Eye In The Sky
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Eye In The Sky said:
Eye In The Sky said:
Denmark has come to the same conclusion. Like Canada, Denmark is a NATO country with substantial maritime zones, largely because of the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Yet in 2006, Denmark decommissioned the last of its German-designed diesel-electric submarines. According to the Danish Ministry of Defence:
The current security environment, including the enlargement of NATO and the EU, is of such a nature that the conventional military threat to the Danish territory has disappeared for the foreseeable future.41
Concurrent with the decommissioning of its submarines, the Danish government increased the size and capability of its surface fleet – including new offshore patrol vessels to provide inspection and fishery protection.
ABSALON Class (2004)
Ships:
L16 ABSALON (2004)
L17 ESBERN SNARE (2005)
IVER HUITFELDT Class (2012)
Ships:
F361 IVER HUITFELDT (2012) *)
F362 PETER WILLEMOES (2012) *)
F363 NIELS JUEL (2013) *)
GR66 said:I think Thucydides is bang on with this. If we intend to use subs in an expeditionary role nuclear is the way we need to go. Transit time, the ability to keep up with an allied surface group, and no need for refueling support are huge advantages over a diesel sub in this role.
The problem with SSNs is that they are likely an impossible sell to Canadians. The very word "nuclear" is likely a political 3rd rail. The strategic expeditionary roles that an SSN is best suited for are also exactly the types of roles that many Canadians could be convinced by the chattering classes are not the types of roles our military should be engaged in. The cost will be huge and would likely mean we'd have to make cuts in other important areas. Finally the support and maintenance issue is huge. I understand that the cost of building a domestic support infrastructure was one of the reasons the original idea for SSNs was dropped. Having our subs go to the US for maintenance (or leasing them from the US for that matter) would open us to major criticism as being puppets of the US. I wish it wasn't so, but I think the idea of SSNs for Canada is a non-starter.
So that leaves us with the potential for a small (4-6?) fleet of SSK's which are best suited for defence of our own waters. The question then is whether this is the most effective and cost-efficient way to control our own territorial waters? While the best defence against an enemy sub may be our own sub, is a fleet of 4-6 enough to effectively cover the vast area that we need to patrol? Would the same money if shifted to additional MPA's, MH's and surface ASW hulls provide us as much or more capability than a small number of subs? What exactly is the sub and surface warship threat in our own waters compared to the overall flexibility that a variety of other platforms might provide?
Chris Pook said:I think the threat assessment included in that paper may be somewhat dated. And although the article itself is date (Vol 14 - 2014?) the data used seems to be, like the Danish information, even more dated and not entirely reflective of anybody's current threat assessment and demonstrated response.
Smoke and rose coloured glasses.
A conversation with the commander of the navy
Vice-Admiral Mark Norman talks naval capabilities, the need for submarines and more.
(...SNIPPED)
On what the Royal Canadian Navy needs
“Canada needs a balanced fleet that allows us to not only defend our interests here directly at home, defend our sovereignty...but we also need to be able to go anywhere in the world that Canada needs us to go at a time of our choosing, under the conditions of our choosing. And that kind of global reach and flexibility is not about ambition. It’s about practicality.
“I think we’ve got a pretty good road map right now for what Canada needs for the next half of this century. We need to basically recapitalize most of the fleet. We need to deliver on the shipbuilding program that’s already in place. We need offshore patrol vessels that we can use offshore and in the Arctic. We need surface combatants. We need submarines. We need helicopters.
“We need everything that supports all that, and that often gets lost in the conversation. That includes the infrastructure, that includes the people, that includes the training system and everything else that allows us to do that. We need motivated, well-educated young Canadians who want to go to sea.”
(...SNIPPED)
Echo Voyager, Boeing’s latest unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV), can operate autonomously for months at a time thanks to a hybrid rechargeable power system and modular payload bay. The 51-foot-long vehicle is the latest innovation in Boeing’s UUV family, joining the 32-foot Echo Seeker and the 18-foot Echo Ranger.
The size of the new Echo Voyager is in the middle of the German U-Boat lengths which were 40-60 feet long depending upon design.
U-boats dominated the seas for several years due to the fact that thousands were produced.
A militarized Echo Voyager could have a similar role if they were mass produced at low cost in the event of a conflict.
The Echo Voyage has a dive depth of about 11000 feet or nearly 2 miles.
