For my part, I acted as the OPs O for F COY 32 LIB for this one and here are a couple of bits for people to chew on:
1. 1RCR did an excellent job in preparing their positions and providing a solid, thinking and professional enemy force that ramped up the level of training for everyone. Excellent job for all who took part. The NCOs and Lt Pappin were particularly helpful during AARs.
2. The objectives were well chosen and tough nuts to crack. Again this only added to the level of training. This part the exercise planners got right, no question.
3. The battle procedure time cycle was too compressed for COY level operations to allow for proper battle procedure. At 48 hours per task, recce did not have sufficient time to deploy, execute their mission and report back. As a result battle procedure for the COY had to start with minimal info, and then in some cases be reworked entirely when information began to filter back to the OC. Given the exercise planners are keen on having three objectives per week there must be a change in the warning order and recce process to permit proper recce which will assist in planning rather than cause rewrites at the last minute. Although there was sufficient time for rest (which the troops loved), weapons maintenance, rehearsals, and coord with FEOs and other COYs, the essential portions of battle procedure revolving around recce were having to be cut short or aborted entirely. This made the plan less sound, and as a result meant that order for the troops and rehearsals which they conducted were less meaningful than they should have been. If the point of these exercises is to test skills and teach from lessons learned, then we should make sure to have all good lessons being taught each time, not half-assed ones.
4. Tactical considerations must be made paramount. Example: doctrine (rightly so) is that you attack a bridge from both ends at the same time, however for our attack we were prevented from putting a platoon across the river (I asked for helos, trucks, and then offered, with an MOI WO to swim our German Pathfinders across). Also tactics would strongly suggest that you don't fly heleicopters over your objective and then land troops less than 800m from it. We were given no choice in our landing zone and had to deal with the fact that the enemy could see us lcrossing a road on the way to it, such that they could call arty on us (thankfully we got the hell out of there before it started falling.) Both of these examples were forced upon our company by higher, not because we are particularly stunned. Exercise restrictions need to be maintained to some degree to ensure safety...fine. However, there must be a flexibility built in, in order to ensure that tactical considerations are not pushed aside in the name of expediency and simplicity. Again, let's try to teach good lessons to troops rather than ones which save time and effort.
5. The lack of a proper smoker for the troops was inexcusable. I heard a variety of reasons, no QL6 cook available to supervise proper cooking of meat, blah blah blah. The troops busted their asses all week, and two cans of half-cold beer and a steak isn't that much to ask for. Given the planning that was said to have gone into everything else, I was shocked to hear that pizza and pop was the best that could be done for the boys, particularly given the fact that SG04 ended with a proper smoker. It can be done, somebody dropped the ball. That has to be fixed.
I'm sure that there is more but those are some of the ones that stand out.
Dileas.
