them with a BV.