The smaller Echo Seeker can go to a depth of 20,000 feet (3.7 miles)
Oldgateboatdriver said:I hope both of you gentlemen know who Professor Michael Byers is: He is a relatively young (I think mid-thirties) professor with law degrees and poli-science degrees who has never lived outside of academia and was a NDP candidate in Vancouver for the last general election. He fully endorses the NDP unilateral "there will never be wars again" agenda, so it's not surprising that he endorses no-submarines policies, just like he endorsed no-F-35 when that issue came up. And BTW, he has not spent a single day in uniform of any service in his lifetime (I don't know about Cadets, though!)
Unfortunately for us, one of his area of knowledge (sort of) is the legal aspects of Arctic sovereignty claims. I say sort of, because he claims certain understandings of facts that he doesn't know or understand.
For instance, his claim that Allies share information on whereabouts of their submarines for search and rescue purposes or to avoid submarines collisions is just laughable.
First, submarines, like any other vessels, are responsible for their own collision avoidance, something you do by looking (or in the case of submarines, listening) where you are going. Nobody tells any body else where its submarines are for collision avoidance purposes, except in exercises, where we do so by setting submarine emergency surfacing areas, for safety purpose.
Second, nobody tells everybody else where their submarines are for SAR purposes: We don't rely on other nations for SAR of own submarines (besides, when was the last time you heard of a submarine SAR ops? I recall a Russian sub about fifteen years ago. That was the last. Submarines in peacetime are not in any serious danger that would require permanent tabs kept on them for "SAR" purposes.
Allied nations, however, do trade partial info on sub operations in two ways: first, area of operations are created and assigned to either submarines, surface ships, and sometimes, MLRPAs. These areas are created so that a surface ship, for instance, that gets a possub contact in a zone where no allied submarine is supposed to be operating then knows it is somebody else's submarine (usually Russian in the Atlantic and Chinese in the North Pacific/Indian Ocean).
The second way to trade info, is if, for any particular reason you are trading joint maritime picture information with another Navy. Then you get where their submarines are.
And Arctic ops, BTW, were highly classified and the info on "who was where" traded only between the two NATO nations that participated: The US and the UK. And no, they didn't tell us anything "for SAR purposes".
So Prof. Byers is completely wrong here.
He is also full of it (since he hasn't a clue on how submarines work, it's not surprising) where it comes to submarines being "available off-the-shelf" and "with the lead time, training to operate them could occur".
First of all, there is no such thing as a "shelf" stocked with submarines (or, as I have explained before anything else for that matter in the maritime world). The fact that some yards have a design of a sub on hand (and built some of them for other people) doesn't mean they "have them on hand". It means they are peddling a design and if and only if they make a sale, start getting the parts they need and working on construction, with deliveries two to three years in the future. That can't help you if you need something NOW, nor may it help you if tension in the world starts rising and everybody (the nation with sub building capacity first) starts to build submarines: You get to the end of the line and wait even longer). Moreover, these peddler of "off-the-shelf" designs may not have what you need (a submarine isn't a submarine isn't a submarine: you need the right one for your circumstances). In fact, as of right now, only one builder makes a submarine that meets Canada's requirement: Kawasaki heavy industries, and they are only now, for the first time accepting to let the design to someone else, the Australian's, in view of their common threat: China.
Finally, his view that you can train the crew during the lead time of construction is simply ridiculous. First, where would you be able to train a sufficiently large number of people simultaneously to take over a whole boat when they all have to start with the very demanding submarine qualification? Second, and this is true of a lot of military specialized fields of operations but even more so in submarines, the problem is never getting enough of the lower rung/beginners qualified. The problem is getting your senior personnel, charged with the more specialized technical requirements and with the advanced tactical knowledge qualified. I am sorry but you cannot take a surface ship CERA and put him down into a submarine after a short two year stint to do submarine qualifications. He needs the lead time of having done his basic quals a long time ago, then served as junior engineer, then as a watch keeper engineer and then as A/CERA all on submarines, to be safe as a CERA. Same goes for sub captains. unless they did their basic sub OOW qual right after getting their OOW cert, then went back as a sub divisional officer, then back as a sub combat Officer and/or XO, they are not fit to take command, and someone who served on the surface ship all his years cannot just step into it. That takes 15 to 20 years, not two or three (and these lead times are getting longer - not shorter). Moreover, the tactical knowledge required is past down AT SEA from submariner to submariner in that osmosis that happens as you serve in ever higher position onboard tour after tour, so that even if you could have the "15 years" lead to send everyone to train here and there in advance at various other nation's facilities, they would not tactically gel as a Canadian submarine crew for years after being put together nor develop a "Canadian" approach to submarine ops for quite some time thereafter.
BTW, Prof. Byers misses one important reason for continuing to operate submarines. Assuming that he is correct and that the defence of Canada's coasts does not require submarines (I disagree, but what the hell, for argument sake), it remains that a large number of nations have and are building even more submarines out there, and Canadian surface ships regularly deploy and operate near these nations. They need the training of facing a real submarine to be able to safely defend themselves, and contrary the good professor's view, nations don't easily "loan" boats to one another for that purpose (in fact, and contrary to what he believes, even the US has a hard time getting non-nuke boat time from allies to train the US Navy - submarines in all nations are heavily tasked, including OWN nation surface force training - so rarely available to loan to others or for extra tasking).
:cheers:
All this would be lost by not having submarines.
dapaterson said:Your questions apply equally to the rest of Canada's navy. The RCN is grossly undersized, but is there political will to double its size (which would still be too small)?
GR66 said:I have no doubt about the utility of subs in general or for Canada specifically. The question I have though is if there is a certain minimum number required to make the expense worth the opportunity cost lost to other capabilities?
Does the relative usefulness of just 4-6 subs with all the overhead related to having subs (infrastructure, support, training & manning issues, etc.) equal the same amount of money added to other capabilities like additional MPA's, surface hulls, UUV's, satellites, etc.
If having just 4 (or 6?) subs realistically means we can only have one (or two?) on active deployment at any given time then is that capability really effective? Say we are in a conflict with Russia and are able to deploy one sub to defend each coast at any given time. While individually the sub may be a much better anti-sub platform than an MPA, can it provide enough coverage to be militarily effective? Would 5 x MPAs instead be more effective in overall terms?
Again, not questioning if subs are an effective and important platform. But in a Canadian context how many would we realistically need to be worth the expense? Is four enough?
Chris Pook said:What would a mixed flotilla of Upholders and large AUVs, like the Explorer to which Thuc just linked up-thread, look like?
Three or four AUVs down, along with an Upholder, and maybe an AOPS or two on the surface?
Actually, I think, if we were serious about controlling the Northwest passage, and still allowing the ice and the seasons to dictate our strategy wouldn't we need to maintain two boats on station? One in the east in Baffin Bay and one in the west in the Beaufort sea? The same as with the AOPS?
From that wouldn't you need a fleet of about 8 SSKs? 6 to maintain a rotation on station and 2 for maintenance and/or discretionary expeditionary ops? Together with whatever AUVs could bring to the party?
Personally I think the AUVs would be something between a less predictable (from the enemy's POV) SOSUS line and a minefield (assuming they were armed). In which case the AOPS would become their tender.
Chris Pook said:Walter, "Chris" is just fine.
I would never suggest the replacement of the manned sub with the AUV. I look at it as an auxilliary, for augmenting the capabilities of the manned units. Exactly in the same way that patrol vessels, SOSUS systems, minefields and LRPAs all aid and assist in the creation of a capability.
With respect to the comms issue:
I, like you, I believe, am an amateur and not a professional. An interested amateur but still an amateur.
There are, I believe, a number of possible comms systems available.
Some of them have range. Some of them are stealthy. Some of them allow for large packets of information to be transmitted. I don't believe there is one solution that does everything.
Some use low frequency sound for long range. But everyone can hear that and probably localise the source. Some use lasers and lights but the communicating parties have to be close together. Some use a "pass the baton" relay system and physically detach a transmitter as a buoy, or possibly a smaller AUV and move the transmitter to a better location (like the surface).
The suitable communication solution would, largely, in my opinion, depend how how much information, how often, in which direction and how discretely.
Manned subs need to be incredibly discrete (stealthy) to protect the people inside as well as for tactical advantage. AUVs may not need to be as stealthy. And they may not need to communicate as frequently.
It may be adequate for an AUV to spend its time gliding and not reporting until it actually makes contact. Then the question becomes does that report have to be done in a stealthy fashion. Sometimes you might want the contact to know that it has been detected. In which case a loud report to everyone in the area of "It is over here!" would seem appropriate. In other cases it might be enough to release a messenger buoy, or vessel to say "At 10 O'Clock on the 25th of Never a contact was discovered over here".
As far as incoming traffic is concerned maybe all that is required is a single encoded "Weapons Free" burst transmission.
As for spools of wire on the deck: I wasn't thinking along those lines. I was thinking of AUVs (Autonomous Underwater Vehicles) and not ROVs (Remotely Operated Vehicles).